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‘(...) alle Begriffe, in denen sich ein ganzer Prozess semiotisch zusammenfasst, entziehen 
sich der Definition; definirbar ist nur Das, was keine Geschichte hat’. 
Nietzsche, F. (1887): Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine Streitschrift. – Zweite Abhandlung, 
Kapitel 13. 
 
[All concepts in which a whole process is semiotically concentrated can't be defined; only that 
which has no history can be defined]  
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PREFACE  
Something representing a ‘point of no-return’ in the approach to the role and political influ-
ence of the radical right took place in Austria at the beginning of 2000. The event was the 
formation of a ‘black and blue’ coalition government between the Austrian Freedom Party 
(FPÖ) and the Christian-democratic Party (the ÖVP). The swearing in of the government was 
followed by massive public interest and media coverag , within and particularly outside the 
Austrian borders. 
The new configuration of the Austrian government was the obvious result of the Austrian 
parliamentary election of October 1999. At this election the Freedom Party gathered just 
about 27 pct. of the votes, becoming the second biggest electoral force in Austria after the 
Austrian social democrats (SPÖ). But many saw the events taking place in Austria in those 
months as a sign that a border had been crossed. Most noticeably, at the European level, the 
formation of the FPÖ and ÖVP government coalition triggered the long threatened official 
diplomatic sanctions against Austria decided by the other 14 member states. However, not 
only the institutional Europe mobilized against the political developments in Austria. The 
‘Thursday marches’ in Vienna became a regular public rally against the newly formed gov-
ernment. Both inside and outside Austria, several voices warned against the worrisome ex-
tremist and racist backlash that was taking place in the small Alpine country.  
At the time these events were unfolding, I was in Northern Italy. More precisely in the 
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia region, which is the region where I was born and grew up and which is 
geographically located just at the border with Austrian Kärnten, the region where Jörg Haider, 
the contested leader of the FPÖ until 2005, was governor.1 Perhaps also because of this geo-
graphical proximity, I recall that several public marches were organised in Friuli against the 
newly established Austrian government. Someone suggested taking the political action even 
further, for example by boycotting Austrian products imported by Italy, or avoiding Austria as 
a tourist destination that year.  
Such was the political situation at the beginning of 2000, as I also personally experi-
enced it. What I want to emphasise here is that at the ime, the Austrian Freedom Party was 
considered an ‘unacceptable alternative’ by most of the official Europe and by part of the pub-
lic opinion; and this despite the fact that the Austrian Freedom Party had been legitimately 
and democratically elected by a significant part of he Austrian electorate. Most of the reser-
vations against the Freedom Party were related to its historical ties with National Socialism 
and to the party’s intolerant (at that time many called it blatantly racist) position on immi-
grants and ethnic minorities in general.  
                                                
1 Jörg Haider was extremely popular in Kärnten, where he was governor in two periods: from 1989-1991 and 
from 1999 until his death in October 2008 (reconfirmed at the regional election of 2004). In 2005 Jörg Haider and 
some of his supporters left the FPÖ to launch the Alliance for the Future of Austria (the Bündnis Zukunft 
Österreich, BZÖ). The new party got about 4 pct. of the votes at the 2006 parliamentary election and almost 11 
pct. at the 2008 election. 
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In reality, some of the same considerations related to the ‘Austrian case’ could interest 
some of the countries that had approved the diplomatic s nctions. The Northern League in 
Italy, for example, supported some of the same anti-immigrant positions, pointing out the 
dangers associated with immigration flows from non-Western countries.  
The Northern League had already been in government for a short period in 1994, with 
the centre-right government coalition led for the first time by Silvio Berlusconi, who in 1992 
had launched the party Forza Italia (FI). But at tht time in the 1990s, Northern League’s en-
trance into office had not provoked significant reactions from the international community, 
even if anti-immigration was already an important issue on the party agenda. In those years, 
the immigration issue had in fact reached the public opinion with the shocking and dramatic 
images of Albanian men and women who tried to reach the Italian shores in overcrowded old 
and decrepit boats. To resolve the emergence, a member of the Northern League suggested 
that a solution could be ‘to throw them overboard’.2 However, the political situation in Italy in 
the 1990s was such that the rest of Europe did not seem concerned that the Northern League 
was in office. It was mainly considered the result of he popular protest against the political 
establishment that had grown out of the cases of political corruption and briberies that ex-
ploded in Italy in the early 1990s and which radically transformed the Italian political party 
system. 
In 2001, only a few months after the Freedom Party came to power in Austria, the 
Northern League was again in office. Meanwhile, the party electoral support had shrunk sig-
nificantly to only 4 pct. of the votes, but due to the Italian ‘mixed’ electoral system the North-
ern League achieved considerable influence in the new centre-right government (2001-2006).  
In 2001 the League’s political profile had adjusted o the new times. In particular, fol-
lowing the increasing number of immigrants of non-Western origin that entered the country 
during the 1990s, the anti-immigration issue had taken a central place in the party politics. As 
for the Freedom Party in Austria, immigration was increasingly interpreted as a threat to the 
national identity and culture and a serious challenge to the Western values and principles, 
besides creating problems of security and law and order. Significantly, one of the first laws 
approved by the newly appointed government in 2001 was the new immigration law, which 
bore the names of Umberto Bossi, leader of the Leagu , and of Gianfranco Fini, leader of Na-
tional Alliance (AN). And as we will see in the foll wing chapters, the modification of the 
immigration regime is not surprisingly one of the first tasks taken up by governments in 
which the radical right exerted a role of influence. 
                                                
2 See: ‘Il naufragio degli Albanesi e la giornalista Pivetti’, La Repubblica, 27 March 2007. It was Irene Pivetti 
who said this in 1997. Pivetti was leader of the Deputy Chamber in 1994. She was in the Northern Leagu until 
1996, when she was excluded by the party leadership because of her opposition to the secessionist politics that the 
Northern League started to support. 
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However, it was the electoral results in Scandinavia that perhaps clearly signalled that 
the new radical right wave was not a phenomenon that could be primarily ascribed to wide-
spread political protest, anti-establishment feelings and national entrenched characteristics.  
When I came to Denmark in May 2000, the Danish People’s Party was still considered a mar-
ginal party. Only a couple of years before, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, the social democratic 
Prime Minister from 1994-2001, had declared during a parliamentary speech that the Danish 
People’s Party would never become an acceptable actor in he Danish party system. He was 
wrong, like many others at the time. The party led by Pia Kjærsgaard was getting increasing 
support among voters. In particular, the way the party dealt with the immigration question 
seemed to me to answer to the increasing concern on this issue among sectors of the popula-
tion.  
When I arrived in Denmark the broadsheet Information was just publishing some inter-
esting essays on the theme ‘Pia’s Danes’. The articles questioned who the supporters were and 
why they supported the party, trying to understand the reasons behind the vote, instead of la-
belling the Danish People’s Party as a marginal phenomenon in Danish politics. In November 
2001, the Danish People’s Party got 12 pct. of the vot s and 22 MPs. Even more significantly, 
in 2001 the Danish People’s Party became a vital supporting partner to the Liberal and Con-
servative minority coalition government.   
Several national and international media described th  political influence achieved by 
the Danish People’s Party as a black stain on the idyllic picture of the tolerant, democratic and 
open Scandinavian society. Somehow similarly to the FPÖ in Austria, the other parties, but in 
particular the centre-left-wing governments had tried to keep the party on the margins of Dan-
ish politics. The Danish People’s Party had from the beginning expressed clearly and directly 
its commitment to safeguarding Danish identity, national belonging and cultural heritage. In 
particular, the party claimed that it was necessary to protect these values against the attacks 
firstly from the increasing number of non-Western immigrants and refugees in Denmark and 
secondly from the European integration process, considered to undermine Danish national 
sovereignty. The Danish People’s Party appealed to people’s wisdom and common sense to 
find the solution to the problems, contrasting it with the irresponsibility and political calcula-
tion of the political and intellectual elite. 
Another thing was clear by the end of 2001: the strategies used to isolate and contain the 
Danish People’s Party had failed and the radical right was actually more than a fleeting phe-
nomenon. But even more than this, the Danish People’s Party had become mainstream as re-
affirmed by the last two parliamentary elections in the country.  
 
What I briefly wanted to emphasise above, is the succession of the events that took place 
at the beginning of this century and which created the background behind the reflections that 
later shaped the present work. When at the end of 2001 I started to look at the radical right 
parties in Western Europe, I had not imagined that t ings would accelerate as they did in the 
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following years. What happened in Austria in 2001 was in reality only the tip of the iceberg 
that would have fully emerged in the years that followed. Other radical right parties later 
achieved important results either at the national or regional level, for instance the List Pim 
Fortuyn in Holland in 2002, the Vlaams Block/Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the SVP in Swit-
zerland and so forth.  
But this is not only a question of electoral success. In fact, not all the parties mentioned 
above have been able to achieve or uphold their electoral support. Some of them experienced 
an electoral decline; others regained it years later, while some were actually able to consoli-
date their position. A case in point is the FPÖ, whose electoral support dropped dramatically 
only a few years after the party had come into office, but in the recent election has regained 
electoral strength. Also in France, support to the Front National shrank significantly in 2007, 
changing the upward electoral curve achieved by the party and its leader Jean Marie Le-Pen at 
the previous elections. Things went differently for the Danish People’s Party, undoubtedly the 
most successful radical right party in Western Europe today. This might suggest that the Dan-
ish party has been able to find the right political formula, allowing it to maintain political in-
fluence and decision-making power in Danish politics. Whether this model is ‘exportable’ to 
other national contexts is an interesting question, which will be discussed below.  
However, what I consider both necessary and appealing in relation to the radical right 
studies today is to look at the way these parties have developed over time both ideologically 
and in relation to their voters. I find it much more interesting than to focus exclusively on the 
reasons for their success. This implies considering how the radical right has evolved through 
different phases of the parties’ life time: breakthrough, exit from the margins, consolidation 
and government responsibility. Recent history has shown that the radical right – as any other 
party – is able to evolve, to transform and – whenev r necessary – to adapt to new situations 
and conditions. This has to do not only with a party’s organisational strategies, but also with 
party ideology. Party ideology and party politics are not a fixed ‘unit’, but can change and be 
influenced by different conditions, opportunities, a  well as internal and external factors.  
Until recently, the literature on the radical right has largely downplayed this kind of ap-
proach. The importance of macrostructural factors in haping the radical right ideology has 
been one of the dominating paradigms to explain the radical right’s electoral success. Increas-
ing immigration flows to Europe, widespread anti-esablishment and populist feelings and 
fear of social marginalisation are often mentioned as main explanations of the radical right 
support. This approach clearly privileges the demand side and the situational context created 
by the social and political opportunity structure at the national and international level. But it is 
also – at least in my view – to take a ‘snap-shot’ of the radical right party at a specific mo-
ment in time. It is perhaps at this point that my historical formation urges me to use an ap-
proach that looks at how these parties developed and tackled the challenges and opportunities 
that emerged during their ‘life’ process.  
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The ambition of this project is to achieve a better understanding of the radical right also 
in the light of these parties’ more recent history by considering concrete case studies: the Dan-
ish People’s Party, the Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in the period from 
approx. the 1990s until 2008. In this period the third wave of radical right parties (Von Beyme 
1988) accelerated and consolidated. This implies an investigation of how the three parties 
reacted to the political opportunities shaped by the national and international context, but also 
how the three parties’ ideology was challenged by the different phases of ‘exit from the mar-
gins’, consolidation and maturity and by the incumbencies that come with government re-
sponsibility. Two of the parties, the Northern League and the Danish People’s Party, made the 
passage from the margins to the mainstream with unexpected rapidity. This may also explain 
why particularly the Danish People’s Party is still rather unknown to the international scholar 
community. To fill in this gap, I will devote more space in this study to the Danish People’s 
Party. 
Studying how these parties have developed also involves looking at the electorate and 
the way voters have endorsed and reacted to the politics developed by the three parties. In 
short, this study attempts to build a comparative analytical framework in which the ‘supply 
side’ (the parties and their ideology) and the ‘demand side’ (the voters) are considered in a 
close interrelationship. This will hopefully also allow us to map the developmental dynamics 
of the parties and to shed light on their similarities and differences, and help us understand 
whether their political evolution, particularly in the last decade, has brought them ideologi-
cally and electorally closer to each other. 
 
The present study is structured into two main parts. The first part (Chapter 1-4) starts with an 
introduction to the three case studies and a critical assessment of the literature on the radical 
right (Chapter 1). The methodological and theoretical aspects are discussed in Chapter 2, to-
gether with an introduction to three main working approaches/hypotheses. Chapter 3 deals 
with the ideological dimensions on which the empirical analysis is based. Chapter 4 com-
pletes the reflections on method and approach, presenting a lifespan framework for the analy-
sis of party ideology and party development, which is meant to represent support to the con-
crete observation of how parties tackled and ‘performed’ in major phases of their political life 
(e.g. emergence, consolidation, government responsibility).  
The second part consists of the empirical analyses of the ‘supply side’, i.e. the ideological 
development of the three parties (Chapters 5-7), discussed separately in each chapter. This 
should allow the analyses of the three parties’ ideology to unfold fully and to keep attention to 
the way the respective opportunity structures have affected their development. Chapter 8 deals 
with the electoral profile and the voters’ attitudes (the demand side) in a comparative perspec-
tive, linking up to the dimensions and issues taken up in the empirical analysis of the three 
parties’ ideology. A final and conclusive chapter rports in a more systematic comparative 
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way the similarities, differences and specificities characterising the three parties on the basis 
of the results and observations from the other chapters.    
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PART I  
THEORY, METHOD AND DESIGN 
 
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE THREE CASE STUDIES AND STATE  OF THE ART 
SCHOLARLY RESEARCH ON THE RADICAL RIGHT 
 
The chapter starts with a more detailed presentatio of the Austrian Freedom Party, the 
Northern League and the Danish People’s Party and their electoral results over time, recon-
structing the events that in the relatively short period between 2000 and 2001 brought the 
three parties from the political margins of their respective party systems to the centre of the 
political decisional power. This represented an important step in the life-cycle of the parties, 
whose effects on ideology and on electoral support will be considered in later chapters. The 
following sections will also introduce a critical assessment of the (different) scholarly ap-
proaches studying the radical right parties in Western Europe; this will allow us to consider 
what kind of new perspectives and updates can be fruitfully added to this field in light of the 
new developments of the radical right.     
 
1.1 Setting the context: the Austrian odd becomes mainstream 
In February 2000, the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) succeeded in forming a 
‘black and blue’ coalition together with the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) after 123 days of 
negotiation. The swearing in of the government, led by ÖVP candidate Wolfang Schüssel, 
caused massive public interest and media coverage within and outside Austria. These events 
followed the results of the October 1999 elections, where the FPÖ, at the time led by the con-
troversial leader Jörg Haider, gathered 27 pct. of the votes, becoming the second strongest 
electoral force in Austria after the historically strong SPÖ (see Table 1.1).  
 
Table 1.1 Electoral support for the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the BZÖ at the national level 
(1983-2008) with parliamentary mandates indicated in brackets. Percentage. 
Source: Republik Österreich Bundesministerium für Inneres. 
 
Although the Austrian Freedom Party’s entrance into government was a legitimate conse-
quence of democratic elections, the result triggered th  threatened diplomatic boycott from the 
other EU-14 members, resulting in reduced bilateral contacts to Austria outside of formal EU 
 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 2002 2006 2008 
FPÖ 
5 
(12) 
9.7 
(18) 
16.6 
(33) 
22.5 
(42) 
21.9 
(40) 
26.9 
(52) 
10 
(19) 
11 
(21) 
17.5 
(34) 
BZÖ . . . . . . . 
4.1 
(7) 
10.7 
(21) 
Total 5 9.7 16.6 22.5 21.9 26.9 10 15.1 28.2 
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meetings. This measure was later justified as follows: ‘(…) the admission of the FPÖ into a 
coalition government legitimises the extreme right in Europe’ (Pelinka 2001:12).3  
The reaction from Europe was partly explained by the FPÖ uncomfortable historical 
legacies in National Socialism and positions on immgration issues and questions of identity 
and belonging. For this reason, the party had for long been considered a pariah by most of the 
Austrian political establishment. It had not always been like this. In the 1980s, the FPÖ had 
developed a clearly neo-liberal profile under the liberal leadership of Norbert Steger. But 
when Jörg Haider took over the party leadership in September 1986, the FPÖ made a clear 
turn to the right, rewarding the more radical right wing in the party.  
As a consequence of this evolution, the SPÖ and the ÖVP pursued a clear strategy of 
containment (cordoine sanitaire) in the following years to keep the Freedom Party way from 
political influence. This was apparently not enough to prevent the Austrian Freedom Party 
from challenging the mainstream parties, by appealing to those electoral segments that were 
politically dissatisfied with the status quo and looked for a political alternative. In 1999, more 
than one out of four Austrians saw in Haider someone else than the dangerous right wing ex-
tremist with Nazi sympathies and an uncomfortable past, as he was often portrayed by the 
domestic and international press (see e.g. Zöchling 1999; Luverà 2000). The vote for the party 
had clear regional differences and was higher in Kärnten where Haider was also governor4 
(see Table 1.2 below).  
 
Table 1.2 Electoral support to the FPÖ (and BZÖ) at the regional level (1996-2008). Percentages.  
Source: Republik Österreich Bundesministerium für Inneres. 
                                                
3 The sanctions were lifted in September 2000 after an expert report submitted to the EU had declared that the 
measures were effective only in the short run, but that they could give rise to anti-EU reactions in the long run (cf. 
Hummer and Pelinka 2002).  
4 Jörg Haider’s popularity in Kärnten was so strong that voters followed him when in 2005 he decided to leave the 
FPÖ and launched the party Alliance for the Future of Austria (Büdnis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ). The party 
achieved 10.7 pct. of the votes at the 2008 elections, in Kärnten 38.5 pct. A few weeks after the election, Jörg 
Haider died in a car accident near Klagenfurt. 
 FPÖ  FPÖ  FPÖ FPÖ BZÖ FPÖ BZÖ 
 1995-96 1999 2002 2006 2008 
Burgenland 6.9 21.0 6.3 8.6 1.7 16.2 5.3 
Kärnten  32.7 38.6 23.6 7.2 24.9 7.6 38.5 
Niederösterreich 17.3 22.4 6.9 9.6 2.2 18.1 6.3 
Oberösterreich 21.6 26.8 10.4 12.2 2.6 19 9.1 
Salzburg 25.4 29.3 10.7 12.2 3.1 17.7 12.2 
Steiermark 21.2 29.2 9.6 10.4 3.1 17.3 13.2 
Tirol 27.0 28.0 9.9 10.8 3.2 17.0 9.7 
Voarlberg 27.4 30.1 12.9 10.9 3.2 16.1 12.8 
Wien 20.1 24.7 7.9 13.8 1.8 20.4 4.7 
National level 21.9 26.9 10 11 4.1 17.5 10.7 
 19 
Electoral surveys carried out in 1999-2000 showed that among the most important reasons for 
the vote to the FPÖ the electorate indicated: 1) the wish for a system change and 2) the party’s 
anti-immigration position (Plasser and Ulram 2000: 229-230). Many Austrian voters wanted 
to express their distrust in the political system and their resentment against the privileges ac-
cumulated by the parties of the Great Coalition over th  years, by voting for the Austrian 
Freedom Party, which they perceived as an alternative to ‘politics as usual’. At the same time, 
feelings of apprehension and fear of global dynamics of social and economic change worried 
some sectors of the electorate that seemed to find an answer in the politics and ideology de-
veloped by the FPÖ.  
The FPÖ responded to the existing socio-economic and political situation by developing 
a programme that matched the demands of parts of the Austrian electorate at that particular 
period of time. But significantly, the party had now achieved a position of political influence 
and government responsibility from where to accomplish concrete political results.  
After the FPÖ entered government, its support withered and it suffered a heavy defeat in the 
2002 election. Apparently, the party had not been able to take full advantage of its influential 
position and to combine the duties and responsibilities associated with a position in govern-
ment with its populist strategies (see Heinisch 2003). This is something that will be discussed 
in the following chapters.  
The FPÖ’s influential position was soon imitated by other parties with a less uncomfort-
able past, but similar – particularly anti-immigration – issues on the agenda. One of these was 
the Northern League in Italy. 
 
1.2 The Northern League in Italy  
The Northern League (LN) entered government only a few months after the FPÖ, when the 
echo of the Austrian elections could still be heard. The politics supported by the Italian party 
also created concern in the rest of Europe. The Northern League has no legacies in Italian 
post-war fascism, but the party increasingly focussed on the anti-immigration question, culti-
vating the populist and anti-establishment rhetoric that has characterised the party from the 
beginning. The Northern League exploited the fear of new immigration flows, using immi-
grants as scapegoats for a number of national problems such as rising criminality, rape, un-
employment and national security. The party also increasingly emphasized cultural differ-
ences and national and regional identity, particularly when referring to Islam and the differ-
ences between Muslim and Western Christian culture. This indicated a change of focus in the 
Northern League’s anti-immigration policy, suggesting a growing ideological convergence 
with other radical right parties in Europe.    
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It was in particular the Northern League’s anti-immigration policy that worried the rest of the 
EU on the eve of the 2001 parliamentary elections.5 For reasons that will be discussed in 
Chapter 6, the Northern League was facing electoral decline (see Table 1.3) and this situation 
forced the party to find a new political strategy. The Northern League thus looked for new 
political niches that could respond to the dilemmas po ed by increasing globalisation and in-
ter-cultural relations in connection with increasing mmigration from non-Western countries. 
 
Table 1.3 Electoral results for the Northern League (LN) at the national level (1987-2008). Percent-
ages and seats in Deputy Chamber and Senate in brackets  
LN 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008  
Deputy Chamber 
8.6 
(55) 
8.3 
(117) 
10.1 
(59) 
3.9 
(30) 
4.5 
(26) 
8.3 
(60) 
 
Senate 
8.2 
(25) 
8.1 
(60) 
10.4 
(27) 
2.7 
(17) 
4.4 
(13) 
8.1 
(25) 
 
Source: Ministero dell’Interno (http://elezionistorico.interno.it/). 
 
In 2001 the party dropped below the proportional thres old of 4 pct. (cf. Table 1.3 above), but 
according to Italian electoral law, a combination of a majority and a proportional system, the 
party was still able to join the centre-right coalition formed by Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia 
(Forza Italia, FI) and the party National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN).  
The Northern League was at that time – and still is – primarily a political phenomenon 
rooted in the regions of Northern Italy. This means that the electoral support to the party has 
always been significantly higher in these regions than at the national level (see Table 1.4 be-
low). At the 2001 election the LN had also lost votes from the party’s traditionally strong con-
stituencies of the North such as Lombardy and Veneto (cf. Table 1.4), for reasons that will be 
dealt with in the following chapters. However, the political influence the party had achieved 
within the centre-right coalition was by no means politically insignificant. At the beginning of 
the legislature in 2001, the party obtained two major ministerial posts with portfolio (the Min-
istry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Services) and one non-cabinet ministry without 
portfolio (Institutional Reforms and Devolution), taken by Bossi.6 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Just before the elections, Belgian vice Prime Minister Michel warned Italy about the same diplomatic sanctions 
applied to Austria, if the Northern League came into government. But since the sanctions against Austria had only 
brought critique and widespread anti-EU feelings, the –at that time– President of the European Commission, Ital-
ian Romano Prodi, decided to drop the question. However, it was clear that the FPÖ was not a unique cas  in 
Europe that could be contained by diplomatic measures against the country.  
6 The third part of the right wing coalition, Alleanza Nazionale, was appointed four ministerial positins: three 
with portfolio (vice-prime ministry, Agriculture, Environment) and one without (Ministry for the Italians 
Abroad). 
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Table 1.4 Electoral support for the Northern League in the Northern regions and central Italy (1992-
2006). Chamber of Deputy. Percentages. 
 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008  
Valle d’Aosta . . 8.1 . 1.9 3  
Piemonte 16.3 16.2 18.4 6.0 6.4 12.6  
Liguria 14.3 11.4 10.2 3.9 3.7 6.8  
Lombardia 23.0 22.6 24.8 11.3 11.2 20.7  
Trentino A. Adige 8.9 7.5 13.2 3.6 4.5 9.4  
Veneto  17.8 21.6 29.8 10.5 10.9 26.7  
Friuli-V.G. 15.3 16.9 23.2 8.2 7.1 13  
Emilia Romagna 9.6 6.4 7.2 2.6 3.9 7.7  
Toscana 3.1 2.2 1.8 0.6 1 2  
Marche 1.3 . 1.5 . 1 2.2  
Umbria 1.1 . 1.0 . 0.7 1.6  
Source: Ministero dell’Interno (http://politiche.interno.it). 
 
Considering the LN’s poor electoral results in the lat  1990s and in 2001, the party’s increas-
ingly anti-immigrant and inward looking positions can be understood as an attempt to find 
new issues after the old ones had apparently weakend their salience. In this sense, the fact 
that the League is still politically and electorally anchored in the geographical North of Italy 
should not overshadow the fact that the party has in the last decade come significantly closer 
to the anti-immigration and populist radical right t an for instance the party National Alli-
ance, which has followed a path towards more traditional conservative right positions. 
However this does not mean that the Northern League is a single-issue party, as it has 
been suggested in relation to several other radical right parties because of the central role that 
the anti- immigration issue now plays on their agenda and in their electoral appeal.  
As we will see in the following chapters, tax protest, the North/South question and the 
populist attacks on the political establishment continued to play an important role in the 
Northern League’s political agenda and rhetoric andre still strategically emphasised when-
ever the party is in opposition. It is interesting how the LN politics and its populist and protest 
image have been influenced by the party’s government participation from 2001-2006 (and 
now again from 2008). The question is also related to voters’ perception of the party and its 
politics, since government incumbencies and the close relationship to the political elite have 
presumably affected the image of the Northern Leagu as a radical alternative to the estab-
lishment. This also questions the perception of the party more as an anti-establishment or anti-
immigrant party.  
 
1.3 The Danish People’s Party 
The third case study is the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF). At the Danish par-
liamentary elections in November 2001, the Danish People’s Party got 12 pct. of the votes and 
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gained an influential role in the Liberal and Conservative government that ousted the Social 
Democrats (Socialdemokraterne, S) and Social Liberals (Radikale Venstre, RV) from office.   
The Danish People’s Party is at present the third-la gest political party in Denmark (see Table 
1.5) and most remarkably the most clear-cut working class party in Danish politics today.  
 
Table 1.5 Electoral support and parliamentary mandates for the FrP and the DF (1973-2007). Percent-
ages. 
Source: Danish statistical yearbooks. 
 
The party is the successor of the Danish Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet, FrP), which was 
one of the pioneers that transformed the Danish political landscape at the beginning of the 
1970s. To describe the DF as a political and ideological continuation of the now defunct Pro-
gress Party is only partly right (see Chapter 5). Still, all five founders of the Danish People’s 
Party in 1995 were former members of the Progress Party.  
At the 2001 election, the Danish People’s Party achieved a positive electoral result de-
spite particularly the left wing parties’ strategies to keep the party at the margins of the politi-
cal system. Especially from 1996-2001, the DF was often portrayed as an extreme right wing 
party with racist/xenophobic features. 
According to the social democrat Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Danish Prime Minister from 
1994-2001, the DF would never become a respectable p rty in the Danish political system.7 In 
2006, the opinion had changed significantly. As thenew social democratic leader, Helle 
Thorning-Schmidt observed in 2006, the Danish People’s Party is ‘a typical right wing party’, 
with which the Social Democrats could work on different welfare issues (Information 08-08-
2006). The Danish People’s Party had evidently come in from the cold. 
From the very beginning, the DF has emphasised the economic, cultural and social dan-
gers posed by immigrants and refugees of non-Western origin to the Danish nation. In the 
2001 electoral campaign, the party insisted on the need to tighten up the country’s immigra-
tion regime and to tackle the question of how to inegrate ethnic minorities in Danish society.  
Today, the party increasingly focuses on the need to safeguard Western values and principles 
against the threat represented by Islam. In recent y ars, the party has promoted itself as de-
fender of the liberal values and principles of the W st. It mentions freedom of expression, 
                                                
7 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen words, addressed to the DF MPs in arliament in October 1999, have become famous: 
‘Therefore I say to the Danish People’s Party: no matter how many efforts you make, for me you will never be-
come respectable (stuerene) enough’, address at the Parliament, October 1999.  
 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2007 
FrP 
15.9 
(28) 
13.6 
(24) 
14.6 
(26) 
11 
(20) 
8.9 
(16) 
3.6 
(6) 
4.8 
(9) 
9 
(16) 
6.4 
(12) 
6.4 
(11) 
2.4 
(4) 
0.6 
(0) 
. . 
DF . . . . . . . . . . 
7.4 
(13) 
12 
(22) 
13.3 
(24) 
13.9 
(25) 
Tot 15.9 13.6 14.6 11 8.9 3.6 4.8 9 6.4 6.4 9.8 12.6 13.3 13.9 
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open-mindedness, tolerance, solidarity and work ethic as Western fundamental values that 
ethnic minorities are expected to understand, respect and accept if they want to be integrated. 
Interestingly, the Danish People’s Party has profiled itself on gender equality and rights to 
women of ethnic minorities. Women wearing the Muslim veil have become emblematic for 
the party’s position and its way of dealing with and discussing these issues. As the following 
chapters will clarify, this indicates another and iteresting stage of the ideological develop-
ment of this party.  
 
1.4 Some reflections about party life course and the different stages of development    
Being part of government does not in itself guarantee electoral success and continued support. 
The fact that the three parties had different experiences in government and achieved different 
results indicates that political incumbencies can hve different impacts on the political con-
solidation or decline of this kind of parties. This al o means that if the immigration grievance 
helped these parties to get political influence, th different conditions and challenges they met 
while in government produced different effects, which need to be more carefully examined.  
Until now, very little research has been done in ths area. In the 1990s, the scholarly in-
terest was mainly focussed on explaining the radical r ght’s breakthrough and success. The 
comparative approaches dealt primarily with isolated case studies limited to relatively short 
time spans concentrating on the periods of major success. Instead, this study focuses on how 
the Danish People’s Party, the Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party have tackled 
the different stages of development, where the last phase is represented by their experience 
with government incumbencies.    
In terms of influence, it is also interesting to look at the parties’ impact on their sur-
roundings. The radical right political agenda, rhetoric and electoral support seem to have af-
fected governments to appease anti-immigration attitudes by pursuing more severe restrictions 
on immigration laws and integration regimes. A path that has been followed also at the Euro-
pean level, where the endorsement of politics of containment and control of legal and illegal 
migration flows have become an important issue on the EU’s political agenda.  
This development confirms the importance of the politica  opportunity structure in shap-
ing the development of the radical right. What happens if mainstream parties co-opt some of 
the radical right’s restrictive positions on immigration? And how have mainstream parties 
responded to the challenges advanced by the radical right parties when they entered into gov-
ernment? Again, such considerations fit well into the scenario of the three case studies. In the 
period considered, the three parties have in fact gone through what we could consider the 
main phases in the life of a party: breakthrough, consolidation, political influence and gov-
ernment responsibility. It is interesting to look at the way the three parties have tackled, over-
come, failed and reacted to the different stages of this development. It is also a way to see 
how close they have come and where their ideology and electoral support still distinguish 
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them as the specific ‘product’ of the demands, opportunities and situation emerging in the 
political systems at the national level.  
The perspective of different stages of development in the life course of a radical right 
party also affects the perception of their role in the political scenario. Radical right parties are 
not necessarily marginal actors on the extreme fringes of the political system. The fact that 
some of them have undoubtedly become mainstream in terms of electoral support, political 
influence, responsibilities and decision making activity has undoubtedly also had an effect on 
the way these parties are classified, considered and designated. The following section deals 
with the different approaches that have been used to frame the phenomenon first of all in 
terms of terminology and classification.  
At this stage of the study, it is also important to lo k at the different approaches that 
characterise the scholarly literature in order to understand how the radical right parties have 
been studies and what results have been achieved in this field. The term ‘radical right’ also 
deserves a more thorough explanation. As we will see, there is by no means agreement on 
this, neither among members, voters, the parties, nor among academics and researchers. 
 
1.5 Framing reality: problems of definition and scholarly disagreement in the classification of 
the phenomenon  
Above, the Danish People’s Party, the Northern Leagu  and the Austrian Freedom Party were 
introduced as belonging to the radical right. However, a large body of literature shows that 
scholars still disagree on how to classify and group these parties.  
Looking at the three case studies, two of them, the Danish People’s Party and the North-
ern League are relatively new political actors within the respective political systems. The 
Austrian Freedom Party has historical roots back to the 1950s, but the party went through 
significant transformations and restructurings in the 1980s and 1990s. We therefore have to 
ask whether the definition of radical right fits the three cases and what meaning and implica-
tions the term radical right has and how it has changed over time.   
International comparisons of contemporary radical right parties tend to focus on the na-
ture of such parties and the reasons of their breakthrough from the mid-1980s.8 The focus on 
the radical right’s electoral success has influenced the research field of political right wing 
radicalism/ extremism to such an extent that there is a general lack of updates, new theoretical 
approaches and contributions on recent developments and often different paths of these par-
ties, particularly in a comparative framework (De Lange & Mudde 2005). Few studies have 
attempted to analyse the role of the radical right par ies as active contributors to decision mak-
ing processes. In particular the policy effects of the radical right’s interaction with the other 
                                                
8 This new wave of right wing politics started with t e European elections in France in 1984, where the Front 
National got more than 10 pct. of the votes. The result was a few years later followed by the Republikaner in 
Germany with 7.5 pct. of the votes at the regional elections in Berlin and 7.1 pct. at the European elections.  
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established parties has until recently been insufficiently addressed (with few exceptions, see 
e.g. Minkenberg 2001).  
Another problem is the long debated and never really resolved discussion about how to 
appropriately define these parties. The terminological debate has nourished what I would de-
fine an essentialist approach, which in some cases has become blind to the ideological devel-
opment of these parties (see also Mc Gann and Kitschelt 2005: 148) and to the combination of 
different ideological typologies, which entail the use of different variants of right wing radi-
calism (on this see Minkenberg 2008: 14-15).  
An essentialist approach can be observed in the widspread scholarly preference for the 
two classical definitions of extreme right wing and radical right wing parties. The origin of 
right wing extremism is studies of fascism, whose th oretical framework was mainly applied 
to study Western European fascist movements and parties of the post-World War II period. 
The label has been widely used in Western Europe, even though some scholars who use this 
terminology often recognize that several of the features traditionally attributed to this term no 
longer apply to most of the parties today.  
The adjective extreme originally referred to parties with historical and ideological roots 
in fascism, which placed them at the extreme right of the traditional left-right political dimen-
sion. A feature of these parties was their anti-systemic position, which often meant refusal of 
parliamentary democracy and opposition to the rules of the party system as such (see e.g. Ig-
nazi 1992; Merkl and Weinberg 1997). Clearly, the involvement of several of these parties in 
government activities makes ‘right wing extremism’ in the above mentioned sense sound 
anachronistic. Even if a party can be placed on the far right on a number of issues (for exam-
ple immigration) it does not automatically make it undemocratic and unconstitutional.  
The extreme right definition often competes with another widely used t rm, right wing 
radicalism. The label appeared for the first time in the 1950s in connection with McCarthyism 
and was later used also to describe the phenomenon of Birchism (see e.g. Bell 1964; Lipset 
and Raab 1970). These movements were mainly characterised by strong conservatism and a 
fervent anticommunism, but they did not challenge th  democratic rules of the system. This 
has made the use of this term less problematic and p rticularly widespread in the Anglo-
Saxon world. Over the years, the distinction between th  two definitions has slowly faded out, 
however, and scholars today tend to use the two labels interchangeably also in relation to the 
same party.  
The ‘one world’ approach, as Minkenberg (2008: 14) appropriately calls the attempt of 
some scholars to postulate one generic phenomenon (which mainly refers to political parties 
rather than movements) described as extreme or radical in relation to its surroundings, has 
been followed by the ‘many worlds’ approach. This approach has become clear with the con-
struction of new ‘composed’ labels that started to be attached to single definitions. In my 
opinion, this also signalled a certain dissatisfaction with the traditional classifications, but also 
that the ‘phenomenon’ was developing and taking newforms. In what Cas Mudde effectively 
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called ‘the war of words’, more than 26 different definitions and descriptions of right wing 
extremist ideology were counted in the radical right literature in the mid 1990s (Mudde 1995; 
see also Mudde 1996). Several scholars adopted morespecific terms, indicating what they 
considered the most relevant features of a party at he ime of observation. I quote the most 
relevant: anti-immigration parties (with variants such as xenophobic, ethno-nationalist parties) 
(Van Der Brug, Fennema & Tillie 2000), new post-industrial extreme right parties (Ignazi 
2000: 55), new authoritarian right wing parties (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Kitschelt 1995) 
and more recently nativist right (Betz 2009; Betz and Meret 2009). The definitions highlight: 
1) the importance of the anti-immigration issue giving these parties a specific content; 3) the 
populist and anti-establishment feature referred to the political style and attitude towards the 
status quo; 3) the relationship of this phenomenon to the structural transformation of contem-
porary societies. The point that I want to emphasise here is that the approach highlighted what 
was happening to these parties in terms of ideological transformation and development, which 
made the use of traditional classifications much less satisfactory. This also underlined an as-
pect which for long has been neglected by scholars and researchers, namely the dynamic 
character of these parties and their great capacity to adapt to new conditions.   
A distinction between an old and a new extreme/radical r ght was already formulated by 
Ignazi (1992; 2000), who distinguished between the old traditional extreme right and the new 
postindustrial extreme right. Ignazi argues that the difference between the two groups is re-
lated to major structural changes in society and in politics. As we will examine carefully in 
the following sections, a major strain of the contemporary analysis considers the recent break-
through and development of these parties a consequence of the macro-structural and long-
term changes in Western societies and brought about by the processes of globalisation and 
post-industrialisation. These changes are considered to have favoured the decline of tradi-
tional established party ties, resulting in the emergence of new groups of voters, who are gen-
erally more inclined to listen to political messages emphasising problems of rising immigra-
tion, crime rates, increasing cultural and religious diversity and growing interdependence of 
the labour markets.  
The position at the right of the political spectrum is today also considered in relation to 
the identitary, cultural and value positions supported by these parties. But this is not the only 
interpretation. In France and Italy, for instance, th  term Nouvelle droite/Nuova destra is used 
to designate the right wing intellectual movement started in France during the late 1970s at 
the initiative of right wing intellectuals, among them Alain de Benoist, who formulated a cri-
tique of the extreme right ideology, particularly in relation to racial differences. In short, the 
movement promoted a new approach that considered politics of difference a value to defend 
against the homogenising forces of globalisation, but within the democratic rules available in 
Western democratic and parliamentary systems. The Nouvelle Droite maintained that it was 
necessary to abandon references to a racial hierarchy nd to put specific emphasis on ‘differ-
ence’ (see Taguieff 1987). The French Front National later embraced these ideas and devel-
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oped strong ethnocentric arguments that some scholars see as the ‘master frame’, which dif-
fused in the late 1990s throughout the populist right n a process of ‘crossnational learning’ 
(Rydgren 2005). This frame to a large extent derived its ideological force from an ethno-
national discourse, which explicitly rejected the association with traditional racism. A proof 
of the other parties’ receptivity to the example established by the Front National and/or by 
other parties during the 1990s is found in their ideology, rather than in the contacts or profes-
sional friendship among the party ‘entrepreneurs’.  
But similarities between parties do not imply a personal acquaintance among their 
members or an open declaration of ideological influence. Alternatively, as Pia Kjærsgaard 
replied in 2002 to a question from the press about the party’s possible connections to the 
Front National, the answer can be simply that:  
 
It is not because we [DF] do not like having good discussions with politicians or parties from 
other countries [but] we have not had the time and e ergy to start such a contact. […] we have 
had enough to do with Denmark and on Danish politics. (Kjærsgaards ugebrev 11-03-2002) 
 
In conclusion, both old and new labels are disappointing when applied to a specific case. In 
this sense, it can be debated how accurately the definition of radical right parties, which is 
used in this study, can define and classify the Danish People’s Party, the Northern League and 
the Austrian Freedom Party. Indeed, what radical right means today is still open to debate. 
However, partly for the reasons explained before, th  label radical right is more accommodat-
ing to new developments in these parties. Certainly, t is less problematic than far/extreme 
right and less ‘saturated’ than that of new/ populist right.  
In reality, I would argue, the difficulty of choosing a term is often the result of the defi-
nitional approach itself, where the main attempt is to explain different aspects of a phenome-
non by means of a (necessarily) schematic method. But this also means that little space is 
generally left for an update. At a certain point in time, a too tight definition of concepts and 
conditions lags ‘historically’ behind in relation to he development of the reality that has to be 
investigated.  
Therefore, the aim of this study is not to decide what concept is more correct, but rather 
to consider the empirical development of the three case studies and to see whether different 
concepts can be descriptively useful. In this sense, how the Danish People’s Party, the North-
ern League and the Austrian Freedom Party can be classified is mainly left to the empirical 
research, rather than considered a definitional question. This is one of the reasons why the use 
of the term radical right is not in itself considered problematic for this study. This of course 
does not resolve the question about what precisely th  two words ‘radical’ and ‘right’ indicate 
separately, together and in relation to the political space considered. But also in this case the 
empirical analysis can help to show where the terminology fits best and where it goes wrong. 
Even by using more words to clarify this question I doubt that I would be able to put a lid on 
the ‘war of words’. 
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1.6 A critical state of the art: contemporary studies of the radical right in Western Europe 
What first jumps out when reading the literature on the radical right is the emphasis on feel-
ings of resentment, reaction and discontent, which are considered to have emerged in relation 
to major socioeconomic processes, political conditions and cultural conflicts. A first critical 
observation in relation to this approach is the risk of adopting a sort of self-feeding interpreta-
tion, where the reason behind the radical right support (the fear) is both the result and the in-
dicator of the rising anomie in contemporary Western European societies (on this cf. also 
Schain et al. 2002: 10-11).  
A vote for a radical right party due to marginalisation, resentment, or protest can be very 
unpredictable in the long run. It is partly in order to avoid electoral volatility that a party’s 
political strategy and its competitiveness on the political market (e.g. through ad hoc political 
programmes and a well-established and reliable organisation) are important factors for the 
consolidation of electoral support. Since much of the literature has until recently concentrated 
on the analysis of the parties’ electoral breakthrough, we know very little about the develop-
ment of these parties in the most recent phases. The time is ripe to look at their development, 
influence and ideological transformations across time and comparatively in the different coun-
tries.9 This does not mean that there is a lack of publications on the topic. Particularly in the 
last decade, a plethora of studies and analyses have been published on the radical right in 
Europe, although only few of them have a comparative approach (De Lange & Mudde 2005). 
However, there is still little consensus about: 1) the reasons for the radical right electoral sup-
port (see e.g. Norris 2005) and 2) the implications a d consequences for these parties’ emer-
gence, but particularly their development and policy effect on the dynamics of party competi-
tion and party politics (see e.g. Schain et al. 2002; Minkenberg 2001). 
Analyses of singular national cases, where radical r ght parties are considered separately 
from one another are still very widespread. The emergence and electoral support of a party are 
in this case explained within a specific national context and little attention is given to theoreti-
cal and empirical frameworks used for similar parties n other countries. This kind of litera-
ture has given some ad hoc explanations, which fit the situation in the indiviual country, at 
least at the time of observation, but do not really contribute to the understanding of the simi-
larities and differences with radical right parties n the rest of Europe. Furthermore, most of 
the edited volumes that use a comparative framework in eality contain country-specific con-
tributions, while the comparative task is limited to the introductory chapter. These studies are 
for the most part written by several experts with specific knowledge of the country in question 
                                                
9 Research on the radical right is moving in this direction. Already today a number of books and workshop panels 
focus more explicitly on the ideological, organizatonal and electoral development of the radical right n relation 
to their lifecycle and evolution. See e.g. the workshop panels on Right-wing Radical Parties at the ECPR session 
in Potsdam, September 2009. 
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and of its political system (e.g. Hainsworth 2000; Perrineau 2001; more recently also Rydgren 
et al. 2004).  
The same approach characterises several single authored monographs (see e.g. Ignazi 
2000; Mudde 2000), where case-studies are put into country-specific chapters. A number of 
articles and PhD dissertations adopt a comprehensiv and more explicit comparative approach 
to explain the emergence and development of contemporary Western European radical right 
parties (see e.g. Mudde 2007) and very few studies include Central and Eastern European 
cases (cf. Mudde 2005).   
Surprisingly few have used both qualitative and quantit tive data (however cf. Betz 
1994; Kitschelt 1995; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2000; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 
2002). The research is still dominated by quantitative analyses of available electoral and/or 
international survey data, while more qualitative comparisons of party ideology based on a 
comprehensive analysis of the party literature such as programs, manifestoes and journal arti-
cles are very sporadic, not to say almost absent.  
There are different reasons for the lack of this kind of studies, but one motive is cer-
tainly that party literature can be difficult to find and in some cases even more difficult to un-
derstand, particularly when it is written in a minor language. This is also a rather pragmatic 
way to explain why some radical right parties are today more studied than others. Quantitative 
data and in particular international survey pakages like Eurobarometer surveys, the Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the European Social Survey data (ESS) are easily 
accessible and have the strong advantage of referring to the same questionnaires, making 
equivalent variables easily comparable for the different countries. Despite the demands for-
mulated by several scholars in recent years for better comparative analytical frameworks con-
sidering the radical right parties in a broadly historical and transnational context, there is still 
a general lack of this kind of studies, particularly considering how the phenomenon has de-
veloped in recent years. 
As regards the theoretical framework, the macro-structural approach is undoubtedly the 
most widespread. Macro-societal transformations such as post-industrialism and globalisation 
are often considered as main explanatory factors in the rise of an electoral demand from con-
stituencies which are likely to vote for a radical right party.  
This approach is counterbalanced by a supply-side explanation, which focuses on the 
political opportunity structure and on party competition, paying more attention to the influ-
ences determined by local or meso-level factors (cf. Eatwell 2000).This approach focuses on 
the opportunities created by the action and programmes of mainstream parties, together with 
the conditions of the country-specific political institution and electoral system. The latter has 
an important function particularly in the electoral breakthrough phase of the radical right. The 
proportional system is considered to facilitate the ris  of new radical right parties, for example 
when combined with a lower electoral threshold of representation in parliament. Majoritarian 
first-past-the-post electoral systems tend to reward st ong and already established parties at 
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the expense of newcomers. Proportional electoral systems can also help the rise of new radical 
right parties (and new parties in general) by benefiti g the consensus politics associated with 
this system in several Western European democracies (se  Kriesi et al. 2008: 43). 
The political opportunity structure also refers to party competition strategies, where the 
rise of the radical right parties can be explained as the result of the convergence/clustering of 
mainstream parties towards the middle to increase the electoral support by attracting the more 
moderate electorate. This restructuring of the politica  space is often considered one of the 
conditions that create new political opportunities for the emergence of new political parties. 
The convergence towards the centre by mainstream parties trying to conquer the moderate 
electorate can for example open new spaces at the margins. In this case, other parties have the 
opportunity to exploit the spaces on the extreme right and the extreme left of the political 
spectrum. It is a scenario that is more likely to take place when the political demand is less 
polarised and influenced by class voting and more dependent on broader issues related to, 
e.g., life chances, individual experiences, personal beliefs and attitudes. Investing in issues 
that have electoral appeal can give parties the support and visibility they are looking for.  
Put shortly, the political opportunity structure approach offers important insights for un-
derstanding the single national cases, but leaves op n the question about the development of 
these parties, particularly within a broader comparative perspective. Can similar theories and 
explanations effectively interpret what has taken place in different socio-political settings? 
This is one of the questions that will be addressed in the following chapters. 
The critical review of (part of) the existing literature on the radical right thus revealed 
that although there is an interest in comparative analytical frameworks that can help explain 
the apparently increasing ideological convergence among radical right parties in Western 
Europe, not much has (yet) happened in the field. In particular, the focus on electoral success 
and single cases still prevails over an approach privileging these parties’ development over 
time and perhaps also the fact that several of them are nowadays much more mainstream than 
marginal actors in the respective countries. Moreover, there have been few attempts to con-
nect the supply side (the parties) to the demand side (the voters) in order to see what kind of 
dynamics and reciprocal feedbacks come from their interaction.  
The present study will look at the radical right in a comparative perspective by means of 
an approach considering both the dynamic development of the parties over time and the inter-
play between their ideology and the profile and attitudes of their voters. The following chapter 
discusses the method, approach and design of this study.  
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2. ABOUT THE METHOD AND THE COMPARATIVE DESIGN 
2.1 Methodological reflections and the advantages of the comparative approach 
One of the aspects emerging from the first readings of the literature on the radical right is the 
frequent remark about the lack of in-depth comparative analyses and at the same time the en-
couragement directed to the scientific community to fill in this gap.  
From this perspective, the analysis of the ideology and electoral support of the Danish 
People’s Party, the Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party offered the opportunity 
to deal with a comparative study of the development of the radical right in the context of three 
Western European affluent societies.10 The decision to deal with these three case-studies was 
not only a pragmatic choice deriving from my personal experience and knowledge of the three 
countries, as partly suggested in the preface to this s udy. Other aspects support the choice of 
precisely these three case studies. In terms of size, the three parties refer to geographically 
limited contexts, which in terms of population have until recently been rather homogeneous. 
This needs an explanation. Austria and Denmark are both small, developed democracies when 
considered in a Western European context, whereas Italy’s geographical and demographic 
size are significantly reduced, considering that the political space of the Northern League is 
mainly limited to the Italian Northern regions (see Table 1.4, chapter 1). Furthermore, in all 
three cases, immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon and even if the size of the migra-
tion flows to the country and the share of the foreign born population are different from coun-
try to country, the immigration grievances started o be seriously felt in all three countries 
during the mid 1980s.  
Already at a first approach, it is thus possible to point at a number of societal conditions 
that have created roughly similar latent political opportunities for the breakthrough and devel-
opment of the radical right.11 However, there are also significant differences in the way the 
societal conditions were used and mobilised at the political level. They are highly dependent 
on the way national politics are structured and on the possibilities that are created at the insti-
tutional level (organisation and structure of the political system, electoral threshold for repre-
sentation at parliament, coalition opportunities etc.) and at the socio-economic level (for in-
stance in relation to the welfare state). 
Significant for the selection of the three parties was also the fact that by 2001, the FPÖ, 
the Northern League and the Danish People’s Party had gone through several of the vital 
phases of a party lifecycle, briefly described as: the breakthrough phase, the consolidation 
phase and the phase of political influence and governm nt responsibility. Compared to other 
radical right parties in other countries, which still have a marginal position, this allowed me to 
                                                
10 In the case of the Northern League, this is particularly true if the geopolitical reality considered is Northern 
Italy with low unemployment and highly industrialized districts, which are often also the electoral strongholds of 
the party. Interestingly, this makes the ‘size’ of the country and its social reality much less different from the 
other two countries. 
11 Evidence for this is for example the political influence and responsibility achieved by the three parties between 
2000 and 2001. 
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pinpoint some specific dynamics of development, for example: 1) how party ideology and 
electoral support have been influenced through the diff rent phases of party development; 2) 
whether it is possible to see a growing ideological and electoral convergence among the three 
parties and what distinguishes them; 3) consider how the three parties tackled the phase of 
political responsibility and governmental participat on and how it has influenced them in 
terms of ideology and electoral profile.   
The ambition of this study is to be able to tackle th  aspects above by relating in a com-
parative framework the supply-side, consisting of party ideology and party positining on a 
number of relevant issues, to the d mand side, represented by the radical right electoral pro-
file and attitudes. In view of the different dimensions included in this study, it was necessary 
to consider what are the main issues and aspects to look at when considering ideology, elec-
toral profile and attitudes, also in order to give a better structure to the analysis. Below, three 
main hypotheses or approaches are introduced, representing an initial guideline for the com-
parative framework that will be used as reference wh n analysing the three parties’ literature 
and their electorate. 
 
2.2 Main explanation for the radical right ideology and electoral support 
To be able to structure and finalise the comparative analysis of the empirical cases, it has been 
necessary to define an interpretative framework to structure and ease the analyses of party 
ideology and electoral profile, and to find a number of main common dimensions. The com-
parative study of the three radical right parties ha therefore been related to three main inter-
pretations, whose implications are briefly introduced in Table 2.1 (see Table 2.1 next page).  
The first column reports some the main characteristics of a specific interpretation, the 
second column the main implications of the hypothesis in relation to party ideology and the 
third column the main characteristics and implications of the electoral profile. The content of 
the columns refers to characteristics and aspects which are often mentioned and underlined in 
studies of the radical right and in connection with the three parties considered here. However, 
at this initial stage of the analysis, the implications on the two levels of party ideology and 
party electoral profile are necessarily and only broadly formulated.  
The three main interpretations considered are: 1) the new social and political cleavage 
hypothesis; 2) the protest and anti-establishment hypot esis; 3) the globalisation and margin-
alisation hypothesis. These are also the main explanations formulated by the scholarly litera-
ture when explaining the radical right electoral breakthrough. Keeping them separate makes it 
possible to emphasise some of their specific characteristics and implications in a more explicit 
way; a task that otherwise could be difficult.   
The three hypotheses do not necessarily suggest a progressive and linear development 
for the radical right and some of their characterisics, implications and consequences can in 
reality overlap. Anyway, the present hypothesis, which will be more clearly explained below, 
is that the generalised decline of traditional cleavages (indicating in particular party identifica 
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Table 2.1 The three hypotheses and some of their main implications. 
Hypotheses 
 
General characteristics Implications on radical 
right party ideology 
Implications on radical 
right electoral support 
New social and political 
cleavages and the post-
materialist/libertarian 
vs. the material-
ist/authoritarian dimen-
sion 
- Emergence of new po-
litical cleavages. 
- Declining relevance of 
traditional. economic/class 
politics and emergence of 
new cultural and value 
issues. 
- Intensification of party 
competition on non-
economic issues. 
- Double dimensionality 
of the political space: old 
vs. new politics; material-
ist vs. postmaterialist 
values; traditional authori-
tarian values and behav-
iour vs. libertarian values. 
 
 
-Exclusionary and nativist 
politics: emphasis on 
nation, community, be-
longing, traditional values 
and principles. 
-Capitalization of the fear 
for the different/Other. 
-Respect for authority, 
self-discipline, frugality, 
commitment of the indi-
vidual to the 
group/community, intol-
erance over for diversity. 
-Support for traditional, 
hierarchical moral values.  
-“Ownership” of specific 
issues and politics: law 
and order; anti-
immigration; anti-Islam. 
-Free-market economic 
orientation,  retrenchment 
on public expenditure, 
economic individualism 
-Working class particu-
larly, but also other 
social groups overrepre-
sented. 
-Older cohorts overrep-
resented. 
-Men overrepresented. 
-Low education.  
-Negative attitudes to-
ward immigra-
tion/immigrants. 
-Low social trust. 
-Authoritarian atti-
tude(s): i.e. support for a 
strong leader; authoritar-
ian childrearing; austere 
view of life.  
-Traditional religious 
behaviour. 
-Position on postmateri-
alist issues: low interest 
in environ-
ment/gender/minority 
rights. 
-Pro-market and pro-
capitalist orientation on 
economic issues.  
Globalisation, margin-
alisation and the socio-
economical bases of 
political resentment  
-Reaction against global-
isation and postindustriali-
zation from specific social  
groups. 
- Scapegoating of other 
groups in society, in par-
ticular immigrants consid-
ered a threat on the labour 
market. 
 
-Identity politics: com-
munity/local/domestic vs. 
global/multicultural/intern
ational. 
-Welfare chauvinism. 
- Protectionist position vs. 
ultraliberal  and promar-
ket capitalism. 
-Emphasis on risk, fear, 
threat and insecurity in 
the future. 
-Forms of anti-
Americanism, non-
interventionist foreign 
policy.  
-Unemployed and people 
outside the labour mar-
ket overrepresented. 
-Unskilled and skilled 
working class overrepre-
sented.   
-Low education. 
-Welfare state chauvin-
ism. 
-Low level of social 
trust.  
-Diffuse feelings of 
insecurity and fear for 
what the future will 
bring. 
 
Protest vote, anti-
establishment populism 
and political distrust 
-Will of people ‘supreme 
over every other standard’.  
-Protest vote and anti-
establishment politics. 
- Political distrust. 
-Charismatic leadership. 
 
 -Idealization of commu-
nity and belonging (“Us 
the people”).  
-Dichotomised political 
discourses and rhetoric, 
such as: Us vs. Them; the 
People vs. the political 
and intellectual elite, the 
productive society vs. the 
unproductive and parasite 
elite.     
-Ideological opportunism 
(neither left nor right), 
lack of clear ideological 
positioning; not a party. 
but a movement  
-Broad social composi-
tion, but middle-class 
groups (particularly 
small entrepreneurs) 
overrepresented.  
-Low political trust and 
political efficacy. 
-No clear ideological 
positioning on left/right 
scale. No clear party 
identification. 
-Fear for own economic 
position/status. 
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tion on the basis of class and religion) has weakened the voters’ attachment to the established 
parties in the three countries. This process was chra terised by a political dealignment, which 
affected the established structure of the political space and which was followed by a realign-
ment based on conflicts dealing increasingly with cultural and value issues.  
Among the new issues integrated in the cultural and value dimension, which have be-
come central in the past decade, are immigration, the process of European integration, envi-
ronment and gender issues. According to this hypothesis and voluntarily amplifying its impli-
cations, one could argue that the three parties act increasingly in response to the new cleavage 
hypothesis. In this perspective, a restrictive positi n against immigration and in particular 
against Islam and the opposition to (further) European integration have become central issues 
shaping the politics and the electoral appeal of these parties and have perhaps diminished the 
saliency of other positions. A point in case is anti-immigration, which in recent years has de-
veloped into a position where particular attention has been given to the Western and Christian 
values and principles in opposition to Islam and its v ews.  
I would also expect that the experience with governme t responsibility and political in-
fluence has largely influenced these parties’ ideology, for example in relation to their protest 
and anti-establishment profile. It can be a difficult task for a party to combine protest and anti-
establishment practices with the duties of a governing party. A political choice can therefore 
be to focus on other issues, for example emphasise cultural and identity questions in relation 
to Islam or highlight how the process of European integration threatens national sovereignty.  
At the risk of forcing the reading, I suggest that the three hypotheses and their implica-
tions indicate a developmental path for the radical right parties, characterising somehow the 
different stages of the life of a party. Seen in this perspective, the protest and anti-
establishment phase would be more ‘functional’ when the party is at the margins or at least 
outside government, but less effective when the party is ‘in charge’. In the same way, the 
negative consequences of globalisation and marginalisation, for example in relation to the 
immigrant workers on the national labour market, can mobilise the electorate in periods of 
economic crises, but are electorally less appealing in times of economic growth and labour 
demand. 
Of course the pattern suggested above does not consider aspects related to the political 
opportunity structure and to the single parties’ specific conditions of development. But again, 
it wants to suggest a dynamic evolution rather than a static interpretation in the approach to 
the radical right. At least, it also introduces different examples to which the three cases can be 
compared in a more structured way. The different dimensions indicated by the hypotheses 
below can clarify how the parties have developed and whether this has brought them closer to 
each other or further apart.  
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2.3 New social and political cleavages and the post-ma erialist/libertarian vs. material-
ist/authoritarian thesis 
During the last decade, immigration has gained increasing attention among voters. However, 
it is particularly among those who cast their vote for a radical right party that the interest is 
highest and the attitudes most negative. The increasing relevance of the issue on the parties’ 
agenda supports the hypothesis that their emergence and development is also the result of a 
more general trend in the political development of many Western (post-)industrialised coun-
tries.  
The social and economic processes of post-industriali ation and post-modernisation that 
interested most of the industrially advanced Western societies, have given rise to new social 
and political cleavages with a significant impact on the way the electorate votes and on the 
way parties are structured and positioned within the political space. It has in fact brought 
about a fundamental change in the traditional cleavage structure, which was created by two 
other historical revolutionary processes: the national revolution and the industrial revolution.  
These traditional/modern cleavages were represented by the conflict between old and 
new forces that saw: 1) the rural/urban (centre/periph y) and the national state versus the 
church, which emerged from the national revolution; 2) the land versus urban/industrial inter-
ests and the owners versus the labourers, produced during the industrial revolution. These 
conflicts were later reduced to two main cleavage dimensions: a cultural (religious) and a 
socio-economic one (class) (cf. Kriesi et al. 2006). Since the 1920s these two cleavages have 
been embedded in a surprisingly stable party structu e, well-described by Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) in their ‘freezing hypothesis’. The cleavages are believed to have remained almost 
unchallenged until at least the 1960s. 
In a predominately materialistic world, conflict over income and ownership of the 
means of production was the central issue. However, th  premises for a societal change 
started during the second post-war period as a result of the increasing welfare, rising levels of 
education, secularisation and value change in most Western societies, which reduced the im-
portance of the traditional cleavages (Inglehart 1977). When the post-war generation reached 
adulthood, it started to promote post-materialist values. In the late 1960s, new groups of vot-
ers began to mobilise around new issues and politics. I  was in this period that the attention of 
the electorate started to cluster around environmental problems, gender issues and ethnicity 
and minority rights. In particular, this development i itiated the decline of traditional party 
identification based primarily on economic and materi l interests. The conventional view of 
class voting associated – roughly put – with working class support for the left-wing parties, 
because they sustained redistributive politics, more government intervention, social reforms 
and the feasibility of wage increases, started to lose centrality.  
From the societal changes that started at the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s a more 
‘issue oriented’ voter moved into politics, much less influenced by class interests and more by 
the position on issues that the individual considers important (see e.g. Lipset 1967; Bauman 
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1982; Clark and Lipset 1991). This process also meant that the voting preference of manual 
workers were no longer automatically associated to socialist/left-wing parties.  
The new political challenge was represented by the development of a cultural/value di-
mension, which gained increasing relevance in the structuring of party systems, party compe-
tition, and voter alignment. This new dimension intersected with the traditional left-right di-
mension and gave rise to a two-dimensional politica sp ce, creating more complex combina-
tions both in terms of party politics, party competition and voting behaviour (e.g. Borre 2001).  
The two-dimensional political space is today widely used in political studies to place 
two sets of rival political positions: 1) an economically leftist (redistributive) versus an eco-
nomically rightist (neo-liberal) pole representing the ‘old’ dimension and 2) a libertarian/post-
materialist versus an authoritarian/materialist pole containing the ‘new’ value dimension (see 
particularly in Kitschelt 1995; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Rabier 1986).  
It is worth mentioning in relation to the development of the new cleavage thesis that the 
transformations and restructuring of the political space was first of all described in terms of a 
left-wing ‘driven’ phenomenon and mainly for the initiative of social movements rather than 
for the receptiveness of the political parties of the left. Post-materialists first became visible as 
student protesters in the 1960s, with values that differed strongly from those of the establish-
ment. The new issues mobilised in particular in the name of universalist values, giving em-
phasis to aspects such as human and ethnic minority rights, racial questions, gender equality, 
solidarity with the poor, protection of the environment etc. These issues gradually entered the 
political agenda of the left-wing, also because several of the socio-cultural professionals who 
had been active in the ‘cultural revolution’ of the 1960s and 1970s became actively involved 
in the left-wing parties (Inglehart 1997: 240; cf. also Kriesi 1998).  
An evident effect of value change in advanced industrial societies was the emergence of 
new politics and new political parties. A clear result was the formation and breakthrough of 
the green parties in some Western European countries (e.g. Germany, Italy), which success-
fully attracted the post-materialist electorate with a political agenda based on the environment 
and its preservation (see Kitschelt 1989).  
The mobilisation of these new social movements did not really add a new dimension, 
but rather contributed to transform and give a different meaning to the existing and crystal-
lised into a new value(/cultural) dimension and an old economic dimension (on this cf. Kriesi 
2008: 13).  
Most noticeably, it was the meaning of the conflicts associated with the two dimensions 
that acquired more significance and effect. In particular, the reaction against the libertarian 
turn soon produced an important answer. For more than a decade, post-materialist values 
dominated the political agenda in most Western democracies, inspired by the new issues in-
troduced during the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1980s, the right wing started a counterattack, 
often using ‘the same political techniques that the postmaterialists had introduced during the 
1960s, when they were a relatively powerless minority’ (Inglehart 1997: 240).   
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This is what Pietro Ignazi (1992) once defined as the ‘silent counter-revolution’.12 It was 
a reaction that did not make use of slogans, public demonstrations or appeals, but shaped the 
attitudes and values that we find today at the opposite pole of post-materialism. The reaction 
against the post-materialists’ political agenda is generally considered in terms of an appeal to 
more authoritarian values, which should stand out against what the right wing interprets as the 
excessive libertarianism and freedom introduced by the post-materialist values. This response 
has in the last 20 years or so become crucial to understand the restructuring of the political 
space in several national contexts.  
Less clear in respect to political positioning is the authoritarian right’s standpoint on tra-
ditional economic policy. This is an interesting aspect that will be taken up later in connection 
with the ideology and politics developed by the three radical right parties considered here. 
Suffice it to say here that the literature on the radical right tends to ascribe to these parties a 
materialist (Inglehart 1997) and neo-liberal positining (Kitschelt 1995).  
The role played by the growing levels of affluence and individual well-being as decisive 
societal conditions supporting the rise of non-materi l needs has been criticised by some 
scholars (e.g. Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Flanagan 1982). Current value change, particu-
larly at the individual level, has instead been related to the profound transformation of the 
condition of human society, i.e. a reorganisation of the historically and socially determined 
norms and values, which came with the introduction and adjustment to new structural and 
technological conditions. Post-industrialism rather than post-materialism is in this case con-
sidered to have created basic changes in the general conditions of life by giving rise to a fun-
damental and enduring reorientation in social and political values and behaviour. This kind of 
development has been particularly evident in the advanced industrial societies, where the con-
straints imposed on individual self-realisation and expression at work and in the social realm 
at large have been significantly alleviated in comparison to the past. The passage from ford-
ism to post-fordism, for example, brought a less commodified and more service-based para-
digm of production in post-industrial societies, implying a need for better education, higher 
social and communicative skills and less authoritarian working environments, thus endorsing 
the general proliferation of libertarian attitudes.  
The emergence of a new set of norms and values in the direction of less severe con-
straints and more open libertarian attitudes is observed particularly among the younger co-
horts that have had the chance to grow up and socialise under the new conditions (see 
Flanagan 1982). At the individual level, however, value and political preference formation 
can also be influenced by different occupational and market experiences (see Kitschelt 1995). 
The most obvious differences being between: 1) wage earners and capital owners; 2) public 
and private sector employees and 3) domestic and international market oriented occupations. 
Blue collar workers in manufacturing, who are more exposed to the increasing competition on 
                                                
12 This definition refers to the opposite process of changing values and political styles in Western societies that 
Inglehart, already at the beginning of the 1970s, called ‘the silent revolution’ (Inglehart 1977).  
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the international market, are for instance considere  more likely to have an authoritarian be-
haviour and view of life, particularly because their occupational situation is often associated 
with low education and a working environment characterised by repetitive object-processing 
tasks and low levels of social interaction. By contrast, high skilled white collar and profes-
sional occupations with high levels of education and e gaged in symbol production and client 
interaction are expected to promote more libertarian attitudes.  
Overall, citizens’ orientation on libertarian and authoritarian alternatives may have been 
affected by several macro-developments: increasing affluence, education, changes in the sec-
tor and organisational composition of the labour maket and the welfare state, socialisation. 
Value change in post-industrial societies reflected not just a shift of saliency towards 
non-materialistic attitudes and behaviour, resulting from the diminishing marginal utility of 
material needs, but a fundamental transformation of value preferences from an authoritarian, 
austere and hierarchic oriented behaviour (and view of life) towards a libertarian attitude 
characterised by a secular, anti-authoritarian and more indulgent conception of the world.  
The distinction between a post-materialist/materialist dimension and a libertarian/au-
thoritarian one is essential to fully understand the value change that has taken place over the 
last decades. The most relevant transformation was perhaps the decline of authoritarianism, 
rather than the fading importance of economic concerns and material preferences. As ob-
served by some scholars (Flanagan 1982; Kitschelt 1995), the importance ascribed to material 
issues can in fact still vary very much even among groups showing high levels of post-
materialist values. 
Material needs can be pushed up by economic crises and rising unemployment. At the 
individual level, the preference for economic issues can re-emerge during a particular period 
of life, or simply as a consequence of the competition for more income, reflecting considera-
tions of personal satisfaction and status position, rather than the levels of access to consumer 
goods. What happens then in relation to the libertarian values? Should we expect a return to 
authoritarianism?   
It is interesting to note that while several observers do agree that parties such as the 
Danish People’s Party, the Austrian Freedom Party and the Northern League occupy a defi-
nite place within the authoritarian/ anti-libertarian pole in the two-dimensional policy space 
created by the new values, it is less clear where these parties position themselves in relation to 
the economic/materialist dimension (cf. Knutsen 1995). 
Kitschelt’s winning formula suggested a combination of capitalist pro-market orienta-
tion together with authoritarian appeals. But his interpretation has already been criticised (cf. 
Ivarsflaten 2005; Carter 2005) and partly reassessed by himself (cf. McGann and Kitschelt 
2005). For sure, the different radical right patterns in the politics of economics suggest that 
the strategies and opportunities on this political dimension have given different results. This 
also reflects the different ways voters cluster toge her in relation to these dimensions, clearly 
affecting the politics of the parties in their vote maximisation efforts (Kitschelt 1995). These 
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considerations underline the need to: 1) consider how these parties have developed, changed 
and performed through time (perhaps developing different winning formulas) as regards both 
their ideology and electoral constituencies; 2) to ad pt a comparative perspective in order to 
come to more general conclusions.13 
The significance that the value dimension has acquired in relation to the ideology and 
politics of the radical right is interesting (see e.g. Rydgren 2005, Betz 2002; Kitschelt 1995; 
Kriesi et al. 2008). Particularly in the Scandinavian case and more specifically Denmark, the 
role played by the traditional class cleavage has diminished since the late 1960s, in line with 
the increasing importance gained by the new left/right value dimension (see Borre and Goul 
Andersen 1997; Borre 2003). Class voting, as measurd by the Alford index,14 dropped from 
around 50 pct. in 1966 to circa 25 pct. in 1979, where it remained relatively stable until the 
1990s, dropping dramatically again to 6 pct. in 2001 (cf. Borre and Goul Andersen 1997: 123-
125). 
The formation of new political parties also seems to endorse this development. The new 
party agendas showed that the electorate they addressed was not necessarily represented by 
traditional social groups, but by voters whose political choice was an expression of the trans-
formations taking place in the social and political space. In contrast with some of the expecta-
tions postulated by the new cleavage theory, the post-materialist and libertarian issues (e.g. 
environment, gender, social justice) affected the voters’ agenda until the 1970s, whereas the 
late 1980s, but particularly the 1990s, were characte ised by an orientation towards more au-
thoritarian positions on issues such as immigration, law and order and foreign aid to develop-
ing countries (cf. Borre 1999; Goul Andersen 1999).  
In 2001, the new politics dimension turned out to be stronger than traditional class poli-
tics (Borre 2003). This changeover in Danish politics also emerged from the voters’ political 
agenda, where immigration was mentioned among the most important issues for the govern-
ment (Goul Andersen 2003).  
Among scholars there is little doubt that this new political situation has strongly con-
tributed to the electoral success of the Danish People’s Party (see e.g. Goul Andersen and 
Bjørklund 2000; 2002; Goul Andersen 2004), also taking into account that until the 1990s, 
immigration was not really a priority on the political agenda of the established parties, except 
for short-term interest in this issue (Tonsgaard 1989).  
Some fundamental questions arise in relation to the new cleavage hypothesis. To start 
with: do the three case studies represent a reaction against a society under rapid social and 
                                                
13 This can be achieved by using a comparative perspective that, in Kitschelt’s words: ‘(should not) boil down 
differences and similarities of extreme-rightist electorates to a few highlights without examining thecompetitive 
space in which the extreme right is situated and the political relations between mainline conservatives, social 
democrats, and left libertarians’ (Kitschelt 1995: 48)  
14 It is the most prominent ‘objective’ indicator for measuring class voting (see Alford 1962). It s calcul ted on 
the basis of the difference between the percentage of blue collar workers and white collar workers who vote for a 
left of centre party. In several advanced Western democracies the mean index value has diminished since the 
1980s, in some cases becoming negative. 
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political transformation, as suggested in recent scholarly literature? Is the emergence of new 
social and political cleavages a (more) plausible explanation for their recent development? 
And more specifically, is the immigration grievance th  issue that best explains why people 
vote for a radical right party? 
However, it is also important to point out that theanti-immigration position is often pre-
sented as a sort of ‘big box’, which the radical right has filled with everything related to nega-
tive images and attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. As we will see in the empiri-
cal analysis of party ideology, the content of this ‘box’ developed differently, for example in 
terms of what kinds of problems have been emphasised ov r the years, how and when.  
Besides, other new issues which can be related to the new cleavage deserve to be con-
sidered in relation to the radical right, among them family politics, gender roles, environ-
mental issues and animal welfare. The fact that these may not have the same strong electoral 
appeal of anti-immigration does not mean that they do not play an important role for the im-
age parties ‘deliver’ to the electorate. 
In order to answer to the above-mentioned questions, the new cleavages hypothesis and 
its implications will be set against two other main competing explanations for the develop-
ment of the radical right: the hypothesis considering the consequences of globalisation and the 
marginalisation process and the hypothesis arguing that the radical right parties can be better 
understood within a framework of protest, anti-elite feelings and political distrust. 
 
2.4 Globalisation, marginalisation and the socioeconomic bases of political resentment 
A significant part of the literature on the radical right focuses on the growing opposition be-
tween the two groups often labelled the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalisation. This approach 
puts clear emphasis on the societal consequences of the globalisation process, which has pro-
voked the reaction of the so-called modernisation and globalisation losers, who are uncertain 
and afraid of the socioeconomic transformations in their social and working position (see e.g. 
Betz 1994).  
Several dynamics are considered to be at play in relation to this response. The increasing 
flexibility of the labour market, together with post-industrialisation and the mobility of both 
capital and labour force can be mentioned as some of the reasons behind the concern about 
the near future in some segments of society. The feelings emerging from the uncertainty and 
risk are sometimes believed to prompt irrational responses and scapegoating practices, which 
are mainly driven by the need to find someone to blame for how things are going, particularly 
in respect to direct material concerns. In this case, the fear that immigrants represent a threat 
on the labour market because they bring down average wages is one of the main concerns 
related to the consequences of globalisation and immigration flows.  
The end of the cold war in the late 1980s and the European Union enlargement in 2004 
have perhaps exacerbated the fear of a new and cheap East European labour force that would 
enter the country and benefit from the new membership of the European Union. Welfare 
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chauvinism is therefore also considered a reaction related to the socioeconomic concerns of 
the immigration grievance and according to which immigrants are seen as undeserving and 
often exploiting recipients of national welfare schemes. High unemployment rates among 
immigrants (particularly among women) and their relatively recent presence in the country are 
mentioned among the reasons behind the idea that immigrants did not help build the welfare 
state, but only abuse it. This translates their entitl ment to welfare benefits into a misuse of 
public money, which makes the future of those who ‘have paid for it’ uncertain. 
Several scholars agree that the above-mentioned implications of the marginalisation hypothe-
sis can play a role in the breakthrough and electoral support to the radical right. This theory is 
not completely new. In the second post-war period sme theories suggested a similar social 
mechanism of ‘revolt against modernity’, interpreting the success of fascism in the light of a 
middleclass fear of downward economic and social mobility (Bell 1964). However, the mar-
ginalisation hypothesis emphasises the role of a residual class of socially disadvantaged (e.g. 
unemployed, low-skilled and semiskilled workers, retired) who are negatively affected both 
socially and economically by the course of events, having to face poorer opportunities on the 
labour market, increasing competition, reduced state benefits and increasing social inequality. 
This general condition would have encouraged the res ntment of the most socially marginal-
ised against immigrants, perceived as unwelcome competitors of welfare benefits (Betz 1994; 
Lubbers, Mérove, Peer 2002). 
The appeal of several radical right-wing parties among the manual workers, for example 
the Danish People’s Party and the Austrian Freedom Party (see e.g. Plasser-Ulram 1999; Goul 
Andersen & Bjørklund 2000; Goul Andersen 2004), suggests another explanation in relation 
to the globalisation/marginalisation hypothesis, which tends to overlap with the new cleavage 
hypothesis. In this case, the relationship between authoritarian and libertarian attitudes and 
behaviour to social class is emphasised, rather than t e economic consequences of globalisa-
tion. This kind of approach maintains that the working class support for the radical right has 
to be interpreted within the framework of decline of class consciousness. Workers supported 
the left wing mainly because these parties spoke for their economic (class) interests, while the 
working class did not really have the same libertarian and open approach towards for example 
minority (social and civic) rights, law and order, gender roles and sexuality and educational 
methods. With the decline of class politics, these issues gained ground in the decision of 
which party to vote for. 
Contrary to widespread post-war social psychological theories (e.g. Eysenck 1954) and 
psychoanalytical studies on authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950), this behaviour was not so 
much related to upbringing during early childhood, but rather a consequence of lower educa-
tional standards, which, according to Lipset: ‘(…) predisposes [the working class] to view 
politics as black and white, good and evil’ (Lipset 1960: 91). 
Lower education is considered also to relate to characteristics of the individual, for ex-
ample a lower engagement in political and voluntary organisations (see Putnam 1993), little 
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reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity and authoritarian family patterns (Lipset 
1960). These characteristics are often seen in opposition to those that should typify the ‘glob-
alisation winners’, consisting of highly educated, highly skilled social groups and individuals, 
employed in fields where creative and social competences are required. Social groups with 
this profile often ‘do well’ in their private life and in their career and are less likely to vote for 
a radical right party. They do not fear internationalisation of labour, nor the social transforma-
tions this brings about; on the contrary, they feeladvantaged by these conditions. 
Since its formation in 1995, the Danish People’s Party has achieved increasing electoral 
support, in particular among workers with lower education (cf. Stubager 2006). Whether this 
composition has more to do with problems of marginalisation among certain social groups, 
concerned by the transformations brought about by globalisation and post-industrialisation 
(see below) rather than with issue voting, is a hypothesis that has found little support so far in 
the studies on DF’s electoral composition and attitudes (see e.g. Goul Andersen 2004). These 
studies emphasise that the most marginalised groups s ch as unemployed and early retirees 
are not overrepresented in the party electorate. However, it could be argued that it is the fear 
of marginalisation and future consequences of globalisation rather than an already marginal-
ised status that encourage the vote for the Danish People’s Party. 
That would mean that those who think that their economic and social situation is under 
threat are still active in the labour market, but employed in occupational sectors that are 
strongly challenged by globalisation and post-industrialisation. Feelings of frustration and 
insecurity deriving from the work environment can be transferred to the broader social con-
text, resulting in a search for security, self-confidence and belonging back into the norms, 
values and behaviour represented by the local community and the nation state. 
As we will see, an explanation that puts weight on the reaction from the marginalised 
sectors of the so-called ‘losers’ of modernisation ca to some extent overlap with some of the 
characteristics advanced by the hypothesis of the new cleavage dimension. In both cases, the 
social groups that are more likely to develop negative attitudes towards immigration and 
prone to develop authoritarian positions in relation t  questions such as law and order and 
welfare rights, can be found among those who have less to gain from the transformations of 
advanced capitalist societies. 
The marginalisation approach has different implications in relation to party ideology and 
electoral support. At the level of party ideology, for example, it is likely that the party official 
texts put an overall negative emphasis on whatever has to do with the development set off by 
the globalisation process. In this sense, it is more likely that the party is against uncontrolled 
forms of neo-liberalism and pro-market capitalism, supporting instead protectionist measures 
against the uncontrolled forces of the market. 
The negative picture of globalisation can also trade into forms of ‘light’ anti-American-
ism, portraying the United States as the worst scenario in terms of the effects of the globalisa-
tion process on society as a whole and on the labour market in particular. Recently, other 
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countries –for example China – might play the role of dangerous competitors on the interna-
tional market for the survival of certain sectors of the national economy. 
The opposition to globalisation also suggests a non-i terventionist position on foreign 
politics, in particular when this implies getting involved in conflicts in other parts of the 
world. At the same time, the fear for the national social and economic situation can be ex-
pressed in forms of European scepticism. European integration is considered a danger to the 
national and a way to impose multiculturalism and globalisation on the member countries. In 
this sense, it is rather interesting to see the position of the three radical right parties on foreign 
policy and how it might have changed across time. 
The macro-level implications of the marginalisation hypothesis suggest an electoral pro-
file with an overrepresentation among the social clsses at the margins of the labour market, 
who are afraid of further deterioration of their ale dy insecure socioeconomic status. In this 
case, unemployed, people retired from the labour market, as well as unskilled blue collars 
represent, according to this reading, the broader voting pool for the radical right parties. This 
leaves many other questions unanswered; for instance, how do supporters of the three parties 
respond to authoritarian attitudes? Are they particularly worried about their socioeconomic 
situation and future life/career chances? Do they trust others? Is their vote particularly af-
fected by considerations about the impact of immigrat on on the labour market and on the 
future of the welfare state? Do they support a different and unequal application of social and 
civic rights when it comes to immigrants and refugees? 
The analysis of the electoral profiles of these parties attempts to answer to these ques-
tions. Although several studies have already dismised the effects of the marginalisation hy-
pothesis, considering them much less significant than other explanations, it still seems prema-
ture, particularly in the present period of global economic crisis, to maintain that they will not 
acquire more relevance in the very near future. 
 
2.5 Protest vote, populism and political distrust   
The resentment against the political establishment is often registered in the levels of political 
distrust that can be measured and observed in some Western democracies. In several cases, 
the protest translated into support for a party whose role and politics were perceived as alter-
native to mainstream politics. 
The use of the vote as a means of political and populist protest is often considered an 
important feature behind the electoral support to the contemporary radical right (Betz 1994; 
1994; Taggart 1996). This explanation raises a number of questions which have different im-
plications (see Bergh 2004). For example, what are these voters protesting against and why? 
And which parties benefit from their protest and how? 
These questions might sound obvious. Nevertheless, much of the academic literature 
that explains the rise of the radical right in terms of protest voting is not able to give clear-cut 
explanations. But before a more in-depth analysis of the protest hypothesis, it is important to 
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explain the relation between the protest by a part of civil society and the concept of populism. 
Populism is often considered a direct political outc me of the voters’ reaction against the 
status quo. 
In short, the term ‘populism’ is used both in relation to the popular bases of the protest, 
which in some cases finds its grassroots in a specific social layer, and to some specific ideo-
logical features that are believed to characterize the populist parties. However, despite the fact 
that the definition, the form and the content of populism have analysed several times in the 
past and more recently (cf. Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Canovan 1981; Taggart 2000; Meny-
Surel 2002), the phenomenon has far from reached a clear classification. In particular, the 
hardest task is to operate empirically with the concept, because it either has been referred to 
specific historical cases (Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Shils 1956), or the definition of populism 
as an ideal type is too vague and descriptive to provide a clear frame of analysis (cf. Taggart 
2000). As often underlined by scholars who have analysed the phenomenon, ‘populism’ is 
both elusive and recurrent (see Laclau 1977: 143; Canovan 1981). As it was observed in a 
classical study on populism: 
 
there has been no self-conscious international populist movement which might have attempted 
to control or limit the term’s reference, and as a result those who have used it have been able to 
attach to it a wide variety of meanings. The more flexible the word has become, the more 
tempted political scientists have been to label ‘populist’ any movement or outlook that does not 
fit in any established category (Canovan 1981:6) 
 
As pointed out before, the vagueness of ‘populism’ is also the result of the fact that this defi-
nition, with all it implies, has been used to boil down characters related to: the nature, socio-
logical background and political features of past and present populist movements, whose 
common denominator was constituted ‘by the people’ (s e e.g. Taguieff 1995). An attempt to 
trace a map of populism that can later be employed on the analysis of the specific cases can 
then be that of considering separately: 1) the reasons and social basis of the populist protest 
and; 2) its ideological aspects. 
The socio-economic conditions of an historical period are undoubtedly a relevant factor 
for the development of specific forms of populist movements. Considering the most recent 
cases of populist mobilisation in Western Europe, an explanation of the phenomenon puts 
emphasis on the middle class element of certain populist movements (e.g. Fryklund and Peter-
son 1981). In particular, the small individual entrpreneur most likely represents the bedrock 
support for the populist protest. Wider support from ther social groups is then achieved by 
means of the broadly shared paradigm of the opposition between people and the rulers, i.e. 
between a productive and an unproductive, a ‘nourishing’ and a consuming class in society. 
However, what lies behind the reaction is what Fryklund and Peterson call ‘a system revolt 
within the limits of the system’ (Fryklund and Peterson 1981: 396), i.e. the result of the de-
velopment of contrasting forces within the system between simple commodity production and 
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the pace of capitalist expansion through rapid industrialisation and modernisation. The reac-
tion to this situation comes, in the first place, from the petite bourgeoisie mainly consisting of 
small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, self-employed craftsmen and artisans who still rely on sim-
ple commodity production. These groups differ in many regards, but they share the risk of 
losing their social and economic position as a consequence of the rapid social changes, best 
epitomised by an ever-growing public sector and large-scale capitalist organisations; a threat 
that becomes particularly concrete in periods of ecnomic recession. Earlier seminal accounts 
(see e.g. Lipset 1960) had already anticipated this relationship between the stage of economic 
and social development and the reaction from the middle-class as an explanation at the roots 
of support for fascism back to the interwar period.15 
The reaction is based on the fear of losing not only economic power, but also social 
status (Lipset 1960: 307-371). The threat of losing status is considered to affect those who 
have risen in the economic structure and may be frustrated in their desire to be accepted so-
cially by those groups who already hold status, by the feeling that the rapid social and eco-
nomic changes threaten their own claims. It is interesting how this state is considered to give 
rise to anxieties and frustrations, which can find their vent against common scapegoats repre-
sented by ethnic minorities or religious groups. 
If there was an historical continuity with the past lso in the social basis of contempo-
rary politics, it would be possible to observe an overrepresentation of the petit bourgeoisie 
among contemporary radical right voters which, according to what has been said, would vote 
for a radical right party mainly out of fear of having something to lose, for example in relation 
to their economy or status within society. In this case, the characteristics would be consistent 
with the hypothesis of marginalisation drawn above. 
The explanation of the social basis for the populist protest in Western Europe today re-
fers to some extent to a similar set of interpretative frameworks. However, it is particularly in 
relation to the populist wave of the 1970s and 1980s that the middle-class reaction hypothesis 
is used. It is for example applied to the electoral breakthrough of the Scandinavian protest 
parties during the 1970s, where support from the middle class was essential to the success of 
the Danish Progress Party (e.g. Fryklund and Peterson 1981; Rasmussen 1977, Glans 1984). 
In the case of the Northern League in Italy, several an lyses have also emphasised the over-
representation of small entrepreneurs and self-employed in the surprising electoral success 
achieve by the party, particularly in its early years. This is explained by the fact that the elec-
toral constituencies granting the Northern League most of its electoral success were located in 
the affluent Northern regions, characterised by an economy based on small family businesses 
(see e.g. Diamanti 1996: 19-27; see also Stella 1996). 
                                                
15 Similar accounts, more broadly based on a conflicting tension between the traditional and the modern, the pre-
industrial/agrarian and urban/industrial, often lie at the core of the literature on populist movements from different 
historical periods (for a critic of this paradigm see Laclau 1977). 
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As noted, recent interpretations tend to explain the concept of populism in terms of a more 
diffuse form of protest against representative democracy and its institutions. As we will see, 
in comparison with the middle-class reaction hypothesis this kind of approach is much less 
specific concerning the social basis of the protest. Some scholars (see e.g. Kitschelt 1995 and 
Kitschelt 2002) consider the middle class white-collars (primarily working in the private sec-
tor) more likely to support populist anti-statist political sentiments, as only more educated and 
consequently politically more sophisticated voters can advance a critique against the political 
establishment and the way it operates. But in most of cases, the socioeconomic composition 
of the electorate is believed to appeal to a broader social coalition, where perhaps those show-
ing a low level of political trust in the system and the establishment together with a low po-
litical efficacy are overrepresented in the voter composition. In classical political theory 
(Easton 1965), political efficacy refers to people’s perception of their ability to influence the 
political system, while political trust indicates people’s perception of the necessity/ability to 
influence the political system at various levels. However, one might argue that a problem with 
much of the analyses on populist protest parties is the relatively simplified explanation of 
their electoral support. Claiming that the party’s success is mainly a result of the voters’ pro-
test downgrades it (in particular concerning the party ideology) to a level where the protest is 
the party only, or at least main, relevant ideological characteristic. There is also another prob-
lem related to the life cycle of these parties: cana protest party continue to be considered as 
such when it achieves political influence and government responsibility? And do its voters 
continue to perceive its anti-establishment role in the same way? 
However, it is important to observe that type and objectives of the protest can stem from very 
different reasons (Bergh 2004). In the most radical case, protest can mean a direct threat to 
democracy (Sartori 1976; see also Capoccia 2002 for a reassessment of the anti-systemic con-
cept), but in its softer version it is interpreted as a general distrust expressed by some voters in 
the way representative democracy and its institutions work and in the influence they have on 
the system. 
In Italy, for example, the electorate has since the 1970s been very dssatisfied with the 
way democracy works in the country (Pasquino 2002). Already at the beginning of the 1960s, 
the classical comparative study Civic Culture by Almond and Verba (1963; 1965), portrayed 
the ‘average’ Italian as a citizen with very little interest in politics, and much more proud of 
the culture, art and architectonic beauties of the country than of the condition of democracy 
and of the political system. Another scholar defined the Italian political culture by means of 
three negative expressions: fragmentation, alienatio  and isolation (La Palombara 1987). 
Much of the literature on this subject agrees that e roots of this behaviour/attitude have their 
origin in the socio-political and economic history of the country before and after its unifica-
tion in 1860 (see e.g. Putnam 1993). 
Another form of protest can be provoked by specific so ial and political transformations that 
for instance weakened the dominance of the established parties, contributing to increased dis-
 47 
satisfaction among voters with the inability of the political parties to put problems on the 
agenda and discuss solutions. This is believed to happen in particular when the programs and 
agendas of the established parties are very similar to each other, since they all tend to cluster 
towards the middle, following a vote-maximising strategy (Taggart 1996; Kitschelt 1995). In 
this case, it might be argued, the protest is mainly a critical reaction against how mainstream 
parties relate to specific issues, more than a protest against the elite per se. The demand for 
stricter rules against immigration can help explain why a voter decides to support a party. 
What at first sight may be read as a vote of protest is rather to be considered a reaction 
resulting from a policy preference. According to some scholars (see Van der Brug et al. 2000; 
Van der Brug and Fennema 2003), anti-immigration parties attract no more protest votes than 
other mainstream parties do. The vote for these parties is not less ideological and pragmati-
cally driven than the vote for other parties. The difference is that the negative attitude towards 
immigrants has a stronger effect for motivating support to an anti-immigration party. An ex-
ample in this direction is the vote for the Danish People’s Party (see e.g. Goul Andersen and 
Bjørklund 2000; 2003; Goul Andersen 2004), whose electoral support seems to be much more 
issue-oriented than driven by specific anti-establishment and anti-elite feelings.  
Another kind of protest vote is directly against the political and intellectual elite and against a 
country’s institutions and can be caused by a country-specific historical and sociopolitical 
development (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995).  
The electoral success of the ethno-regionalist and populist Northern League during the 
1990s cannot be explained without reference to the political situation in Italy at the beginning 
of the 1990s (Biorcio 2003; Diamanti 1996). These years witnessed the passage from what in 
Italy is considered the system and history of the First Republic to the current Second Repub-
lic. The events of the 1990s provoked a political earthquake that involved most of the political 
system and in which several prominent parties and politicians where accused of serious brib-
eries and corruption. This situation gave new political actors the chance to exploit the possi-
bilities in the growing anti-establishment populist protest.  
A similar type of protest is believed to have affected the Austrian case (see again 
Kitschelt 1995). Thirteen years of the so-called Great Coalition between the Austrian Social 
Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Conservatives (ÖVP), together with the colonization of the 
public sector and publicly owned companies by means of the Propoz system are believed to 
have provoked the voters, who expressed their protest by voting for the FPÖ (see e.g. Plasser 
and Ulram 2000). As in the case of LN, the party was considered extraneous to the clientelist 
politics and patronage practices that the political establishment had constructed over a decade. 
The FPÖ also insisted very much on its role of guarantor to the Austrian pluralist democracy, 
attacking on several occasions the duopoly system built by the SPÖ and ÖVP. 
On the whole it seems that anti-establishment populism and ideology were more successful in 
Italy and Austria (Kitschelt 1995; 2002; Biorcio 2003; Betz 1994), increasing the electoral 
support of the Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party. However, there is reason to 
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believe that the mobilisation strength of anti-establishment populism in the case of the LN and 
FPÖ has lost some of its relevance, particularly since the two parties reached political respon-
sibility and duties in government, making it more difficult for them to distinguish themselves 
from the other mainstream parties.   
At any rate, there is still very little conceptual clarity behind the use of the term ‘protest 
vote’, making it difficult to test this interpretation empirically. The different forms of protest 
outlined above represent an attempt to interpret protest voting in terms of the possible under-
lying reactions and electoral choices. Two can be considered proper ‘protest votes’, where the 
vote primarily represents discontent with the system and anti-establishment/elitist feelings, 
whereas one is rather the result of what we have defined a ‘policy-driven’ protest, where the 
vote mainly expresses dissatisfaction with the issue positions of the mainstream parties 
(Miller 1974).  
In the literature on populism, the ideology, programmes, rhetoric, discourses and organi-
sation of the parties are often considered important for their success. However, it is difficult to 
find out what ideological contents are considered important and whether they change in rela-
tion to the different positions the party occupies in the political space. 
Contemporary studies tend to combine different aspect  of this phenomenon, and there 
is an overlap among the reasons that have provoked the protest (demand side) and the ideo-
logical features that characterise the parties (supply side). This often gives a picture of these 
parties as merely manifestations/results of the transformations and contradictions that are at 
the basis of the protest, forgetting about the roleof the party as competitive actor on the po-
litical scene. In his attempt to draw out an ideal-type of the concept of populism, Taggart 
makes an explicit list of the most important features for understanding populism at the politi-
cal level (Taggart 2000; 2002). One is the politics of identity, in which people identify with 
their ‘heartland’, an ideal conception of one’s community where all core values come from. 
The sovereignty of people over elites is best epitomized by the appeal to ‘direct democracy’, 
concretely translated into a demand for popular initiatives and referenda as the best form of 
government vs. the government represented by politicians, bureaucrats or judges. 
Another important aspect is the lack of a clear politica  programme and ideology, which 
is related to the fact that the populist parties’ main goal is responding to peoples’ reaction to a 
sense of crisis. The refusal of any ideological self-positioning seems in this case well de-
scribed by the expression ‘neither left, nor right, but for the people’, which populist parties 
often like to make use of.  
 
2.6 Research design, method and data  
The implications of the three working approaches decribed above will be considered on the 
two levels that characterise the present study, namely: party ideology and party electorate. 
This will be done by considering the three main interpretations to the radical right break-
through and development in relation to three concrete case studies: the Danish People’s Party 
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(Dansk Folkeparti, DF), the Northern League (Lega Nord, LN) and the Austrian Freedom 
Party (Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs, FPÖ). Particular attention will be given to the analy-
sis of the Danish People’s Party. This for two reasons: for the first, because the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party is -among the three- the party which has ‘done best’ in terms of electoral support 
and political influence even if it is the youngest of the three (the party was founded in 1995). 
For the second, because compared to the older and much ore known FPÖ and LN, the DF is 
still a relatively little studied party, particulary outside Denmark. 
The three approaches introduced above will mainly be used to: 1) improve the structur-
ing of the comparative analysis by suggesting some clear dimensions to the analysis of re-
spectively party ideology and electoral profile and attitudes; 2) indicate some possible paths 
of development, which allow us to consider these parties as dynamic actors, rather than fixed 
realities occupying a specific space in the political landscape. 
In this respect, one of the challenging tasks of this study is to account for the ideological 
and electoral development and transformations undergon  by these parties. Until recently, the 
studies on the radical right have focussed almost exclusively on the parties’ breakthrough and 
electoral success. Time is now ripe to direct the research towards the development and politi-
cal impact of the radical right parties, both at the national level (considering how these parties 
have tackled becoming mainstream) and at the international level, looking comparatively at 
the ideological and electoral convergences and differences that have characterised the differ-
ent phases of their evolution. In this respect, it can be argued that only the long time span lets 
us cast light on the question of whether the radical r ght parties in Western Europe have de-
veloped more similar agendas and in respect to what dimensions and issues. This does not 
mean that studying the radical right electoral breakthrough has become irrelevant. On the con-
trary, considering the conditions that may have facilit ted the rise of the radical right parties 
in some countries can help understanding the following steps of their more recent develop-
ment and their possible impact on the political system. 
In the last decade, the radical right has enhanced its influence significantly, not only on 
the political debate in general, but also at the lev l of policy making. As national governments 
attempt to cope with new realities of global migration patterns, strained welfare states, the 
threat of foreign terror to national security and the challenges of the recent global economic 
crisis, new opportunities opened up for parties of the radical right to position themselves stra-
tegically. This means that while the theoretical frmework created by the three hypotheses can 
help cast light on the conditions of emergence of the DF, LN and FPÖ and their similarities 
and differences, other frameworks might be considere  to explain the recent phase. In particu-
lar, the influence of the political opportunity structure can play a decisive role for the history, 
development and successful performance of a party. The implications and effects of this will 
be considered in relation to each party.   
 
 50 
2.7 Selection of the qualitative and quantitative material 
The analysis of the Danish People’s Party, the Northern League and the Austrian Freedom 
Party is based on a selection of both qualitative and quantitative material. The literature used 
for the qualitative analysis consists primarily of fficial party programmes, manifestoes, 
newsletters and newspaper articles with interviews to ome of the parties’ prominent leaders. 
The intent is, however, to look primarily at the official ideological and programmatic position 
of a party by taking into account a broad spectrum of publications. This means looking at the 
position and profile that the party wants to present to its potential electorate and core voters. 
Of course it can be argued that most voters do not read party programmes. Their idea of 
a party and its political positioning is often influenced by other channels of communication, 
such as television and newspapers. This is also why the qualitative material collected for this 
study is not exclusively based on official party programmes, but – where possible – also uses 
other party documents such as newsletters, articles from party papers and to some extent slo-
gans, mottos and images used in party campaigns and elections. Parties send their ‘message’ 
out to voters using different communication strategies; the publication of the party pro-
gramme is one strategy, but not necessarily the most effective, when it comes to reaching and 
influencing the electorate. However, while the way and channels used to communicate the 
message can be different, especially in societies where communication is so important, the 
substance of the message is the same, since a party would hardly insist on something it does 
not stand for.  
Party programmes are also one of the best sources of party positioning and saliency of 
issues and in a temporal perspective a good indicator of a party’s transformations.  As will be 
discussed more specifically in later chapters, one of the difficulties of using party programmes 
and documents is that tracking the development and transformation of politics and ideology 
requires extensive reading. This task is even more demanding when three parties are involved. 
Considering that there are very few examples, the method suggested in this study represents a 
possible approach to this kind of literature to look at the way the parties have moved from 
marginalisation to the centre of the political system. 
The analysis of the electoral profile and attitudes is based on quantitative data. For the 
Danish People’s Party and the Italian Northern Leagu  the research is primarily based on data 
from the Danish national electoral studies and from the Italian National Election Studies 
(ITANES). The Danish election survey project started already in 1973 and has since covered 
every parliamentary election, giving the opportunity to see how the voters’ agenda, attitudes 
and composition have changed over time.16 The data considered in this study start from the 
1994 election– when the Danish People’s Party still did not exist, but whose founders were 
already politically active in the Progress Party – and end by including also the last election 
survey data from 2007.  
                                                
16 See the homepage of the Danish Electoral Studies at http://www.socsci.auc.dk/election/dansk/index.htm (last 
accessed 11-11-2008).  
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The Italian National election studies (ITANES) have a more recent history.17 The Italian 
project was launched at the beginning of the 1990s, starting with two post-electoral surveys in 
connection with the parliamentary elections. However, the first real major survey is from 
1994 post-electoral data. The 1994 electoral survey still almost exclusively covered party be-
haviour and positioning, whereas variables on attitudes towards immigration and immigrants, 
nationalism, social trust and the like were included from 2001. The data considered include 
the surveys from 1994 to 2008, covering the last five Italian parliamentary elections (1994, 
1996, 2001, 2006 and the recent 2008). The Italian d ta represent an advantageous starting 
point to look at the transformations of the electoral composition and attitudes of the Northern 
League. The party appears very little in international surveys (very small N), which can be 
explained in different ways, for example: the party’s political and geographical specificity, the 
decline in electoral support to the party in the lat 1990s and beginning of 200018 and a certain 
reticence by party supporters to declare that they voted LN. 
The Italian election studies tell us more about the Northern League’s voters, even if the 
number of party cases is sometimes low (more specifically in relation to the two elections in 
2001 and 2006). The shortcomings in the first-hand data will therefore, when necessary, be 
counterbalanced by second-hand literature dealing more specifically with the Northern 
League’s voter composition and attitudes.  
A little more complex was the case of the Austrian Freedom Party, given that Austrian 
electoral surveys are not available to the internatio l community. The analysis of the FPÖ 
electorate has thus been conducted based on different int rnational surveys, including the In-
ternational Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on natiol identity (1995), the 1999 European 
Value Survey and the European Social Survey (first round 2002-03). 
The ISSP is a cross-national social survey which started at the beginning of the 1980s 
and each year covers a different topic with particular significance for research in social and 
political science. The ISSP survey considered here is on national identity and the first Austria 
joined as a member partner.19 
The European Value Study (EVS) is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal sur-
vey research programme on basic human values. The surv y explores the moral and social 
values underlying European social and political institutions and governing conduct. The first 
major survey was carried out in 1981 in ten European countries. Austria took in the second 
wave of surveys which was launched in 1990 and included all European countries (and many 
                                                
17 For a more detailed description of the ITANES programme see in Italian: http://www.itanes.org/index.asp, or in 
English at http://www.italianpoliticalscience.org/issue1/itanes-the-italian-national-election-study-serie  (last ac-
cessed 11-11-2008).  
18 Remember that the party electoral results have always been very different at the regional level. At the most 
recent elections of 2008 the party got 8.2 pct. of he votes at the national level, reaching the peak of 26.7 pct. of 
the votes in the Veneto region and 20.7 pct. in Lombardy (see Table 1.4; Chapter 1).  
19 For more details and archive of previous and following data see in: http://www.issp.org/data.shtml (last ac-
cessed 11-11-2008).  
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non-European). The data here refer to the 1999/2000 wave, as the last and more recent wave 
of EVS is not yet available.  
The ESS is a European-based and academically-driven social survey designed to track 
and explain the interaction between Europe’s changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs 
and behaviour patterns of its diverse populations. The first round was completed between 
2002 and 2003 and focussed on citizenship and immigration.20 Austria, Denmark and Italy 
were all represented. In the ESS, the number of cases representing the Austrian Freedom 
Party is relatively low, as in those years the party was just facing a critical period in terms of 
electoral support.21 However, the second-hand literature based on the Austrian electoral sur-
veys will also help to understand the party electoral p ofile and attitudes.  
It is perhaps uncommon to use so many different surveys in an analysis of the radical 
right. Particularly international surveys generally prefer to concentrate on one survey at time. 
This allows full use of the same variables in a cross-national and comparative perspective, but 
at the same time gives only a ‘snap-shot’ of the party t a particular period in time, which 
loosing therefore most of the information about how the party has developed and changed at 
the different stages of its political life. 
The period considered by the study in relation to the three parties focuses in particular 
on the years going from the late 1980s and 1990s and until the recent developments. For extra 
clarity, it is perhaps necessary to say that the temporal scale is open at both ends, particularly 
in respect to the qualitative material considered, whereas it is more precisely limited in rela-
tion to the quantitative data. However, the lifespan considered allows us to look at different 
phases of development of the three parties in terms of ideology, electoral support, govern-
ment-seeking strategies and political influence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 Each European Social Survey round has a questionnaire consisting of a permanent module, which is repeated at 
every round, and two or more rotating modules, designed by multi-national teams of experts and whose thematic 
focus varies at every round. The two modules carried out in the first round dealt with: 1) citizens, involvement 
and democracy and 2) immigration. See http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.  
21 Unfortunately it is even worse for the Danish Peopl ’s Party and the Northern League; this last represented by 
only 11 cases in the 2002 ESS.   
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3. PARTY IDEOLOGY IN A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK   
3.1 Introduction 
Considering the extensive literature on the rise of radical right parties that has been published 
since the mid 1980s, it is remarkable how little attention has been given to radical right-wing 
party ideology. In light of the assertions emphasising the increasing ideological similarities 
among radical right parties in Western Europe, comparative analyses of party ideology can 
uncover several aspects about the similarities and differences developed by these parties.   
An explanation for this lack of interest can be ascribed to the theoretical approach that 
since the 1980s has won a leading position in studies of these parties and which favours de-
scriptive and cause and effect approaches. The electoral breakthrough and development of 
radical right wing parties have most commonly been related to structuralist readings. This has 
often entailed that long-term ‘bottom up’ interpretations have represented a pivotal paradigm 
to explain the vote for the radical right in Western Europe. More specifically, the growing 
political and social discontent – or frustration – among voters who have been less favoured 
and are more sceptical about the transformations in advanced capitalist countries, are consid-
ered among the main explanations of the radical right wing and populist vote.   
As outlined in Chapter 1, many studies on radical right wing parties highlight the conse-
quences of the weakened class cleavage in party politics, which has declined over the last 
three decades in many Western post-industrial societies. This has given rise to a process of 
partisan dealignment, where traditional patterns of voter-party loyalties related to class inter-
ests have declined. And in a time of less predictable voting behaviour, where the rock-like 
configuration of class and partisan identities no longer anchors voters to specific parties, other 
‘doors’ have opened up for party competition. But this also means that parties are given the 
opportunity to capitalise the vote by investing in specific politics or issues, which can take 
advantage of the long-term and enduring structural transformations of societies (new cleav-
ages), as well as other short-term and country-specific settings and opportunities.  
In short, mass parties, which emerged in the era of industrialisation, urbanisation and 
broader suffrage and brought people of common interes  together based on a shared ideology, 
have slowly been replaced by parties promoting themselves on the rules of demand and sup-
ply driving the electoral market. Some studies (cf.for instance Kircheimer 1966; Katz and 
Mair 1994) emphasise some of the extreme results of his process, indicating that party com-
petition today is very similar to the marketing and ‘branding’ of a product, where the rule of 
thumb is to win the competition over marketable issues. 
Party competition is thus increasingly based on a struggle for the ‘ownership’ of a num-
ber of salient questions. The task of a political party is to construct a party platform that pro-
vides voters with decision criteria and allows them to distinguish these from competing op-
tions when they have to vote. It follows that political parties focus increasingly on influencing 
the content of the political agenda, rather than positioning themselves on a limited number of 
issues responding to the socioeconomic profile of their electoral basis. This dynamic has in-
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fluenced the content/framework of party ideology and the way parties place themselves in 
relation to each other in the political space.  
 
3.2 The radical right’s lack of ideology   
Within the interpretative framework described above, party positioning on specific issues, for 
example immigration, law and order, foreign policy and welfare, are given increasing impor-
tance on party agendas. To some extent, this also explains why several scholars still consider 
radical right parties more as ‘containers’ of single-issues, rather than parties with a defined 
Weltanschauung. This is partly confirmed by the frequent use of classifications such as ‘anti-
immigration’, or ‘protest/populist’ parties, which proliferated during the 1990s and clearly 
ascribed the electoral success of the radical right to the overwhelming ‘popularity’ of a spe-
cific and selected number of issues (see for example Van der Brug et al. 2000; Van der Brug 
& Fennema 2003). Undoubtedly, one of the most distinct features of the radical right wing 
parties – particularly in recent years – has been th  s rong opposition to immigration. This is 
also one of the reasons why ‘anti-immigration’ today h s overshadowed the protest and popu-
list component, which until the 1990s was among the main interpretations of the vote to the 
radical right.  
One of the intentions of this chapter is to show that radical right wing ideology is more 
complex and broad than most scholars and analysts have been inclined to concede. There is 
also reason to expect that the legitimisation of a number of radical right parties as partners or 
supporters of government coalitions (a condition which applies to the three parties considered 
here) has influenced the parties’ ideology in two directions: 1) constraining the way the radi-
cal right in government incites anti-immigrant sentiments and 2) inducing these parties to 
elaborate more comprehensive programmes and political agendas. 
In the literature on radical right wing parties, many scholars are cautious to use the word 
‘ideology’ when speaking about these parties. It isas if scholars think that the parties lack a 
defined ideology, because they prefer opportunistically to follow the electoral disposition of 
the moment (e.g. protest/anti-establishment feelings), or because they rely almost exclusively 
on single issues (anti-immigration). For sure, several radical right parties’ agendas neglect to 
take clear standpoints on some issues, for example socioeconomic policy and environmental 
questions. Paradoxical shifts between contrasting positions on certain issues can therefore 
occur, without the party feeling the urgency to explain or justify the changes to the electorate. 
However, the political incoherence and ideological unfeasibility that have often been as-
cribed to the radical right are likely to characteris  the initial phases of a party history. Par-
ticularly for a newly formed party, it can be more advantageous to concentrate on more ap-
pealing and vote winning issues. However, this strategy is unlikely to last forever. Electoral 
support for a political party whose ideological platform relies on a single issue, cannot survive 
in the long run, even if the issue has been the most important catalyst for the party’s electoral 
breakthrough. Voters continue to support a party onl  if it demonstrates effectiveness and 
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reliability and if it is associated with issues where it is perceived as competent. The danger is 
to lose electoral support and die out, particularly in cases where protest and floating voters 
represented the main electoral recipient for a party’s electoral breakthrough. This hypothesis 
is supported by some studies (see for example Van der Brug & Fennema 2003), which indi-
cate that most of the radical right voters explain their vote with the same variables that deter-
mine preferences for mainstream parties. Votes for these parties are not necessarily protest 
votes, particularly in the long run. 
In line with the role and political influence of a r dical right party, there is reason to ex-
pect a diversification and development of its politics. But does this mean that the political 
strategy is to pick up new issues that might attract and gratify voters? In relation to this form 
of party behaviour in times of fast socioeconomic transformations, some scholars speak about 
transaction party politics (see Klages 2003; 2002). Free from the political constraints and 
ideological legacies characterising mainstream parties, he radical right can invest in issues 
which are particularly appealing to the electorate nd which the other parties do not give 
enough space to. To attract voters from the whole pitical spectrum, transaction parties espe-
cially use symbolic political issues, whose content is deliberately made simplistic and acces-
sible to everybody. Voters then feel directly engaged in the making of the party agenda and 
are therefore more likely to vote for the party. But again, how long can this political strategy 
last? And what happens when a party achieves government responsibility?  
The transaction party thesis has a weak point: the need for a party to take in new issues 
to attract new voters or maximise existing electoral support is considered a permanent condi-
tion rather than a transitional stage leading to a new stable political and ideological position.  
This interpretation can partly be ascribed to a reading which has become rather wide-
spread in the literature on political parties and which is related to the observation that main-
stream parties tend to move towards the political middle to attract more voters. This means 
that mainstream parties are less likely to make sudden changes in their party platform, or to 
take radical positions which could imply a loss of v ters. The same definition ‘mainstream 
parties’ (but even more ‘catch-all parties’, nowadays frequently in use) indicates the effort to 
appeal to as many voters as possible. On the other sid , the so-called peripheral parties tend to 
operate on the fringes of the political spectrum and their main characteristic is to be ideologi-
cally more volatile than mainstream parties.22 This is because these parties are able to direct 
their attention to a single or a limited number of issues, making them the focal point of their 
objectives and eventually adopting new issues and positions when the electoral appeal of the 
former is fading. In this sense peripheral parties can be considered the antithesis of main-
                                                
22 In the spatial theory of party competition (for example also in Kitschelt 1995), political parties compete for 
votes by strategically altering their policy position and/or choice situations (influenced also by politica  opportu-
nity structures). This happens, for example, by adopting winning policy positions on certain issues and/or by 
promoting the importance of their winning issues over others. This approach can be seen at the opposite pole of 
the interpretation which emphasizes the role of the political elite, in giving shape and content to the public re-
sponse to political events. The reality is rather somewhere in between these two opposite readings (on this point 
cf. Ivarsflaten 2008).  
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stream parties in terms of focus, tactics and objectiv s. Radical right parties are often consid-
ered as peripheral parties (see also Williams 2006), mainly because they are positioned at the 
margins of the political landscape (even if some of them have managed to ‘leave the ghetto’ 
and achieved political influence). However, the peripheral position of a radical right party 
should not be confused with permanent lack of political coherence and influence. A banal 
observation of how this happens is that a party’s strategies and chances to be heard nowadays 
are more and much less traditional than in the past. As a matter of fact, most of the radical 
right parties in Western Europe very early developed w ll-designed and wide-ranging home-
pages compared to other mainstream parties, which have come later in the process. 
The opportunity to persuade and influence the public opinion on issues where the main-
stream parties have shown a certain disinterest is thus not (or at least not only) necessarily the 
result of an opportunistic strategy. The development and restructuring of Western European 
societies have undoubtedly created new potential interests and demands that can be translated 
by the political elite into an ideological framework, which is able to mobilise voters and re-
structure party politics. And again, this does not happen only because of bottom-up dynamics. 
As pointed out by Goul Andersen: ‘this perspective is pretty different from the bottom-up 
approach (…) Focusing on political actors and on, what conflicts are about, allows to link the 
macro-, and meso- with the microlevel’ (Goul Andersen 2007: 21). 
The meso-level is about how the parties, through the agency of the political elite, are 
able to articulate the conflicts emerging at the socio-structural level into concrete and elec-
torally successful ideological frameworks. 
Seen within a broader perspective, this situation has encouraged the party to articulate 
and support clear political positions, which have also influenced the other parties. Bale (2003) 
suggests that the legitimisation of the radical right in several Western European countries and 
its policy impact has in fact strongly influenced the established parties. According to his 
analysis, this can be seen in the way traditional centre-right wing parties (mostly liberals and 
conservatives) – particularly on immigration policy and law and order – have started to in-
habit and promote parts of the same discursive and rhetoric universe, which before was almost 
exclusively the domain of the radical right agenda.  
The shrinking of the political distance between parties of the centre-right and the radical 
right is a consequence of the fact that several of the issues raised by the radical right had a 
considerable appeal among voters, most notably on pr blems related to immigration, crime 
and welfare abuse. The radical right agenda became mor likely to win voters and therefore 
more attractive also among mainstream parties of the right. This has helped remove the con-
straints preventing a majority right wing coalition in parliament. Radical right and populist 
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votes were either going to the left (in the case of blue-collar voters), or were considered as 
wasted (in the sense that they did not benefit the office-seeking parties of the right).23  
The three parties observed in this study are an example of the legitimisation process 
which took place at the end of the 1990s, enabling the formation of governing coalitions in-
cluding the radical right; something considered an almost impossible scenario only a decade 
before. This has made a number of new research questions highly relevant in relation to the 
radical right wing parties. But it has also urged a look at the impact of the radical right politics 
on the other parties. Has radical right support hadany impact on the decisions and reforms 
made by the government, in particular on core issue represented by immigration policies? 
And have government responsibility and political inf uence affected the radical right parties 
and their ideology?  
This chapter is going to look closer at how ideology can be tackled, first of all in com-
parative terms. Looking at the parties’ recent electoral results, the success is clearly varied. 
Political strategy and ideology cannot explain the success or failure of a party as such.24 The 
aim here is rather to look at the development of ideology of the party through the different 
phases of its life-time by considering a number of main ideological dimensions.25  
 
3.3 Party ideology: conceptual and methodological ref ections 
It is not easy to give a simple and exhaustive answer to what party ideology is. The word 
‘ideology’ has no generally accepted definition and it has often been ‘loaded’ with different 
meanings, depending on the subject analysed and the approach adopted for the analysis (see 
for example Eatwell 1999). Furthermore, the importance of studying the ideology of political 
parties has at times been challenged by positions maintaining that the time of ideologies has 
come to an end or that any form of meta-narration was deemed to be past and finished. The 
lack of comparative research into the ideologies of political parties can perhaps be explained 
as a result of this position (see also Mudde 2000). However, parties still refer to fundamental 
principles and positions in their programmes and this is what allows them to distinguishing 
themselves from the others and to compete in the political system.   
                                                
23 Although it can be argued that most of the radical right wing party leadership declares that the party is willing 
to support both centre-right wing and centre-left wing parties and coalitions, provided that these can realize as 
much as the radical right party politics as possible. To be sure, radical right parties reject the tradi ional classifica-
tion between Left and Right. Jean-Marie Le Pen saidthat the French Front Nationale is ‘neither to the Right, nor 
to the Left’ (ni droite ni gauche). This position has the clear advantage of appealing to those voters, which Mayer 
(2002: 41-57) defines as the ‘ninistes’.  
24 Since the mid-1980s, a plethora of articles and stu ies have dealt with radical right electoral success, showing 
how difficult it is to make conclusive and univocal explanations for the rise and success of the radical right parties 
in Western Europe. Significantly, some recent analyses have begun to look instead at the reasons of the failure of 
the radical right (see for example Ivarsflaten 2006). The approach in this chapter is to look at the experience of 
the radical right by means of an analysis of party ideology taking into account how three different radic l right 
parties developed their ideology when they achieved political influence. This approach can help explain why 
some parties have been electorally more successful than others, but electoral success is not the dependent variable 
to be explained.  
25 The position supported by this chapter is that a change of party politics (but also permanence) can be identified 
in party programmes and in the official literature of a party. 
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Martin Seliger’s early classical work, Ideology and Politics uggests some approaches that are 
still helpful to study party ideology and to understand how it develops and changes in relation 
to the different positions that a party occupies in the political system. Seliger distinguishes 
between an inclusive and a restrictive conception of party ideology. In his words: 
 
What defines the inclusive use of ‘ideology’ in the context of social and political theory and sci-
ence is that it covers sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of or-
ganised social action, and specifically political action, irrespectively of whether such actions 
aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given order.  
In the restrictive use of the term, ‘ideology’ is reserved for extremist belief systems and parties; 
or ideological factors are held to be present in some and absent from other belief systems; or at 
least they are assumed to be more important in some than in others (Seliger 1976: 14). 
 
For sure, it is the inclusive conception of ideology that best describes the meaning of party 
ideology in the present study. As also other scholars h ve observed, the risk in the restricted 
use of the term ‘ideology’ is to limit both the view of the phenomenon and its usage in com-
parative research; what in fact can be perceived as extremist and ideological in one context, 
can be moderate and non-ideological in another (see also Mudde 2000). 
More specifically, this chapter focuses on an analysis of the ‘conceptual frame of refer-
ence’ built by the parties and providing the criteria of choice and decision, by virtue of which 
the major activities of the party are oriented and governed (Seliger 1976). A rather compre-
hensive indication of a party’s fundamental ideas and directions on the nature of society and 
how it should be organised and governed can be found in the party programmes and official 
literature; this kind of material is moreover rather useful to show how the ideology of a party 
has developed and changed over time.  
Some scholars (see e.g. Fennema and Pollman 1998) argue that party ideology does not 
only consist of the set of moral principles and political axioms primarily found in party pro-
grammes and party literature. These represent the ‘ingredients’ of party ideology, which an-
swer the more immediate principles and positions of the electorate, whereas it is a party’s 
political doctrine that creates the clear logical relationship among the key ideological con-
cepts. Behind the political doctrine of a party is often the work of one or more intellectuals, 
whose intellectual activity and writings are considered crucial for the ideas and positions de-
veloped by the party.  
There is no reason to doubt that specific political theorists may have exerted a relevant 
influence in forming the policies of a party (think for example about the influence that the 
Nouvelle Droite has had on the Front National in France), but this ‘ideological debt’ is not 
always openly recognised by the party members. Moreover, it can be difficult to determine to 
what extent, when, and in some cases for how long the political doctrine has influenced the 
ideology of a party.26 Therefore, this chapter on (comparative) party ideology will mainly 
                                                
26 Some conclusions on party ideology made on the basis of interviews with party members a decade ago would 
give rather different results if repeated today (see F nnema and Pollman 1998). A case in point is the Italian party 
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focus on party literature, whereas the reference to a specific doctrine or thought is limited to 
cases where the party explicitly refers to the work r set of guidelines, which can clearly be 
attributed to the intellectual work of a single person or a ‘school of thought’.  
Highlighting the role of the political elite in the definition of ideological frameworks 
poses the question about how stable these frameworks are, particularly when confronted with 
changes in a party’s placement within the political system. For instance, what happens to the 
ideology of a radical right party when the party’s political platform is considered in relation to 
a lifespan model?27  
The main implication of a lifespan model is evolution and change: a party in general has 
to go through several stages of development, which can be influenced by different factors, 
such as institutional context, threshold levels, conditions of the political opportunity structure, 
voters’ preferences. Each stage presents different challenges, which can be general or country 
specific. Schematically described, we can distinguish three main stages, or phases of devel-
opment. A first stage consists in surpassing the thr shold of representation in order to gain 
political visibility. The second stage is the consolidation phase, where the party has to deal 
with aspects related to its internal organisation and structure. At this stage, it is important for 
the party to be able to build an image of coherence and stability to keep the electoral support 
and attract new voters. A third stage is when a party is able to reach government responsibility 
and/or a certain degree of political influence. In this case, it can be necessary for a party to 
redefine its party politics, for example distance its lf from some radical positions which might 
have characterised the party’s most recent past.   
These stages interest all radical right parties, although the direction of development is of 
course not necessarily linear and progressive. Support or hurdles to party development can 
depend on several circumstances, for instance the party’s internal structure and organisation 
and the environment in which the party operates. Several Western European radical right par-
ties have nonetheless and in a relatively short time come through all three stages, which 
means that their position is now changed in relation to the past.  
Today, several radical right parties exercise more than a limited influence on the politi-
cal system. A recent study states that radical right parties do in fact matter (Williams 2006) 
also if they are placed at the electoral margins in the political landscape. This is also why the 
radical right phenomenon today cannot be explained as a deviant case, or as the result of a 
temporary form of protest against mainstream parties. Also the high mortality rate among 
small parties of recent formation has in the case of the radical right proven incorrect. 
                                                                                                                                              
Alleanza Nazionale, whose leadership would nowadays h rdly mention Mussolini, Evola or Gentile as its intel-
lectual fathers. Just like party literature and party p ogrammes, a party doctrine is subject to change, according to 
transformations of different kinds, involving the political opportunity structure and choices of party s rategy. 
27 A detailed indication of a lifespan model can be found for example in Mogens Pedersen (1988). Despite their 
importance, the institutional and situational conditions characterising the different phases that Peders n calls 
declaration, authorization, representation and declin  are not emphasised here, but rather the parties’ work on the 
ideological platform as far as different conditions and opportunities relate to different main stages of the party 
lifetime. 
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At the time of writing, several Western European radic l right parties that had their elec-
toral breakthrough in the mid-1980s and 1990s have experienced some degree of government 
responsibility. The three parties considered here are the first and clear examples of this devel-
opment: they have survived some important stages of ev lution and there is reason to expect 
that this has required a re-evaluation and perhaps transformation of their political pro-
grammes, as a consequence of their involvement in pol tical decision making and policy im-
pact. The analysis will therefore pay attention to the direction party ideology has developed 
over time and in particular in relation to the different phases of the party life.  
The background history of the three parties offers good premises for research in the way 
mentioned above. It is in fact about two decades since scholars began to be interested in the 
rise of the radical right parties in Western Europe. The scholarly literature on this field inten-
sified significantly around the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, at a time where most of 
the radical right parties still represented a peripheral phenomenon, but were electorally in-
creasingly significant.  
On the other side, the radical right, which managed to ‘leave the ghetto’ and achieve 
electoral acknowledgement had a very hard job to do to consolidate its electoral support. The 
fact that several radical right parties have survived important stages of party development 
gives more elements for a comparative analysis that can break with an approach that is often 
limited to an analysis of the reasons for the radicl right electoral breakthrough and success. 
Some steps in this direction have already been taken by a number of recent scholarly studies 
(see e.g. Minkenberg 2001; Williams 2006; Mudde 2007), which consider more carefully the 
radical right political content and impact, rather than an explanation of its emergence and suc-
cess. The position achieved by these parties has drawn attention to the importance of the radi-
cal right policies and discourses and on their effect on mainstream parties and on policy mak-
ing processes.   
In his work on party ideology, Seliger mentions for example that there are in effect two 
important dimensions forming the ideology of a party (Seliger 1976: 108): a fundamental and 
an operative dimension. The fundamental dimension is found in party programmes and party 
official documents and consists of the central statements and foundations of party ideology. 
According to Seliger, moral principles are here placed at the centre. Around these, in a sort of 
‘feeding-up constellation’, we find other interacting components, including the means avail-
able for the implementation of these values, the examination of their impact and the definition 
of the politics, which allow realising the maximum of these values. 
However, the politics of a party have to cope with the political context within which the 
party operates. This means that competition with other parties, feedback from the electorate 
and eventually participation in government often call for a re-evaluation of the political 
strategies and politics of a party. This creates what Seliger defines as the operative dimension 
of party ideology, where short-term, more pragmatic nd inevitably empirically oriented po-
litical goals prevail. 
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Both ideological dimensions are important to explore party ideology and the way it has 
developed and changed over time. The two dimensions also draw attention to the fact that 
ideology is not a static formulation of goals and beliefs, but a more dynamic construction 
which is highly influenced by the conditions and situation of the surrounding environment. 
As a methodological guideline for an empirical study aiming at positioning a party ideo-
logical standpoint, Seliger considers both the party fundamental and operative ideology di-
mensions. This suggests that it is important to look at the ideology of a party both within a 
specific party systems (in relation to other parties and the conditions within which the party 
operates) and in a comparative perspective (with similar – or allegedly similar – parties in 
other countries).  
 
3.4 On the different methodological approaches to the study of party ideology: a critical as-
sessment 
Dealing with party ideology opens up the question about how to analyse the material avail-
able. As an important methodological aspect of thisc apter, it deserves to be discussed and 
explained in more detail.  
Very schematically, there are two approaches to the analysis of party ideology: a quanti-
tative and a qualitative approach. Several comparative studies on party ideology and strategy 
use the quantitative approach. One of the most important examples is the Comparative Mani-
festo Project (CMP), which today dominates the comparative study of party ideology in 
Europe. Over the years, the scholars affiliated with this project have compiled a large amount 
of documents, which have been filed in a party manifesto database (see Budge et al. 1987). 
The CMP’s dataset is the most extensively validated set of policy estimates, collecting cross-
national data on the content of party manifestos, which date back to the first elections held 
after WWII. Party manifestos are coded according to a measuring of most debated issues. 
These are then clustered in a number of ‘domains’ by means of a factor analysis, revealing 
how single issues closely relate to each other forming broad areas of the political debate. The 
underlying coding procedure which is used to plug in the party manifestos is represented by 
the sentence. More precisely, the dataset provides information on the number of quasi-
sentences found in each party manifesto, which can be related to a specific topic.  
The strength of this method is that it enables comparisons across time and space. Its 
weakness is the closure of the coding scheme, which cannot be changed without jeopardising 
its ability to allow the comparative research. Another main limitation of the manifesto project 
dataset is that its main aim was to develop a measur  of the placement of political parties on a 
traditional left-right scale (cf. Green Pedersen 2006). Therefore, the analysis on new issues is 
still limited and does not grant the same level of precision. 
The use of expert surveys is another method to explore party ideology and in particular 
to indicate party position. Expert surveys consist of ratings made by qualified political scien-
tists in established democracies on a party position on the national political system (Laver and 
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Hunt 1992). But as already observed for the comparative manifesto project, this kind of 
analysis indicates the party placement in the natiol political arena and in relation to parties 
or families of parties in other countries, but it is not able to specify if and where there are 
ideological differences and similarities.  
The quantitative method that can be used for the analysis of party ideology fits better in 
comparative analyses of a large number of parties and countries, where the scope of the 
analysis is to compare policies and party families rather than ideologies. Already the need to 
restrict the inquiry to party manifestos does not offer the possibility to integrate party ideol-
ogy with other relevant sources of party literature. B sides, coding frames and procedures 
used by the computerised method are very inflexible and ‘unable to learn’ during the process. 
It is still difficult – not to say impossible – for a computerised system to discover the hierar-
chy, saliency and causal chain connecting different issues in a given context.28 
If the goal is to focus on the way ideology and a specific ideological argument is built 
up and develops through time, a quantitative approach c n help only to the extent that it can 
say something about the saliency and the complexity of a specific issue, or of a cluster of is-
sues (i.e. on the welfare state, freedom and democracy, foreign policy) in party agendas at a 
particular point in time or over a longer time span. In this sense, a qualitative approach is best 
for the empirical analysis of the material chosen for this study. In relation to what it has been 
said above, it is interesting to look at the way the ree parties have exploited the potentials 
that were opened up by the emergence of new conflicti g social dimensions emerging from 
the recent processes of post-industrialisation and globalisation, by formulating politics that 
can bring together a plurality of social demands. On the other side, a qualitative comparative 
analysis of party ideology highlights possible ideological convergences which may have taken 
place among the parties and/or the differences that remain among them.    
The method adopted for the analysis of party ideology can be characterised as a qualita-
tive extensive textual analysis. This method refers to a research process which has already 
been used in a few other studies of comparative radical right party ideology and which in-
volves different steps of analysis (see Mudde 2000, but also Gardberg 1993). A first step con-
sists in the careful and extensive reading of the literature available, which attempts to frame 
what kind of ideological dimensions and issues characterise the party. At this point, it is not 
only important to be aware of the differences among the three parties, but also to observe how 
the same party may have changed focus and position over time in relation to some issues. At 
this stage, some attention has also to be paid to the argumentative strategies, style and rhetoric 
that the three parties employ in their agendas. However, the aim of this chapter is to look at 
(describe and compare) what the three parties say, rather than how they say it. References to 
                                                
28 This interpretation is perhaps a little too schematic. In fact, there are approaches which today offer effective 
quantitative methods and tools for qualitative textual analysis, for example the qualitative text analysis using the 
software NVivo. The efficacy of NVivo is still limited by the availability of documents in digitalized form. But in 
many cases, large parts of the party material are still only available on paper (particularly ‘old’ party literature). 
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the semantic of the discourse (see i.e. Van Dijk 1993) are therefore only be considered to a 
limited extent in the following pages and only in those few cases where they can help to better 
explain an ideological argumentation or causal chain, but they do not represent one of the 
main interests of this study.  
As may be expected, the character of the party literature that will be considered seldom 
deals with one topic at time. This is why it is important to be aware of the causal chain link-
ing the different ideological arguments and discourses (see also Mudde 2000). The direction 
of the argumentation is often hierarchically organised and the meaning of a period or section 
can be understood only by discovering the underlying relationship. An example is a passage 
of a party programme which deals with welfare state problems, but where the causal relation 
leads to the core of the argument represented by immigration and its impact on public spend-
ing. This is why it is important to understand how different arguments can be articulated in 
relation to each other and where the focal point of the argumentation can be found.29  
But the initial qualitative textual reading of party ideology is not in itself ensuring that 
all the most relevant ideological dimensions are taken into account. The risk is to explore 
party literature against the background of a pre-made pproach and frame, which inevitably 
can result in putting emphasis only on some few and manifest ideological features. This kind 
of approach characterises several studies of the radical right ideology. Party ideology is in 
these cases locked into an interpretative frame that is shaped when the phenomenon is consid-
ered, for example, to have its origins in post-war fascism, populism or new politics.  
Keeping this risk in mind, the list of the most relevant ideological dimensions that can 
help structure and carry out the comparative analysis of the three parties is defined on the ba-
sis of a combined strategy. An anticipation of this can be described in a sort of ‘mapping and 
comparing’ the ideological dimensions considered in some of the most relevant works on the 
radical right. This preliminary exploration will also include the features which emerged from 
the analysis of the three main hypotheses introduced in Chapter 2 (cf. Table 2.1).  
The three hypotheses also indicate a possible path of development of radical right party 
ideology. Within such an interpretative framework, it is expected that the period of emergence 
and electoral breakthrough of a party is mainly characterised by an emphasis on populist is-
sues, which appeal to those voters who – for different easons (related also to national specific 
situations) – were clearly discontent with the status quo and can convey their dissatisfaction 
by voting for a radical right party. But protest and populism are an inadequate strategy in the 
                                                
29 Discourse theory speaks about ‘nodal points’, whose function is to create and sustain the identity of a certain 
discourse by constructing a knot of definite meaning (Torfing 2003: 98). A nodal point cannot stay alone, in the 
sense that alone it is an absent fullness that needs to be loaded with more precise substantive contents, which 
people are able to recognize and identify with. Examples of nodal points are ‘the nation’, ‘democracy’, ‘the peo-
ple’: the meaning of these words is so overloaded that they can actually signify everything and nothing. But it is 
precisely the apparent emptiness that makes their rol  as unifiers of a discourse possible. The concept of a nodal 
point is part of the system of concepts developed by the two scholars Laclau and Mouffe (1985) in their discourse 
theory. According to the explorative and empirical haracter of this study, the discourse theory here only informs 
the analysis of party ideology, but it is not going to be used as a theoretical framework.  
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long run. Therefore, it is likely that the following step in development of party ideology goes 
in the direction of new cleavages and value politics. In this case, the opposition to globalisa-
tion and the emphasis on the risks of marginalisation may characterise a transitory phase to-
wards a clearer definition and development of exclusionary identity politics, where the role 
played by ethnic belonging, culture, values and principles is given a first place in the politics 
of the party.  
In reality, the path concretely followed by each of the three parties analysed is very 
likely to deviate from the simplified order indicated above. However, this schematic way to 
proceed has the advantage of indicating a pattern, where different stages of party development 
are taken into account. Deviations and overlaps are ce tainly going to characterise the empiri-
cal results and one of the tasks of the comparative pproach is to explain why this occurs.  
To indicate how the main hypotheses can explain the development of radical right ide-
ology is here also considered a way to make more explicit what several scholars have already 
said. Few would contest the importance played by the national component and by politics of 
belonging and identity for the radical right today. There is also a clear indication that assimi-
lationist positions are winning ground not just among radical right parties but also among 
mainstream parties. However, it is necessary to look cl ser at how this has taken place in the 
three cases and what other features characterise the ideology of the parties today. 
The following section looks at the ideological dimensions defined by the three hypothe-
ses. The main challenge is represented by the attempt to regroup different and relevant issues 
into a limited but exhaustive set of basic categories, with the help of the existing theories. The 
categories so outlined should be able to capture the underlying dimensions of radical right 
ideological development, the similarities and differences among the three parties and their 
political impact on mainstream politics. 
 
3.5 The radical right main ideological dimensions  
As argued several times in this study, genuinely comparative studies of radical right parties 
have – at least until recently – been quite underrepresented in academic research. There are 
some few contributions in this direction which are worth noticing, though. The short and early 
study by Annvi Gardberg (1993) on the ideological profile of four Western European radical 
right parties is perhaps among the first real attempts to look at the similarities and differences 
of four parties by taking into account party programmes and interviews with leading members 
of the four parties. 
In order to clarify the meanings and to establish adequate working definitions for the 
ideological characteristics of the radical right parties (cf. Gardberg 1993), the author distin-
guishes among six different broad approaches: neo-fascism; extreme right; nationalism; xeno-
phobia or racism; neo-conservative and neo-liberal; populism and protest. Each approach then 
specifies a number of ideological elements that the author tests on the empirical material. The 
comparative analysis highlights a few important differences and similarities among the par-
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ties. However, the study only pays little attention t  the ideological development and trans-
formation.  
Another comparative study on the ideology of five extr me right wing parties30 is done 
by Cas Mudde (Mudde 2000), who also considers different ideological features: nationalism; 
exclusionism; xenophobia; the strong state; socio-eonomic policy; populist anti-party senti-
ments; democracy and ethical values. Some of these (nationalism, exclusionism, xenophobia, 
the strong state) are mentioned as main indicators for the ideology of the extreme right 
(Mudde 2000: 24). The list of radical right main ideological dimensions is based on an exten-
sive reading of the existing literature on the topic, from which the author completed a list of 
the most important features for the analysis of extreme right wing ideology (Mudde 1995; 
1996).  
In 26 definitions of right wing extremism that Mudde found in the literature, no less than 
58 features were actually mentioned at least one tim . However, only five of these features 
were mentioned, in one form or another, by at least h lf of the authors, namely: nationalism, 
racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state (see Mudde 1996). It is with refer-
ence to these issues that Mudde carries out a comparative analysis of party ideology. Only 
few other dimensions are considered, when they may turn out to be of particular importance 
for the ideological foundation of one of the parties analysed in his comparative study.  
Compared to Gardberg’s study, the definition of a limited number of issues is in effect 
more suitable for a comparative analysis of party ideology, which is already complicated by 
the different country-specific features. Structuring the analysis into few core ideological di-
mensions allows the author to concentrate on relevant aspects of party ideology and to dis-
close eventual similarities, differences and convergences in the politics developed by the 
cases studied. This is clearly not an easy task, but it is often the ambition to create perfect 
models of comparison that often discourages research in the direction of comparative politics. 
The present comparative study is partly inspired by the methodological approach sug-
gested by Gardberg and Mudde, but with some important differences. The two authors tend to 
privilege an approach in which there is no clear indication of the stage of development of the 
parties considered. This means that the guiding principle behind these methods is to consider 
a large sample of studies on the radical right, dealing with known and less known parties of 
the Western European radical right. According to Mudde, this way of sorting the literature 
ensures that relevant dimensions of radical right wing party ideology are not missed; a prob-
lem that can arise for example when the literature is limited from the beginning to the analysis 
of the ‘usual suspects’, i.e. the scholarly more ‘popular’ radical right parties such as the 
French Front National. And yet, the selection of the relevant ideological dimensions depends 
on what kind of explanation and hypotheses characterise the studies, which are taken into ac-
count and significantly also on the history and role f the parties considered. In this sense, 
                                                
30 The parties are the two German parties Die Republikaner and Deutsche Volksunion, the Belgian Vlaams Blok, 
the two Dutch Centrumdemocraten and Centrumpartij ’86.  
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much of the analysis of radical right ideology lacks a more critical assessment of the dimen-
sions considered. The key ideological categories of radical right party ideology in reality lean 
against a classic interpretation of the phenomenon of right wing extremism. This approach is 
also framed by studies on neo-fascism and post-war extremism, where dimensions such as 
anti-democracy, anti-parliamentarism, strong state n tionalism, anti-Semitism and conspiracy 
theories are included in the framework. More recently, Ignazi (see Chapter 1) has updated the 
analysis of right wing extremism suggesting to distinguish between old and new extreme right 
wing parties, where anti-democracy and the strong state are still on the agenda, but their rele-
vance is essential to define the legacies of the contemporary extreme right to the past (the 
more important these features are for a party, the closer the party is to the old extreme right 
wing).  
In this chapter the main ideological dimensions for the radical right ideology are opera-
tionalised with the help of the existing and more recent literature and – as mentioned – with 
the help of the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 1. Interpreting the rise of a radical right party 
within a specific theoretical framework undoubtedly contributes to emphasising some aspects 
of party ideology and politics rather than others. It is therefore important to make more ex-
plicit what kind of ideological dimensions are considered relevant and in relation to what 
main interpretation.   
The three main approaches are the new political clevages, the anti-globalisation and 
welfare chauvinist approach and the protest anti-establi hment and populist approach. As ob-
served in Chapter 2, these approaches are still the most widespread in the recent literature on 
the radical right, both in analyses of single national cases and in cross-national comparative 
studies, and their implications are often (more or less explicitly) considered independent vari-
ables for the study of the vote to the radical right party. In the following, the task is to look at 
what kind of ideological dimensions originate from the three hypotheses when they are con-
sidered in relation to radical right ideology.  
The attempt is to open up a realm of different ideological ‘combinations’ when dealing 
with the analysis of the empirical material. This means that instead of starting from an a priori 
definition of a ‘winning formula’, which later needs to be adjusted and justified according to 
the cases which deviate from the formula, the ideological issues related to the three hypothe-
ses can here empirically help locate the party in a two-dimensional political space created by a 
classical socio-economic left-right dimension and by a libertarian/authoritarian dimension 
(some prefer to define this more neutrally as a cultural and value dimension) where new is-
sues such as immigration demarcate the position of the party, in this case in relation to its 
ideological position. It is important to underline that the positioning of a party is not to be 
considered static, but liable to change, particularly in relation to different phases of its devel-
opment, or more simply the party life-course. 
This allows suggesting a development pattern for radical right wing ideology. Most 
likely, some of the issues matured during the firstphases of the party life, which mainly char-
 67 
acterised the party’s breakthrough and role while they are going to be strongly underempha-
sised in later phases of the party development; it is for example the case of populist and anti-
establishment claims. The phases of party maturity and government responsibility are also 
expected to influence the ideology of these parties s gnificantly, in the direction of less ex-
treme positions and more compromise seeking politics. Being in government as a support 
partner or as part of a government coalition undoubtedly gives better access to institutional 
channels of influence, allowing greater visibility n the political arena and increased legisla-
tive power. This may also have given rise to strategies from mainstream parties trying to co-
opt salient issues from the radical right.   
Theory suggests that government responsibility has a ‘return impact’ on the ideology of 
the radical right that can be visible in the party’s self-restraint on positions that could be 
judged far too extreme in a government situation. Furthermore, it is expected that the greater 
visibility in the political arena obliges the party to enhance issues other than those that have 
contributed to its electoral breakthrough, such as anti-immigration in the case of the radical 
right parties. In this sense, government responsibility contributes to a change of the political 
agenda of the radical right in the direction of less radical positions and a more diversified 
agenda setting. At any rate, does this development actually epitomise what in effect has hap-
pened to the empirical cases considered in this study? And if there is reason to believe that 
government responsibility affects the agenda of the radical right, how is this documented in 
the empirical cases at hand?  
Since it would be difficult, not to say impossible, to look at the development of radical 
right party ideology in a comparative perspective without considering the transformations that 
have taken place over time, the empirical analysis considers three phases of the history and 
ideology of these parties, which will be introduced and explained further in Chapter 4, but 
roughly sketched consist of: an initial breakthrough and formative phase; a phase of consoli-
dation and maturity and a third phase of influence and government responsibility. 
 
3.6 The new political cleavage hypothesis: ideological dimensions for the study of the radical 
right parties 
In his comparative analysis of the radical right in Western Europe, Herbert Kitschelt explicit 
refers to the hypothesis of new social and politica cleavages. The emergence of the radical 
right parties is considered an outcome of the transformations brought about by post-
industrialisation and by the increasing internationalisation of the markets. In his words 
(Kitschelt 1995: vii): 
 
The social structure and economy of advanced capitalism have given salience to a competitive 
dimension of politics with two aspects: economically leftist (redistributive) and politically as 
well as culturally libertarian (participatory and ind vidualist) positions at one extreme and eco-
nomically rightist, freemarketeering as well as politically and culturally authoritarian positions 
at the other. 
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The framework that Kitschelt uses for the analysis of the radical right is directly derived from 
what the author used to explain the rise of left libertarian parties in his book on the transfor-
mation of European Social Democracy (Kitschelt 1994). Together, the two books form a 
comprehensive reading and explanation of the dynamics and factors which gave rise to new 
parties on both the left and the right wing of the political spectrum. The emergence of these 
parties is described in close relationship to the political processes that in the context of ad-
vanced post-industrial capitalism brought about a significant redefinition of what was tradi-
tionally considered the political left and right.  
The electoral appeal of the new parties on the right and on the left is therefore inter-
preted in relation to the major changes in the working structure and living conditions of to-
day’s post-industrial societies, where new kinds of values and new forms of political demands 
have emerged. In short, these transformations have – according to Kitschelt – provoked a 
process of ideological convergence of mainstream parties towards the centre, following the 
purpose of maximising the vote of the moderate electorate. This pursuit of the median voter is 
considered to have opened up free areas of political action for a new (or ‘renewed’) radical 
authoritarian right and for new libertarian parties on the left wing. In this sense, Kitschelt con-
siders the success of the new radical right as highly dependent on the opportunity and ability 
of these parties (supply side) to adjust their programs and their electoral strategies to the new 
demands (demand side). As Kitschelt observes (Kitschelt 1995: 3): 
 
The sociological account of right-authoritarian politics remains incomplete without a reconstruc-
tion of the strategies of political entrepreneurs that seize on opportunities to build genuinely new 
right-authoritarian parties 
 
This interpretation takes the political opportunity structure as an important factor to explain 
the rise of the new radical right. Two main ideological dimensions are seen as characterising 
the politics of the radical right: a freemarketeering neo-liberal position in socioeconomic pol-
icy and an authoritarian position in the value dimension.  
However, in relation to the aim of this chapter, which is a more precise definition of the 
radical right ideological dimensions, it is important to look closer at the way Kitschelt (as well 
as other authors referring to this hypothesis) concretely gives the two dimensions mentioned 
above contents (see Table 3.1).  
 
 69 
Table 3.1 The new political cleavages hypothesis: ideological dimensions for the new radical right 
Social process Ideological dimensions Characteristics 
Post-industrialism Socio economic policy 
Freemarketeering neo-liberalism, flat/proportional 
taxation, spontaneous market allocation, free industrial 
growth, environment under material production  
Exclusionary politics 
Restrictive immigration policy; narrow definition of
citizenship rights; narrow entitlement to civic rights; 
emphasis on community and cultural/ethnic homoge-
neity; islamophobia 
State and political organi-
sation 
Strong state; law and order (harder punishments for 
crimes); collective norm compliance; hierarchical 
choice procedures   
Internationalisation/ 
Globalisation 
Traditional values 
Cultural conservatism; emphasis on Christian values 
and principles; authoritarianism; (protestant) ethic of 
hard work; traditional gender roles; rigorous parental 
childrearing; antiabortion 
Source: Own elaboration from Kitschelt 1995. 
 
According to Kitschelt, the freemarket and neo-liberal position promoted by the radical right 
is almost a direct and natural consequence of the opening up of a global market economy fol-
lowing the post-industrialization process.  
In electoral terms, the exposure to global economy is more likely to promote a positive 
reaction for politics endorsing spontaneous market allocation and proportional (flat) taxation, 
rather than redistributive welfare state measures and progressive taxation. This erodes the 
target groups in favour of welfare chauvinist appeals, consequently undermining the electoral 
support to parties promoting this kind of politics ( f. Kitschelt 1995). 
The history of several radical right parties seemed actually to support this thesis. During 
the 1980s and part of the 1990s, several of nowadays radical right parties (or their predeces-
sors) were known for their neo-liberal and freemarket politics, which often went along with 
proposals for severe tax reductions.  
These politics were deemed to fall soon after, but it was difficult to imagine that this po-
sition could be drastically turned into pro-welfare politics. It is what happened for example in 
Denmark with the Danish People’s Party in the mid-1990s. As we will carefully examine in 
Chapter 5, the party has now become a strong supporter of traditional welfare politics, where 
the condition of the old, the sick and the less privileged rates high on the party agenda.  
The substantial difference from universal welfare politics is that the welfare supported 
by these parties is not ‘for all’, but consists of a system of social protection including and be-
longing first of all to the ethnically homogeneous community, which – in the party’s words –
has paid for it by ‘hard work and savings’. Within this understanding of welfare politics, im-
migrants are depicted as freeloaders, who have not directly helped build the system and none-
theless are today claiming its benefits. This positi n is considered to have increased the sup-
port from the blue-collar constituency.  
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The emphasis on neo-liberal and pro-market economics has recently been subject to ex-
tensive criticism (cf. e.g. Ivarsflaten 2005). The recent development of the radical right sug-
gests that this formula was not necessarily the one chosen by the radical right. This implies 
that there may be alternatives to the radical right ‘winning formula’ suggested by Kitschelt. 
Kitschelt himself does not ignore the possibility of ‘blended appeals’ (see Kitschelt 1995). 
More recently, he has suggested that a more viable and ‘weaker’ form of the new radical right 
formula can emerge. It is characterised by ‘a mute appeal to freemarket liberalism [which] 
might be sufficient to satisfy the small business constituency without alienating blue-collar 
workers’ (Kitschelt 2005). But this political compromise is considered viable only until the 
party does not have government responsibilities.  
The alternative interpretation is that the radical right parties – particularly in countries 
with established welfare states – have deliberately given up the neo-liberal agenda, adopting a 
form of welfare politics as a more and more advantageous strategic position. Within a new 
cleavage framework, this shift of political strategy could also be explained by the fact that the 
libertarian left, traditionally guardian of politics of redistribution of scarce resources, began to 
have difficulties satisfying an electorate consisting of both materialist and post-materialist 
voters. The ‘materialist’ voters could not really recognise themselves in the libertarian and 
multicultural politics promoted by the left-wing parties, which meant that they might feel 
more attracted by the authoritative and anti-multicl uralist position characterising the radical 
right. In this case, the shift from a neo-liberal and anti-tax position to welfare chauvinist poli-
tics cleared the reservations and made the radical right almost an obvious alternative for the 
materialist electorate.31 
However, the socio-economic agenda of the radical rght is not considered to matter so 
much, particularly in the context drawn by the new cleavage approach. Recent studies tend to 
confirm this hypothesis, arguing that among the grivances explaining the populist right vote 
in some countries ‘only one of these grievances – the one over immigration – was consistently 
mobilised by all successful populist right parties’ (Ivarsflaten 2006). 
These results give even more significance to the new cl avage hypothesis, according to 
which especially non-economic and value issues nowadays structure party competition and 
mobilise voters. Significantly, in a recently published book on the populist radical right (note 
that he no longer uses the term extreme right), Mudde (2007) has given a chapter the unambi-
guous title: ‘It’s not the economy, stupid!’32 The chapter challenges what Mudde calls ‘the 
most widespread and fervent misperceptions in the field, i.e. the importance of neo-liberal 
economics to the ideological program and electoral success of the populist radical right fam-
ily’ (2007: 136).  
                                                
31 This reading is clearly influenced by the thesis on ‘working class authoritarianism’ discussed in Chapter 1 (p. 
32). 
32 The wording makes a little fun of a sign that was s id to be hanging in the office of former US presid nt Clin-
ton to remind him every day that it is economy that m tters.  
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Economics, argues Mudde, ‘is a secondary issue to the populist radical right party fam-
ily, the parties instrumentalise it to pursue their pr mary ideological agenda, i.e. nativism, au-
thoritarianism and populism’ (2007: 137). Going back to Kitschelt (see Table 2.1, chapter 2), 
the ideological dimensions which at the end are considered to really matter are: exclusionary 
politics, state, political organization and traditional values. 
Not surprisingly, it is the ideological content and meaning of these three indicative di-
mensions which present studies highlight and examine ore carefully, when dealing with the 
radical right. Questions of culture, identity, national feelings and religious tolerance therefore 
represent the core issues in the recent literature (e.g. Betz 2009; Akkerman & Hagelund 
2007). However, one could argue that this approach suggests again an ‘either-or’ solution (see 
also Cole 2005), which may turn out to be too rigid, particularly in the long run.  
This conclusion leaves little space to a more careful valuation of how the radical right 
political agenda answers to the different challenges posed by society, which is squeezed from 
the outside by immigration flows, market forces and the like and from within by national in-
terests, a national social and political context and the conditions created by the opportunity 
structure .  
It could be argued that one of Kitschelt’s contribut ons to the studies of the radical right 
was to emphasise the role that economics and old politics still play for the radical right. His 
approach differed from the part of the literature that considered the emergence of the radical 
right more as a reaction – or ‘silent counter-revoluti n’ (Ignazi 1992) – against the issues and 
politics developed by the left libertarian movements of the 1960s. 
Within this interpretation, the position of neo-liberal politics is considered important in 
particular for the previous ‘wave’ of the radical right development. In a classical article, Von 
Beyme (1988) distinguishes among three main phases in the history of the radical right in 
Western Europe: a first wave of neo-fascist parties, emerging in the aftermath of WWII; a 
second wave of tax revolt, which started in France during the mid-1950s with Poujade’s party; 
and a third and most recent xenophobic wave beginning approximately in the mid-1980s. Von 
Beyme argues that there is an important discontinuity in the history and development of radi-
cal right parties and that each of the main three waves can be distinguished based on the 
dominance of specific issues. The most recent wave is dominated by xenophobic, or at least 
anti-immigration politics, whereas the precedent wave was dominated by tax protest and 
populist issues. Betz (1994) seemed to support this hypothesis, arguing that already from the 
mid-1980s, many radical right parties have diverted the emphasis from economic liberalism 
upon exclusionary politics, nativism and islamophobia.  
Most of the issues belonging to this new dimension are included under the definition of 
authoritarian politics (sometimes also defined as materialist, new right or neo-conservative 
politics), which represents a sort of ‘political container’ for different and often very diverse 
issues, such as anti-immigration politics, Islamophobia, law and order, authoritarian childrear-
ing, defence of traditional values and so forth.  
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As mentioned above, in comparative radical right par y ideology, this dimension is con-
nected to issues like identitary politics, nativism, national culture, authoritarianism, and tradi-
tional values (see i.e. Gardberg 1993), or more large y in politics of exclusionism, xenopho-
bia, ethical values and the strong state (i.e. Mudde 2000). Considering the importance of this 
dimension, it is important to find out how it can be operationalised and structured, so that it 
can be effectively applied in a comparative analysis of party ideology. A careful reading of 
Kitschelt (see Table 3.1 above) is helpful. In his analysis he distinguishes among three major 
thematic fields: 1) exclusionary politics: where anti-immigration and exclusionary politics 
represent the main subject; 2) state and institutional rganization: dealing with the position of 
the party on matters concerning how the state and its institutions must be organized, ruled and 
controlled; 3) politics about traditional values: ind cating the standpoint on matters concerning 
the family, gender roles, childrearing and more broadly questions of culture, values and reli-
gious character. 
This way of grouping different political issues into main thematic areas is expected to 
give a clearer structure to the empirical analysis of comparative party ideology and to leave 
space to additions and observations in relation to the three parties considered. It also allows 
drawing clearer lines between what can be defined as the authoritarian elements characteris-
ing these parties from the reaction against the challenges posed by the recent immigration 
flows and integration. 
 
3.7 Main ideological dimensions relate to the marginalisation or the winners’ and losers’ 
interpretative approach  
The second approach considered in Chapter 2 is the o-called marginalisation or winners and 
losers hypothesis. Also in relation to this approach, the aim is to be able to find the most rele-
vant features of this particular interpretative approach, which can help make this hypothesis 
operational for an analysis of radical right party ideology in a comparative perspective (at 
least for the three parties considered). Concretely, his means to be able to observe how the 
competition between globalisation ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ can be translated into a potential 
field for a political mobilisation within a national political context and how this has been ex-
ploited by three case studies in the respective natio l contexts. This means to be able to dis-
close how party ideology in the three cases strategically emphasised questions indicating that 
one of the main problems of advanced capitalist societies nowadays is the increasing margin-
alisation of distinct social groups. 
This task is far from straightforward, since support f  the marginalisation hypothesis is 
often traced on the basis of an analysis of the radical right voters’ socioeconomic background 
and attitudes. In these studies, an overrepresentatio  of unemployed on benefits and low 
skilled manual workers is considered an indicator of a potential economic and societal mar-
ginalisation, which can help explain why these social groups vote for a radical right party. 
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However, the analysis of the demand side (the voters) often takes the supply side (the party), 
in this case radical right party ideology, as given b forehand.  
Depending on how important this group of voters is in terms of electoral support, the 
party is expected to respond with a critique against the globalisation process. This can for 
example take the form of a critique against the socioeconomic consequences of the increasing 
internationalisation of trade and the openness of the labour market. Within this interpretative 
framework, immigrants are likely to be considered as competitors on the labour market and in 
the distribution of social benefits. Particularly in Scandinavia, where welfare state and social 
rights are based on citizenship and residence rather than contribution, immigrants can be tar-
gets of argumentations dealing with their economic dependency on and their costs to the pub-
lic system at large. Radical right parties can then exploit the electoral potentials of this dis-
course, emphasising the relationship between immigration, welfare costs and labour competi-
tion.  
However, several analyses show that often there is little evidence of the correlation be-
tween labour market position, or ‘welfare dependence’ and attitude towards immigrants, nei-
ther between welfare dependence and support for right wing populism (see e.g. Goul Ander-
sen 2006). This suggests that there must be other elements than the strict relationship linking 
marginalisation to the fear of downward economic and social mobility. 
Immigrants can be perceived as less ‘deserving’ than e indigenous population, but not 
necessarily –or at least not only–  because there is a generalised fear among the most disad-
vantaged groups about the possibility that foreigners put in danger the economic and conse-
quently social situation. But this position is not translated into anti-welfare politics; rather the 
welfare state is considered a right for those – mostly meaning the native population – who 
have paid for it. In the Danish case, for example, adherents of the Danish People’s Party are 
more supportive of the ‘classic’ welfare arrangements than adherents of any other party (Goul 
Andersen 2006; see also Chapter 9 here), showing that increasing support for the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party is not accompanied by declining support for he welfare state. This should give the 
chance to reflect on the assumptions linked to the marginalisation hypothesis.  
Some scholars (Kriesi et al. 2006) suggest a wider int pretation of the consequences of 
globalisation, particularly in terms of the transformation they set off in the national political 
space. Three mechanisms are considered behind the formation of winners and losers dynam-
ics: economic competition, cultural diversity and political competition. While the first dimen-
sion basically has economic implications, cultural diversity and political competition relate to 
the opening of another competition field, where winners and losers face their different inter-
ests and position on cultural matters. An open and cosmopolitan approach to ethnic difference 
(the winners’ position) challenges a national protectionist cultural perspective, where ethni-
cally different populations are considered a potential threat to collective identities and the 
standard of living (the losers’ position). 
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The different positions and interests developed by globalisation winners and globalisa-
tion losers have been appropriately articulated by traditional and new political actors/entre-
preneurs according to the electoral group the party imed to reach (see Kriesi et al. 2006; 
Kriesi et al. 2008). Radical right parties distinguished themselves because they elaborated 
politics which are primarily addressed to the losers of globalisation. Therefore, their politics 
are strongly influenced by comprehensive protectionism and differentialist nativism (Betz 
2001).  
It is the parties that have appealed to the interests and fears of the losers, which (quite 
unexpectedly for much of the scholarly literature, could one argue!) have become a driving 
force in the transformation of the European party systems.  
When the marginalisation hypothesis relates socioeconomic considerations with aspects 
related to the cultural implications of globalisation, it starts to overlap with the new political 
cleavage hypothesis discussed above. However, some asp cts still distinguish the two ap-
proaches. As we have just seen, the marginalisation hypothesis considers the development of 
the radical right parties as the translation into politics of the consequences of globalisation, as 
experienced from the most disadvantaged social groups. Furthermore, the transformation of 
the national political space is not seen as the result of a wide reorganisation of values or inter-
ests, which had the individual as an aware actor supporting the change.  
It is the tensions and conflicts set off by the globalisation process, which are at the ori-
gin of a demand for politics responding to the new social and economic situation. This means 
also that there is much less focus on the formation of ew social and political cleavages and 
on the reading of radical right politics as a counter-reaction to the emergence of a new left. 
The globalisation process has not created new areas of conflict, but has rather emphasised the 
existing national and cultural conflict dimension (see Kriesi et al. 2008). These dynamics are 
represented in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2 The marginalisation approach and its main dimensions 
Dimensions  Characteristics   Issues  
Economic dimension  National protectionism; welfare chauvin-
ism 
General anti-globalisation positions; 
market protectionist measures; anti-
Americanism; local vs. global  
Cultural dimension Anti-multiculturalism; national/local vs. 
global and international 
Cultural protectionism; emphasis on 
Western values and principles: em-
phasis on difference (na-
tional/regional/local)  
 
3.8 Populism, protest vote and anti-establishment: ideological dimensions  
Populism and protest are frequently used attributes in relation to the three parties examined in 
this study. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this is often explicit already in the terminology im-
posed on these parties, where compound names such a radical right-wing populism (cf. Betz 
1994 and more recently Mudde 2007), or new populist/protest parties (cf. Taggart 1996) are 
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rather widespread and accepted. Alternatively, the implications of anti-establishment politics 
and populism are taken up in country-specific analysis of a party, its history and the national 
settings and opportunity structure (i.e. Kitschelt 1995). 
The fact that populism and protest are often mentioned in relation to different situations 
and contexts also makes a clear definition of the ideological dimensions difficult. It is also 
rather unclear whether a party can develop different forms of ‘populism’ over time and 
whether at a certain stage of its development, a party c n move away from early forms of 
populist protest and reaction. All in all, it is therefore difficult to identify which implications 
and consequences are related to the populist nature of a party. 
The difficulty to come to terms with how populism and protest are considered as ideo-
logical dimensions has its origins in the same literature dealing with the phenomenon, where 
observations and remarks about populist ideology and populist strategy are often mixed to-
gether. However, this chapter aims to outline at lest some of the most relevant ideological 
features related to the populist and protest hypothesis. This will be done by looking directly 
and more concretely at the way the populist and protest thesis is ‘processed’ in some of the 
most relevant studies on the radical right. As anticipated, the literature considered is seldom 
characterised by clear-cut theoretical approaches. Only few analyses (see Taggart 2000; Meny 
& Surel 2002) go deeper into an inquiry of what populism and protest entail at the ideological 
level. 
Populism and protest are often considered within a broader context of macrostructural 
transformations, such as the loss of importance of the ideologies that have signed the social, 
political and historical development in the 19th and 20th centuries. But populism and protest 
are even more clearly seen as opportunity and country dependent reactions. Particularly in 
some national context and at times when this was electorally appealing, the radical right par-
ties emphasised the malfunctioning of the public sector and on the untruthfulness of the po-
litical elite. According to Kitschelt, it is particularly at the beginning of a party history that 
this strategy can ensure a broader electoral constituency. In this sense, populism is very much 
a country dependent condition. For Kitschelt, anti-statist populist parties are more likely to 
emerge and be successful in countries where patronage politics and clientelism have tradition-
ally nourished the political system. For this reason, the parties which are often qualified as 
unequivocally anti-statist populist parties are theAustrian Freedom Party and the Northern 
League. Austria and Italy are in fact countries where forms of clientelist party politics have 
been quite widespread, particularly during the 1980s. In the late 1970s and the 1980s, due to 
different reasons, both countries began to see cliente st linkages between citizens and politi-
cians as an unacceptable political habit and this resulted in a rapid decline in the electoral 
support for democracy and political trust. 
Betz (2002) argues that the initial phase of mobilisation and electoral success of the 
radical right depends largely on the ability of theparty to exploit the existing popular ressen-
timent. This is again a country specific condition, which s not necessarily related to immigra-
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tion or other general macrostructural changes such as post-industrialisation and globalisation. 
In this sense, the definition of populist protest sui s these parties well, since it reflects the feel-
ings of dissatisfaction and discontent with the established elites (Betz 2002).   
Populism is particularly manifest at the national level, even if, as we will see, some of 
the critique and scepticism against the national political elite has been extended to the Euro-
pean political class in recent years. Critique of the establishment is usually seen in opposition 
to the ‘will of the people (…) supreme over every other standard’ (Shils 1956: 98). This is 
also why populist parties often have demands for popular referenda on their agenda, so that 
people can be more often and directly involved in decision making during the legislative 
process. 
However, the exploitation of the populist anti-establishment protest particularly charac-
terises the electoral breakthrough and the early life of a right wing populist party. The appeal 
of this kind of politics is expected to weaken in the long run. This is also why populism and 
protest alone are unlikely to explain why some of the radical right parties have done well over 
time, whereas others have suffered a clear drop in electoral support (Betz 2002).  
The protest vote is fleeting, so if a party is not able to profile itself as competent on 
other issues besides critique against the incumbent government, it is doomed to failure. It is 
often when the populist and protest drive are about t  fade that a transition must take place. 
Betz argues that the populist anti-establishment position is switched with populist nationalism 
(Betz 1994; see Table 3.3). This implies that other issues become central on the party agenda. 
He indicates anti-immigration and national identity politics as the most important features, 
arguing that parties are also likely to change their n o-liberal agenda in favour of a more pro-
tectionist position on economic matters. As reported above, also Kitschelt supports the transi-
tion hypothesis; it is at this point of its instituonal life that an anti-statist populist party takes 
up the socio-culturally authoritarian agenda and becomes a full-fledged new radical right 
party. 
 
Table 3.3 The anti-establishment and populist approach: ideological dimensions for radical right-wing 
populism 
Socioeconomic dynamic Ideological dimension Characteristics  
Country-specific reac-
tion/ressentiment 
Neo-liberal populism 
(until mid/late-1980s) 
Anti-establishment politics; demand for direct 
popular representation (referenda); tax protest; 
public sector cutbacks  
Globalisation Populist nationalism/ 
(from mid-1980s) 
Exclusionary nationalism; anti-immigration; so-
cioeconomic protectionism, EU scepticism  
 
However, the existing literature is not very explicit about how the populist and protest com-
ponents develop in their transitional phase towards national populism. The question is what is 
left behind in terms of populist ideology and populist strategy from the previous period. At a 
general level, Betz indicates that feelings of dissati faction and discontent become more wide-
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spread and diffuse: they gradually become associated with feelings of frustration and power-
lessness that some people experience in relation to ‘the intricacies of politics in post-industrial 
societies’ (Betz 1994).  
More specifically one can argue that internationalisation and the process of European in-
tegration also intensify this general lack of refernce. This can add new saliency and content 
to the populist critique against the established elite (both political and intellectual), resulting 
in the differentiation between what will increasingly be perceived as Us (the people, the 
common citizens), looking at the nation as the appro riate focus for identity and belonging, in 
contrast with Them (the elite), identified with the unknown global, the multiethnic and supra-
national (dis-)order.  
The nation is identified with what Taggart (2000; 20 ) calls the ‘hearthland’, represent-
ing an idealised and often retrospectively constructed onception of the community, on which 
the idea of ‘the people’ is constructed. It often emphasises aspects and attributes related to the 
idea of the nation and ‘the people’, that the party explains its position on a number of issues. 
As we will see, the emphasis on nationalism and natio l belonging allows the party to distin-
guish between what it is considered good and loyal nationalism and what is not. The need to 
tighten up immigration and to be against more EU are considered elements of good national-
ism and genuine patriotism, as these processes are perc ived as direct dangers to national sov-
ereignty and national identity.  
In relation to the present study, it is both interesting and important to look at the way the 
three case studies construct and make use of the noion of the national and ‘the people’. The 
three parties operate within different national frameworks, where the idea of the ‘hearthland’ 
– as explained by Taggart – and of the people belonging to it, can be based on different histo-
ries, accounts, ideals and traditions. A comparative analysis of nationalism and the construc-
tion of the idea of the nation in the ideology of the three parties can therefore be useful to re-
veal the similarities and differences on this specific and relevant subject.   
An issue which has been developed over the last decade by the radical right parties is 
Euroscepticism, or the politics against the process of European integration. Euroscepticism is 
a rather complex dimension, which embraces different and contrasting positions and which 
can be found both on the right and the left of the political spectrum. The radical right is 
against the European project basically because the process of European integration is seen as 
undermining the sovereignty and autonomy of the member states. But the position against the 
European Union is matured within the same context of populist rhetoric and critique ad-
dressed against the national elite, which has then be  transferred critique of the ‘bureaucrats 
in Brussels’. This latter political class is often put at the top of list when it comes to criticising 
and accusing the malaise of the political elite, whereas national politicians are portrayed as 
submitted conveyors of European anti-national dictates. 
Another scholarly observation on Euroscepticism is that this is more pervasive among 
parties on the periphery of the party system (at both ends of the political spectrum). This 
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means that these parties are more likely than established traditional parties to use anti-EU 
politics as a mobilising issue (cf. Taggart 1998). Only very few studies have analysed when 
and how this issue has entered the agenda of the radical right parties in Western Europe and 
how it has been developed (and eventually softened) when a party achieved government re-
sponsibility. What happens when a Eurosceptical party joins Europositive parties in power? In 
view of the role played by the radical right in several European countries, this question has 
become even more relevant. 
It is well known that several of the radical right parties which today are against (more) 
EU, have in their past been supportive, sometimes ev n enthusiastic about the process of 
European integration. It is the case of the Northern League, which until at least the 1990s was 
a great supporter of the European project. This positive approach was largely informed by the 
fear that Italy might be excluded from joining Maastricht Europe, which the Northern League 
held the South responsible for (see Betz 2002). The party later changed course and began to 
endorse anti-EU politics. The Northern League began to refer to notions of ethnopluralism to 
explain its approach to European integration, which suggests – as argued by Rydgren – that 
the Northern League has not been insensitive to the messages from the National Front in 
France (Rydgren 2003; 2005). This ethnopluralist approach is much less dominant in the Eu-
rosceptical position of the Danish People’s Party, whose main concern is the question of na-
tional sovereignty against the supra national power increasingly represented by the EU.  
In the light of the recent development of the radicl right and particularly in view of the 
fact that the three cases considered here have experi nc d government responsibility, it is 
important to look at the way the parties have tackled this issue over time. Particularly impor-
tant is the need to consider this issue as a relevant fe ture within a broader conception of the 
new populism characterising these parties.  
The themes that can be concretely used in the comparative analysis of party ideology 
highlight different typologies and recent developments of the populist and protest hypothesis. 
The more traditional approach and reading of the populist and protest ‘dimensions’ as the 
result of a lack of trust and dissatisfaction with the incumbent government are still feasible 
explanations of what populist party politics are about, perhaps still particularly for the Italian 
and Austrian cases. But in the framework of anti-establishment politics and political distrust, 
other and perhaps more complex populist expressions have emerged over the years. A form of 
populist Euroscepticism can today be considered another side of the phenomenon. However, 
opposition to European integration is not only a critique against ‘the bureaucrats in Brussels’. 
In a context of internationalisation and globalisation, the European process is considered an-
other – perhaps even more concrete because geographically and politically closer – danger to 
national identity, economy and national sovereignty at large.  
The conflict between national and European interest ha  also been given high priority in 
radical right party politics regardless of the party’s past position on the issue. The question is 
whether a softer position on European integration arises when a party achieves government 
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responsibility. This is also why it is important to c nsider how Euroscepticism has entered the 
agenda of the radical right parties and how it has developed over time. 
 
3.9 Summarising the ideological dimensions  
From the analysis of the three hypotheses, two main domains/dimensions have immediately 
emerged as important realms for an exploration of radical right ideology: a socioeconomic 
dimension, ‘measuring’ the position of the party on economic matters and a value and cultural 
dimension. 
There is still strong disagreement about the importance and character of the economic 
dimension. Neo-liberals and freemarketing positions are in some cases still seen as the best 
indicators of radical right economics. However, this interpretation –which is strongly sup-
ported in Kitschelt’s ‘winning formula’ – is today criticised and challenged by alternative 
explanations. At present, it is not only discussed what kind of economics the radical right 
supports, but about how much significance economics have for the success of the radical 
right. Particularly at the national level, different dynamics can still influence the development 
of economics in one direction rather than another. And yet, Kitschelt’s interpretation is still 
that radical right parties (in the end) will endorse a neo-liberal and pro-market profile. Such a 
position is considered to have a broader electoral appeal at least for voters who would vote 
otherwise, considering that it may be interpreted as a far too intransigent view on immigra-
tion. In particular for parties such as the Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party, 
whose electoral success was initially fuelled by anti-establishment and protest, the choice of 
neo-liberal politics is also interpreted as a convenient solution to hold an electorate in which 
also small entrepreneurs and low skilled white collars are strongly represented.  
The question is to what extent the emphasis on exclusionary politics, anti-immigration 
and traditional values, which are seen as characterising the radical right today, have changed 
the neo-liberal approach ascribed to the radical right in the past. Instead of taking economics 
‘out of the picture’ because it is not considered rlevant for the electoral success of the radical 
right, the approach will be to consider how much relevance economics is actually given in the 
political agendas of the three parties and whether t  contents of these politics have changed 
and if so in which direction. The Danish People’s Party’s campaign manifestoes will serve as 
an example. The party’s concise slogan was in 2001: ‘Fresh breath over the country’ (Frisk 
pust over landet), where the picture following the text shows the party’s three most prominent 
persons (Pia Kjærsgaard, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, Peter Skaarup) portrayed while walking 
forward. The image and words of the manifesto wanted to point out that the party’s main goal 
was to renew and change the status quo. A few years later, in spring 2007, the slogan changed 
into: ‘Tight immigration policy and real welfare’ (Stram udlændingepolik og ægte velfærd). In 
2007, the party concretely formalised its politics around two main issues: anti-immigration 
and the welfare state. This clear definition of theparty political goal is significantly repre-
sented by an image of the three MPs now standing stll in front of the camera. This is only an 
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example which illustrates that radical right parties are not afraid to take a clear standpoint on 
socioeconomic politics.  
Choosing a form of exclusionary welfare can perhaps send part of the electorate away, 
but it can also contribute to stabilize the constituencies that have proven most loyal in the long 
run, such as working class voters. Whether this is a viable solution only in the specific Danish 
case, or an ‘exportable model’, is something that te comparative analysis of party ideology 
can partly clarify. 
Anti-immigration policy and the image of the foreigner in the literature of the three par-
ties is another dimension considered. As already mentioned elsewhere, recent studies consider 
anti-immigration as the most important field explaining the electoral success of various radi-
cal right parties in Europe at the national and local level. The anti-immigration issue was al-
ready relevant on these parties’ agenda in the late 1980s and 1990s, but at the beginning the 
question targeted problems that were closely related to the type and nature of the immigration 
flows entering the country. After 9/11, the radical right’s anti-immigration stance hardened 
even more. In particular, immigration is not only explained in terms of national emergency, 
but more broadly as an international problem relating o the clash between two different and 
opposite civilizations: the Western world and Islam, described as a medieval, anti-democratic 
and sexist culture, where the Koran is the law.  
Several radical right parties had already in the past formulated their position against Is-
lam and framed Islam in terms of culture, values, and identity. But the international events of 
2001, combined with the start of the ‘war against terror’, gave the anti-Islam issue new le-
gitimacy and allowed the radical right parties to pr mote themselves as defenders of funda-
mental liberal values, such as individualism, secularism, and gender equality (see Akkerman 
& Hagelund 2007). 
All this also indicates that the ‘content’ of the radical right anti-immigration issue went 
through various phases of development. Several scholars would in fact argue that Islamopho-
bia is today the central feature of right-wing radical ideology and programs, particularly in 
comparative analyses of radical right party ideology looking at ‘cross-national’ influences. 
However, the anti-immigration stance will here be considered in terms of how the three 
parties have dealt with it over time. It is expected hat their position (in particular after 2001) 
will exhibit increasing similarities in the way they tackle immigration and relate the issue to 
questions of values, culture and identity. However, this is something that the empirical analy-
sis of the party ideology can help answer. It will examine how the three parties frame the anti-
immigration question in terms of a threat to the national and cultural identity, i.e. the nation, 
the country’s historical past, national proud tradition, values and identity. 
The analysis of the party literature will especially focus on the way the three parties re-
late to a ‘more classical’ interpretation of authoritarianism, which includes traditionalism (pa-
rochialism), strong politics, (more or less) sexist positions and authoritarian forms of child-
rearing and education. These and other items – also quoted by Kitschelt in his definition of 
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authoritarian politics – have in some relevant studies on authoritarianism and the authoritarian 
personality of the past constituted an important reference for measuring authoritarianism. 
Nowadays, the authoritarian attitude is more seen as a reaction against the secularised and 
libertarian position advanced by the left during the 1960s, which the radical right parties op-
posed, defending traditional values, gender roles and a less tolerant view on educational prac-
tices and sexual behaviour. However, as anticipated bove, some attention has to be directed 
to the interplay between the traditional (some would say ‘old-fashioned’) view of gender rela-
tions and the role that the radical right has in some cases taken up as critics of women’s con-
dition in Islamic societies and within the Islamic culture more broadly.   
Populism and protest are the last issues to be discussed in relation to the dimensions 
opened up by the three hypotheses. As discussed in the paragraph on this issue, populism is a 
feature which is not so easy to map in relation to party ideology. It refers in fact to arguments 
against the elite and the political class, arguments mphasising the ‘will of the people’ and 
direct/plebiscitary democracy, politics against EU and its political class. However, there is 
some agreement that populism and protest are characteristi  features especially in the initial 
phases of a party’s history and but then become less relevant when a radical right party is able 
to achieve government responsibility.  
 
3.10 Conclusions  
A party’s ideology is often defined by its fundamental principles and medium and long-term 
effects of policies that are first of all described in official programmes, which are usually re-
leased by a party before the elections. Party programmes, or in their absence their nearest 
equivalent, represent important documents for the satement of a clear party policy, which is 
backed up by the leadership and sponsored as the party’s official position. The importance 
and reliability of this kind of literature for the study of party ideology is already well known 
in the field of party political studies and comparative party politics.33  
Party programmes and manifestos represent the most authoritative and comprehensive 
reference where party identity is demarcated and wherefrom the party develops issues and 
principles that will be evaluated and eventually voted on by the electorate. Their orientation is 
predominantly external, in the sense that their aim is ainly to attract voters and enhance the 
profile of the party (Mudde 2000). But precisely because of their official function, party pro-
grammes are also moderate in tone, coherent and carefully formulated. Particularly in the case 
of the radical right parties, these characteristics have been considered as the expression of the 
party’s ‘front-stage’. The ‘front-stage’ conceals other statement declarations, positions and 
points of view which are initiated by party spokesmn of various kinds and where it is less 
                                                
33 This is emphasised by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG), later transformed into the Comparative Manifes-
tos Project (CMP). This group has created a party manifesto dataset bringing together data on the content of party 
manifestoes for most of Western European parties. The method and analysis used by the CMP has been described 
in the pages above.  
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clear how far the party as a whole is officially committed to them. These are expressions of 
the party’s ‘back-stage’; an ideological realm whose positions are less likely to be openly ad-
vertised in official party manifestoes. They find a place in party papers, primarily read by 
party members, in newsletters, books, articles, interviews and speeches at party meetings.  
When a party achieves government responsibility, some f the extreme positions, which 
might be uttered within the party ranks, are more lik ly to be filtered out. The leadership is 
often aware that radical standpoints can be highly damaging to the profile of a party that seeks 
political influence. The risk is to alienate the more moderate electorate. This does not mean 
that the party completely avoids some of the extreme ideological positions representing its 
‘hard-wing’. They can continue to exist within the party, at least until the party leadership is 
able to control them and eventually take distance from them when necessary and in particular 
when the party risks being damaged. It could also be argued that the fact that someone in the 
party still can express radical positions – for example on immigration – allows the party to 
hold on to voters who would otherwise feel uncomfortable with the more moderate course 
chosen by the party. 
Several analyses on the radical right are based on research of the extreme factions in a 
party and possible relations with groups uttering racist or undemocratic positions. It is impor-
tant to reveal the ‘back-stage’ in order to fully understand the composition of these parties, 
especially when it comes to radical right parties that still show clear borderline anti-
democratic and anti-systemic features, e.g. the Republikaner and NDP in Germany. For a 
party that has come through different stages of political legitimisation, and which in some 
cases has openly distance itself from it, the extremism of some of its members can mean little 
for the position of the party as a whole and also to explain why people vote for it. 
Another aspect concerns the relation to the ‘taming effect’ resulting from the political 
and government influence achieved by the three parties considered here and the effects on 
party ideology. In this case it is important to keep in mind the difference between the funda-
mental and operative dimensions of party ideology quoted above. 
To sum up, party ideology can be studied at different l vels, and to get a complete pic-
ture of the ideological position of a party the best solution is to consider all the different levels 
of analysis. However, this implies reading a vast and very heterogeneous literature, which, 
particularly for a comparative study like this, can present several problems as far as availabil-
ity and organisation of the material. Therefore, this chapter mainly focuses on the analysis of 
the three case studies by using sources which are define  as the party external literature 
(Mudde 2000). This primarily consists of party programmes and manifestoes, but also of other 
forms of party literature, representing the party’s official political line. The most important 
prerequisite is that the publications used to supply arty programmes must also represent the 
official party positions and be addressed to a broader udience than party members, although 
in most cases the latter are the only readers. Articles, newsletters written by party leadership, 
interviews, books and party slogans represent other sources of externally oriented literature. 
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Party programmes are useful to the extent that they indicate the fundamental position of 
a party on most relevant political issues or domains. But precisely because party programmes 
and manifestos have to be wide-ranging and clear-cut, they only partly reveal party position 
and change on different issues. Moreover, it is not cer ain whether the issues that are most 
extensively discussed in the party manifestoes are actually those that are most highlighted by 
the party in its effort to reach out to voters. It is widely known that voters seldom read party 
programmes to form an opinion of what the party stands for. In view of this, it is useful to use 
other forms of written sources, perhaps more heterogeneous, but nonetheless used by the party 
leadership in its effort to reach out to voters. 
Less exhaustive but necessary is the analysis of the operative dimension of party ideol-
ogy. In relation to radical right parties this dimension has until recently been neglected, but 
this can be explained by the fact that its importance has increased together with the movement 
of these parties towards the core of the political system. Being at the periphery of the system 
implies that a party is less constrained by pragmatic and more operative decisions; on the 
other side mainstream parties can more easily impleent politics of containment in relation to 
the radical right and its politics. Nowadays, the political impact exercised by and on these 
parties clearly deserves a more in-depth analysis. 
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4. SUGGESTION OF A LIFESPAN MODEL AND INTRODUCTION TO THE 
SOURCES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PARTY IDEOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This brief chapter refers more explicitly to a party lifespan model to aid the analysis of the 
direction party ideology has taken over the years, particularly in relation to the different 
phases of a party ‘evolution’. The ideology and politics of a party can of course be influenced 
by the party’s position in the political system. Being at the margins and in opposition gives 
other possibilities and challenges in terms of the attitudes, beliefs and politics developed than 
those that emerge from being a party in office. Similarly, the strategies and politics of a party 
seeking consolidation and eventually political influence differ from those of an established 
party; in this case, there will be greater focus on making the party appear trustworthy and reli-
able to the electorate and to other mainstream parties. The future of a party whose emergence 
was largely based on one issue, let us say anti-immgration or anti-establishment politics, can 
expectedly be challenged in its efforts to consolidate its position and the electoral support, by 
the lack of a clear programmatic standpoint on other fields, e.g. economics and welfare issues. 
In relation to the three parties considered by this study, it is therefore interesting to look 
at the way the different phases of their political life have influenced their ideology and poli-
tics. In this sense, the fact that all three have experienced the main phases of political emer-
gence, consolidation and political influence offers an appealing comparative background. 
Section 4.2 introduces a party lifespan model that will later be referred to in the analysis 
of party ideology. The remaining chapter serves as an extensive introduction to the party lit-
erature in relation to each party case. This descriptive section will give the reader an in-depth 
overview of the material considered for the analysis of party ideology. 
 
4.2 A lifespan model for the empirical analysis of party ideology 
The comparative analysis of ideology of the Danish People’s Party, the Northern League and 
the Austrian Freedom Party is based on three main phases of the parties’ evolution, suggesting 
an indicative lifespan model, which should simplify the ‘reading’ and emphasize the devel-
opment of ideology over the years. The three phases con idered are: 1) a first breakthrough 
and formative phase, which covers approximately the period from the early 1980s until the 
mid-1990s; 2) a consolidation and maturity phase from 1995 until 2000; 3) a third phase of 
government responsibility and policy impact after 2000-01 which still applies to the Danish 
and Italian case, but which in the Austrian case ended with the election of 2006. The third 
phase of government responsibility is considered particularly interesting for this study. How-
ever, the division into three periods is essential in order to map the ideological evolution and 
changes that have given rise to the present ideological configuration. Analysing party ideol-
ogy in relation to a lifespan model also lets us draw attention on the specific way the three 
parties have dealt with government responsibility and how this has affected previous positions 
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on certain issues. This approach is also expected to help indicate to what extent the three par-
ties have developed similar strategies and ideological positions in the course of their life time, 
for example on the important issue of anti-immigration, which several studies still present as 
these parties’ most effective issue for grievance mobilisation (cf. Ivarsflaten 2008(b)). Other 
ideological dimensions will also be taken into account and considered in a comparative per-
spective (see Chapter 2). 
The phase of historical breakthrough and formation mentioned above is indicatively re-
ferred to the years from the early 1980s until the mid-1990s. In reality, the year of launching 
varies considerably for the three parties. The Danish People’s Party was the last to be formed 
and was launched as late as 1995, but as we will see the main political actors who started the 
party had already matured their political experience within the ranks of the Progress Party, 
which undoubtedly was a major factor in the ideological positioning and agenda making of 
the Danish People’s Party. The historical roots of the Austrian Freedom Party date back to 
1955-56, when the League of Independents (Verband der Unabhängigen, or VdU), a party 
including several former Austrian Nazi members, wasgradually transformed into the Austrian 
Freedom Party. However, from 1986 and more precisely under Jörg Haider’s leadership the 
Austrian Freedom Party was completely overhauled and transformed from its liberal position 
under the former leadership into a full-fledged memb r of the new radical right. The same can 
be argued in the case of the Northern League, which saw its beginning in 1982 with the 
launching of the Lombardy League. The League’s realpolitical breakthrough came much 
later, during the early 1990s, when it won over 20 pct. of the votes in the Italian northern re-
gion Lombardia and over 14-15 pct. throughout the North at the 1992 election. 
However, the three periods are not based on a strict chronological and institutional his-
tory. The records on how the three parties crossed th  (different) thresholds of declaration and 
authorization are of course essential moments for these parties’ history, but the lifespan model 
is built on other premises. The three stages relate to he context created by the historical con-
ditions and socio-political circumstances under which the parties emerged and in particular 
the way they managed to build, develop, transform and adapt to these conditions.  
Parties are far from passive suppliers of electoral demand, and there has been too much 
focus on explaining their breakthrough in relation t  electoral demand. If the explanation of 
electoral success is often a snapshot of a ‘status’  that moment, a lifespan approach can un-
ravel some of the dynamics which allowed the ‘survival of the fittest’ over a longer period of 
time and here with reference to more than one natiol context.  
The first phase to be explored is the breakthrough and formative phase. At this stage the 
parties have laid some important ideological bricks upon which their later development will 
be based; this, independently of how much a party brings along or moves away from this early 
phase. Changes and permanence in a party’s ideology can only be identified by looking into 
the party’s past: what issues and positions characterised the party in the early stage? What did 
the party emphasise? And how is the specific ideological platform related to the national and 
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international context of the time? To this purpose, party programmes and manifestoes in par-
ticular, but also other sources of official party li erature represent helpful available documents 
for tracking the change. The sources used for each of the parties analysed will be described in 
more detail below. 
The second period of the political life of these parties goes indicatively from the mid 
1990s until 2000, which is considered the parties’ consolidation and maturity phase. Several 
radical right parties, starting from the three cases h re, were deemed to decline in the 1990s. 
The general belief was that they would sooner or later disappear from the political landscape, 
as a consequence of what was considered the high volatility of the radical right vote. Particu-
larly their anti-establishment and protest nature was seen to endanger their political survival. 
The inconsistency of their political programmes was seen as a disadvantage in the long run, 
particularly if the party had achieved a certain visibility in parliament.   
Reality proved these predictions wrong and several radical right parties in Europe con-
tinued to matter in national politics, while their v sibility and influence became more obvious. 
This was also the result of the fact that other issue  besides anti-establishment protest became 
important and immigration was certainly one of these.   
Undoubtedly, the increasing relevance the immigration question has gained since the 
mid 1980s has given radical right parties a new opportunity to survive the troubles arising 
from decreasing electoral support. This showed the capacity of these parties to take advantage 
of the opportunity and to develop anti-immigration politics that appealed to the voters. To find 
a political and ideological platform which is visible, unique, easy to defend and exploit is not 
an easy task in a political arena where all parties are looking for new developing issues to 
exploit in order to survive or maximize their electorate. Anti-immigration was one of these. 
However, although anti-immigration has undoubtedly represented an important factor 
for the survival of the radical right, it may not be the only reason that some of these parties 
not only managed to break through, but even paved th ir way into government. As suggested 
by the new cleavage hypothesis, the radical right had ‘something to say’ on other ideological 
dimensions. For example, it is hard to believe thata party can be considered eligible for gov-
ernment if it does not take a clear standpoint on economic matters such as the welfare state, 
taxation and the organization of the public administration. 
There is no doubt that symbolic politics play a greater role in contemporary societies 
than in the past and that immigration has a clear appe l. However, voters are also pragmatic 
when they decide which party to vote for and they expect to hear something about how their 
economy will be affected if a party comes into government. Most of the radical right parties 
are aware of this and the need to formulate a more precise plan becomes even more pressing 
when the party gets closer to government.   
The third phase is that of government influence andgovernment responsibility. As ar-
gued by Minkenberg (2001), parliamentary presence does not alone result in policy effects. It 
is particularly when a radical right party holds office that most of the impact can be registered 
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at the legislative and executive levels. This is also likely to produce a ‘taming effect’ on radi-
cal right ideology. As introduced in Chapter 2, theeffect of having or being close to govern-
ment responsibility (as the Danish People’s Party) can be ‘measured’ on what Seliger calls the 
operative dimension of a party ideology (see here Chapter 3; cf. Seliger 1970: 326), 
 
when ideology is made to function in the here and now it becomes subject to strains and stresses 
that endanger its […] relative consistency. In fulfilling its function of guiding political action, 
each political belief system is faced with the challenge of change. All such systems must deal 
with change, attempting either to perpetrate or prevent it. In this process they are confronted 
with the challenge of changing themselves’ (my italics) 
 
Seliger suggested a very interesting analytical perspective on the implications arising when 
the radical right gets into office. The approach of the scholarly literature is rather to focus on 
the radical right’s influence on mainstream parties and on government policy. In particular, 
recent studies have started to look more specifically at the outcomes in government legislation 
in cases where a radical right party is either a coliti n partner or a supporting party. At this 
level, legislation on immigration matters and more b oadly the parliamentary debates leading 
to this have become subject of intensive ‘fieldwork’. However, this approach does not always 
make clear where and how the radical right has (re)adapted, changed or turned down funda-
mental positions in order to be government eligible. S liger has proposed different scenarios 
representing how the fundamental and operative ideological dimensions of a party can inter-
act, conflict and be solved (see Seliger 1970: 331-7). This is not necessarily happening at 
the expenses of the party, as ideological ‘soundness’ is not always and necessarily a positive 
token, especially in today’s highly dynamic and competitive party political systems. Very 
much depends on what ideological compensations a party is able to deliver in exchange for a 
shift of course. The radical right party is again faces a new test: it has to overcome the diffi-
culties of being a political force with government duties and responsibilities, but without los-
ing too much of its identity. This is not an easy task and it can have a great effect on the elec-
toral future of the party.  
In relation to the empirical analysis of this chapter, the observation and assessment of 
the government impact on radical right ideology represents a challenging operation, present-
ing some problems in terms of how to do it. Unfortunately, the (in fact quite few) empirical 
examples Seliger (cf. Seliger 1976) uses to explain how the fundamental and operative di-
mensions interact are of little help, since he derives them from a historically and politically 
very different landscape.34 Moreover, his theoretical framework is better develop d than his 
empirical analysis. Anyway, Seliger’s bi-dimensional model can be used as a framework in 
the analysis of how the three parties’ ideological pl tform has changed in the third phase of 
their political life, where government responsibility became the new challenging factor. More 
                                                
34 Seliger’s analysis only considers the effects on the ideology of the individual party and thus fails to mention 
how his ‘model’ can for instance be affected by the co-optation of similar issue positions by other paties.  
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specifically, this will be done by comparing the position developed by the three parties on 
some of the core ideological dimensions in relation t  the two previous periods. However, 
since official party programmes are rather loath to change (particularly in the short term), the 
analysis often uses other sources, where adjustment of old positions and/or introduction of 
new can first emerge. Examples are party papers, pamphlets, official party publications and 
newsletters. The following section presents a more detailed description of the sources and 
party literature considered in the analysis of the ideology of the Danish People’s Party, the 
Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party.  
 
4.3 Introduction and description of the party sources for the analysis of party ideology 
4.3.1 The Danish People’s Party  
From its launching in 1995 and until 1997 the only official programme released by the Danish 
People’s Party was a ten point declaration of intent, a short programme of no more than 900 
words, which was only meant as a temporary programmtic platform for the initial phase of 
the party’s political life. The work and activities during the first couple of years, among them 
the administrative elections of 1997, postponed the rel ase of a new party programme which 
did not come out until September 1997.  
The 1997 Principle Programme, or policy agenda is therefore the first comprehensive 
Danish People’s Party programme that was in force until September 2001, when the party 
presented the Working programme: common values, common responsibilities ju t a few 
months before the elections. The Working programme is the party’s most comprehensive and 
detailed ideological platform, and it discusses all issues of relevance in Danish society in de-
tail in relation to the party’s political perspective. Since 2001, the Danish People’s Party has 
had both a policy agenda (the first version from 1997 updated in October 2002) and a so-
called working programme. The policy agenda summarises the party’s most important princi-
ples and foundations, which are not subject to change. The working programme – as formu-
lated in the introduction to the latest version – contains ‘clearly defined proposals about how 
to design Danish politics in the immediate future and is therefore the daily tool for the Danish 
People’s Party elected people – whatever these are safeguarding the party’s interests in par-
liament, the European Parliament, and at the regional r municipal level.35  
The 2001 working programme was reviewed in October 2007 in consideration of the 
fact that ‘a long list of the proposals that were formally included in the 2001 working pro-
gramme have (…) been realised and thus have become legislation or praxis in the country’. 
For the period before 1995, the analysis of party ideology also builds upon the pro-
grammes released by the Progress Party, in particular the programmes covering the 1980s and 
early 1990s. The Progress Party was king of ‘fostering’ a political milieu for the five party 
                                                
35 See: ‘Fælles Værdier – Fælles Ansvar’, October 2007 in: http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/bIndledning_b.asp 
(last accessed 07-04-2008). 
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fellows (Pia Kjærsgaard; Poul Nørdgaard; Kristian Thulesen Dahl, Peter Skaarup and Ole 
Donner) who in 1995 launched the Danish People’s Party. 
The Danish People’s Party was founded with a critical attitude against the past repre-
sented by the Progress Party. However, the critique seemed, particularly at the beginning, to 
be directed more against the way the Progress Party was internally organized and steered, 
rather than against its ideological positions and foundation. Later, the Danish People’s Party 
broke increasingly free from its past. However, it is very important to look into the ideological 
background and political formation behind the Danish People’s Party leadership. It is still 
unclear how much the two parties diverged ideologically, particularly in the first years of the 
Danish People’s Party political development.36 From the 1970s to the 1990s, the Progress 
Party went through significant transformations that changed its profile as a tax protest, neo-
liberal and anti-establishment party considerably. More specifically, in the second half of the 
1980s, the party began to focus on new issues and develop new programmatic strategies. This 
was partly a necessary reaction to the declining electoral support in those years. The strategy 
of ideological readjustment to the new times is to some extent related to the ideological de-
velopment of the Danish People’s Party and cannot be ignored. Therefore its formative phase 
will initially be considered in relation to the experience matured under the Progress Party, and 
next we will look at how and to what extent the Danish People’s Party left that ideological 
heritage behind. 
Similarly to other radical right parties, but perhaps a little more avant-garde, the Danish 
People’s Party members have been very active in disseminating the party political message. In 
February 1997, the parliamentary group launched the party paper, Dansk Folkeblad (Danish 
People’s paper), which comes out about every second month. From 1997 to 1998 the aim of 
the paper was to inform and to keep in touch with registered members, who received the party 
paper by post (Dansk Folkeblad 1998/ 3: 15). According to party sources, there were approx. 
3500 paying members after the 1998 elections. Copies of the paper were made available to 
more than 600 libraries (out of approx. 850) nationwide. From 1997-2005, Dansk Folkeblad 
was directed by Søren Espersen, a professional journalist who initially worked with MP Peter 
Skaarup, a prominent party leader. Dansk Folkeblad benefited a lot from Espersen’s solid 
journalistic experience, and he has played an important role in developing the paper, taking 
care of press relations and launching the party internet site. In 2005, when Espersen was 
elected to parliament, he was followed by Søren Søndergaard, another experienced journalist. 
Dansk Folkeblad is the official paper of the Danish People’s Party MPs and even if the 
frontispiece specifies that ‘the articles and contributions included in the paper do not necessar-
ily reflect the party’s official position’, most of articles are written by party MPs, or at least by 
                                                
36 Until recently, the scholarly position has tended to accentuate elements of continuity rather of discontinuity 
between the two parties. Rydgren has quite interestingly questioned this approach, suggesting also that the ideo-
logical divergences between the parties can perhaps el  to better understand the recent history and success of the 
Danish People’s Party.  
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a group of people that works closely with the MPs. ia Kjærsgaard contributes to each issues 
with a page 3 newsletter (Nyhedsbrev fra Pia Kjærsgaard) on topics of current political or 
public relevance.  
Compared to other party papers, Dansk Folkeblad has an attractive and colourful layout 
similar to some gossip magazines. When Dansk Folkeblad replaced its original and rather 
boring black and white layout with a colourful format at the end of 1998, following the strat-
egy of popular dissemination of party politics, theype of articles published also became more 
diversified, dealing with historical, popular and traditional topics, which do not always have 
something to do with the politics or organization of the party, but which appealed to national 
feelings, national identity and memories of Danish costumes, traditions, way of life and typi-
cal food. This may have made the party paper a little more interesting than ‘just’ a container 
of boring political stuff about the party’s parliamentary activity. In this respect, it is interest-
ing how the Dansk Folkeblad, besides getting deeper into matters of political nterest, has 
dealt with the private life of party MPs, updating readers about engagements, marriages, 
births and deaths.  
At present, Dansk Folkeblad can be found in most Danish public libraries and it is sent 
to most MPs and journalists (cf. Dansk Folkeblad 2005/2). From the end of 1998, the paper 
became available in a downloadable format on the party homepage. As today it is the case for 
several radical right parties, the Danish People’s Party homepage is very well organized, al-
though only available in Danish, and hosts most of the party’s relevant documents and infor-
mation.  
The epistolary form is one of Pia Kjaersgaad’s most favourite and direct ways to reach 
out to people. Besides the newsletter published in Da sk Folkeblad, Pia Kjærsgaard writes a 
weekly newsletter every Monday, Pia Kjærsgaard’s ugebrev, which is published on the 
party’s homepage or alternatively sent via e-mail to all subscribers. 
The newsletters mostly deal with the week’s most important political or social event or 
news and are therefore good indicators of what the party leader thinks and considers impor-
tant ‘here and now’. Therefore, Pia Kjærsgaard’s letters can give a rather detailed idea about 
the position of the party on up-to-date issues and also a feeling of the transformations, which 
might have taken place within the party over time. The letters examined here are written from 
2002 to 2005, including a scattered sample from 2000.37 
There are other party official publications which are worth considering, since they rep-
resent the official position of the party or relevant information about the party history and 
development. It is the case of the party book on immigration and immigrants, which was 
widely advertised by the party leadership at the time of publication in May 2001, Denmark’s 
Future: Your Land – Your Vote (/Choice) (Dansk Folkeparti Folketingsgruppe 2001). The 
book was strategically released just before the November 2001 elections where immigration 
                                                
37 The party secretary has not answered a mail regarding availability of letters from 2000 and 2001. These years 
are not available in the archive hosted on the party’s homepage.  
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was one of the most debated and relevant issues during the electoral campaign. Denmark’s 
Future was sent to all party members and it was available in bookstores at a very cheap price. 
The contents of the book, as we will see later, are important for understanding the party’s po-
sition on immigration.  
 
4.3.2 The Northern League 
The history of the Northern League begins in the 1980s. The phenomenon of regionalist 
movements was becoming a widespread reality in the Italian political landscape, at first in 
particular the wealthiest regions of Northern Italy, such as Piedmont, Lombardy, Friuli and 
Veneto. The main goal of these movements was initially the preservation of the regional lan-
guage, culture, tradition and folklore, but within a few years it changed to a demand for in-
creasing regional self-government, in particular in terms of economic and fiscal autonomy 
from Rome. It was this original political objective and spirit that characterised the Lombard 
League, when it was officially founded under the name of Autonomist Lombard League in 
April 1984 by Umberto Bossi, the historical leader of the Northern League, together with a 
few other members.  
The movement’s first publication was an unpretentious and home-made paper called Au-
tonomist Lombardy. It became the platform for the first controversial messages and positions 
of the ethno regionalist organization, with a distribution limited to the very local level. Since 
the main subject of this study is the Northern League, very few of the most relevant docu-
ments published in Autonomist Lombardy from 1982 to 1992 (the year the Lombard League 
merged with other regional autonomist parties giving rise to the Northern League) will be 
considered.  
The first programme released by the still locally based Lombard League was a twelve 
point programme written in 1984 entitled ‘Overcoming the centralized state’. Together with 
the articles from Autonomist Lombardy, this first official party document represents an im-
portant source for understanding the character and first ideological phase of the party.  
The 1990s were a turning point for the history of the Northern League, as it will be dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter 6. It was in the early 1990s that the Italian political party 
system was shocked by exceptional events; firstly by the consequences of the collapse com-
munist bloc, and secondly and even more dramatically for the country by the result of the in-
vestigations into political corruption that involved the leadership of several Italian parties. In 
this political situation the Northern League delivered a comprehensive ideological and pro-
grammatic plan that placed the party as a credible alternative on the political arena. Both the 
1994 and 1996 party electoral programmes show a higher level of ideological, political and 
organizational ‘maturity’ in relation to the party’s recent past.  
In 2001, the Northern League (re)joined the centre-right coalition The House of Liber-
ties (La Casa delle Libertà) led by Silvio Berlusconi. The Northern League became a party of 
the centre right coalition in force of the 1993 electoral law, which had established a 
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(semi)bipolar political system, but which in reality was a mixture between a proportional and 
a majoritarian system (see e.g. Pasquino 2002: 81-106). However, it was in 2001 that the 
Northern League made a clear programmatic agreement with he other parts of the coalition,38 
which produced the programmatic document called Pact of the House of Liberties, igned by 
all the member parties of the coalition (Forza Italia; National Alliance; CCD-CDU and North-
ern League). To return to the party sources, this means that since 2001, the position of the 
Northern League is also represented in the programmatic texts produced by the centre-right 
coalition. 
A significant source for reconstructing the ideological transformations and evolutions 
undergone by the Northern League is also represented by the books written by party leader 
Umberto Bossi.39 Contrary to the anti-intellectual and populist image that both he and the me-
dia have encouraged, Umberto Bossi has been a rather productive writer, at least until 2004, 
when serious illness kept him away from politics for more than a year, obliging him to sig-
nificantly reduce the level of political activity, also after his political comeback. Before that, 
he managed to write a number of books on the history, programme, experience and vision of 
the Northern League starting from the party’s beginnings until the years of maturity and con-
solidation of the late 1990s. Bossi was assisted by Daniele Vimercati,40 a professional journal-
ist, who had become interested in the Northern Leagu  from its beginnings in 1982, when few 
would have imagined that the local party would achieve such an influential role in the years to 
come. 
During the 1990s, when the party had made a clear br kthrough in Italian politics, other 
professionals and intellectuals joined the party, developing and improving the party’s ideo-
logical doctrine. In particular, the project of a federalist reform of the state – with different 
degrees of autonomy from the centre – which has always a core issue of the Northern League 
ideology, attracted, particularly in the 1990s, a number of academics and intellectuals, who 
supported the transformation of the Italian republic into a federal state.41 
The first party paper, Autonomist Lombardy, quoted above, changed its name to North-
ern League, a periodical that was published until 1996, when the newspaper La Padania be-
came the official press organ, with Umberto Bossi a political director. The publication of the 
party newspaper takes place in a difficult period fr the Northern League. At the end of 1994, 
the party had in fact broken with the Berlusconi government, provoking a crisis that led to 
new parliamentary elections. The party political project to separate the North from the rest of 
Italy and to create an independent Padanian state ws received with some scepticism by parts 
                                                
38 In 1994, the Northern League had made a separate agre ment with Forza Italia for the North of Italy, since the 
party rejected any possibility to come together with what Bossi called the ‘fascists’ leading National Alliance. In 
1996 the party ran alone the parliamentary elections.  
39 For a list of these books see the bibliography.  
40 D. Vimercati has co-authored most of the books written by Umberto Bossi.  
41 One of the relevant intellectuals joining the party a  the beginning of the 1990s was Gianfranco Miglio, an 
academic and professor of law, who was elected to the Senate (Upper House) as an independent on the Northern 
League’s list.  
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of the party electorate. The needs to re-establish direct contact with the electoral base and to 
keep the party as a visible alternative in the political scenario were certainly some of the rea-
sons for launching a new communication strategy including the daily La Padania.  
In addition to the party literature mentioned above, other forms of publications have 
been considered. An example is the party leaflet Lega Flash, initially released only at the re-
gional level, but now downloadable directly from the party homepage (www.leganord.org), 
which deals very concisely with some of the most relevant issues such as immigration, crime, 
taxes and so forth. After the entrance into governmt in 2001 and until its end in 2006, the 
Northern League has also released the information paper Here League (Qui Lega),42 reporting 
on parliamentary activity and in particular about the laws proposed and discussed by the gov-
ernment.  
  
4.3.3 The Austrian Freedom Party  
The analysis of the Austrian Freedom Party ideology is based on a number of official party 
programmes covering the period from approximately 1985 until about 2006. This time span 
and the related documents analysed give the opportunity to consider the party ideology at dif-
ferent stages. However, mainly for limited time and resources, the amount and variety of the 
FPÖ official party documents available are less comprehensive than for the other two cases.  
In 1985, the Austrian Freedom Party was still under th  leadership of Norbert Steiger 
(1980-1986), who had launched a liberalist and compr ise-seeking course. From 1983 until 
1986, the party had experienced a brief government responsibility in the ‘small’ coalition with 
the Social Democratic Party. The first FPÖ official p rty programme considered is from 1985, 
just before Jörg Haider became party leader in 1986. It remained the official programme until 
1994, when a brief programmatic document entitled ‘Theses for a political renewal of Aus-
tria’ upgraded the ideological platform of the party. I  was as late as 1997 that the party re-
leased a new official programme.  
The writing of a new programme had been in progress since 1995, but was interrupted 
by the unexpected general election. As indicated by Sully (1997: 53), the 1997 programme 
was prepared by an inner circle of party intellectuals, among them Ewald Stadler, an Austrian 
politician with strong nationalist and militant Catholic views. The approval of the new pro-
gramme and particularly the emphasis on certain issues encountered some difficulties and 
further postponed the publication to October 1997 (cf. Sully 1997: 55-56).  
Within the period 1985-1997, however, the FPÖ released a number of other official 
documents, for example the so-called ‘Contract with Austria’ (20 punkte für den Vortrag mit 
Österreich) of 1995, in which the FPÖ criticised the status of democracy in Austria and sug-
                                                
42 The weekly Here League covers the period from 2001 until 2006 and can be downloaded from the Northern 
League’s homepage. As observed in the case of the Danish People’s Party, the League’s internet site is full of 
political documents, articles and references, but it is not as well updated and structured. 
 94 
gested the beginning of a new era (or a Third Republic), where citizens could really express 
their will.  
The FPÖ’s years in government will be examined on the basis of a number of relevant 
electoral programmes and documents published after 2000. FPÖ’s entrance into office to-
gether with the ÖVP was opened by the government declaration of February 2000, where the 
Chancellor Wolfang Schlüssel explained the vision of the new government. It is a significant 
document because it was written under the pressure of the diplomatic sanctions imposed by 
the other EU countries and by a general climax of political scepticism of FPÖ’s role in gov-
ernment. 
For the anticipated election of November 2002, the party released the electoral cam-
paign programme ‘Social and fair’ (Sozial & Gerecht Lebenswert & Leisbar. Zukunftorien-
tiert und Modern. Wir gestalten Österreich mit Sicherheit). In the same years, the FPÖ was 
experiencing a deep internal crisis and the party leadership was aware that the electoral result 
would not be as in 1999.  
The new phase after the electoral decline in 2002 and Jörg Haider’s exit in 2005 will be 
considered through the ‘Handbook of FPÖ politics’ (Handbuch freiheitlicher Politik) and the 
FPÖ electoral programme presented at the 2006 parliamentary election.  
 
The following Chapters 5, 6, 7 are dedicated to the empirical analysis of the Danish 
People’s Party, the Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party ideology. Each chapter 
deals with one party at time, as it was difficult to contain the comparative analysis of the three 
parties in a single chapter. However, several comparative reflections are included in the 
course of the analysis.  
Chapters 8 and 9 shall deal respectively with the comparative analysis of the voters’ so-
cial profile and attitudes. The electorate is studied in close relationship to the dimensions that 
emerged from the analysis of the ‘supply side’ in order to see how the two interact and ex-
plain each other.   
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PART II  
THE SUPPLY SIDE: PARTIES AND IDEOLOGY  
 
5. THE DANISH PEOPLE’S PARTY 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how the ideology of the Danish People’s Party has 
developed and changed over time and in relation to the different phases of the party lifecycle. 
To get a clear picture of the party’s emergence, history and ideological development, the 
analysis also refers to the experience of the Progress Party, which in many respects can be 
considered the forerunner of the Danish People’s Party, but from which the new party wanted 
to emancipate itself both ideologically and organiztionally. This produced elements of conti-
nuity and discontinuity between the two parties, which deserve to be more closely investi-
gated. The ideological development of the Danish People’s Party is then considered in rela-
tion to the main dimensions traced in Chapter 3 above, which also refer to the three hypothe-
ses about new political cleavages, marginalisation and anti-establishment politics.  
 
5.1 HISTORY 
5.1.1 Historical overview and electoral development: from the Progress Party to the Danish 
People’s Party 
Any study of the Danish People’s Party ignoring the history of what happened before 1995, 
gives an imperfect image of what the party is today and how it has developed over time. More 
specifically, any attempt to understand the Danish People’s Party cannot avoid considering 
the experience the party’s leadership gained in the ranks of the Progress Party in the 1980s 
and until the beginning of the 1990s.  
To evaluate the past in relation to the present is therefore still an important task, pre-
cisely because it also helps to track some clearer lin s of the ideological evolution and 
changes between the Danish People’s Party and the Progress Party. This allows us to consider 
what drained the experience and appeal of the Progress Party, which in 2005 disappeared for-
ever from the Danish political scene, leaving the Danish People’s Party as the only radical 
right party of significance in the Scandinavian country. 
 
5.1.2 The Progress Party (1973-2001) 
The Progress Party started as a populist, ultra-liberal and anti-tax party (see Bjørklund & Goul 
Andersen 2009). In 1973, the Progress Party won a lands ide victory with almost 16 pct. of 
the electoral support and 28 seats in parliament (cf. Table 1.5, Chapter 1). In Danish books 
 96 
this election is described as the ‘Earthquake election’ (Jordskredsvalget), primarily because 
five new parties entered parliament, radically transforming the Danish party system.43 
The Danish electorate expressed discontent with the mainstream parties and wanted a 
new course in Danish politics. Although the party never managed to repeat the result in fol-
lowing elections, it was able to get more than 10 pct. of the votes until at least the beginning 
of the 1980s, showing that it was more than a flash party. The Progress Party was in many 
respects a political formation out of the ordinary, starting from its leader, Mogens Glistrup, 
whose entrance in politics did not follow a conventio al path (see also Robdrup 1977). Until 
1971, Glistrup was only known as a tax lawyer. His popularity came after an interview to the 
Danish national television in 1971, in which he provocatively declared in front of the audi-
ence that he did not pay taxes to the Danish state and that this was – in his view – a legitimate 
duty for every Danish taxpayer. Glistrup later compared it to the courageous railway sabo-
tages by the Danish resistance movement against the Germans occupiers in WWII. 
Later, Glistrup formed and launched the Progress Party, which he initially presented as a 
popular movement,44 different from the other conventional party organiz tions and himself as 
a sort of spiritual guide, rather than a conventional party leader. In the 1970s and early 1980s 
the Progress Party played the role of a protest, anti-establishment and anti-tax party and these 
characteristics made it very similar to other protest and anti-tax parties in Europe of which the 
Poujadist movement in France had represented the political avant-garde. However, at the be-
ginning of the 1980s, the exclusive role of the Progress Party as a neo-liberal forerunner with 
tax protest on the agenda seemed to have reached an end. During the 1980s, the neo-
conservative wave from Britain and the US was revivd by the Thatcher and Reagan admini-
strations. Here, liberal economic arguments for the fre  market, individual enterprise and a 
reduced public sector were justified in terms of social and moral conservative principles (see 
King 1987). In 1982, the leader of the Danish Conservative Party, Poul Schlüter, formed a 
centre-right government coalition45 with the Progress Party and the moderate Social Liberals 
as parliamentary guarantors. In line with the neo-liberalist economic philosophy, the govern-
ment cut back public expenses and retrenched the welfare state. This drained interest in the 
Progress Party’s main issues, which aimed at abolishing income taxes, abandoning public 
regulation and welfare and tidying up the public setor (see Fremskridtsparti 1973; Andersen, 
1992; Glans, 1984).  
In the late 1980s and 1990s, the party’s internal division between the ‘slackers’ and the 
‘hardliners’ became more profound. After Glistrup’s exit in 1990, Pia Kjærsgaard invited all 
the voters who had previously stated that ‘they were only waiting for Mogens Glistrup’s exit’ 
                                                
43 Besides the Progress Party, also the Centre Democrats, the Christian People’s Party, the Left Socialists (Ven-
stresocialister) and the Danish Communist Party enter d parliament. None of them are represented in Parliament 
now. 
44 The Progress Party was founded at a press conference at the restaurant Grøften in Tivoli in the midst of the 
debate on the European Market (EF), as a popular move ent against the rule of public officials. 
45 The coalition governed from 1982 until 1988 and included the Conservative Party (K), the Liberal Party (V), 
the Christian People’s Party (KrF) and the Centre Democrats (CD).  
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to join the party (see Fremskridtsparti 1990: 4). But the party internal conflicts continued and 
in 1995 Pia Kjærsgaard decided to leave. At the 1998 elections, the Progress Party barely 
cleared the threshold of 2 pct. and managed to remain in parliament. At the same elections, 
the Danish People’s Party at its first parliamentary election got more than 7 pct. of the votes. 
In 2000, the Progress Party readmitted Mogens Glistrup. Quite symbolically, Glistrup, who 
had founded the party three decades before, managed to be there to see its end. In 2001, the 
Progress Party got only 0.4 pct. of the votes and disappeared from Danish politics, while the 
Danish People’s Party successfully entered mainstream politics.  
 
5.1.3 The Danish People’s Party (1995-2008) 
The Danish People’s Party was officially launched on October 4 1995 by the party leader Pia 
Kjærsgaard together with Poul Noerdgaard, Ole Donner, Kristian Thulesen Dahl and Peter 
Skaarup.46 All the DF founders had been former MPs and members of the Progress Party.47  
The exit of the five members from the party group in 1995 has often been explained as 
the result of a power struggle between two factions within the Progress Party (cf. Ringsmose 
2003), the so-called ‘hard-liners’ (strammerne) and the ‘slackers’ (slapperne), that had trou-
bled the party since the 1980s and was based on two different views on what political strategy 
to adopt in relation to government politics. While th  hard-liners supported an either/or politi-
cal line and were against the politics of compromise, the slackers wanted an influence-seeking 
political strategy that supported the politics of the bourgeois parties in government to gain 
more political influence. Pia Kjærsgaard was among these.  
Kjærsgaard had joined the Progress Party in 1978 at the age of 31. In 1984 she was 
voted into parliament and chosen as temporary substit te o the leader Mogens Glistrup, while 
he was in prison for tax fraud, for which he had been convicted in 1983. Pia Kjærsgaard had 
no previous experience with politics. She has often made this a point of force of her biogra-
phy, emphasising her popular origins and life pragmtism in contrast with the academic pro-
fessionalism of most politicians in Danish politics. As she directly put it once: ‘I am not a 
political scientist, but a home helper (hjemmehjaelper). Some may look down on this, but I 
am proud of it’, adding polemically that other politicians have certainly never experienced the 
need ‘to turn old people in their beds in the middle of the night’, something that, as she main-
tained, contributed to make her ‘soft-hearted on social issues (Kjærsgaard in Politiken 19-10-
1997).   
With the help of the moderate wing of the Progress Party and in particular with the po-
litical support of Helge Dohrmann, leader of the Progress Party’s parliamentary group, Pia 
Kjærsgaard worked during the 1980s to stop the party’s electoral decline. The party leader-
                                                
46 The latter two are today the most prominent politicians in the Danish People’s Party, after the undisputed 
leader Pia Kjærsgaard. 
47 Four of them (Kjærsgaard, Nørdgaard, Thulesen Dahl and Donner) were until 1995 Progress Party MPs, while 
Peter Skaarup was until 1994 responsible for the Progress Party secretariat. 
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ship worked to promote the Progress Party as a trustworthy political party and a credible part-
ner for parliamentary coalitions.  
Kjærsgaard was a crucial actor in the game for the leadership in the Progress Party. Her 
decision to quit the party is therefore often relatd to her failing to reach power by placing her 
people in the vacant organisational posts. This interpretation is important to keep in mind 
since it supports a reading that sees more ideological continuity than fracture between the 
Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party. This reading has until recently been supported 
by much of the scholarly literature on the party (e.g. Bjørklund & Goul Andersen 2000; 
Pedersen & Ringsmose 2005). Recently, other scholars h ve instead maintained that there is 
greater discontinuity between the two parties than so far claimed (cf. Rydgren 2004: 474). 
However, neither side has really substantiated their positions with a comprehensive compara-
tive analysis of the two parties’ ideology.  
The position indicating a close ideological affinity between the Danish People’s Party 
and the Progress Party seemed initially confirmed by former Progress Party voters who 
switched to the Danish People’s Party when it was launched in the 1990s. Among those who 
in 1994 had cast their vote for the Progress Party, bout half declared they would vote for the 
Danish People’s Party in 1998.  
However, it is also a fact that the creation of theDanish People’s Party offered the 
unique opportunity to the newly formed political actor to reconsider and revise the party’s 
foundation and principles and to work on a more original ideological platform for the Danish 
People’s Party. And, as we will see, the founders of the Danish People’s Party did not leave 
this opportunity untried.  
The beginnings were particularly difficult for the n wly formed political organisation. 
The press was quite unanimous and predicted a short life for the new party. The popular Dan-
ish tabloid Ekstra Bladet ran an article entitled ‘Farewell Mrs. Kjærsgaard’ (Ekstra Bladet 10-
1995) considering her political future on the right wing of Danish parliamentary politics de-
finitively closed. But the party managed very well already from the start. Only a few months 
after the launching, the Danish People’s Party had collected the 21,000 signatures necessary 
to register on the list of parties running for the upcoming parliamentary election. The party 
soon had a significant number of members, which increased with time. In 1997 the DF 
counted about 1500 members (see Dansk Folkeblad 1997:3), which at the beginning of 1998 
had passed 2500 (in Dansk Folkeblad 1998:1) and reached 5000 in 2000 (Dansk Folkeblad 
2000:1). At present the party membership is reported at about 10,000 (Dansk Folkeblad 
2009/1: 32). 
At the first municipal elections in 1997 about 7 pct. voted for the party.48 It was a posi-
tive result, considering that the party was only about a year old and its programme consisted 
of a very concise declaration of intents. However, the clear electoral breakthrough came at the 
                                                
48 Already at the municipal elections, the Danish Peopl ’s Party did particularly well in traditional ‘left wing’ 
municipalities, becoming a potential rival for the Social Democratic Party (see Nielsen 1997). 
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1998 parliamentary election, where the Danish People’s Party was able to confirm the 7 pct. 
and gained thirteen seats in parliament (cf. Table 1.5, Chapter 1). The positive electoral sup-
port gave the party a rather solid parliamentary representation that needed to be consolidated.  
Since its formation, the Danish People’s Party worked to get electoral support and po-
litical influence, aware of the fact that this would require compromises with the other parties. 
Already in the 1996 declaration of intents it was stated that the aim of the Danish People’s 
Party was: ‘to give the Danish voters a real alternative to the politics pursued by the existing 
political parties’ but also that such an alternative ‘can play an active role in the parliamentary 
life’ reaching ‘political results through collaboration with other parties [because] a political 
party must never be a goal in itself. (…) The Danish People’s Party therefore sees as its goal 
to realise as much of the party’s politics as possible’ (Dansk Folkeparti 1996).   
The pursuit of order and unity within the party’s own ranks was a first and necessary 
step to achieve the necessary political reliability that helped the party forward in the process 
of ‘normalisation’ and achievement of political responsibility. One of the first tasks was for 
example to release the party from the negative image built by the Progress Party in the 1990s 
and often associated with anarchic situations, internal conflicts and political unreliability. To 
promote the Danish People’s Party as a politically credible alternative, the party leadership 
(and in particular Pia Kjærsgaard) made clear from the beginning that the party leadership 
would not tolerate internal conflicts and disagreemnts with the strategy. In a newsletter enti-
tled ‘Control from the top? Yes, of course’ (Topstyring? – Ja, naturligvis), Pia Kjærsgaard 
explained that a highly centralised party leadership was necessary to prevent the chaotic situa-
tions experienced in the years of the Progress Party, fo  as she said:  
 
when I launched the Danish People’s Party together with other MPs, I swore that I never ever, as 
long as I was party leader, would let something happen that was even slightly reminiscent of the 
anarchic situation we were coming from’ (Pia Kjærsgaard in Dansk Folkeblad 2000/2: 3). 
 
This was pursued with determination and has excluded numerous party members who dis-
agreed with the leadership or whose standpoints were considered extreme or inappropriate for 
the party.  
At the November 2001 elections, the Danish People’s Party got 13 pct. of the votes and 
22 parliamentary seats, nine more than in 1998. It was after these elections that the bourgeoi-
sie parties decided to benefit from the support of the Danish People’s Party. From 2001 the 
party became the key partner of the Liberal-Conservative coalition in office. The newly 
formed government lacked some of the necessary mandates to get the majority of the seats 
(90) in the Danish Parliament. This meant that the two parties had to count on the support of a 
party outside the governing coalition, to be able to pass the government politics. The Danish 
People’s Party was from the start the favoured candid te, since the party had clearly stated its 
support to the Liberal candidate Anders Fogh Rasmusen during the electoral campaign.  
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In this scenario, the government parties contributed to the political legitimisation of the Dan-
ish People’s Party, putting an end to a situation in which the votes to the radical right were in 
effect wasted (cf. Bale 2003). At the same time the coalition at government could adopt some 
of the ‘winning’ issues of the Danish People’s Party (for example on immigration, law and 
order and welfare abuses) responding to the Danish voters’ concerns about the immigration.   
The official position of government support partner in 2001 implied a more active and 
direct engagement of the party in the decision and policy making process and the unprece-
dented opportunity to exert relevant political influence on several social and economic do-
mains in Danish society. The opposition defined the new government configuration as ‘block 
politics’ (blokpolitik). The definition refers to the preferential decisional pattern consisting 
almost exclusively of agreements made between the Liberal-Conservative government and the 
Danish People’s Party. From the opposite side, the Danish People’s Party replied by calling 
the government resulting from the 2001 parliamentary elections a ‘system change’ (system-
skifte); a change that according to the party has to be interpreted as a popular revolt against 
the dominant cultural paradigm imposed by the political and intellectual left wing elite (cf. 
Krarup 2006).   
In 2001, the Danish People’s Party thus gained a particularly favourable and influential 
position, which gave the party the chance to work more concretely and operatively on the 
decisional process and on policy making. From 2001, the Danish People’s Party took part in 
nearly all broad agreements on labour market reforms, welfare reforms, reforms of the public 
administration and worked together with the governme t parties to approve all annual budget 
negotiations starting from 2002. Most significantly, the Danish People’s Party had a crucial 
role in writing the rules and conditions for immigration in the immigration law approved with 
the government in May 2002. Also in foreign politics was the support of the Danish People’s 
Party essential for the Danish military participation in Afghanistan and in Iraq in 2003. The 
only exception was on European politics, where the Danish People’s Party has remained scep-
tical towards further integration, which, in the view of the party, would undermine the na-
tional sovereignty.  
The participation in major reforms and political agreements is now used strategically by 
the leadership to attest the influential role and reliability of the Danish People’s Party in Dan-
ish politics. Already in 2002, Pia Kjærsgaard started o emphasise the concrete results ob-
tained with the support of the Danish People’s Party:  
 
The Danish People’s Party now runs all-round politics. We cannot be brushed aside as a single-
issue party; we are now a government leading party, which is helping to secure the welfare state 
and is not afraid to carry out the necessary reforms of the Danish society (…) the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party has placed itself at the centre of Danish politics’ (Pia Kjærsgaard ugebrev 11-02-
2002; see also ugebrev 04-03-2002). 
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In 2001 and the following two legislations, the votes of the Danish People’s Party secured the 
Liberal and Conservative government the necessary support. This has given the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party’s an influential status and the opportunity to exert important pressure on the gov-
ernment parties to carry out as much of the party’s politics as possible. The role of support 
that the DF has occupied until now has allowed the party distance itself from positions in di-
rect contrast with the politics supported by the party; an example is clearly EU politics. It is a 
‘preferential’ position, whose advantages are clear to the party leadership. As Peter Skaarup 
answered in a recent interview to the question whether the party has developed ambitions to 
come into office (Skaarup in Berlingske Tidende 03-05-2009): 
 
A party does not have to get into government, if it has no interest in this. If this does not reward 
the interests that the party and the party voters have. If a party has to get into government it must 
be because it wants to achieve a stronger position and influence. After the last election we de-
cided that we were not interested in this; however this may change after the next election or the 
next election again.  
 
In this sense, the fact that the party has not yet be n offered any ministerial positions and even 
more significantly, the fact that the DF has never advanced such a demand since 2001 is the 
result of a strategy that has given the party some advantages, perhaps more than could have 
reached by being in government. This must not be forgotten in the following sections on the 
ideology of the party.  
 
5.2 NEO-LIBERALISM AND TAXES  
5.2.1 The Progress Party of the beginnings: neo-liberalism and tax protest. 
According to the populist hypothesis (see here Chapter 2), radical right parties are often also 
tax protest movements. Tax protest is part of their anti-establishment stance, as paying taxes 
is considered a way to maintain the public sector, which is considered costly and unproduc-
tive. Therefore, a common demand is to strongly downsize the public spending and to privi-
lege investments from the public sector. As we have se n in Chapter 2, independently from 
the approach used to explain the radical right, most of the scholarly literature suggested that a 
clear neo-liberal orientation on the economic dimensio  represents one of the essential com-
ponents in the so-called radical right winning formula (cf. Kitschelt 1995).  
The tax protest and neo-liberal interpretation fits very well in the case of the Progress Party, 
whose political beginnings in the 1970s were clearly made under the ideological banner of 
anti-tax politics and a neo-liberal position translated into the demand for less state interven-
tion and more privatization and liberalisation of the national economy. The party’s main goal 
was complete abolishment of income tax, something the party considered achievable in 
maximum seven years and which should have started by progressively increasing the amount 
of the non-taxable basic income (cf. Fremskridtsparti 1973: 7).  
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In the first programmes of the Progress Party, the abolishment of all income taxes is de-
scribed as a necessary reform to solve a number of major national economic problems, such 
as unemployment, inflation and the financing of welfare. In the party documents of those 
years, these problems are portrayed as the result of the unbearable tax pressure on the Danish 
tax payers. According to the party, this only slowed down private investments and damaged 
individual initiative and creativity.  
During the 1980s, the Progress Party began to moderate the anti-tax profile and the party 
demands changed from unconditioned income tax abolition into a more pragmatic claim for a 
higher minimum non-taxable income. However, even if tax-protest was one of the main issues 
on the agenda particularly during the first decade, th  party was not a strictly Poujadist variant 
of the radical right. Its neo-liberalism was not unco ditional and the party also focused on 
social issues like economic and living conditions of the underprivileged in Danish society 
(Goul Andersen 2007). The party favoured higher mini um pensions, better hospices for the 
old and a general improvement of the health system (including the preservation of small hos-
pitals, free medicine, and reduction of patient waiting lists for special health treatments) and a 
publicly financed educational system (see e.g. Fremskridtsparti 1980: 7 and Fremskridtsparti 
1989: 17). This aspect is seldom emphasised in connectio  with the Progress Party, but it ac-
tually represents the first step towards the development of the pro-welfare politics for under-
privileged Danish citizens (pensioners, sick, handicapped, homeless) that would later charac-
terise its politics. In this sense, it can be argued that some of the elements of the pro-welfare 
position developed by the Danish People’s Party were also expressed by the Progress Party. 
 
5.2.2 The Danish People’s Party and the tax issue 
Ideological elements reminiscent of the Progress Partys position on economic issues can still 
be traced in the Danish People’s Party first party p ogrammes. The shift towards pro-welfare 
politics took place slowly, even if the purpose to leave the neo-liberal and tax protest legacies 
behind emerged rather early in the history of the Danish People’s Party. The intention to pro-
mote a pro-welfare and a more social-liberal profile was apparently influenced by the success 
of the Norwegian Progress Party at the 1997 election. The Norwegian Progress Party, founded 
in 1973 by Anders Lange, had been inspired by the Danish Progress Party.49 In 1997, the 
party under the leadership of Carl I. Hagen got over 15 pct. of the votes and became the sec-
ond political force in the country (cf. Aardal 2007). This happened also thanks to an agenda 
that had focussed on issues such as elder care, hospitals and the quality of the health care sys-
tem. In that year, the interest in welfare issues pr vailed over the immigration question among 
                                                
49 However, during most of the two parties’ lifetime, there was little or no direct contact between the Danish and 
Norwegian party. The Norwegian party preferred to av id close formal relations with the leader of the Danish 
Progress Party, Mogens Glistrup, considering his position democratically dubious. Also relations with the Dan-
ish People’s Party were until recently very limited. But in recent times, the present leader of the Norwegian 
party, Siv Jensen, declared that DF’s politics in Denmark represent a model to follow in Norway, particularly the 
Danish immigration regime.  
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the party’s voters (cf. Bjørklund 1998). Pia Kjærsgaard could therefore see how a pro-welfare 
agenda had a better electoral appeal than neo-liberal and low tax positions defending the in-
terests of the strong. The electoral appeal was also stronger when welfare was coupled to 
other issues such as law and order and anti-immigration. As she declared in 1997: 
 
When we founded the Danish People’s Party (…), we made away with the Progress Party spe-
cifically in that field [no taxes]. The Progress Party was in the 1970s related to no-taxes and 
cleaning up the public sector. This is a bad image. The Progress Party in Norway has always 
been cleverer than the Danish party. Carl I. Hagen [leader of the Norwegian Progress Party from 
1978 until 2006] won (at the 1997 elections) precisly emphasising the lack of welfare during 
the electoral campaign. I do not mind [the Danish People’s Party] leaning toward [this strategy] 
(quoted in Politiken 19/10/97). 
 
Presenting the party programme in 1997, Pia Kjærsgaa d emphasised that the Danish People’s 
Party was born as a ‘red and white party – a Danish party’. Concretely, this meant that the 
party had given up ‘ultra-liberal ideas about the right of the strongest, (…) silly ideas about 0 
taxes’, ‘automatic phone machines saying in Russian we surrender’ and ‘all that meant to let 
everything be ruled by profit making’. The party warned against ‘ideas of opening the na-
tional borders wide’ and against ‘the complete capitulation to Europe’s United States (…) 
with deadly and naïve dreams about a multi-ethnic so iety’ (Pia Kjærsgaard in Dansk 
Folkeblad 1997/5: 3).  
In reality, in 1997 the Danish People’s Party still owed an ideological debt to the neo-
liberal and tax reduction positions developed in the past by the Progress Party. Taxes were 
still a relevant voice in the policy agenda of 1997, where the party asked for a ‘strong reduc-
tion of taxes combined with rationalisation and reduction of expenses in the public admini-
stration and abolition of tax deductions’. In particular, the party demanded ‘higher levels of 
non-taxable income’ and asked to apply a fiscal withdrawal not exceeding 30 pct.  
A tax reform was still considered necessary to reviv  private investments and activity 
and to give the economy and the market the right conditi ns for ‘fair and free trade, where the 
demand of the market can self regulate the supply’, in order to produce so much that ‘there is 
welfare for all’ (Dansk Folkeparti 1997: 24). For this reason, the 1997 policy agenda sug-
gested to abolish a number of taxes and expenses considered to slow down the private com-
panies’ competitive power, such as direct taxation on companies (selskabsskatten) and other 
forms of indirect costs (Dansk Folkeparti 1997: 22).  
At the same time, the party demanded a significant utback in the costs of the public 
administration by means of a generalized economisation, rationalisation and privatisation of a 
consistent number of public services and tasks. Some sectors are specifically mentioned as 
fields where it is necessary to implement economic cutbacks: immigration; culture; interna-
tional military activities; public support to political parties; social benefits (overførselindkom-
ster) and economic aid to underdeveloped countries (Dansk Folkeparti 1997: 24).    
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The economic strategy in the 1997 policy agenda was blatantly defined by the Ministry 
of Finance as unrealistic, since the demand for tax eductions would not allow public finances 
to cover the increasing public expenditure planned for health care, education and improve-
ments in the nursing sector. Some of the articles published at that time did not hesitate to con-
sider this programmatic imprecision a sign of the party’s complete inexperience in the eco-
nomic field (cf. in Jyllands Posten 19-10-1997).  
In ideological terms this was perhaps also a sign that he party was in a transitional 
phase, where the attempt to position itself as more pro-welfare ran against the attempt to pre-
serve the neo-liberal and tax protest mindset inherted from the past. 
Meanwhile, it became clear to the party leadership t at it was not possible to hold both 
positions without losing political credibility and electoral support. The political consolidation 
of the party required careful reconsiderations of the positions related to economics and tax 
politics. Significantly in this respect is the 2001 policy agenda, in which the working guide-
lines for economy, taxes and welfare are much more pragmatically formulated and concrete in 
scope. For example, it is clearly stated that ‘the Danish People’s Party wishes a renewal of 
several Danish social conditions’, but also that the party will give its parliamentary support to 
‘changes which are fully considered and carefully panned and which do not jeopardise the 
national economic stability’ (Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 2001). Correspondingly, the 
position of the party on taxes in 2001 is that: 
 
it is senseless to speak about reducing taxes, without making clear which public expenses are 
going to be diminished, or what effect one wants to achieve. The Danish People’s Party will 
work for a gradual lowering of the tax burden to a level corresponding to the average in those 
countries [Denmark] compares itself to.  
 
Furthermore, it is specified that the party ‘is against any form of tax reduction that can dete-
riorate the basic welfare conditions of fields such as the elder care, pensions, health care, edu-
cation, research and security’ (Dansk Folkeparti 2001). 
In the updated working programme of October 2007 (cf. Dansk Folkeparti 2008), the 
party makes even clearer that fiscal policy represents the necessary frame for the development 
of society and for a sound redistribution of the national wealth. A central role is given to tax 
policy, where the party carefully explains how a higher taxation of the top incomes is neces-
sary to finance welfare benefits and services for socially and economically needy citizens. 
According to the party, the existing level of taxation is therefore necessary in order to support 
the system of cohesion and solidarity which characterises Danish society. In this sense, the 
party has today become very careful when dealing with possible reforms of the tax system, as 
the quotation below demonstrates: 
 
In general the Danish People’s Party is in favour of adjusting Danish tax policy if this takes 
place slowly and respects the welfare state that is financed without putting pressure on the debt. 
Tax policy is an important instrument in forming the welfare state, which influences the life of 
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everybody. It is therefore important that tax policy is always perceived as just, effective and fair 
(Dansk Folkeparti 2007). 
 
Since 2001 the party has supported the government’s tax stop, also in periods when this 
measure seemed to be problematic in terms of maintaini g the same levels of welfare.  
In the 2007 working programme, the party took a pragm tic position on this, safeguard-
ing the position as guarantor of the welfare state by stating that: ‘the effects of the tax stop on 
distributional policy and on the organisation of the welfare state are going to be under con-
tinuous assessment’. It is not surprising that the Danish People’s Party emphasises its role as 
welfare guarantor within the Liberal-Conservative government: 
  
Since the government change in 2001, the Danish People’s Party has worked to reinforce 
(opruste) the public sector, for example with the improvement of the health system and elder 
care system and with the support to the judicial system by adding extra policemen and more 
prisons. The Danish People’s Party will also in the future highly prioritize the improvement of 
the elder care sector, health care, the judicial system and the police, and the conditions of those 
who are doing less well in society (Dansk Folkeparti 2007) 
 
In 2007 the Danish People’s Party completed the ideological shift started in 1995 and today it 
works to consolidate its pro-welfare profile. This does not mean that in the practice the party 
has always and consequently supported welfare politics. But certainly, under a Liberal-
Conservative government, its position on welfare matters has often emerged with more inten-
sity, even if the outcome was limited in terms of plicy decisions. 
However, the welfare state ‘as such’ is no longer questioned by the Danish People’s 
Party. The focus is rather on who is actually entitled o its benefits. This has meant a demand 
for increasing restrictions against those who are considered undeserving recipients of welfare 
benefits, primarily immigrants and refugees. The limits are not only based on the economic 
factor (how much people have contributed to finance the welfare), but increasingly on ques-
tions of social, cultural and value assimilation of the different. 
 
5.3 WELFARE  
5.3.1 A break with the past: the Danish People’s Party pro-welfare position 
Since the start in 1995, the party’s leadership has focussed on a few specific issues. This 
helped the party to promote a clear ideological profile and to acquire a kind of ownership 
status on some issues, in particular anti-immigration, law and order and EU scepticism. 
The same issues characterize other radical right wing and populist parties in Western 
Europe. However, to understand the Danish People’s Party’s ideology and how it has devel-
oped and changed through the years, it is important to consider different dimensions and to 
consider how they relate to each other. In this respect, the economic dimension has often been 
underestimated in relation to the study of the radic l right parties’ ideology. This is even more 
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evident in the case of the Danish People’s Party, as the development of a more pro-welfare 
orientation represented a clear break with the politics supported by the Progress Party. 
The Danish People’s Party today has a pro-welfare oriented profile. On welfare issues 
the party is considered to challenge the traditional domain of the Danish Social Democratic 
Party. Since the Danish People’s Party was launched in 1995, its politics on economic matters 
have become much more supportive of welfare policy. 
Undoubtedly, the development in this direction was influenced by the fact that the DPP 
voters showed to be among the most supportive for ‘classic’ welfare arrangements than the 
electorate of other parties and in particular of the mainstream right (see Goul Andersen 2006). 
This has to be considered in relation to the socioeconomic profile of the party’s electorate 
with a clear overrepresentation of working class voters (see Chapter 8). This has made the DF 
a clear working class party in Danish politics today. And this composition has certainly also 
affected its policies on welfare issues.  
However, the pro-welfare orientation came gradually. While during the first years the party 
carefully promoted limited forms of welfare, today the party leadership intentionally promotes 
itself as the carrier of the classical Social Democrati  welfare tradition. Thus, at the Danish 
People’s Party annual meeting in 2000, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, prominent member and the 
man who will likely lead the party after Pia Kjærsgaard, declared that: 
 
The Social Democratic Party has already forgotten is old trade mark: security and welfare, so 
we can also take over the rose [symbol of the Social Democratic Party, redesigned in 2000]. But 
it must be the real product and not the one which today has been computer designed (Dansk 
Folkeblad 2000/5: 10). 
 
This role was acknowledged with even more resolution at the party’s annual meeting in 2006, 
when Pia Kjærsgaard declared that ‘a real Social Democrat votes for the Danish People’s 
Party’ (Pia Kjærsgaard in Dansk Folkeblad 2006/5:4-5)50. The statement indicates a radical 
change of course from the ultra-liberal and anti-tax orientation which characterised the Pro-
gress Party. The Progress Party moderated its initial position as a zero-tax party over the 
years, but tax protest, the critique of the welfare state and the demand cutbacks in public 
spending remained at the core of the party politics also in the 1980s and 1990s.  
The formation of the Danish People’s Party in 1995 offered the unprecedented opportu-
nity to abandon the neo-liberal legacies and the tax protest profile, choosing instead a devel-
opment towards pro-welfare politics.  
In the first ten point programme, the Danish People’s Party asked for ‘protection of the old 
and the sick’ and for improvement of the economy and quality of life of the economically and 
socially disadvantaged in Danish society. These demands included more money for pension-
ers and a better service quality in the health system and in the elderly nursing sector. Educa-
tion and schooling were also mentioned as sectors in need of more economic support, whereas 
                                                
50 And recently by Pia Kjærsgaard also at the September 2009 party meeting.  
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the rest of the public sector was expected to shrink both in economic and bureau-
cratic/administrative terms. However, as observed above, before the Danish People’s Party 
also the Progress Party had advanced demands for the improvement of the economy of the 
same exposed social groups. In particular the conditi s of retirees living with minimum pen-
sion were often discussed by the Progress Party and by Pia Kjærsgaard when she was in the 
party (cf. Kjærsgaard in Jyllands Posten 24-01-1992). But in 1997, the Danish People’s Party 
expressed its political engagement for the socially and economically disadvantaged groups in 
a louder tone. As Pia Kjærsgaard uttered in one of her newsletters: 
 
We have a responsibility for the weak in our society (…) social responsibility is going to be one 
of the main issues for the Danish People’s Party. We will send a clear signal that we are respon-
sible for the weak groups in society. (…) we will not save a single penny when it is necessary to 
help those citizens who cannot help themselves. (…) we are in many, many situations ready to 
increase public expenditure for the weakest (Dansk Fol eblad 1997/2: 3).    
 
In the 1997 policy agenda, this commitment was officially repeated in the introductory words, 
where welfare is described as the natural responsibility that in the Danish community the 
‘strong feel to take care of the weak’ (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram 1997:3). The elderly, 
early retirees, sick and handicapped are mentioned among the groups which are most in need 
(Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram 1997: 10-11).  
But welfare benefits are not considered accessible to all. There is an essential difference 
between the welfare supported by the Danish People’s Party and the Social Democratic leg-
acy. Seeing immigration as the greatest threat to the survival of the Danish welfare state, the 
party has from the beginning spoken in favour of measures which could: 1) reduce signifi-
cantly the pressure on the welfare state from immigration by a drastic cut down of the number 
of immigrants coming to the country; 2) guarantee natives priority on welfare benefits (this 
opens up what the Danish People’s Party considers another problematic issue: naturalization).  
The impact of immigration on welfare was first of all considered in economic terms and asso-
ciated to the list of the economic costs that the Danish taxpayers have to pay. The economic 
costs of immigration were considered in terms of unemployment benefits, integration on the 
labour market, health care, education, housing, welfare abuses and the like. Articles such as: 
‘Foreigners cost 29.8 billion annually’ (Dansk Folkeblad 1997/5: 4-7), ‘The refugee flow con-
tinues’ (Dansk Folkeblad 1998/1: 4) and ‘Immigration has gigantic costs’ (Dansk Folkeblad 
1999/1: 6-7) appeared regularly in the party journal. The position on this point was explicit: 
the welfare state must be for those who have paid for it with the savings of their hard work. 
Welfare must not be a ‘free self-serve’ for the many foreigners coming to the country (cf. 
Kjærsgaards ugebrev 04-12-2000).  
Immigrants are considered to abuse the Danish welfare state to the detriment of Danes 
who are really in need. As expressed by Pia Kjærsgaa d ‘in quality of social benefit clients, 
foreigners get all of it, while our own homeless and our weak are placed in the second rank’ 
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(Kjaersgaard in Dansk Folkeblad 1999/1:3). And because of this, as formulated in the 1997 
policy agenda, ‘the current immigration flood represents a serious threat to the survival of 
Denmark as a universal welfare state’ (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram 1997: 6).  
The Danish People’s Party’s pro-welfare orientation questions what many scholars until 
recently considered a feature of the electorally successful radical right, namely that it is free-
marketing and neo-liberal politics that have gained wind in radical right economics. Instead, 
protectionist positions on national economy, welfar chauvinism and politics containing the 
effects of globalisation appeared on the radical right parties’ agenda.  
The marginalisation hypothesis has often been used to explain this development. It 
should be the fear among the working class of how the economy develops in times of rapid 
socioeconomic transformations that changed the appro ch to economics among the radical 
right parties. Not neo-liberal and free marketing positions, therefore, but rather politics safe-
guarding the national market from the international competition and granting the necessary 
welfare to those considered deserving of economic help.  
However, it is also interesting to observe that the electoral support to the three parties 
comes primarily from national and territorial contexts characterised by economic affluence, 
relatively low unemployment rates and a rather effectiv  welfare state.51 These conditions 
have apparently not been enough to contain the reaction from some the most exposed social 
groups, granting a better socioeconomic protection fr m the challenges of globalisation (see 
Swank & Betz 2003). Solidarity turned instead much more inwards and immigrants were in-
creasingly portrayed as the most concrete danger to the survival of the welfare state.  
The way the Danish People’s Party has developed its i eology in relation to welfare is-
sues has not only introduced a model that seems to fit best in countries having an established 
and acknowledged welfare state, but in general this policy combination has introduced an 
alternative to the liberal and free-market formula, which did not seem to live in the best 
health. The pro-welfare and anti-immigration formula developed by the Danish People’s Party 
can thus be part of the answer to the party’s increasing electoral support over the last decade.  
 
5.3.2 Recent developments in relation to welfare and welfare issues 
The Danish People’s Party approach to the immigration queston in the 1990s was considered 
closely related to the welfare issue. Immigrants and refugees were first of all considered in 
terms of numbers and costs. This approach did not exclusively characterise the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party. At the beginning of 1999, a new integration law was approved by the left-wing 
government. The aim was to define different conditions and rules for new immigrants and 
refugees in relation to labour market, housing conditions, education and social care. The dis-
cussions leading up to the enactment had focussed increasingly on workfare discourses in 
relation to integration of immigrants in the country (cf. Holm 2005: 168-177). The goal was to 
                                                
51 In the case of the Northern League the observation refers mainly to the Northern Italian regions, representing 
the geographical and electoral reference area for this party.  
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help immigrants on the Danish labour market and make them less dependent on social and 
unemployment benefits.  
Some of the Danish People’s Party’s ‘ownership’ of the immigration issue was then cap-
tured by the government parties, particularly by the Social Democratic Party. It was perhaps 
also in response to this political development thate Danish People’s Party started to put 
increasing emphasis on the culture and value questions in relation to immigrants and their 
integration in Danish society. The party’s pro-welfare rhetoric started therefore to refer to the 
immigrants’ lack of fundamental principles and values considered essential to support the 
foundations of the welfare state. Among the values m ntioned, the party emphasised the soli-
darity, collective interests, equality, tolerance and working diligence charactersing the Danish 
society. In this way, the core elements behind the welfare construction took on a qualitative 
and permanent character represented by values, principles and cultural differences. The im-
migration impact on welfare quantified in terms of economic costs to a high degree also be-
came a question of cultural differences. 
The party’s pro-welfare position and the impact of immigration on this are directly for-
mulated in the 2001 working programme. All in all, it is difficult to overlook the differences 
between the 1997 policy agenda and the one released in 2001 on the eve of new elections. The 
2001 programme is certainly the most articulate and comprehensive party programme; a sign 
that the ideological development had reached a mature phase.  
The 2001 working programme makes also explicit the party’s position on the welfare 
state. There is hardly any critique against the way the welfare state is built and financed, 
whereas tax reduction is given less relevance and appro ched more pragmatically that in the 
previous years. Significantly, the programme expresses a favourable position in relation to an 
increase of public spending. Particularly when taxes and public money are used to improve 
the conditions of the socially and economically needy in Danish society: old pensioners and 
people with low incomes, homeless, drug and alcohol addicts and so forth. As stated in the 
2001 party programme: 
 
The Danish People’s Party is against tax reduction, which deteriorates the basic fields of the 
welfare state such as elder care, pensions, health system, education, research and the fight 
against crime (Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 2001). 
 
Another significant development in the 2001 party programme is the international context 
against which the development of the Danish society is framed and compared to and where 
interrelated and self-reinforcing processes and global dynamics are considered to play a sig-
nificant role for the future of the country. Within this framework, there are two major threats 
to Denmark from inside and outside the country: 
 
Solidarity and community in Denmark and in other small countries are threatened today from 
several sides; from inside the country by a closed an  intolerant minority and from outside by 
globalisation and the power of the international capital (Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 2001) 
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The Danish People’s Party here plays the role of guardian of these values: 
 
The Danish People’s Party will work for a Denmark characterised by solidarity, responsibility 
and freedom. (…) It is the Danes’ inescapable right and duty to defend and to hand down these 
important values our society is built upon: freedom, equality, individual responsibility and dili-
gence (Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 2001). 
 
In general, the party puts great emphasis on what it sees as the values, norms and principles 
that explain why and how the Danish society has developed the way it as. Within this inter-
pretative framework, Danish culture is considered to bear a distinctive set of norms and values 
representing the pillars upon which the society andits individuals have been created, formed 
and organized. The existence and functioning of the Danish institutions, of which the welfare 
state is among the most outstanding constructions, can be endangered by a high socioeco-
nomic pressure (for example from problems of economic financing due to a high number of 
immigrants living on welfare benefits). However, the Danish People’s Party considers even 
more dramatic and dangerous the meeting between different cultures, which do not share the 
same principles, values and norms. In this sense, culture and identity have become fundamen-
tal cultural components in the DF ideology to explain the need for more restrictive immigra-
tion policies and for stricter integration rules for the immigrants already living in the country.  
This kind of discourse also started to demarcate even more significantly the ideology of the 
Danish People’s Party from the positions ‘inherited’ from the Progress Party. The ‘old’ party 
focussed mostly on the economic costs and social implications when dealing when the immi-
gration issue, leaving the anti-Islam positions mostly a free domain to the extremist positions 
of Mogens Glistrup. The ‘revolution’ of the Danish People’s Party was to take up issues of 
cultural and value conflicts and to related these to the Danish national uniqueness (‘Danish-
ness’).  
This position has become a central part of the party’s politics particularly from 2000-
2001 when the focus increasingly turned to question f national identity, principles, values 
and cultural differences. The 2001 working programme is significantly entitled: ‘Common 
values – common responsibilities’. The Danish values of ‘solidarity and community (fælle-
skab)’ are considered to be ‘threatened from several sides; from inside the country by a closed 
and intolerant minority and from outside by globalis t on and the power of the international 
capital’ (Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 2001). The aim of the Danish People’s Party is to 
defend the threatened values, working ‘for a Denmark characterised by solidarity, responsibil-
ity and freedom. (…) It is the Danes inescapable right and duty to defend and to hand down 
these important values our society is built upon: freedom, equality, individual responsibility 
and diligence’ (Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 2001).  
Within this cultural and identitarian perspective, individuals are considered different be-
cause they are carriers of different cultural background, values, beliefs, attitudes, and identi-
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ties which affect the way they interact with each ot er, the way they live, think, work and 
behave. In this perspective, different cultures canbe of equal value, but they are essentially 
incompatible and mixing them can be dangerous.  
As the Danish welfare state it built upon fundamental values, its construction can be fa-
tally endangered by the instability and cultural diversity brought into the country by immigra-
tion. As explained in the 2001 party programme:  
 
Denmark has with a background of a millenary tradition developed a very homogeneous and ex-
traordinarily stable society, where the experience of community and solidarity was and still is an 
important and natural part of its existence. The basic greement on common values has been 
crucial for the functioning of important social functions such as the maintenance of law and or-
der, tax collection and redistributive politics. This society is under threat. (…) Everywhere in the 
world it has proven impossible to transmit that sense of community and solidarity that character-
ises a homogeneous society to a multicultural society, where all the tensions and conflicts result 
from the fact that the population does not take the same values as a point of departure (Dansk 
Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 2001).  
 
Different cultures are not only incompatible, but an ttempt to put them together endangers 
the fundamental values the receiving societies are built upon. This is also one of the main rea-
sons the party today uses to explain why integration is so difficult and the welfare state seri-
ously jeopardised by immigration.  
 
5.3.3 Concrete results in welfare politics and the consequences of political influence.  
From 2001, the Danish People’s Party tried to consolidate its role as guarantor of the welfare 
state. The party had by then become the key supporting partner to the Liberal-Conservative 
government. The achievement of this influential positi n gave the party more space and 
means to profile itself as the protector of the interests of the old, the sick, the poor and the 
homeless. Most importantly, the annual budget negotiati ns with the government gave a 
unique opportunity to achieve concrete results in favour of these groups.  
After every finance act, the Danish People’s Party leadership emphasised its crucial role 
in ensuring the necessary welfare improvements. In particular, pensioners have often come on 
the party agenda in negotiations with the government in terms of higher pensions and better 
services for the elderly. But also in other areas such as the healthcare sector, the party has 
used its influence to ask for better hospitals, shorter waiting lists for operations and treatments 
and recognition of alternative medical therapies. According to the party in 2002, most of these 
expenses could have been financed by money saved from the cutbacks on immigration, asy-
lum seekers and from the reduction of the economic aid to developing countries.   
Already in the first finance act law agreement for 2002 (Finansministeriet 2002), the 
role wielded by the Danish People’s Party was clear. As clearly expressed by Pia Kjærsgaard, 
the fact that the party decided to support the Liberal-Conservative government did not mean 
that the party ‘should automatically vote for the politics of the government’, for as the DF 
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leader assured, the party would have voted in favour only when it was ‘the right politics for 
Denmark’ (Kjærsgaards ugebrev 04-02-2002). The party has at times used this position to 
‘blackmail’ government policies, threatening the government with withdrawal of support in 
order to obtain concrete results or to manifest disapproval of policies supported by the gov-
ernment. The Danish People’s Party has obtained significant results, considering that the party 
has not been in office and has never had a ministry or another relevant post in the three Lib-
eral-Conservative governments that have governed the country since 2001.  
On several occasions the party has contributed to the approval of extra resources for sec-
tors strongly supported by the party. In the finance a t for 2002 these included for instance: 
funding for reduction of waiting lists in hospitals; an extension of the maternity leave period 
financed by public benefits; withdrawal of the planned cuts in the education system; freedom 
for the elderly to choose between private and public home help, a reduction of their expenses 
to heating and extra economic support to pensioners with low incomes (cf. Finansministeriet 
2002: 8-9).  
Public spending for immigration was where the Danish People’s Party wanted to see 
significant cutbacks on the public budget. This measure was already included in the first fi-
nance act approved by the government with the support of the party and paved the way to the 
more comprehensive rewriting of the law on immigration and integration that was approved in 
May 2002.  
In the various finance acts approved since 2002 the Danish People’s Party left clear fin-
gerprints on issues concerning the elderly and improvement of the healthcare system, and the 
fact that this was decided together with a bourgeois g vernment put the Danish People’s Party 
welfare profile even more into relief. This was used by the party as a situation that could bet-
ter promote its task. As Pia Kjærsgaard observed: 
 
even if the Danish People’s Party is part of the parliamentary basis (parlamentariske grundlag) 
of a bourgeois and liberal government (…) we have always had most at heart to help the weak 
and most vulnerable groups in our society; among them the old, the sick and the handicapped. 
(…) I am glad for the role of the Danish People’s Party as the parliamentary social guarantor. 
(…) There is good reason to be glad for every step in the direction of a society which cares. (…) 
we can only take a little step forward every time – but it is all right, so far the course is right’ 
(Kjærsgaards ugebrev 14-07-2003).  
 
At present the party defines straightforwardly its role as: ‘(…) the social consciousness of the 
Liberal and Conservative government, keeping an eye on very attack that may be directed 
against the welfare state’ (Kjærsgaards ugebrev 26-10-2005).  
However, the party has in practice also given its support to politics which have endan-
gered the welfare state, for example by backing up on the tax reductions strongly wanted by 
the government, which have benefitted in particular taxpayers with higher incomes. But also 
in this case, the party has been able to promote itself as the guarantor of the welfare state, by 
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ensuring the electorate that its support is actually conditioned by the influence these policies 
have on the condition of the Danish welfare state. 
 
5.4 ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT POLITICS 
5.4.1 Anti-establishment and anti-intellectual politics in the Progress Party 
Particularly in the 1970s, the ideology of the Progress Party was strongly characterised by anti 
establishment politics and by a populist rhetoric and style. This emerged for example in the 
attempt to mobilise people against the elites, claiming that the will of the common man was to 
be considered ‘supreme over every other standard’ (Shils 1956). As many other populist par-
ties, the Progress Party supported a more direct involvement of the people in democracy via 
more popular referenda that according to the party should be organized ‘every time a govern-
ment introduces an important piece of legislation with the support of a restricted majority’ 
(Fremskridtsparti 1978: 12).  
The Progress Party’s populist and anti-establishment thi king emerged also in the fre-
quent reference to the opposition of the mass against the elite and their divergent interests and 
priorities. The party’s official documents portray the public administration as out of control 
and overburdened by bureaucratic measures, paper pushing and unnecessary costs. 
The party considered this situation to heavily affect the work of many Danish citizens 
and in particular the private sector because, as spelled out in the 1978 Progress Party pro-
gramme: ‘bakers, bookshop keepers, doctors and so on are better employed baking bread, 
selling books and curing people than fighting with public officials about how to fill in all kind 
of forms’ (Fremskridtsparti 1978: 4).  
The party also criticized the power and privileges achieved by politicians, suggesting 
drastic measures such as a reduction of the number of MPs from 179 to only 40, introducing a 
monthly turn out of the MPs to ensure a political shift. The party nourished the same distrust 
for the intellectual elite, considered closely relat d to the political elite. In particular, the party 
denounced the widespread norm that academic jobs were more prestigious than a manual 
work (Fremskridtsparti 1980: 9), asserting that academics and intellectuals represented an 
unproductive sector in the Danish society.   
As any other field seeking to be ‘productive’ in society, culture and arts should –
according to the party- be self-financed, driven and supported by the private sector and cer-
tainly not subsidised by public money. In a perfectly ultraliberal style, the Progress Party con-
demned public funding of cultural initiatives and activities, which were considered to hamper 
the artist’s creativity and to burden the public budget unnecessarily. For this reason, the party 
wanted to abolish all kinds of public support to culture, encouraging writers, painters and art-
ists in general to make their own living out of their activity, or to reconsider their choice and 
find another job when the engagement in the cultural market was not proportional to the eco-
nomic return (Fremskridtsparti 1989: 23). But the populist rhetoric against the elites and 
championing the virtues of the common Dane did not translate into an explicit commitment to 
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Danish values, norms, principles and virtues. In line with the party’s neo-liberal style, support 
for individual well-being and freedom were considered as necessary premises for the func-
tioning of the society. 
This position, as we will see, is different from tha  later formulated by the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party. In contrast to most of the recent radic l right, the Progress Party did not put par-
ticular emphasis on the need to safeguard national dentity and to protect ethnical homogene-
ity against the threat ‘from outside’. At least until the 1980s, there was little or no reference to 
a historical core of Danish principles and values endangered by other cultures and life styles. 
Particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Progress Party’s approach to the national ques-
tion was rather characterised by a pragmatic emphasis on the geographical extension and 
population in relation to other European countries. This entailed that Denmark had a limited 
decisional influence at the international level and therefore needed to cooperate with other 
countries. As it is spelled out in the 1980 Progress Party programme: 
 
The Danish ambitions on foreign policy must adjust to he fact that from an international point 
of view we are amongst the smallest and therefore least influential countries. Aware of this fact, 
Denmark should use only a very limited amount of economic and human resources on foreign 
policy issues (Fremskridtsparti 1980: 14). 
   
It was a portrayal of Denmark that differed significantly from that promoted today by the 
Danish People’s Party. This (also) has an historical explanation. At the beginning of the 
1980s, internationalisation of the markets was still limited and the migration patterns to 
Europe were not significant enough to mobilise public opinion. The international power was 
exerted at higher levels and mainly seen in terms of the opposition between USA and the 
USSR. From this perspective, the national role was considered in relation to other and at that 
time different dynamics and international relations.    
 
5.4.2 Anti-establishment politics in the Danish Peopl ’s Party 
The anti-establishment critique was particularly strong in the period that the Danish People’s 
Party spent at the margins of the Danish politics. The critique went in two directions: one fea-
tures a ‘classic’ populist and anti-elitist reaction, accusing the political and intellectual elite of 
being disconnected from the common people; the other was specifically and held the main-
stream parties responsible for the consequences of their immigration politics on society. The 
party judged the political establishment directly responsible for years of a mistaken immigra-
tion regime. In an article commenting the support t he Danish People’s Party in districts 
with a high number of immigrants, Pia Kjærsgaard blatantly observed in 1998 that:    
 
The political upper-class at Christiansborg and the press have not yet understood how serious 
the situation is. (…) The political upper-class is able to give a talk (…) and to instruct the fools 
in the residential concrete housing how to behave. ‘Be tolerant! Look at us!’- they say, from the 
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safety of their homes and in front of the fireplace, where tolerance does not cost anything 
(Kjærsgaard in Dansk Folkeblad 1998/3: 24). 
 
For the Danish People’s Party, the mainstream parties had in several ways disregarded what 
was good for the country. The party saw this political irresponsibility not only in relation to 
the immigration politics approved by the previous governments, but also in the politics sup-
porting the process of European integration, which for the party would put national sover-
eignty in serious danger. The party’s anti-establishment was then mainly directed against the 
position and political results achieved by the parties in government, rather than against the 
abuse of power and money. Since 2001, anti-establishment issues–not surprisingly- have be-
come a much less relevant topic in the Danish People’s Party agenda. 
 
5.5 ANTI-IMMIGRATION 
5.5.1 The Progress Party and anti-immigration in the mid-1980s. 
As mentioned above, the first signs of electoral declin  for the Progress Party came in the 
mid-1980s suggesting that the electoral success as a neo-liberal forerunner, with tax protest on 
the agenda was coming to an end (see Glans 1984).  
In 1982, a centre right government coalition led by the Conservatives implemented a 
number of structural reforms that made the existence of the party much less appealing to the 
Danish electorate. In 1984, the Progress Party reached its lowest result ever with less than 4 
pct. of the votes. By the mid-1980s it was clear that t e party had to find another political 
strategy to survive. The long period with the bourgeois government led by the conservative 
Poul Schlüter had in many respects weakened the electoral appeal of several of the Progress 
Party’s original issues, and in the 1980s many considered the party to be politically worn out.  
But some other and deeper reasons for what happened in the mid-1980s must be 
searched in the party’s ideological transformations. It was for example in the 1980s that the 
party started to run an anti-immigration position. Actually, already in the 1970s, Mogens Glis-
trup felt that anti-immigration politics could mobilise a part of the Danish electorate (Goul 
Andersen 2007). At that time the situation was not yet completely ripe and Glistrup’s uncon-
trolled and often extreme statements alienated the vote of the better-educated.  
However, while in 1979 the Progress Party voters did not deviate from the others in 
terms of attitudes towards immigration, in the mid-1980s an increasing number of Progress 
Party voters started to express anti-immigration grievances (Bjørklund & Goul Andersen 
2002). This has to be seen in relation to the development of the immigration flows to the 
country. During the 1980s, the number of asylum seekers increased exponentially, from 800 
in 1983 to 4,300 in 1984 and 8,700 in 1985 (Goul Andersen & Bjørklund, 2000: 200). Their 
number was adding up to those immigrants who had come as guest workers during the eco-
nomic upturn in the 1960s.  
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In November 1973 a law approved by the government stopped the entrance of foreign 
workers to Denmark responding to the economic stagnatio  and increasing unemployment 
that in the 1970s had started to pressure the world economy. But the measure did not stop 
immigration. Similarly to other Western countries, several immigrants who had come to 
Denmark decided to remain and were later joined by their families through family reunions. 
Asylum seekers were also still allowed to come intothe country in accordance with interna-
tional conventions.  
Before the 1980s the immigration issue was basically non-existent in the Progress Party 
programmes and in the official party literature. The only issue which until then had something 
to do with non-Western countries in the programmes of the Progress Party concerned eco-
nomic aid to underdeveloped economies, which the party wanted to cancel from the public 
budget and finance only with private money. It was only after 1986 that immigration became 
a relevant issue on the party’s agenda. An official document on local politics published in 
1986 has a paragraph on ‘foreign workers’, in which the party declares itself against any form 
of positive affirmative action, adding that foreigners ‘are welcome to keep their own cultural 
habits, language and religion, but tax payers must not be charged for these expenses’ (Frem-
skridtsparti 1986: 2).  
The political debate followed the situation in the country closely. In 1983 the Parliament 
started to work on a reform of the existing immigration law. The law that came out of the po-
litical negotiations was described as one of the most liberal in Western Europe, ensuring for-
mal rights to immigrants and refugees on matters such as family reunions and expulsions, but 
it was later criticised by most parties, including those which had helped write it. During the 
1980s the law went through several adjustments (Gaasholt & Togeby 1995: 27-31; Holm 
2005: 217-257). It was against this background that t e Progress Party started to play an im-
portant role, influencing the debate and the public opinion on specific aspects related to im-
migration, immigration policy and their impact on Danish society. The increasing importance 
given to this issue emerges clearly in the programmes from the late 1980s. 
In the 1989 party programme, a section deals specifically with the ‘Foreigners in Den-
mark’ and finds place under the discussion about foreign policy. Here, the party declares that 
the ‘invasion of the foreigners’ is primarily a consequence of ‘the foolishness of Danish legis-
lation’ and therefore ‘it is a mistake to blame foreigners for taking advantage of such a law’ 
(Fremskridtsparti 1989). 
Initially, the Progress Party was mainly concerned about the economic costs of immigra-
tion. Its position on immigration, at least in the official party programmes, was that immi-
grants were welcome in Denmark, as far as they wereable to provide for themselves and their 
family without economic aid from the Danish state and taxpayers (Fremskridtsparti 1989: 26-
27). The party opposed any form of ‘special treatment’ or positive discrimination that could 
help immigrants on the housing market, labour market or in the educational system.  
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Another central issue that started to be discussed in the 1980s was the conditions and 
rules for asylum seekers. The 1983 immigration law had in fact broadened the terms for the 
acquisition of the refugee status, including under the definition of ‘de facto’ refugees also 
asylum seekers who were not directly mentioned in the Geneva Convention. The Progress 
Party was among the first to protest against the new rules, which were considered to generate 
an uncontrollable flow of refugees to the country.  
In 1989, the Progress Party insisted that ‘only genuine political refugees’ were to be al-
lowed entry and only when ‘Denmark is for them a natural getaway country’ (people from the 
North-Eastern bloc or boatpeople saved by Danish ships in international waters). The party 
specified that only the quotas of refugees regulated by international agreements had to be ac-
cepted by Denmark, meaning that recognition of other refugee status had to be removed from 
the law. 
As we will see in the following pages, also the Danish People’s Party initially put 
stronger emphasis on economic and cost-benefit explanations in relation to immigration. The 
focus later turned to other cultural and value aspects in relation to immigration and asylum 
politics. However, to some extent, also the Progress Party dealt with issues that did not neces-
sarily or directly imply economic consequences and cost and benefits estimations. For exam-
ple, it was the Progress Party that started to criticise the right achieved by immigrants (non-
European citizens) in 1981 to vote and run in municipal and regional elections after three 
years of residence in the country. The Danish People’s Party today has the same position on 
this issue, claiming that the right to vote should be given only to Danish citizens (Dansk 
Folkeparti Principprogram 1997: 6). Precisely in relation to citizenship, there is another ideo-
logical continuity between the position developed by the Progress Party and the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party that has to do with the question of naturalisation. Already in the 1980s, the Pro-
gress Party started to discuss naturalisation policy, asking for a general tightening of the law 
and accusing the public authorities of being too ‘generous’ in granting Danish citizenship to 
foreigners. Naturalisation is also in the case of the Danish People’s Party to be considered the 
highest reward given by the Danish society to an immigrant for his or her successful efforts to 
integrate in Danish society in social, economic andnow cultural terms.   
On the eve of new elections in 1990, the Progress Party formulated a ‘list’ of problems 
and solutions related to immigration: 1) Denmark allowed too many foreigners to come into 
the country, and number was to be reduced by stopping family reunions; 2) illegal immigra-
tion had to stop with the help of the police forces; 3) economic benefits to immigrants had to 
be regulated by law so that a foreigner could not receive more than the amount responding to 
a minimum pension; 4) the so-called two years law hd to be abolished and refugees should 
be sent back to their countries also after more than wo years from their arrival; 5) immigrants 
who had committed a crime had to be sent back to their native country; 6) the naturalisation 
law needed to be significantly tightened; 7) the construction of a big Mosque in Copenhagen 
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had to stop immediately. The pamphlet finished with the motto: ‘Long live Danishness’ 
(Fremskridtsparti 1990).  
In an official Progress Party document published a ye r later, further solutions were 
proposed to contrast the costs and negative impact due to immigration (Fremskridtsparti 
1991). This indicated that the question increasingly engaged the party and that it started to be 
considered under other perspectives than the merely conomic. The document mentions the 
abolition of the publicly sponsored mother tongue teaching, the removal of the immigrants’ 
right to vote in local elections and the necessity to compile ethnically informed statistics on 
crime in order to respond to the challenges created by the immigrants in Denmark.  
Looking at these old documents from the Progress Party it is interesting how the Danish 
People’s Party undoubtedly took with it some of theconcrete political suggestions already 
advanced in the late 1980s. 
The Progress Party’s official position on immigration in the 1980s underlined thus 
mostly the economic costs associated with an increasing number of immigrants and refugees, 
although the position emphasising the cultural and value differences between Islam and the 
West was not far behind. In 1988, the party already formulated slogans such as ‘Return Den-
mark to the Danes!’ and ‘Denmark can not culturally, economically, or socially bear the 
weight of more refugees’ (Fremskridtsparti 1988: 2). 
But if the party’s official position on immigration had been cleared of the extreme 
standpoints, the rhetoric used by leading members of the Progress Party, first of all by Mo-
gens Glistrup, was neither moderate nor carefully formulated. To define Muslims, Glistrup 
introduced the term Mohammedanians (muhamedener), a word with a clearly derogatory con-
notation. With time, the discussion on immigration a d immigrants became more and more 
polarised. In the 1990s, Mogens Glistrup spoke increasingly about what he called the 
Mohammedanian threat (see Glistrup 1994). He warned D nmark against the danger from 
Muslim immigrants arguing that ‘we have to be 1000 pct. sure not to underestimate the 
Mohammedanian threat, otherwise our descendants will no onger be Danes in Denmark’, 
adding that ‘if Islam triumphs, our world dies’ (Glistrup 1994: 456).  
The Progress Party undoubtedly contributed to taking the immigration issue up to dis-
cussion, giving voice to the most critical positions. However, Glistrup and some others in the 
party had driven the discussion too far. Voters who ere perhaps sceptical about the country’s 
immigration regime, but who did not want to be considered racists started to leave the party. 
At the same time the Progress Party gained increasing support among manual workers and 
voters with a lower educational attainment (see chapter 8).   
The more moderate wing of the Progress Party had instead understood that it was elec-
torally advantageous to be critical, but in a more careful and pragmatic way in relation to the 
immigration question. This would have helped the party gain more influence in Danish poli-
tics. It was the strategy that Pia Kjærsgaard and some other supporters tried without very 
much success in the Progress Party, but which gave results with the Danish People’s Party.  
 119 
 
5.5.2 The Danish People’s Party on immigration  
In 1995, the programmatic position of the Danish Peopl ’s Party on asylum and immigration 
had several points in common with the issues that the Progress Party had taken up in the past. 
The Danish People’s Party ten point programme of 1995 asked for a general tightening up of 
the law both for asylum and immigration. In relation t  asylum seekers and refugees the party 
asked for more rigid rules. Already in 1995 the party was in favour of ‘massive and durable 
repatriation politics’52 of refugees who had come to the country and could go back to their 
homelands. This proposal was followed by plans of investments in aid programmes that had 
to be realised ‘on place’, in the refugees’ neighbourh od countries. The party considered this 
the best way to help as many people in need as possible, rather than only those few who could 
manage to flee from their countries.  
The demands of the party in relation to immigration included much stricter measures for 
family reunification and prohibition of marriages of convenience, which the party considers a 
widespread practice among ethnic minorities. Crime a ong immigrants also had to be pun-
ished by sending immigrants out of the country as soon as they had served their sentence. In 
relation to the foreigners already living in the country, the Danish People’s Party asked for the 
abolition of the right to vote at the municipal elections after three years of residence in the 
country. This right was established in the country in 1981 with the vote of the left-wing par-
ties and the Social Liberals (RV), when the political orientation was to give immigrants living 
in the country the same political and civil rights a  Danish citizens independently from their 
level of integration, linguistic skills and knowledge of Danish society. As seen above, already 
in the 1980s the Progress Party had asked to review th  law and to withdraw this right. The 
Danish People’s Party continued to be of the same idea, considering the right to vote some-
thing exclusively reserved to Danish citizens and to ci izens of the other Nordic countries af-
ter three years of residence in the country. For the party the right to vote is inextricably asso-
ciated with the knowledge, understanding and complete integration in Danish society. Other-
wise the whole structure and organization of society can be jeopardised.     
In the late 1990s, the Danish People’s Party started to focus on an issue that would in-
creasingly engage the party in the years to come: the question of citizenship. As early as 1997, 
the party described the naturalisation procedures pur ued by the governments as a ‘ticking 
bomb’ under the Danish society. The bomb was represnt d by the 6-8000 foreigners getting 
Danish citizens every year. An article in Dansk Folkeblad reported that:  
 
                                                
52 The demand for an effective repatriation policy is frequently put forward by the party, recently in relation to 
its pressure on the government to send back refugees from Iraq, for which the party was strongly critiized. The 
way the party interprets what it considered the convenience refugees (bekvemmelighedsflygtninge) and their 
stubbornness to stay is interesting: ‘Show responsibility to your land and help reconstruct your countries (…) 
Re-establish your self-respect. Re-establish our respect for you. (…) Go home and do something for your coun-
try’ (Pia Kjærsgaard’s talk at the Danish People’s Party annual meeting, 3-4 October 1998, Vissenbjerg, Fyn). 
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It should be something very special for a foreigner to become naturalised in Denmark and to be-
come a Danish citizen. Today the naturalisation law is an office practice (…) the expedition of-
fice grinds every year like a grinding mill thousands of foreigners into the promised land. This 
attack against the Danish people and outrageous rape against the spirit and words of the Consti-
tution is a ticking bomb under Denmark (Dansk Folkeb ad 1997/1: 2).  
 
In the same year, an issue of Dansk Folkeblad published the names and surnames of all the 
1200 foreigners that had just become Danish citizens, mphasising that this practice was tak-
ing place with the support of most of the mainstream parties. To make the point clear to the 
public opinion, in spring 2001, the party made a similar public announcement in the Danish 
newspaper Jyllands Posten, calling attention to the fact that a majority of the ‘new Danes’ 
was of Middle Eastern origin.53  
The Danish People’s Party considered most of these ‘new Danes’ undeserving of Danish 
citizenship, because they were not yet fully integrated in Danish society. The DF considers 
Danish citizenship a gift reserved to the few who have proven able to accept and assimilate 
the Danish culture, values and principles and who do not represent a cost for the country. The 
question was also one of numbers. Given the continued influx of immigrants into the country, 
their high birth rates in comparison to Danish families and their refusal to assimilate, the party 
felt that it was only a matter of time before the immigrant community would be strong enough 
to pose a fundamental challenge to Europe’s values, culture and principles. 
In 1996-97 the Danish People’s Party made concrete proposals for a substantial change 
in the practice of naturalisation. First of all this had to follow a paradigm of reward, according 
to which only a number of years of permanent residence in the country would open up for 
Danish citizenship (the party suggests raising thatperiod to a minimum of ten years). But 
even more determinant should be the degree of assimilation, considered in terms of active 
social and economic contribution to the country’s wealth, an in-depth knowledge of the Dan-
ish language, society and history.54 The party also suggested that foreigners applying for Dan-
ish citizenship had to sign a declaration in which they agreed to respect important social 
norms and democratic rules, for example gender equality. As formulated in the 1997 policy 
agenda in the paragraph on ‘Foreigners and the naturalisation law’: 
 
Danish naturalisation must be given only to persons exempted from punishment, who have 
proved able to do well and who, in the course of ten y ars in Denmark, with their efforts have 
benefitted the country. Moreover, they must have contributed to the Danish welfare – and only 
so far the person shows in a written and spoken test to master the Danish language and to pos-
sess good knowledge about the Danish culture, Danish social conditions (samfundsforhold) and 
a good knowledge of Danish history, can an applicant apply for the bill that must be discussed in 
Parliament, in order to obtain Danish naturalisation (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram 1997: 6). 
 
                                                
53 See also the DF website: http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/pdf/file-53-6412-24499.pdf (last accessed: 27-03-
2008).  
54 Foreigners applying for Danish citizenship have to pass a language tests and a cultural proficiency test. 
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The party suggested a return to the praxis used by the ‘founding fathers’ behind the naturalisa-
tion law in Denmark: Guldberg and Grundtvig. At that time (1849), every single individual 
case was discussed and evaluated in Parliament. Application of this procedure would clearly 
imply a drastic reduction in the number of foreigners being naturalised in Denmark to only a 
few hundred every year.  
Some of the restrictions mentioned above were impleented in spring 2002, as part of 
the new immigration law that was approved by the government with the support of the Danish 
People’s Party. The number of foreigners becoming Danish citizens fell significantly in the 
following years. This result has been afterwards often used by the party as evidence that the 
party is actually able to deliver concrete political results when it is given responsibility. As 
underlined by Pia Kjærsgaard in 2002:  
 
(…) last Friday we received the happy news that so far only about 600 applications for Danish 
citizenship have been accepted. This number contrasts directly with the 17,000 foreigners who 
became Danish citizens last year. (…) this is an issue which is going to be successfully realised. 
No one before the Danish People’s Party has fighted against the catastrophic course coming with 
the automatic distribution of Danish citizenship in large quantities as [it has happened] in recent 
years. We are now almost living up to the spirit of our constitution, saying that citizenship can 
only be given by law, where the Parliament decides for each individual person who wants to be 
accepted into the Danish community. (…) the demands related to citizenship now signal that 
foreigners must make an effort if they want to be accepted as equal members in [Danish] soci-
ety. Also the demand that they must declare their loyalty to the democratic pillars in Danish so-
ciety sent a signal that there is no place in Denmark for a parallel society with its own norms. 
Denmark must remain a community of people and not a multicultural society with ethnic closed 
enclaves, whose only interest is to become more and more numerous (Kjærsgaards ugebrev 07-
10-2002). 
 
From 1998 the issue of naturalisation clearly became more relevant for the party agenda and 
in the same year the party presented a proposition to the Folketing to change the practices of 
conferring and retrieving citizenship (cf. Dansk Folkeparti Forslag B36, 1998). This included 
minimum ten years of permanent residence in the country, no criminal record, no prison sen-
tences and to pass a written and oral exam, certifying the applicant’s good knowledge of the 
Danish language, history and social norms and princi les. Besides, the right to withdraw citi-
zenship in case of false declaration and – up to ten years after the assignation – in case of 
crimes implying a prison sentence. The party intended to put a stop to the ‘widespread idea 
that the Danish citizenship has no value’ and to bring to an end ‘the automatic mass distribu-
tion of the last years’ because ‘it must be a privilege to become a Danish citizen (…) and no-
body wishes to have Denmark populated by citizens of a f reign nationality, who do not have 
the same historical, linguistic and cultural belonging and who are not capable of enriching the 
country (…)’.  
Naturalisation became therefore for the Danish People’s Party a way to emphasise an 
organic view of the Danish community, where belonging and identity in terms of shared val-
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ues, principles, history and culture are considered mbedded attributes that can almost only be 
transmitted by birth.  
An important influence in the elaboration of the Danish People’s Party cultural and 
identity discourse has come from the two protestant p stors and later Danish People’s Party 
MPs Søren Krarup and Jesper Langballe. But in particular Søren Krarup in his years as party 
MP (from 2001) has expanded and explained the position on the nativist questions in the cul-
tural and religious realms. Krarup’s first official contacts with the party dated back to the 
1990s. In 1997, he was invited to speak at the annul meeting, where he explained his politi-
cal engagement arguing that ‘the Danish situation was so despairing that a Dane should no 
longer doubt and support those who support Denmark’ (Dansk Folkeblad 1997/6: 6).  
When he officially joined the Danish People’s Party, Søren Krarup had already devel-
oped a clear position on immigration and naturalisation. Krarup defined in fact the achieve-
ment of the Danish citizenship as ‘the most precious gift to a foreigner’ (in Dansk Folkeblad 
2002/5: 13), whereas looking at ‘how the country’s most precious gift to a foreigner was re-
duced to a poor and indifferent item, which was automatically assigned to people who had no 
relation to or insight into Danish society was considered ‘disheartening’ and a practice that 
needed to be changed (in Dansk Folkeblad 2002/6: 12). For Krarup naturalisation is some-
thing intrinsically related to identity, culture and religion; something that can almost exclu-
sively be inherited from one’s parents and only hardly acquired by law, or as also MP Jesper 
Langballe once put it: “something that comes together with mother’s milk”.55 As a conse-
quence, cultural differences can hardly be bridged or overcome. For as Krarup has once ob-
served: 
 
It should not be difficult to understand that Arabs and Africans are so different from the Danish 
culture, tradition and language that it will be very difficult for them to integrate in Denmark. 
(…)It is clear that when we have to give citizenship, it plays an important role whether the per-
son is for example a Christian Asian. I think that a Christian Asian has greater chances of being 
integrated than a Muslim Asian, naturally (Krarup quoted in Holm 2005: 103). 
 
In 2001, Krarup was appointed party member of the naturalisation committee (infødsretsud-
valget) and in the following years he exerted a rather influential role in the debate about Dan-
ish citizenship and in the negotiations which in 200  tightened the criteria regulating the law 
on naturalisation.  
In recent years, perhaps also as a result of the results achieved with the restrictions ap-
plied in this field, the Danish People’s Party has started to tone down the character of the de-
bate on naturalisation, focusing more generally on the question of the democratic values and 
principles that the party considers threatened by the meeting with other cultures.    
 
                                                
55 Jesper Langballe during a debate on immigration and integration at Hotel Helnan Phønix, Aalborg, August 25 
2005.  
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5.6. Identity, culture, values and the Danish nation under threat: distinguishing aspects of the 
Danish People’s Party’s ideology and agenda setting  
5.6.1 The Danish People’s Party and the commitment to the Danish nation 
A strong national profile is one of the features that the Danish People’s Party has always em-
phasised in relation to the party origin and commitment. This was already unmistakably ex-
pressed by the founders in the choice of the party name, in which the ‘Danish’ character of the 
party is clearly underlined. In a way, this represented a rupture with the Progress Party, in 
which the word progress (fremskridt) clearly underlined the party orientation towards political 
and social change. The name chosen for the new party accentuated instead the idea of identity 
and belonging (a Danish party for the Danes) and the commitment to safeguard an existing 
condition from the threats from inside and outside the Danish nation.  
The 1997 policy agenda was built upon what Pia Kjærsgaard defined the essential ‘red 
line’ in order to understand the nature and scope of her party. As she formulated it: ‘the clear 
general line in the programme is our warm and strong national nature’ and that ‘the Danish 
People’s Party is proud of Denmark’ adding that ‘welove our fatherland and we feel an his-
torical obligation to protect the Danish heritage’ (Dansk Folkeparti principprogram 1997: 3). 
This obligation is followed by the importance of defending and protecting national sover-
eignty and to feel part of a community of people, whose task is to take care of the weakest in 
the Danish society. The first paragraph of the 1997 policy agenda dealing with political objec-
tives points out that the party works to ‘re-establish Denmark’s independence and freedom 
(…) and to resist any attempt to reduce people’s fredom’ (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram 
1997: 4).  
Despite the centrality that is given to national identity, national belonging and culture, 
there are still only vague explanations about what t is concretely means for the party. Every 
reference to the Danish nation and to Danish nationl identity is summarised in definitions 
such as culture, the Danish heritage, the Danish hitory and the Danish community. On the 
contrary, there is little doubt about what is threatening the country, its freedom and independ-
ence: immigration and the development of a multiethnic society on the one side and the Euro-
pean Union on the other.  
Compared to other parties, the Danish People’s Party leadership has never been afraid to 
assert that the party was ‘born as a red and white party, a Danish party’. The party has un-
doubtedly and in several ways proved to be a red and white party. For instance, the use of 
national symbols such as the Danish flag (Dannebrog) was one of the first symbols used to 
emphasise the party’s distinctiveness in relation to the other parties. The party has never been 
afraid to be accused of having strong nationalist feelings, nor of being criticised for being 
traditionalist and old-fashioned when celebrating traditional habits and common places of the 
Danish culture and way of life. 
Very early, the Danish People’s Party got engaged in the role of guardian of the 
achievements of Danish society in terms of welfare, democratic values, individual and collec-
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tive freedom, working ethic and diligence, communitarian responsibility and so forth. This 
task has become more explicit with time, as the different programmes show.  
In the 1997 policy agenda, the party’s commitment to the nation was still formulated in 
abstract terms. In the 2001 working programme, the scope of the party is described in much 
more concrete terms. The specificity of the Danish nation is here embedded in the values, 
principles and religious and cultural heritage achieved through the historical and social devel-
opment of the country:  
 
The Danish People’s Party will work for a Denmark characterized by belonging, responsible 
awareness and freedom. Our land’s historical development is established by our culture, which 
means by those norms and religion, faith, attitudes and behaviour that the people have chosen 
and uphold. It is the Danes’ inevitable right and duty to defend and transmit these important val-
ues on which our society is built: freedom, equality, ndividual responsibility and diligence. 
There is no alternative to these. The Danish People’s Party will defend and strengthen the Dan-
ish values, which represent a condition for Denmark to eep on being a free, vigorous and hu-
mane society also in the future (Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 2001).  
 
In the latest working programme released in 2007, the Danish people’s Party is even more 
specific when it comes to defining the Danish values that must be defended and which are 
‘the freedom of speech, equality, broad-mindedness and tolerance’ (Dansk Folkeparti Arbe-
jdsprogram 2007). Denmark is considered to be one of the most libertarian, equal and rich 
societies in the world as a result of the values held by the Danes and thanks to the cultural 
influence from the rest of Europe and from the US.  
The concept of nation and of its people are in the ideology of the Danish People’s Party 
inextricably related to the threat that immigration represents for the survival of the Danish 
identity and culture as we know it. Multiculturalism and the development of a multiethnic 
society therefore represent the worst case scenario. In the first years after the party formation, 
the opposition to a multiethnic and multicultural society had a pragmatic oriented and populist 
character. As early as 1997, the Danish People’s Party launched a campaign56 against the po-
litical establishment’s attempt to transform Denmark into a multiethnic society: 
 
Denmark is going to be transformed into a multiethnic society. But the Danish population has 
not been asked whether it wants this development or ot. [The party] will therefore ask for a ref-
erendum on this issue (in Dansk Folkeblad 1997/2: 2).   
 
The development of a multiethnic and multicultural society was considered an ideological and 
political project planned by the political and intellectual elite and in particular by left-wing 
milieus. Intellectuals and politicians were accused of not listening to ordinary people – who 
were the first to bear the consequences of the social changes provoked by immigration flows. 
                                                
56 This was only the first of a number of campaigns the Danish People’s Party has launched across the years. 
This political form has to be seen in relation to the position of the radical right on the direct involvement of the 
population in the decision and law making, entailing a more frequent use of referenda. The launching of public 
campaigns is also characteristic of the Northern Leagu  and of the Austrian Freedom Party.  
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At the end of 1997, the Danish People’s Party present d a parliamentary bill for a referendum 
on the question: ‘Should Denmark be a multiethnic so iety?’ (Dansk Folkeparti L58 1997-
98). In the past, the Progress Party had advanced similar requests, where the demand for a 
referendum was used to signal that the party was the voice of the ordinary people against the 
experiments and ideals of opportunistic and deracinated elites.  
For Hans-Georg Betz (cf. Betz 2009) the contemporary r dical right ideology represents 
a fusion of nativism and populism, where the ‘fight for the survival of the nation as a cultur-
ally distinct entity and against multiculturalism has become pivotal for the ideological devel-
opment of radical right wing populist discourse’. In his words: ‘the nativist right claims for 
itself to represent and express the “defensive instinct” of ordinary people against the nefarious 
multicultural fantasies and experiments of deracinated, cosmopolitan elites’. In the case of the 
Danish People’s Party, the ideological development towards the nativist discourse was grad-
ual. The nationalist/populist approach was initially strongly emphasised by the party, while 
the foundation and arguments of the nativist discourse were less developed and ‘refined’. It is 
in particular after 2001 that the party started to put special emphasis on this kind of approach.  
 
5.6.2 The cultural and value impact of immigration: the Danish People’s Party after 2001  
The immigration question is a relevant issue in the 2001 Danish People’s Party programme, 
even if it is not the first question mentioned in the programme. The consequences and impli-
cations of immigration are in fact seen within the broader social and economic context, such 
as the welfare state, national security, the globalisation process, the education system and so 
forth.  
As indicated in the title of the programme (Common values – common responsibility), 
immigration is discussed increasingly in relation t culture, identity, values and principles; 
culture is interpreted as the determinant of identity. This also means that beliefs and practices 
are derived from and not equated with one’s cultural identity. 
Particularly from 2001, the party started to give increasing relevance to the cultural 
question, interpreting immigration within a paradigm of cultural diversity, where the contrast 
is seen in terms of a ‘clash of cultures’ between the two dominant cultures in the world: mod-
ernity and Islam. From this perspective, the Western Christian Judaic civilization and culture 
is considered the carrier of progressive, open and tolerant values such as democracy and free-
dom of speech and religion, whereas Islam is often portrayed as a ‘backward culture’, bearing 
a medieval, rigid and intolerant view of the world (Dansk Folkeparti, Danmarks Fremtid 
2001: 191). Immigration in general is presented into a perspective of ‘national catastrophe’ 
(Kjærsgaard in Dansk Folkeblad 1999/5:3) that has to be stopped. Its consequences are com-
pared to events of historic dimensions, which in the past seriously threatened Denmark’s exis-
tence, like the wars with Sweden in the 17th century (where Denmark lost the important terri-
tories of Skåne, Halland and Blekinge in the Astensund), the loss of the ‘native soil’ of South-
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ern Jutland to the Germans in 1864 and the occupation of Denmark by Nazi Germany in 1940 
(Kjærsgaard in Dansk Folkeblad 1999/6: 3).  
Immigration to the advanced capitalist societies of the Western world is also considered 
an ‘ill-fated consequence of the fact that a number of countries outside the Western cultural 
sphere cannot manage to create a sustainable development’ (Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdspro-
gram 2001). But underdevelopment and political oppression are not provoked by socioeco-
nomic or institutional reasons, but rather considere  the result of a backward culture, which is 
unable to create and support the development of democratic values and principles. The West-
ern world should not bear the consequences of the fail d development caused by others. In 
particular, small and ethnically homogeneous countries like Denmark are considered particu-
larly vulnerable to the consequences of the undemocratic and uneven development in the non-
Western countries: 
 
Denmark is the Danes’ land, it is very small and its existence as a stable democracy also in the 
future is conditioned by the fact that its demographic composition does not change dramatically. 
The solution to the problems of the Third World is to be found within the same countries – they 
can only achieve stability by adopting important cultural elements from the West, such as lib-
erty, democracy, equality, enlightenment, economic reforms and control of population growth 
(Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 2001). 
 
The only way to save Denmark from the catastrophe is to ‘find a point of reference’ in the 
national culture, values, principles and identity and to introduce strict rules in the immigration 
regime of the country.  
As observed in earlier chapters (see Chapter 3 and 4), party programmes are often for-
mulated in a politically correct and moderate way. The 2001 programme gives an example of 
this. Immigration is seen as the plague that the Western and civilised part of the world is fac-
ing in the 21st century, but to the careful reader it is surprising that the programme omits any 
direct reference to Islam or to the Muslim community.57 
But from 2001, the party significantly hardened its position against Islam, playing to 
popular concerns about the threat posed by Muslim countries and Muslims in general. This 
was more explicit in other party literature than in the official working program. The party’s 
2001 book ‘Denmark’s future. Your land, your choice(/vote)’ (Danmarks Fremtid. Dit land – 
dit valg), for instance, largely amplified fears of Islam. The book cover portrays a group of 
demonstrating people and the two men (of clearly Middle Eastern origin) in the front are seen 
brandishing a pistol and holding a Palestinian flag; right under the picture the caption: ‘Den-
mark’s future’. Inside the book, pictures, interviews, statistics on crimes and violence com-
mitted by ethnic minorities and examples from other countries are used to illustrate what the 
                                                
57 With the only exception of this passage: ‘There is no society in the world where a peaceful integration of Mus-
lims in another culture has been possible and it is irresponsible to inflict on Denmark a cultural clash, which 
risks having serious consequences’ (Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 2001). 
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party considers the obvious result of three decades of a failed immigration regime and poli-
tics. Danish society is described as under serious threat and a chapter on the Kreuzberg dis-
trict in Berlin describes how Denmark may look in some years. The German residents are 
described as an isolated minority within their own country, where Turkish is the spoken lan-
guage in schools, shops and mosques, Islam is the practiced religion, and women bear head-
scarves (cf. Dansk Folkeparti 2001).   
The about first hundred pages of the book show the current situation in Denmark. 
Largely as a consequence of what the party considers th  complete failure of the immigration 
and asylum politics, Danish society is described being under heavy pressure. The problems 
listed in the book are numerous and their impact overwhelming; high unemployment rates 
among immigrants and public spending on social benefits to immigrants and refugees, urban 
ghettoes, crime among young second generation immigrants and an educational system ham-
pered by the difficulties of integrating a large number of students with little knowledge of 
Danish and other customs and habits. 
What from 2000-2001 becomes central in the eyes of the Danish People’s Party is the 
view of Islam as a fundamental threat to Western values and culture. International events fu-
elled this equivalence. After 9/11, the Danish Peopl ’s Party clearly radicalized its rhetoric 
against Islam. The difference between Islam and Islamism (radical Islam) at times disap-
peared from the party political discourses and Islam was more and more often directly associ-
ated with a totalitarian and violent ideology, whose destructive effects were seriously jeopard-
ising Western democratic principles and values from within.  
At the Danish People’s Party annual meeting of 2001, which was held only a few days 
after 9/11, several prominent party members emphasised the direct connection between radi-
cal fundamentalism, terrorism and Islam. The party MEP (1999-2009) Mogens Camre drew a 
direct connection from men who commit rape, let their daughters be mutilated and force their 
wives to bear the veil to the terrorists from the World Trade Center, concluding that: ‘they 
share a hatred which is induced by a sick ideology’ (Camre quoted in Politiken 19-10-2001). 
On the same occasion, Camre asserted that Muslims in Western countries ‘are only waiting 
until they are enough to remove us [in the written t xt to the press the words were ‘to kill us’] 
– as in Sudan, Indonesia, Nigeria and the Balkans’ (Camre: 2001). Camre’s opinion was far 
from isolated and during that party meeting, several other members supported his position.   
That Islam is incommensurable with Western liberal democracy is a standpoint that has 
become part of the Danish People’s Party’s ideology, in line with the increasing emphasis on 
culture, value and principles. There are several exmples of this. In 2001, the party declared 
that Islam propagates ‘medieval’ ideas, which are fundamentally at odds with modern social 
values. As clearly expressed in the book ‘Your land – your choice’:  
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The Lutheran evangelist church is named in the Danish Constitution as the Danish people’s 
church. In other words: Denmark is a Christian land. This is the first thing that has to be clear, 
before talking about religious freedom (…). The Danish People’s Party thinks that the Islamic 
way of living is incompatible with the Danish and Christian way of thinking. In the same way, it 
is in conflict with the Danish way of thinking to accept male chauvinism, violent childrearing, 
division between sexes, arranged marriages, female utilations, flogging and brain washing of 
small children (Dansk Folkeparti, Danmarks Fremtid 2001: 190). 
 
Post-9/11, Pia Kjærsgaard denied that the confrontati  represented a conflict between civili-
sations. For, as she put it in a speech at the Parliament opening, this would imply two civilisa-
tions and this was not the case because ‘there is only one civilisation, and that is ours’ 
(Kjærsgaard at the parliament opening speech 02-10-001). This was a position emphasised 
by the Danish People’s Party whenever a domestic or nte national event fuelled widespread 
generalisations about Islam and the Muslim community. However, in recent years the party 
ideology has followed new developments. The Danish People’s Party has increasingly focus-
sed on the role of defender of Western fundamental rights and liberal values. The freedom of 
press and speech and the rights of ethnic minority women, in particular Muslim women, are 
only two of the issues which have increasingly engaged the party in recent years. Signifi-
cantly, the party leadership has in about the same period asked party members to pay more 
attention to the distinction between Islam and Islamism. This separation seemed difficult to 
maintain, as some assertions of prominent members illustrate (cf. Søren Espersen quoted in 
Jyllands Posten 26-06-2007). However, several examples indicated that the party was working 
on a profile in which the general critique against Islam was replaced by specific issues which 
the party sees as contrasting with Western liberal values. Some of the main aspects of this 
ideological development will be traced below. 
 
5.6.3 Towards the defence of liberal values: recent developments of the Danish People’s 
Party’s political agenda 
As observed above, the agenda of the Danish People’s Party has since 2001 focussed increas-
ingly on the discourse of Islam and its incompatibili y with liberal democratic values. This 
type of assimilation entails not only the wish, but also the ability, on the part of the immi-
grant, to absorb the values and principles characterising the host culture.  
Assimilability, in turn, presupposes cultural commensurability with respect to the fun-
damental values that define Western Europe’s cultural heritage. For the Danish People’s 
Party, Muslim immigrants lack both the basic ability and the willingness necessary for assimi-
lation, for the simple reason that Islam itself is considered almost entirely incompatible with 
the basic principles of Western civilisation.  
The Danish People’s Party very early placed the question of Islam’s incompatibility 
with liberal democracy on the party agenda. Already in 2001, an article in the party paper 
maintained that Islam and democracy represented an ‘impossible combination’ (cf. Dansk 
Folkeblad 2001/2: 14-17). The position was again emphasised in the book Danmarks Fremtid 
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in the same year where Islam, unlike in Christianity, is presented as an illiberal and undemo-
cratic faith, which gives no space to individual free will and where the Koran decides every-
thing, from how the individual is supposed to live to how society is supposed to be organised 
(cf. Danmarks Fremtid 2001: 28).  
However, a number of concrete issues have in recent y ars taken centre-stage in the 
policies and discourses of the Danish People’s Party. It is issues which until recently have 
absolutely not been considered to ‘belong’ to the radical right agenda, including gender equal-
ity, free speech, liberal family values and the like. This development seems quite in contrast 
with the ‘traditional’ issues and concerns taken up by the radical right. Furthermore, it is diffi-
cult to relate these issues to the image of a materialist, authoritarian and traditionalist right 
described by most of the scholarly literature. Particularly in the new cleavage approach, which 
considers the new/authoritarian right a reaction to post-materialist and libertarian values and 
politics, the emphasis is rather on aspects of conservatism, traditionalism and authoritarianism 
in relation to the radical right ideology and agenda setting. Gender issues and free speech 
have never been considered to fit in the radical right profile and have rather been ascribed to 
the new libertarian left. Within this reading, the radical right was often considered a counter 
reaction and as such a transitory and rather periphral phenomenon in relation to the new 
movements and political issues. In the words of Inglehart: ‘an important phenomena – but not 
represent[ing] the wave of the future. On the contrary, (…) a reaction against broader trends 
that are moving faster than these societies can assimilate them’ (Inglehart 1997: 251). This 
interpretation is in contrast with the efforts to champion liberal values, and particularly 
women’s rights in Muslim culture that characterise parts of the radical right in recent years.  
Clearly the approach to these issues is different than hat of the post-materialist left. As 
Tjitske Akkerman (2005) has observed, it is a liberalism that is turned inward and driven by 
fear. The scholarly literature has underestimated the capacity of the radical right parties to 
transform and develop their agendas and perhaps to learn from the cultural change shaping the 
new dimension of political cleavage.  
Early on, the Danish People’s Party started to engage in what seemed to support basic 
rights to ethnic minority women and more specifically to Muslim women. Already in 1997, 
the Danish People’s Party was among the promoters of a bill that wanted to prohibit female 
genital mutilation performed outside Denmark by ethnic minorities and to penalise it as a 
grievous bodily harm, even if committed abroad (see Dansk Folkeparti L65 1996). This issue 
was among the first related to women’s rights and familial relations among ethnic minorities 
that the party dealt concretely with. The law was voted down by most of the left wing and by 
the Social Liberals in 1997, because ‘a specifically t rgeted and preventive information effort 
in order to combat female genital mutilation was prefe erable’ to a ban. A specific paragraph 
on female mutilation was included by the Danish Peopl ’s Party in the 1997 policy agenda, 
where the party asked for harsher measures and punishment: 
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Female genital mutilations are prohibited by Danish law. Foreign citizens living in Denmark, 
who go abroad and get involved in the accomplishment of the mutilations must be punished and 
sent out of the country, when they return to Denmark. Has this person achieved Danish citizen-
ship, it must be withdrawn (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram 1997: 12). 
 
In the following years, the Danish People’s Party took the issue up to discussion again. The 
party claimed for example that also the imams supporting the practice of female mutilation 
had to be prosecuted, and children had to be removed from their families by the authorities 
(cf. Kjærsgaards ugebrev 11-11-2002). The practice of genital mutilation on little girls in par-
ticular of Somali origin was interpreted by the party as another sign of a mistaken asylum 
policy, which despite the ‘billion of Danish kroner spent on teaching immigrants Danish and 
Danish democracy and legal tradition’ looked more and more as a ‘caricature of humanity’. 
Despite the clear problems determining the number of cases, the Danish People’s Party in-
sisted that female genital mutilation was a widesprad practice among immigrants of African 
origin and in particular among Somalis, and proposed th  compulsory medical examination of 
all school-aged children (cf. Kjærsgaards ugebrev  03-02-2003).  
In 2003, a special paragraph was added to the Danish penal code making female genital 
mutilation a criminal offence. The law abolished the so-called principle of double punishment 
(dobbelt strafbarhed) in relation to genital mutilation and gave the Danish authorities the right 
to prosecute a Danish citizen or a foreigner living i  Denmark also in cases where genital mu-
tilation had taken place in a foreign country where it was not a crime. 
By using examples of arranged and forced marriages, honour killings, female mutila-
tions and the Muslim veil, the party wants to emphasise the condition of minority women liv-
ing in a backward culture, whose rights –according to the party – have been manifestly disre-
garded in the name of multiculturalism and the multiethnic projects mainly supported by the 
left wing. In this regard, women’s rights allow the party to bring several tensions into the 
open, particularly in Denmark and in the Nordic countries more generally, where gender 
equality is defended and widely implemented in society.  
In 2002, reporting the murder of a Kurdish teenager by her own father because she had 
a Swedish boyfriend, Pia Kjærsgaard observed that the girl was a victim of the multicultural 
utopia still practiced in Sweden and whose consequences the Danish People’s Party was try-
ing to stop in Denmark. According to the party, multic lturalist and multiethnic experiments 
have again opened the doors to the Middle Ages, which t e Danes ‘(…) had left behind centu-
ries ago’ (Dansk Folkeblad 2002/1: 2). Portraying Islam and the Muslim world as backward, 
still living in the Middle Ages has put emphasis on the assimilationist approach, since nothing 
from such a society can be accepted by the democratic Western world.  
A few years later, Pia Kjærsgaard observed in one of her newsletters that nobody would 
have imagined only a hundred years ago that several Danish cities and towns would be 
crowded by people with ‘a lower level of civilisation – with traditions brought from their 
home countries, such as honour killing, male chauvinism, halal slaughter – and vendettas’. 
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Yet, according to the leader of the Danish People’s Party, this was exactly the case for Den-
mark. Denmark, which ‘left the Middle Ages hundreds of years ago,’ had become home to 
tens of thousands of people, who culturally and mentally ‘live in the year 1005,’ who had im-
ported undemocratic and illiberal practices to Denmark, and who now tried to impose them on 
the Danish majority. A point in case is also the Muslim veil.  
From 2001, the party put increasingly emphasis on agendered portrayal of minority eth-
nic groups. Women are often described as ‘oppressed’ victims of their culture, wearing head-
scarves and subjected to discriminating practices, whereas Muslim young men are portrayed 
as arrogant and prone to violence. On the occasion of a demonstration on the main square in 
Copenhagen where Muslims gathered to hold a public Friday, Pia Kjærsgaard observed that: 
‘(…) women had to stay at the very rear of the assembly – only men could come in front. In 
Danish we call it gender discrimination and we have no tradition for this in this land. (…) One 
thing is what Muslims do privately, but another is what takes place in public’ (Kjærsgaards 
ugebrev 07-04-2003).    
The Muslim veil is considered another visible symbol of Islam’s refusal to accept some 
of the basic values and principles Western societies ar  built upon, for example gender equal-
ity. According to the party, if a Muslim woman living in the West decides to wear the head-
scarf this is because: 1) it is imposed by the authority of her husband or father; 2) it can be 
used as protection against sexual harassment and provocations by young Muslim men; 3) it is 
a visible religious symbol, signalling the wish to transform the society in the direction indi-
cated by the Koran (cf. Kjærsgaards ugebrev 21-05-2007). To prohibit its use in the public 
administration is explained as a way to keep sexual discrimination out of Denmark and help 
Muslim women’s emancipation, besides being a measur to avoid the Islamization of Danish 
society. 
In more recent years, the debate about the Muslim headscarf has become even more 
heated. When a young Muslim woman wearing the headscarf ran for the 2007 parliamentary 
elections, the Danish People’s Party again fuelled the issue, calling the headscarf a strong 
political symbol. In a parliamentary debate MP Søren Krarup went so far as to declare that 
‘the headscarf (…) is a symbol of tyranny and slavery’ and that it must be considered equal to 
‘the swastika or the hammer and sickle’ (Krarup in Nyhedsavisen 20-04-2007). The statement 
was supported by Pia Kjærsgaard, who argued that some women wear the headscarf as a 
‘provocative political symbol’ (Kjærsgaard in Berlingske Tidende 19-04-2007). 
The case of Asmaa Abdol Hamid opened up the debate about how to regulate concretely 
the use of the headscarf in the public administration. After the 2007 elections, the Parliamen-
tary Board had to decide whether a politician wearing the Muslim headscarf could take part in 
parliamentary activities. There was no previous resolution in this sense, but the case in ques-
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tion made it necessary.58 The result was to allow female politicians to wear the headscarf 
when in Parliament. The Danish People’s Party MP and member of the Presidium Søren Es-
persen, who had initially taken the issue up to discus ion, called it ‘a black day for democracy 
and equal opportunities’, arguing that many were not aware the headscarf ‘is not just a piece 
of cloth’ (Espersen 8-04-2008), but a symbol of the Islamic uprising and a clear manifestation 
of the oppression of Muslim women.  
Only a few weeks later the Board of the Court of Justice (Domstolsstyrelsen) decided 
that a judge can also wear the headscarf in court. The Danish People’s Party expressed deep 
concern with this decision, arguing that the court should indeed avoid getting involved in poli-
tics and religion. In particular, as Pia Kjærsgaard put it, in a period when ‘aggressive interpre-
tations of Islam advance everywhere in the Western world and daily challenge the Western 
values of equality, liberty and democracy’. Pia Kjærsgaard underlined again the implications 
of gender, arguing that the Muslim headscarf ‘divides women into two kinds (…) making it 
easier to distinguish the “honourable Muslim woman” from women who do not wear it and 
are therefore considered “for sale”’ (Kjærsgaards ugebrev 28-04-2008). Significantly, the 
leader of the Danish People’s Party expresses solidarity with Muslim women, accusing Mus-
lim men of forcing them to bear the headscarf. In the words of Pia Kjærsgaard, if the Muslim 
man ‘has not yet understood that the Middle Ages were over long time ago and that the prem-
ise for freedom and progress is women’s equality, then it must be his and not the woman’s 
problem, but the result is clearly visible in the impoverished and violent Middle East’.     
But the Danish People’s Party not only started to profile itself as defender of liberal val-
ues and principles in the field of gender equality and women rights among ethnic minorities. 
Other items such as freedom of expression, open-minded ess, tolerance, solidarity and dili-
gence are today often mentioned as ‘real Danish values’ (Kjærsgaard quoted in Dansk 
Folkeblad 2007/5: 6-7) which ethnic minorities in Denmark should understand, respect and 
accept.  
The publication of the twelve Mohammed cartoons in the Danish newspaper Jyllands 
Posten in 2005 strengthened this position. On that occasion the freedom of speech and expres-
sion became the issue which the party rallied to explain the difference between the Western 
and Christian world and Islam. Christianity is described as tolerant, open-minded and open to 
critique and dialogue and Islam as a closed and intolerant religion. For the Danish People’s 
Party the difference is that ‘Christianity itself gives space to freedom – and Jesus came to 
Earth to be outraged’ (Kjærsgaards ugebrev 5-12-2005), while Islam is against freedom of 
expression and democratic principles in general.  
According to Pia Kjærsgaard, the main problem is that e West attracts people who are 
seeking material well-being, but who do not want to ake ‘the whole package’ including ‘de-
mocracy and the freedom to freely think and express oneself’ (Kjærsgaards ugebrev 24-10-
                                                
58 Asmaa Abdol Hamid was not voted into the Parliament, but she can be called in to substitute one of the MPs 
of the left-wing party Enhedslisten (The Unity List). 
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2005). In this sense, according to Kjærsgaard, many Muslims living in Denmark ‘have not yet 
understood what it means to be a citizen in Denmark’  (Kjærsgaard 17-10-2005). But if Mus-
lims wish to live here, ‘they have to respect the [Danish] fundamental values, among them the 
freedom of expression’. 
 
As regards the anti-immigration question, it is notonly important to observe the nature and 
character of this issue, but almost as significantly to consider how this issue has developed 
and transformed in the ideology and agenda of the radical right. In this respect, the political 
influence and the position of responsibility that several radical right parties achieved in the 
course of the last decade can imply an effect on the way these explain their opposition to im-
migration. In the case of the Danish People’s Party,  different approach seems to characterise 
the party in relation to the discussion about specific onflicts on values such as gender equal-
ity, freedom of speech, solidarity, tolerance and the like. In the pages above, this has ben in-
terpreted as a new development in the way the Danish party approaches today the question of 
immigration.   
 
5.7 AUTHORITARIANISM AND CONFORMIST VIEW OF THE WORLD 
5.7.1 Law and order, authoritarian attitudes and traditionalism    
Authoritarian attitudes are often associated with radical right parties. This reading is in some 
cases related to the fascist legacies of a number of Western European radical right parties, 
thus emphasising authoritarian appeals related to a particular vision of the social order based 
on a strong (corporativist) state and on a strong man leading the nation. However, as we have 
already seen (see Chapter 2), part of the recent scholarly research refers to authoritarianism as 
a value dimension, which contrasts and reacts against the rise and establishment of the liber-
tarian values. In this view, libertarian values areb oadly defined as emphasising ‘personal and 
political freedom, equality, tolerance of minorities and of those holding different opinions, 
openness to new ideas and new lifestyles, environmental protection and concern over quality 
of life issues, self indulgence and self actualisation’ (see Flanagan 1987: 1304). At the oppo-
site, authoritarian values consist of such things as ‘ security and order, (…) respect for author-
ity, discipline and dutifulness, patriotism and intolerance for minorities, conformity to cus-
toms and support for traditional religious and moral values’ (Flanagan 1987: 1305). Even if 
rather broadly defined, these definitions give a more precise definition of the contents of the 
radical right authoritarian dimension. At this point it is interesting to see how concretely this 
dimension is dealt with by the Danish People’s Party ideology.  
An important topic in the literature of the Danish People’s Party is law and order. Both 
the 1997 policy agenda and the 2001 working programme contain significant sections on law 
and order policies. In the 1997 policy agenda under th  heading law and order (Princip Pro-
gram 1997: 11-12), the party asked for a number of measures which clearly emphasised the 
need for increased security, discipline, control and punishment in society, among them a more 
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effective police force, harsher punishments against crime and a lowering of the criminal age 
from 15 to 12 years.  
In 1998, the party launched the campaign Security now! Violence out of Denmark (see 
Dansk Folkeblad 1998/6: 1). With this initiative, the Danish People’s Party wanted to empha-
sise that Demark was no longer the peaceful and safe pl ce it used to be, which several politi-
cal parties still wanted people to believe. This situat on called for some concrete measures, 
which the party presented and discussed in parliament in the following years (see Dansk 
Folkeparti B59 (1998)).  
In the 2001 programme, law and order is considered of ‘greatest importance in modern 
society’, in view of ‘increasing and more brutal crimes (Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 
2001). Immigrants are held responsible for higher crime rates than ethnic Danes. The party 
asked for ethnically grouped statistics on crime, which should differentiate also naturalised 
Danes from ethnic Danes. Furthermore, a foreigner police with specific functions of control of 
the activities of the foreigners living in the country, including smuggling, trafficking of 
women for prostitution and expulsions were among the priorities on the law and order issue 
from 1997. According to the party, immigrants who commit crimes should be expelled from 
the country (Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 2001). 
However, it is particularly after 2001 that the party started to emphasise immigrant 
crime, playing to popular concerns about the threat presented by the violent ‘stranger in our 
midst’. The Danish People’s Party’s book from 2001 deals largely with the question of crime 
among ethnic minorities mentioning the costs and the consequences. A chapter quite signifi-
cantly entitled ‘Homicide, attempted murder, brutal violence and rape committed against 
Danes’ (Danmarks fremtid 2001: 151-165), and reports in detail some of the cruelest crimes 
committed by immigrants from 1985. The date is not accidentally chosen, since it is the years 
just after the enactment of the immigration law of 1983, considered by the party as one of the 
most nefarious laws in Danish politics. 
  
5.7.2 About family, children and sexuality    
For the new cleavage hypothesis, the radical right authoritarianism is not limited to questions 
of law and order and zero tolerance, but it is a value nd cultural reaction to open-mindedness 
and libertarian thinking, for example on family relations, religious attitudes and sexual norms.  
The Danish People’s Party considers the family as a unifying and fundamental social 
element in society. In the 1997 policy agenda, the family is defined as ‘the core of the Danish 
society’, which is strictly ‘dependent on the conditions given to it’ (Dansk Folkeparti Princip-
program 1997: 12). In the 2001 programme, the family is again considered at the core of Dan-
ish society and the location of the relationships and ffect where children first learn about the 
importance of societal values such as reciprocity and social responsibility (Dansk Folkeparti 
Arbejdsprogram 2001). The term ‘family’ refers primarily to the traditional married hetero-
sexual couple with children. As specified in the programme: ‘even if other family combina-
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tions can give children a safe and good childhood, marriage continues to be the natural point 
of departure for family life and other ways of living together should not be favoured over 
married couples’ (Dansk Folkeparti Arbejdsprogram 2001). However, compared to other 
radical right parties in Europe, the preference for married heterosexual couples does not result 
in a negation of rights to non-married or homosexuals59; this is for example the case of the 
Northern League and other radical right parties in Europe. Nevertheless, the party is still very 
careful about discussing homosexuality. Søren Kraup has for example called homosexuals for 
handicapped ‘because they do not fulfil the conditions of a marriage or of making a family. 
Therefore, they cannot expect to be considered at the same level in respect to this’ (Krarup in 
Nyhedsavisen 26-04-2007). 
Being the core and point of reference of the whole s ciety, the family has to be able to 
bear these responsibilities and this task must be facilitated by the state through family policies 
supporting this core of the social organization. According to DF, the family and not the state 
is primarily responsible for the upbringing and education of children. The programme spells 
out that ‘it is necessary to define the limits of hw much society contributes to the upbring-
ing’. The idea that society as a whole has to overtak  a significant part of the caring and edu-
cation of children is seen as both ‘ideologically conditioned and worrying’. Public care must 
not ‘substitute the natural link and network represented by family and friends’ (Arbejdspro-
gram 2001); an idea that the party considers a socialist heritage, but it is the ‘parents who bear 
the full responsibility for a child’s conduct and behaviour until it comes of age’ (Arbejdspro-
gram 2001). In this direction we can read also the party’s acceptance of parents’ right to in-
flict corporal punishment on their children as part of heir upbringing methods. This was ex-
plained by Pia Kjærsgaard in a speech given in 1997:  
 
The other day Parliament abolished with the majority of the votes the right to corporal punish-
ment. Therefore it is no longer possible for parents to decide over their own children and to de-
cide how to educate their children. Consequently, children have become state property. An out-
rageous socialist law, which has snuck through and passed without a public debate. (…) the 
Danish People’s Party will not give up the claim that children’s upbringing is of course the par-
ents’ responsibility – not the state’s. As soon as we get some political influence in Parliament 
we will take the question up to discussion again (Kjærsgaard, Grundlovstale 1997). 
 
Instead, the so-called declaration of integration (integrationserklæring) introduced in 2005, 
requires immigrants to, among other things, familiarise themselves with and sign a statement 
that in Denmark boys and girls have the same possibilities and that parents may not punish 
them physically.60 The party accepted this as a fundamental element of the Danish culture. 
                                                
59 Until 2007 the Danish People’s Party had an prominent MP who was declaredly lesbian.  
60 See: 
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/resources.ashx/Resources/Blanketter/Ansoegningsskemaer/2007/fa1_ansoegningspa
kke_aegtefaellesammenfoering_endelig_230107.pdf (last accessed: 14-05-2008). 
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However, for the Danish People’s Party the way children are brought up and educated in to-
day’s Denmark is often not good enough. In the introductory pages to the 2001 programme, 
for instance, one of the threats against the Danish society is considered the ‘ineffective and 
ideologically biased upbringing and educational methods which has brought about an increas-
ing lack of norms, so that many children and young people do not learn to respect other peo-
ple, the understanding of other generations and the working moral’ (Arbejdsprogram 2001). 
In this sense, a more rigid education and upbringing methods are considered necessary to pre-
vent the general decay of the values and principles n contemporary Danish society.  
 
5.8 FOREIGN POLITICS AND RELATIONS TO EU 
5.8.1 The Progress Party on Europe  
Until the beginning of the 1990s, the Progress Party was in favour of full Danish membership 
in the European Union. Particularly during in the 1970s and 1980s, the party underlined the 
importance of being part of the European project, warning against the problems that would 
come if Denmark was left outside. The party predicted that Denmark would become ‘a pe-
ripheral area in the world economy’ (Fremskridtsparti 1980). The Progress Party also had a 
provocative response, maintaining that ‘the Danish economy and the Danish society are much 
better influenced by the European Union than by the politics from [the Danish Parliament]’ 
(Fremskridtsparti 1980). 
The positive attitude towards EU was strengthened by the belief that the European inte-
gration project would bring a general improvement in erms of the free movement of goods, 
labour and capital and these goals had also been endorsed by the popular referendum of 1972 
on EU. The Progress Party’s support to EU politics wa  therefore not unconditional, but based 
on the prerequisite that the European Union followed a liberal pro-market orientation that 
would not interfere with national politics.  
The prospect that EU could evolve into a bureaucratic machine, with more legislation, 
common monetary policy and military power was put forward as a kind of threatening sce-
nario. The party’s position on EU was in fact due to change in the following years.  
At the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, the Progress Party supported the no-side. 
The party leadership explained this position arguin that the EU project had undergone dra-
matic transformations and that ‘the original ideals of a free Europe with a free market a free 
trade and a reasonable individual freedom had slowly but surely been buried underground’ 
(Fremskridtsparti 1992).  
For the Progress Party, the European Union had started to represent everything the party was 
against in relation to public administration and bureaucracy: a centralised and bureaucratised 
power with an ever growing public sector. The development of EU was on its way to create 
an organ dictating the rules of the game and eroding the national sovereignty of the member 
countries, or as the party called it ‘an intrusive supranational body’ (quoted in Mudde 2007: 
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159). This was a view that would be later adopted an  further developed by the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party.  
The Eurosceptical position of the Progress Party had m tured in a changed historical situation, 
where the end of the Cold War had made much less concrete the risk that the country would 
end up at the periphery of Europe. Instead, the rul of thumb in relation to EU became to try 
to get as many benefits as possible from the EU membership and to sacrifice as little as possi-
ble. For the Progress Party, England was an exemplary model:  
 
England managed to get through with much more of the country’s wishes than Denmark. The 
two countries have otherwise always worked together against any sign of bad sovranational de-
velopment of the European Union, but when it really mattered, the Danish government fell to its 
knees and said yes (Fremskridtsparti 1992). 
 
It is worth noticing how the party in these years completely changed its position and started to 
emphasise national self-determination. The logic was inverted in relation to the past; because 
Denmark is a small country, its national interests must be protected and defended against the 
pressures from larger nations such as France and Germany. This was a significant transforma-
tion in the perception of the role of the country in the international arena and suggested the 
development that would be followed also by the Danish People’s Party. Not surprisingly, the 
question of national sovereignty and the bureaucratisation of EU are today among the issues 
that the Danish People’s Party uses to explain its opposition to the EU integration. 
In the 1980s, the Progress Party also changed the position on foreign politics quite sig-
nificantly. Questions involving aspects of national and international security started to get 
more weight in the programmes. This was somehow in contrast with the mocking attitude 
adopted by the party leadership in the past and which was blatantly epitomised by Mogens 
Glistrup’s proposals to abolish the Danish military in favour of an automatic answering ma-
chine with a message in Russian: ‘We surrender!’. It was in the same years that the party had 
withdrawal from NATO on the agenda (Fremskridtsparti 1973: 17). Quite in contrast with 
these demands, the party indicated that NATO was the only guarantor of military defence on 
the international level, while Europe, with its open borders and free movement of goods and 
people, was for synonymous with low national and inter ational security.  
 
5.8.2 The Euroscepticism of the Danish People’s Party 
Radical right parties have for the most part become very negative towards the process of 
European integration. But as we have seen above, it has not always been like this. Several of 
the radical right parties which today are among the most Eurosceptical were in the past overall 
positive towards EU. Considering the centrality that n tional culture, identity and national 
sovereignty are given in the radical right ideology, this is not surprising. But in reality, the 
radical right Euroscepticism emerged at different times in the different countries during the 
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1990s, when the integration process of the European Union started to accelerate both at the 
institutional and at the political level.  
The Maastricht Treaty played an important role in spreading a strong scepticism, and 
even outright criticism, of the nature and development of the integration process. Several 
radical right parties started to change their minds on EU.  
In Denmark, the population had already in the past voted on EU; in the 1972 referendum 
on membership to the European Common Market, and in 1986 on the Common Act. In 1992 
the result was a ’small’ no to the Maastricht Treaty nd at that time the Progress Party sup-
ported the no-side. The Maastricht Treaty was accepted after a new referendum in 1993, 
which followed the so-called Edinburgh reservations, allowing Denmark to take a step back 
from cooperation on European integration in on four specific areas: a reservation on the final 
steps towards the European Monetary Union and the introduction of the euro, on defence pol-
icy and cooperation on juridical matters such as citizenship and asylum.  
In 1995, the Danish People’s Party continued the anti-European line started by the Pro-
gress Party in the early 1990s. For the Danish People’s Party, Europe should only represent 
cooperation between ‘free and independent countries’ in a number of common fields (cf. 10-
punkts program 1995), which maintained their sovereignty and national identity. To make the 
point, the party stressed the concept maintaining that ‘ here must be nothing above or besides 
the national Parliament’ (Principprogram 1997: 7). The Danish People’s Party did not reject 
Europe as such, but supported a model based on a cofederation of a Europe of the nations, 
where European cooperation is limited to few specific policy fields such as free market, envi-
ronment and international security. Core fields such as foreign policy, fiscal and monetary 
issues should never be decided at the EU level, becaus  it would mean a loss of national sov-
ereignty.   
For questions of international military collaboration and defence Europe should neither 
challenge nor take the place of the existing NATO alliance. In line with the positions above, 
the Danish People’s Party has from 1995 consistently opposed any further integration at the 
European level. The party is resolutely against the European Monetary Union. In 2000, the 
party campaign ‘For the Crown and the Fatherland’ was launched before the popular referen-
dum to be held in March 2000, asking the population whether the country had to abandon the 
reservation on monetary policy and join the other Euro countries.  
The party was resolutely against the introduction of the European currency and ran a 
campaign in which the crown was given a particular economic, but also a strong symbolic 
significance. With the words ‘We know what we have, but we do not know what we get’, the 
DF answered to what they considered the scare campaign of the government, about Denmark 
losing influence and economic power outside the European Monetary Union.  
In 2001, the Danish People’s Party was also actively engaged against the European in-
tegration process; this time represented by the imple entation of the Schengen agreement, 
which in Denmark took effect on March 25 2001. To mark the occasion, the party decided to 
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buy the border station in the city of Saed, Southern Denmark, explaining that this act repre-
sented a way for a ‘Danish minded (dansksindet) party’ to contribute to ‘the preservation of a 
piece of the Danish national border history’ and for the second a concrete demonstration of 
‘the conviction that the Schengen convention is not going to hold’ considering the pressure 
that the party saw would come from the illegal immigration into the country (Dansk 
Folkeparti køber grænsen i : Dansk Folkeblad 2001/1: 4).  
 The Danish People’s Party is also strongly against the introduction of a European consti-
tution, which for the party represents a serious and direct challenge against the Danish Consti-
tution. Therefore, the party was very satisfied with the result of the French and the Dutch ref-
erenda that respectively in May and June 2005 rejected of the Treaty establishing a Constitu-
tion for Europe. In her newsletter, Pia Kjærsgaard commented that this should send the clear 
message ‘to drop the EU state’ and to throw the EU constitution ‘in the garbage’ (Dansk 
Folkeblad 2005/3:3). The party leader suggests a kind of ‘return to the past’ in EU policy: 
 
The CEE-EU worked fine when it was a common market between sovereign and proud nations. 
But keep your hands off ideas and utopias. A community is doing best when there is respect for 
difference. The State of Europe is a sinking ship (Dansk Folkeblad 2005/3:3). 
 
Looking at the way the party’s EU policy has develop d over time it is possible to distinguish 
different phases emerging partly from the progress of European integration, but also respond-
ing to the different conditions that characterised the Danish People’s Party’s political life 
course.  
As mentioned above, what engaged the Danish People’s Party on Europe was in particu-
lar an anti-integrationist position aimed at safeguarding national sovereignty. Parallel to this, 
the party ran a harsh critique against the politica establishment, aimed at denouncing the de-
mocratic deficit behind the whole European integration process. For the party, the agenda and 
development of Europe are designed by the political elite in a process involving only politi-
cians and public administrators, who do not listen to common people. The integration process 
is for the Danish People’s Party something that the political elite wants to force through, even 
where people have clearly rejected it, because they t ink that they always know best. As Pia 
Kjærsgaard expressed this in 2003: 
 
EU does not need new visions (…) the EU project has gone too far. It must be rolled back be-
cause it has come too far from what people wish. What t e EU-elite in its Babel tower dreams 
(eating) at the restaurants in Brussels and Strasbug is one thing. What the old cultural Europe of 
the people wants is something else and much more down-t -earth (Kjærsgaards ugebrev 15-09-
2003). 
 
The party anti-establishment politics in relation t the European Union thus involves different 
levels. First, the party presented the European Parliament as an institutional organ both geo-
graphically and politically far from the Danish population. For this reason, in the 1995 and 
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1997 party programmes a point on the agenda suggested to limit considerably the power given 
to the European Parliament and preferably to eliminate it right away (cf. Dansk Folkeparti 10-
punkts program 1995; Principprogram 1997: 7). The Council of Ministers should then remain 
the chief responsible organ and the Ministers the guarantors of the positions of the respective 
national Parliaments, considered more legitimate representatives of their people.    
As a second point, the party blamed the Danish politicians for bowing to the power of 
Europe and for ‘feeling ashamed of their people’, who had said no to the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992. Being ashamed of the Danes’ attitude towards EU is described by Pia Kjærsgaard as ‘a 
contagious sickness among politicians in Parliament’ (Pia Kjærsgaard in Dansk Folkeblad 
1998/1:3). The charge of being ashamed of the Danish people associated Danish politicians 
with their colleagues in Brussels and thus made a distinction between the political elite and 
the people. Consequently, this put even more into relief the fact that the party was on the side 
of the people.  
Until 2001 this kind of approach was helped by the fact that the party was in political 
opposition and a centre-left wing coalition led by the Social Democrat Poul Nyrup Rasmussen 
was in government. Furthermore, the fact that several other Western European countries were 
ruled by left-wing government coalitions was a way to emphasise that multiculturalists and 
the open borders to immigration was the policy of the EU and any attempt to oppose this pro-
ject was considered illegitimate by the EU.  
A case in point was the diplomatic sanctions imposed on Austria by the EU-14 in 2000, 
when the FPÖ entered office. Other initiatives were described as the effort of the political 
elite in Brussels to silence those with other political opinions and agendas. In 2000 Dansk 
Folkeblad ran an article: ‘Big Brother Is Watching us…: EU’s opinion police is brought into 
action against the Danish People’s Party’ (Dansk Fol eblad 2000/2: 8-9). For the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party, the creation of a European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 
(EMCR) was a clear political intimidation against parties with anti-immigration and EU scep-
ticism on the agenda. For the party, the EMCR motto was: ‘Today Austria – tomorrow Den-
mark’, demonstrating that the EU strategy was to keep the critical parties away from any po-
litical influence by treating them as outcasts.  
 
5.8.3 The Danish People’s Party’s Euroscepticism and the party political influence  
During the period of consolidation of the party, the politics on EU have been both ideologi-
cally and strategically functional to the Danish Peopl ’s Party; ideologically because they 
helped the party strengthen its national oriented profile and strategically by distinguishing it 
from the other parties and from the political establishment.  
The position on EU politics has not registered sudden and radical changes since the 
party beginnings in the mid-1990s. On the contrary, the Danish People’s Party has been rather 
consistent on this issue over the years. Apparently, coming close to the centre of the political 
power has not affected the Danish People’s Party in erms of its Euroscepticism. This indi-
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cates that the position on EU was something more than a mobilising issue taken up to con-
struct identity and differentiate from the others when the party occupied a peripheral place in 
Danish politics (on such interpretative approach see e.g. Taggart 1998: 372; Sitter 2001). The 
Danish People’s Party continued to emphasise its position against EU as a way to make clear 
that there was no change of course because the party had achieved political influence support-
ing a government of Euroenthusiasts. In this sense, the party’s politics against EU allow the 
party to continue demarcating itself as an alternative to the political establishment on this is-
sue.  
Undoubtedly, the fact that the Danish People’s Party is not part of the government coali-
tion, facilitated the task. The party can vote against and criticise the way the Liberal-
Conservative government deals with EU, without being considered problematic or contradic-
tory. As mentioned above, this is one of the advantages that the DF has achieved by being 
influential without being in office. 
The position against EU has thus continued to represent a platform from where to pro-
mote the role as guardian of Danish national sovereignty and at the same time to retain an 
anti-establishment profile that could be affected an weakened by the party’s influential posi-
tion in Danish politics. Another way the party used to promote itself was to ‘market’ Denmark 
as a model to be copied by other European countries in terms of the results achieved on immi-
gration by means of a restrictive national immigration regime.  
This way to promote the country was also legitimised by rising levels of cooperation and 
integration on immigration policies in the EU, particularly during the last decade, and towards 
which the party has always been very critical. However, the increasing focus on policies of 
migration control also at the European level (see Faist and Ette 2007) has been used by the 
Danish People’s Party to demonstrate that Denmark ws right on its political course, despite 
the critique from the European Union at that time. As observed by Peter Skaarup in 2002 be-
fore a European meeting in Sevilla: 
 
What it was put to silence and lied about for decads, has now finally become a first priority on 
the EU political agenda. (…) Illegal immigration is now considered a problem. It took group 
rapes, honour killings and an attack in Manhattan before the EU leaders took this threat seri-
ously. (…) But the good news that the EU governments apparently begin to take reality seri-
ously, must always be considered with critical eyes, so that the situation is not used to sneak in 
even more centralisation and EU control through the back door. (…) Denmark can decide its 
own faith when it comes to immigration and asylum policy. The truth is that Denmark is now in 
front in terms of control of immigration politics (…) the Danish Prime Minister can come to 
Sevilla as a leader of a country which is in front, a country which as far as national politics is 
concerned has taken the bull by the horns. There is something to learn for the other countries 
(Skaarups ugebrev 17-06-2002).     
  
5.8.4 Foreign policy, military and defence 
On foreign policy and international issues the Danish People’s Party has not been afraid to 
take a standpoint of its own. Since 2001, the party has been in line with the decisions of the 
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Liberal and Conservative government in the field of international military interventions. The 
party has been an important supporter of the participation of Denmark to the military inter-
vention in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
As we have seen, the Progress Party already in the 1980s adopted a position in favour of 
NATO membership and cooperation with the US on natio l and international defence. The 
Danish People’s Party maintained this position, prefer ing the Atlantic Alliance to European 
military and security cooperation. The party considers Europe politically too weak a construc-
tion to safeguard the interests and security of the member states against possible threats from 
unstable countries outside Europe (cf. Arbejdsprogram 2001). 
Particularly from 2001, the Danish People’s Party has been in favour of the interventionist 
wing, supporting the Liberal-Conservative government to keep the Danish military presence 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq. But this does not mean that the party has uncritically accepted 
all NATO decisions; for example, when in 1999 the Danish government supported the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo. At that time, the party described the conflict as an ‘inverted crusade’ 
(Dansk Folkeblad 2008/1: 24), arguing that the Danish military presence in the province 
helped Muslims win over Christians. For the party this was even more problematic because 
the region had an historically symbolic significance, being the place were the Christian Serbs 
fought the famous battle of the Blackbird Plain in 1389, in their effort to contain the ad-
vancement of the Ottoman Empire (Dansk Folkeblad 2008/1: 24).  
The Danish People’s Party’s pro-NATO position dovetail d with the widely held positive 
attitude of the party towards the USA. Particularly after 9/11, the party considers the US one 
of Denmark’s best allies, which can help the Western world against attacks from terrorism 
and Islamic fundamentalism. 
A similar logic is behind the party’s pro-Israel position. The Danish People’s Party is an 
outspoken supporter of Israel in the conflict with the Palestinians. In the course of the years 
the party has on several occasions demonstrated its ‘solidarity with the Israeli people in their 
fight against Muslim terrorism’ (Dansk Folkeblad 200 /5: 4). On this position the party is not 
alone and particularly in recent years several other radical right parties in Western Europe 
have adopted a similar position, although there are some exceptions like the FPÖ, which is 
declared critical towards the Israeli management of the conflict (see Chapter 7).  
There are, however, still several differences among the radical right parties in relation to 
their position on foreign policy. As we will see in the next chapters, both the Freedom Party 
and the Northern League have been very critical of what the party leadership considered the 
American hegemony on Europe and the consumerist and multiethnic American society. How-
ever, the latter has after 9/11 revised this position, but not the FPÖ which is actually very ex-
plicitly against US foreign policy and favours the cr ation of a Palestinian state. On this issue, 
the positions of the Danish People’s Party and the Austrian Freedom Party could not be more 
different. 
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Conclusions 
When it was launched in 1995, the Danish People’s Party had the opportunity to drop some of 
the ideological standpoints that had characterised th  Progress Party and to develop policies 
that better fit the demands from the electorate. One of the first ideological transformations of 
the Danish People’s Party in discontinuity with thepast was the shift from the tax-protest pro-
file developed by the Progress Party and the promoti n of a pro-welfare image. This was in-
creasingly implemented by the party and in particular after the party reached a position of 
political influence as a support party to the Liberal-Conservative government in 2001. The 
party’s influence on the political forces in government, being formally still ‘out of office’, 
proved to be rather advantageous for the Danish People’s Party. In this way, the party ac-
quired a higher degree of freedom than it would have, if it had been directly involved in gov-
ernment. This position allowed the party to dissociate itself from decisions and resolutions of 
the government that were directly in conflict with s own politics, most notably on the EU, 
but also on other issues. It has also allowed the Danish People’s Party to promote itself as a 
‘real protector of the traditional Social Democratic values and principles in relation to wel-
fare’, without making this avowal sound unfitting with a Liberal-Conservative government. 
However, as argued above, the results concretely achieved by the party in relation to the Dan-
ish welfare state are much more moderate than expected from a party that today asserts that 
‘real social democrats vote for the Danish People’s Party’.  
In any case, the party’s pro-welfare orientation clearly questions what many scholars un-
til recently considered a main feature of the electorally successful radical right: freemarketing 
and neo-liberal politics. Instead, it is rather protectionist positions on national economy, wel-
fare state chauvinism and politics containing the eff cts of globalisation that came on the 
agenda of this party in relation to economic issues.  
Undoubtedly, the development in this direction was influenced by the fact that the DPP 
voters turned out to be among the most supportive for ‘classic’ welfare arrangements com-
pared to the electorate of other parties and in particular of the mainstream right. This has to be 
considered in relation to the socioeconomic profile of the Danish People’s Party’s electorate 
with a clear overrepresentation of working class voters (see Chapter 8) and which has made 
the DF the most clear cut working class party in Danish politics today. It is an electoral com-
position that has certainly influenced the party’s decisions and politics on welfare state issues.  
As for the value dimension, the Danish People’s Party made anti-immigration a central 
issue. Complaints against immigration and against the politics approved by the governments 
in order to face the challenges had already characterised the politics of the Progress Party 
from about the mid-1980s. However, the Danish People’s Party was able to take this issue up 
to discussion more effectively and concretely than the Progress Party.  
The pages above suggested a development in the way the party has dealt with immigra-
tion over the years. While at the beginning the main concern was economic and social costs of 
immigration and crime and law and order, in recent years the Danish People’s Party has fo-
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cussed increasingly on nativism and on the cultural and value diversity and incompatibility of 
Western civilisation and Islam. This ideological development also suggests that in the Danish 
case the new political cleavages have actually becom  more and more relevant in shaping the 
political position of the party. By putting the emphasis on what the party claims are the fun-
damental libertarian values and principles of Denmark and more generally of the West, such 
as freedom of speech, tolerance, solidarity, industriousness and equal rights between men and 
women, the Danish People’s Party has shifted the terms and paradigm with which the party 
explains its opposition against immigration from Muslim countries. The challenges and dan-
gers that follow immigration are therefore not only explained in terms of economic and social 
costs for the Western societies, but as endangering the very foundations and principles on 
which the Western culture and identity are built.  
 145 
6. THE NORTHERN LEAGUE: HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
Until recently, the Northern League was not considere  a full-fledged member of the radical 
right, but rather an ethno-regionalist party with only few characteristics in common with other 
alleged radical right parties in Western Europe. This interpretation seemed endorsed by the 
party history, in which the demands of regional autonomy from the central government in 
Rome had played a major role in the politics of the Northern League until at least the end of 
the 1990s. Moreover, the Northern League was born and still is mainly a Northern Italian po-
litical and geographical phenomenon.  
However, from the mid-1980s and particularly since th  Northern League achieved gov-
ernment responsibility in 2001, the party has develop d politics that went in the same direc-
tion chosen by other radical right parties in Western Europe. In particular, the similarities be-
tween the Northern League and parties such as the Danish People’s Party and the Austrian 
Freedom Party, relate to the cultural and value dimension and to the ensuing politics. Most 
noticeably, the Northern League has in the Italian political system become the most clear cut 
anti-immigration party. A harder course against illegal immigration, effective repatriation 
programmes, no right for immigrants to vote and – significantly – a very negative approach to 
Islam clearly suggest a pattern of development similar to other radical right parties in Western 
Europe. These parties’ anti-immigration politics are perhaps the most evident similarity, but 
not the only one. As it will emerge in this chapter, political convergence is seen in other po-
litical fields as well, for instance EU policy, where there is a general agreement to frame the 
EU integration process in the context of competences and responsibilities of the local com-
munity and the national space versus the challenges of global and sovranational realities.  
However, on other issues the Northern League continues to hold specific positions that are 
related to and of course influenced by the party history, development and electoral support. 
As we will see, it is especially on the traditional economic dimension that we still find the 
most obvious differences between the three parties compared in this study. How the politics 
and positions of the Northern League have changed and taken shape through the years is part 
of an interesting account that can help us understand several aspects of the present condition 
of this party, also in comparative terms.  
The chapter starts by considering the history and ideological development of the party, 
from its origins in the mid-1980s until the more recent present. This background allows us to 
observe the way the Northern League developed in relation to the different opportunities that 
emerged over the years and to the different phases of the party’s life. It started as a party with 
a very limited geographical and political significan e and ended with political influence and 
government responsibility. As argued in the case of the Danish People’s Party, the recent po-
litical standing of a party is not without history and this is often important to understand the 
process and conditions of the party ideological and political development.  
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The remaining part of the chapter engages in a closer analysis of the ideology of the 
Northern League, which follows the main ideological dimension and issues indicated in the 
previous chapters and which helped structure the analysis of the Danish People’s Party in 
Chapter 5. This allows closer comparative observations of the differences and similarity in the 
policies and positions that characterise the Northern L ague in relation to the other two par-
ties.  
 
6.1 HISTORY 
6.1.1 The rise of the phenomenon of the Leagues in Northern Italy in the 1980s 
The Northern League was born as an ethno-regionalists movement in the 1980s, when a wave 
of regionalist and autonomist movements entered Italian politics. This gave rise to cultural 
and political realities that achieved significant electoral support in the late 1980s, particularly 
in the North of the country.  
The claims for more regional autonomy and self-government were not new to Italian 
history. Especially in the border regions, local community and identity had often clashed with 
feelings of national belonging and respect for state institutions. The formation of the nation 
state had partly contributed to this, resulting from a process that came mainly from above, 
whereas feelings of national belonging were still weak among the population.  
In the course of the 20th century, the diverse regional st and autonomist demands were 
contained by the fascist regime, which controlled an held down any form of localist or re-
gionalist demand that could endanger the integrity of the nation. After WWII these demands 
re-emerged and through the years new opportunities for the rise of new parties were created. 
At the same time, the secularization of Italian society triggered important changes in the vot-
ers’ political consciousness and affiliation, particularly in some areas of the North, where Ca-
tholicism had been coupled to the vote for the Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, 
DC). 
The DC’s dominant position started to change in the 1980s and new political realities 
gained electoral support, for example the Venetian League (Liga Veneta). The Venetian 
League was a movement founded during the 1980s and its politics and interests were embed-
ded in the local reality represented in this case by the Italian North Eastern region of Veneto. 
This explains why the main focus of the Venetian League was initially on cultural and linguis-
tic aspects, for example official recognition of the Venetian dialect as a specific ethnic and 
linguistic reality and the demand for a higher degre  of decisional power and economic 
autonomy from the centre (cf. Gold 2003: 79-81).  
In 1983 the Venetian League got about 4 pct. of the vot s, which entitled it to two par-
liamentary seats, one in the Deputy Chamber and one in the Senate. It was a remarkable result 
for a new ethno-regionalist movement, which encouraged the emergence of similar regionalist 
claims in other parts of Italy. In fact, while the V netian League was consolidating its experi-
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ence in Veneto, another regionalist reality was born in the Italian Northwestern region 
Lombardia.  
In 1982, Umberto Bossi, who is still leader of the Northern League, and a few close 
friends launched the Lombard (Autonomist) League (L ga Autonomista Lombarda), which 
was the precursor to the Northern League. The name was accurately chosen to recall the his-
tory of the towns and villages that in the 12th century had banded together to fight the occupa-
tion by Federick I Barbarossa, King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor. To represent the 
Lombard League, the party founders opted for the sword-wearing warrior Alberto da Gius-
sano, a popular hero who is believed to have historically led the league to victory over Bar-
barossa’s troops at the Battle of Legnano in 1176. These historical events and actors were 
used by the newly formed Lombard League to symbolize the revolt of the ‘peoples’ of the 
North against the powerful and centralizing forces that in the past were represented by the 
German and Roman Empire and in present times by the Italian government in Rome. 
Initially, the League’s political agenda did not differ much from the issues and questions 
developed by other Italian ethno-regionalist parties. The main goal was primarily to safeguard 
the ethnic, cultural and linguistic heritage of theregion and to achieve a higher degree of re-
gional autonomy from Rome (cf. Lombardia Autonomista 1982). The Leagues’ agenda repre-
sented a ‘return’ to the opposition between the periph y/local against the urban interest and 
the centre of the political power. The revival of this opposition reloaded a socio-political 
cleavage whose effects on Italian politics and society seemed at that time to have exhausted 
their strength (e.g. Tarchi 2003: 136). These opposition  also emerged in the electoral profile 
of the Leagues, whose electoral core came from minor urban centres, provincial towns and 
communities of the Italian Northeast and Northwest (see Diamanti 1993). However, it was 
unlikely that this electoral support indicated symptoms of marginalization and decline in face 
of the socioeconomic transformations of the 1980s. The phenomenon of the Leagues was 
rather the product of affluent regions and relatively strong socioeconomic realities that in 
many respects were ready to tackle the consequences a d challenges brought about by global-
ization and by the increasing internationalization of the markets. 
The Leagues and later the Northern League did particularly well in geographical and so-
cioeconomic contexts that in the 1980s had experienced a positive and dynamic process of 
industrialization and economic growth. Largely based on small and medium scale industries 
and firms, several regions of North and Central Italy developed a number of important pro-
ductive industrial districts during the 1980s. These are territorially and geographically delim-
ited areas where industries and firms often worked in the same productive sector and special-
ized in different phases of the production (for example the chair industry in the Northwestern 
region Friuli Venezia-Giulia). The majority of these industrial districts flourished particularly 
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in the North of the country.61 To give an idea of this development, in the North East of Italy, 
with a population of about 10 million residents, there were in 2001 about 42 different indus-
trial districts, whereas the Northwest of the country, with a population of about 15 million, 
had 39 industrial districts and 49 were located in Central Italy. In comparison to this devel-
opment, the South, with only 26 such districts, had great difficulties catching up with the 
flourishing industrial and economic development in he North; an economic difficulty emerg-
ing at other levels, such as income levels and employment rates.62 
The industrial activity and the social and economic affluence in the North of Italy, to-
gether with the social and political events characterising the country in those years, contrib-
uted to the formation and consolidation of specific forms of identity and belonging, strength-
ened by the fact that many shared common working experiences in the same field of produc-
tion. Feelings of localism, individualism and sense of belonging to a shared community and a 
Protestant work ethic were successfully interpreted by the political and cultural phenomenon 
of the ethno-regional leagues. They tried to maximize them, highlighting the distinctiveness 
of the place, the uniqueness of the cultural and liguistic regional tradition and the successful 
economic growth of the region. All this was put in contrast to the situation in the rest of the 
country and particularly in the South (see e.g. Diamanti 1993).  
The leagues were also able to give voice to widespread esentment against the state and 
the political establishment, considered to hinder the private initiative and the economic 
growth of the North and to feed the increasing costs f the public sector, particularly in the 
unproductive South. By taking these issues up, the Lombard League was able to promote it-
self as a movement in opposition, with completely antithetical values and principles that 
clearly contrasted with the negative image embodied by the political establishment and its 
elite (on this cf. Chapter 9).  
The Lombard League pointed to the Italian political establishment as the main responsi-
ble for a national debt that in the early 1990s hadreached 117 pct. of the Italian GDP.63 Par-
ticularly in the productive regions of the North, te idea that their money was used to ‘main-
tain’ the South and an inefficient and corrupt political elite became widespread among voters, 
and fuelled their distrust in politicians and in the political system at large. To this the 
Lombard League attached a direct critique against Sou hern Italians, who considered moving 
North only to take advantage of the favourable conditions created for them by the national and 
local political establishment. The Lombard League was the first political organization that 
mobilised the electorate on the North and South question. In the 1980s the party declared that 
                                                
61 See in: ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica), 8° censimento generale dell’industria e dei servizi, p. 29, 
2001, in: http://www.istat.it/salastampa/comunicati/non_calendario/20051216_00/Volume_Distretti.pdf (last 
accessed 13-08-2008). 
62 In 2007, the unemployment rate for Italy was about 6 pct., but showing important geographical differenc s, 
with 3.8 pct. in the North, 6.1 pct. in Central Italy nd 11.8 pct. in the South. ISTAT, Rilevazione sulle forze di 
lavoro. IV trimestre 2007, in: http://www.expobg.it/downloaddoc/OccupazioneIstat2007.pdf (last accessed 13-
08-2008). 
63 The Italian public debt was in 2007 about 104 pct.of GDP. 
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the labour and housing markets in the North were privileging the newcomers instead of help-
ing native Lombards. Although resentment and stereoyping of Italians from the South were 
not new among segments of the population in the North, the Lombard League translated them 
into a clear political issue based on hard tones and demanding politics that put Lombard na-
tives first when it came to employment opportunities in the public sector and benefits on the 
housing market. The party did the same with the immigration question, putting into clear 
words the anti-immigration position, which later would become a central issue on the political 
agenda. This was initially based on the same premises: the socioeconomic costs of immigra-
tion and its negative consequences for the regional development and wealth.  
The Northern League was launched at the beginning of the 1990s as a result of the ex-
perience of several different regional leagues. Thepolitical breakthrough and support to the 
phenomenon of the leagues in the 1980s represented a  important event and an essential step 
towards understanding what the Northern League has become today.  
 
6.1.2 From the leagues to the League: the phase of organization and consolidation  
At the European election of 1989, the Lombard Leagu, the Venetian League and a number of 
other minor leagues and regional political realities gathered for the first time in a unitary list, 
obtaining significant electoral support. At the following administrative elections in 1990, the 
Lombard League achieved important results in Lombardy nd in other regions of the North, 
confirming this positive electoral trend. In February 1991, the Lombard League, the Venetian 
League and four minor regional parties (Lega Emiliano-Romagnola, Alleanza Toscana, Union 
Ligure and Piemont Autonomista) formed a new political party organization called the North-
ern League.  
At the party first federal congress, Umberto Bossi was elected party secretary. This posi-
tion allowed the newly constituted Northern League a highly centralized structure and top-
steered leadership. Bossi achieved the undisputable role of charismatic party leader with ex-
ceptional powers that political commentators have on more than one occasion effectively 
summarized in the sentence: ‘Bossi is the League, the League is Bossi’.  
In the case of the three parties here considered there is little doubt about the leading role 
of Umberto Bossi in the Northern League, Pia Kjærsgaard in the Danish People’s Party and 
Jörg Haider in his years as leader of the Austrian Freedom Party. They have great communi-
cation skills, an anti-elitist stance sometimes supported by their ordinary background (Bossi 
and Kjærsgaard) and in general their ease in the position of undisputed party leaders. 
However, as already observed for the Danish People’s Party (see Chapter 5), giving the 
party leader greater decisional power over the members was also a way to prevent escalation 
of internal conflicts and divisions. This role and power was particularly significant for new 
political organizations such as the Northern League and the Danish People’s Party, but also 
for the Austrian Freedom Party, with a longer party history, but like the other two involved in 
a phase of radical transformations and consolidation strategy at the end of the 1980s.  
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During the 1990s, most of the exclusions decided by the Northern League leadership 
were explained as necessary to prevent party members from betraying the aim and goals of 
the League by getting too involved in promoting their own interests and career. This was also 
a way for the Northern League to emphasize that the party was still different from the other 
political organizations, even if it was gaining increasing political influence and decisional 
power. As Bossi (1992: 84-85) once formulated it: 
 
the League is not an ordinary party. I believe thatour movement expresses the desires and hopes 
of many people of the North and of all those looking for freedom, respect for traditions and jus-
tice against the unfairness of the power. Those who join the League must have solid ideals and 
must be ready for personal sacrifice (…) there is no place for those looking for a position and for 
personal rewards. There is no place for those selling our federalist cause for easy money.  
 
Statements like this allowed the Northern League to keep a profile as an alternative political 
force, contrasting with the highly corrupt and incompetent political establishment. A party 
made of ‘strong and pure souls’ that did not give in to political selfishness and personal inter-
ests. As part of the same strategy, the Northern Leagu  leadership described the party as a 
popular movement, whose existence had emerged directly from the needs and demands of a 
popular base that has grown increasingly disenchanted with the political establishment. These 
feelings were not new to the Italian electorate, but the Northern League was the party that 
managed most effectively to capitalize them.  
 
6.1.3 Tangentopoli and the anti-establishment politics of the Northern League 
At the beginning of the 1990s, a number of political corruption and bribery scandals jeopard-
ized the whole Italian political system. What was lter defined as the Tangentopoli (Bribe 
Town) affair, was a real turning point in Italian post-war politics. The so-called Clean-Hands 
(Mani Pulite) trials that took place in Milan during the 1990s showed that the phenomenon 
went even beyond the worst case scenario. Several prominent Italian politicians were involved 
in illicit financing and corruption. These events took place only a few years after the dramatic 
transformations in Italian politics provoked by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, 
symbolically marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and by the dissolution of the So-
viet Union.  
The Italian political scenario had been rather stable since the post-war period. This was 
based on what an Italian scholar once defined the ‘imperfect bipartitism’ (Galli 1967), refer-
ring to the political configuration that characteriz d the country with the Christian Democrats 
(DC) in power and the Communist Party (PCI) in oppositi n. In the years of the Iron Curtain, 
the DC had benefitted electorally from acting as a bulwark against communism, while the 
Socialist Party (PSI), the third biggest party in Italy at that time, had been electorally favoured 
by the lack of realistic chances that the PCI had to govern. The international events in 1989 
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put an end to this situation. The voters no longer saw DC’s position in government as inevita-
ble and reconsidered the role of the party.  
Tangentopoli amplified the discontent and political distrust that w s already widespread 
among the electorate. Unsurprisingly, at the 1992 parliamentary election most of the main-
stream parties registered a drop in electoral support. F r the first time in decades, the DC got 
less than 30 pct. of the votes, while several of the party’s traditional constituencies in the 
North voted for the Northern League. The League achieved about 9 pct. of the votes at the 
national level and 55 seats in parliament, obtaining solid representation in national politics. 
But most remarkably, the League became the first political organization in several regions of 
the North (cf. Table 1.4, Chapter 1). The party achieved 23 pct. of the votes in Lombardy, and 
managed to surpass 15 pct. in Veneto, Piedmont and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia. The support to the 
party in the North was then confirmed in June 1993 at the administrative elections where the 
Northern League won in a number of significant municipalities and most remarkably in Mi-
lan, where the new mayor, Marco Formentini, was a Northern League man.  
Undoubtedly, the anti-establishment politics advanced by the Northern League appealed 
to the part of the electorate that was strongly dissat fied with how politics worked in general 
and had very little trust in politicians and institu ons. The feelings of resentment against the 
institutions, the political establishment and particularly against what in Italy is often referred 
to as ‘the Italian political class’ were nothing new. Several classical studies portray the Ital-
ians as citizens with a low interest in politics and who are much more proud of being Italians 
because of the artistic and architectural beauties of the country rather of the Italian political 
system and how this works.  
The roots of the political distrust were already produced by the sociopolitical and eco-
nomic development of the country before and after its unification (Putnam 1993). But politi-
cal corruption, clientelism and bad political culture increased the distrust among the voters. 
The Italian political literature is rich in studies dealing with the degree of corruption and per-
sonal interests among politicians (cf. for example the recent book by Stella 2007). 
This situation influenced the opportunities for the vote for the Northern League. The 
party not only profiled itself as a clear political alternative to the status quo, but also as a po-
litical force that would safeguard the interests of the medium and small entrepreneurs that 
strongly contributed to the economic growth in the North of the country. It was the battle 
against ‘the parasitic and clientelist capital in Rome’ and ‘the capital of economy in Milan’. 
The fact that the party was relatively new and thatit had never been in office was another 
positive argument for the voters’ support. In the 1990s the Northern League was moving 
steadily from the margins to the mainstream of Italian politics. 
  
6.1.4 The Northern League at its first government experience 
A popular referendum in 1993 overwhelmingly supported he introduction of more plurality 
in the Italian party system. This was translated into a new electoral law approved in 1994. As 
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a result of this law, 75 pct. of the deputies in parliament were elected in a first-past-the-post 
system, and the remaining 25 pct. on a proportional basis.  
In order to stop the proliferation of smaller parties, the law also introduced an electoral 
threshold at 4 pct., which the parties had to cross in order to win seats on the proportional 
basis. However, a result below the threshold would not prevent a party from entering parlia-
ment, if it was part of one of the coalitions running for the government. This electoral reform 
was a first step towards the establishment of a bipolar and majoritarian political system. It 
forced the parties to form two major coalitions resp ctively at the centre left and centre right 
of the political space.64  
Facing the potential losses that would result from running alone, the Northern League 
decided somehow reluctantly, but out of necessity, to join the coalition led for the first time 
by Silvio Berlusconi. The entrepreneur and media magnate Berlusconi had entered politics in 
1993, in a political situation that was still shattered by the events of Tangentopoli, where vot-
ers were strongly dissatisfied and disillusioned about politics and the Northern League was 
not always seen as an appealing and reliable alterntive, particularly in the South. When Ber-
lusconi entered politics, he emphasized his politica  debut more as a necessary act, as a per-
sonal sacrifice to safeguard the interest of the country, rather than an interest in active politics 
(see Tarchi 2003: 164-65). 
Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia was a new political organization, whose politics and 
populist appeals were soon competing with the Northern League. The two parties struggled 
over the same electoral segments and this resulted in a contradictory political relationship of 
‘love and hate’ between the two. Forza Italia was moreover advantaged by the fact that its 
appeal when beyond the electorate of the North, and h d good chances in the rest of the coun-
try. However, the Northern League leadership understood that in order to leave the margins 
and achieve political influence, the party had to accept a political coalition with Berlusconi. 
Bossi encouraged his people to ‘hold their nose’ adding that ‘to give in to something’ meant 
also to ‘receive something back’ (Bossi in Il Corrie e 28-02-1994).  
At the March 1994 elections, the Northern League got 8 pct. of the votes at the national 
level, but reached about 22 pct. of the votes in Lombardy and in Veneto, and maintained a 
good position in other Northern constituencies. A few months later, the party was for the first 
time in office with Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale and a few other minor parties from the 
split-up of the former DC.   
But the party’s first government experience did not las  long. In the few months (April-
December 1994) the party was in government in the centre-right coalition, a significant part of 
the Northern League’s electorate went over to Forza Italia. Already from the beginning the 
Northern League disagreed with the line chosen by the o her coalition partners. Deep dissatis-
faction was expressed with Berlusconi’s decision to run the elections together with the party 
                                                
64 On the electoral laws in Italy see Pasquino, I sistemi elettorali, Il Mulino, Bologna 2006.  
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MSI-AN. AN has significantly transformed itself during the last fifteen years, but for decades 
the party, under the name of Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) represented the traditional 
extreme right with roots in post-war fascism (cf. Ignazi 1989; 1994; Tarchi 2003).  
Before the 1994 parliamentary elections, FI presented a separate coalition with AN in 
the Centre and South of Italy called Polo per il buongoverno (Pole for the good government). 
Bossi considered this a political betrayal, emphasizing that the Northern League had more 
than once clearly stated that the party would never get together with the fascists (see Scaliati 
2006). As Bossi put it in his speech at the party congress in February 1994:  
 
We, the Northern League, are the extension of the liberation movement that struggled for lib-
erty: the Northern League will never make a political agreement with the MSI, with the fascists, 
or whatever they now call themselves. Never with the fascists! 
 
As the Progress Party in Denmark, the Northern Leagu  was in the 1990s promoting a profile 
connecting the party to the anti-fascist liberation movement that during WWII and particu-
larly in the final phases had played a crucial role in the battle against the Italian fascist and 
German Nazi troops. These historical events explain why the electoral support to the MSI and 
later to AN has always been stronger in the Centre and South of the country than in the 
Northern regions, where the liberation movement wasstronger and anti-fascism remained a 
widespread value, particularly among the generations that had experienced the war; this also 
when the MSI officially changed its name to Alleanz Nazionale. In the years that followed 
AN distanced itself from the fascist ideology and its leadership has intensively worked to 
place the party in the traditional and conservative right wing camp.  
The Northern League’s position on Alleanza Nazionale was due to change in the 1990s. 
Even if the two parties have never really come to like one another, they ran together in the 
following elections, in the same coalition from 2001 until 2007 and again in 2008 – they were 
in office together. In this sense, government respon ibility changed significantly the position 
of the Northern League in this respect. On the whole, the party’s office seeking politics was 
not painless and required careful evaluation of the consequences of a change in politics in 
order to enter and remain in office.   
But the challenging task for the Northern League was to become mainstream and at the 
same time hold on to those features that had given th  party the profile of alternative to the 
establishment. From being mainly a regionalist, territorially based party of protest and opposi-
tion, the Northern League had developed into a governm nt party with a traditional political 
organization and with decision-making influence at the national level. This ‘passage’ from the 
margins to the mainstream was part of a political strategy that strived to achieve political in-
fluence. As Umberto Bossi (1996: 80) explained:  
 
the League is not a temporary movement, in the sense that it will dissolve when the federalist 
construction is realized. The League (…) is becoming a new political actor which represents a 
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secure investment in the future and which is ready to interpret the dynamic political demands of 
the voters.     
 
This was also a way to make clear that the Northern L ague was not a flash party, but a reli-
able political actor with a clear programme and plans for the future. The political agreement 
with Berlusconi gave the Northern League considerabl  power. The Northern League got 117 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 60 in the Senate, five influential ministries, three with 
portfolio (Interior, Industry and Finance) and two ithout (European Union Affairs and Insti-
tutional Reforms). But the government had a very short life and already in December 1994, 
only seven months after its formation, a vote of no-confidence and the Northern League’s 
withdrawal from government put an end to its first government experience (cf. Bossi 1996: 
85).  
Disagreement emerged in particular in the political relationship between the Northern 
League and Forza Italia. The Northern League was not o ly losing voters to Forza Italia, it 
was also difficult to be in government without becoming unpopular. An example was a bill 
presented by the Minister of Justice to limit the us  of preventive detention to suspects of ter-
rorism and mafia activity, thus affecting the investigations of political corruption. The bill, 
which was later nicknamed the ‘save the thief bill’ (decreto salva ladri), was considered a 
way to avoid that Silvio Berlusconi would get involed in the investigations on illegal financ-
ing to political parties by a team of judges in Milan (pool Mani Pulite). The immediate protest 
of the civic society prevented the enactment of the bill into law, but this cast a shadow on the 
government parties, in particular on the Northern League, which had insisted on its role of 
watchdog against the irresponsibility and corruption of the political establishment.    
Seen in a broader perspective, the direct engagement of the Northern League in govern-
ment politics made it more difficult for the party to uphold a ‘clean’ profile. Moreover, the 
position of responsibility had shifted the LN away from its original role of non-cooperation 
and anti-establishment. 
The party was also unable to counterbalance the negativ  effects of being in government 
by keeping its promises on for instance federalism, which during the electoral campaign was 
promoted as the most important issue if the party managed to get in office. But no relevant 
steps were taken in this direction during the brief p riod the Northern League was in govern-
ment.  
The pragmatism that characterized the party in its first government experience endan-
gered the political and ideological profile of the Northern League in the electorate. The poor 
results in the European elections of May 1994 were interpreted as a clear sign of the electoral 
decline. The Northern League got just above 6 pct. of the votes and sent only six members to 
the European Parliament in Brussels, where they joined the European Liberal Democrat and 
Reform Party.  
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In December 1994, the party decided to withdraw its support to the government coali-
tion. This provoked turmoil in the coalition and within the party. The other government par-
ties considered this a political betrayal that made the Northern League an untrustworthy part-
ner. Also within the party a number of MPs disapproved of the leadership’s decision and left 
the Northern League to join Forza Italia.   
The result of this first government experience was deterioration rather than an improve-
ment of the party’s position (cf. Diamanti 1996). This meant that also the League’s attempt to 
promote itself as a new moderate and centre party hd failed. However, the withdrawal from 
government in 1994 was a way to stop the great losses of party members and voters. By De-
cember 1994, about one third of the Northern MPs had already left the party to join FI and the 
Northern League had to recuperate. To do this the party returned to a vote seeking strategy at 
the margins, where it remained until the end of the 1990s.   
 
6.1.5 Back to the political periphery: the Northern League’s differentiation strategy at the 
margins of Italian politics (1995-1997)  
With its return to the margins of Italian politics the Northern League’s ideology and politics 
became more radical. At the federal congress of September 1996, the Northern League pro-
claimed officially the independence and sovereignty of the Padanian state (cf. Lega Nord, 
Padania o Roma 1998), which the party defined an ‘irreversible and definitive act’ that de-
rived from the impossibility to ‘reform the state in a genuine federalist direction’, as this 
would mean to ‘destroy it and to build a new one starting from zero’. According to the North-
ern League, the only alternative was to ‘come out, to separate from this state and make an-
other one’ in order to save the economy, liberty and culture of the peoples of the North (Lega 
Nord, Padania o Roma 1998: 11) 
The radicalization of the party on the issue of federalism provoked a new phase of pe-
ripheralization from 1995 until about 1997. The Italian scholar and Northern League expert 
Ilvo Diamanti (Diamanti 1996: 73) has appropriately defined this period of the party charac-
terized by the ‘independence as a form of differentiation strategy’. After the negative experi-
ence in government and the difficulties created by the competition with Forza Italia to gain 
the voters’ support, the Northern League needed to find a strategy that could help the party to 
re-establish its profile of a clear alternative to the mainstream parties. In this prospect, 
Padanian independence was also a strategy to make clear distinctions between the Northern 
League and the rest of the political establishment. Within this framework the leadership spoke 
about a ‘movement of liberation’, whose politics were neither left nor right, or as Bossi for-
mulated it once: ‘the League (…) is the centre. It is in the centre and above, to be more pre-
cise’ (Bossi 1996: 105). 
The Northern League wanted to reach all voters and therefore did not take a clear politi-
cal standpoint after its experience in government. In spring 1996, the party ran alone at the 
parliamentary elections, which significantly reduced the number of parliamentary mandates 
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because of the rules introduced by the electoral law of 1993, which supported the develop-
ment of a bipolar system. However, although potentially nconvenient, this decision seemed to 
give the party a more credible position in light of the more radical orientation the party had 
taken.   
The strategy gave positive results and in 1996 the Northern League achieved over 10 
pct. of the votes at the national level, reaching peaks above 20 pct. in some constituencies of 
the North. The decision to run alone prevented the centre-right coalition La Casa della Lib-
ertà to get the necessary votes to win the elections. Berlusconi commented this result at the 
congress of Forza Italia in 1999 pronouncing the famous words: ‘together with the League we 
can win, without the League we lose’ – and this, even if several of the members of FI had 
little sympathy for the Northern League after the political ‘betrayal’ in 1994.  
In 1995, the Northern League continued its project to create a Padanian state. The party 
created its own ‘shadow’ parliament in the Northern city of Mantova, called the Parliament of 
the Northern People (Bossi 1996: 109). While waiting for the official creation of the Padanian 
state, the function of the Parliament of the North was to discuss and vote laws and bills that 
the party MPs had to present to the Parliament in Rome. This was part of the project for the 
construction of ‘parallel structures of government a d mobilization at all levels’, which had to 
prepare and get ready to rule the new Padanian state. In he months after the 1996 elections, 
new controversial organs were formed by the League. Th  Parliament of the North appointed 
a committee to write the new Padanian Constitution. The ‘Padanian nation’ also had its own 
flag (a flower with six petals on a white background called the Sun of the Alps) and its own 
National Guard, better known as the ‘Green-Shirts’, to maintain security and order. The party 
leadership reassured that the secession had nothing to do with violence and weapons, but 
would take place peacefully, even if Bossi’s belligrent remarks often seemed in contradiction 
with this spirit.  
The construction of the Padanian identity represented an important step in the process of 
creating an independent and sovereign Padanian state. The Northern League worked actively 
in those years to legitimize this project, by creating he necessary symbols, myths, history and 
events. This can be easily traced in the party rheto ic, as suggested by the way Bossi (1996: 
164) started to speak about the Padanian nation: 
 
The new nation is a newborn child with the heart in Mantova, the head in Venice and the spine 
along the Po river. Its blood is the men and women who have reach d their national awareness, 
who feel deep-rooted in the European Community and who are resolute to fight for their rights, 
as they have sworn in Pontida, where the Padanian soul lays. 
 
A yearly event acquired particular significance: the party meetings at Pontida, where Umberto 
Bossi, prominent party party and party sympathisers gather on the river Po and declare their 
loyalty to the party and to the Padanian cause (Lega Nord, Cronistoria: 9). During what is 
comparable to a pagan ceremony, a sample of the river’s water is collected to be poured again 
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into the Venetian Laguna, where the party leadership, supporters and sympathizers meet again 
a few weeks later.  
The pagan celebration symbolized the pact of unity among the Padanian peoples. These 
events have never really had a significant mobilizat on effect, being frequented almost exclu-
sively by the party’s most loyal voters and supporters. However, they attracted media and the 
public attention, particularly when the party was again at the politic periphery.   
The independence initiatives and claims of the Northern League provoked reactions and 
concerns of the institutions and of the public opinion, which looked at this new phase of radi-
calization with feelings varying between fear, scorn and veiled support. This re-awakening of 
the questions of independence and ethnic claims also brought the party back to regionalist and 
independence questions, characterizing other regionalist and separatist movements in Europe, 
such as the Catalans and Basques in Spain.  
In May 1997, the League launched a referendum for Padania’s independence asking to 
vote yes or no to the question: ‘Do you want Padania to become an independent and sovereign 
federal republic?’ Later, party sources declared that e result was an overwhelming yes from 
those who had voted in one of the electoral gazebos that the party had put up in the main cities 
of the North. A survey commissioned by the Italian political review Limes just before the 
elections in 1996 showed that the public opinion on the independence of the North gave a less 
consensual result. Asked about what the ‘independence of the North’ represented for them, 35 
pct. of the interviewed declared that it was an unacceptable hypothesis, 29 pct. that it was a 
favourable prospect but on the whole not possible and only 23 pct. found it a favourable and 
desirable prospect (cf. Gold 2003: 105-106). Even if more than half of the respondents were 
open to the idea separating the North of Italy from the South, most of them considered this an 
impracticable if not impossible project to realize. This implied that it would be very difficult 
for the Northern League to find the necessary support and popular backup for the realization 
of the Padanian independence.  
In the same years, the centre-left government coaliti n understood the need to make re-
forms in a federalist direction, answering to a demand that came primarily from the North of 
the country. In 1997 a nonpartisan bicameral committee was created to realize some reforms 
in this direction. The so-called Bassanini law represented an attempt to give regional and local 
administrations more decisional power (see Legge n. 59 1997) in education, health care, in-
dustrial incentives, urban planning, public works and the environment. The law introduced the 
simplification of the administrative system and a reduction in the number of government min-
istries.   
The initiatives taken by the centre-left government 1997-1998 threatened the Northern 
League’s ownership of the federalist issue (see Gold 2003). According to other scholars (e.g. 
Diamanti 1998), the leadership of the Northern League understood that the support to the 
party in the North would hardly become a movement strong enough to carry out the separa-
tion from the South. Furthermore, the legitimization f Northern secession as a necessary 
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measure to join the European Monetary Union in 1999 disappeared when Italy was finally 
accepted in the EMU in 1997.  
Life at the margins no longer offered great opportunities. At the end of 1997, it was 
clear to the leadership of the Northern League that t e party had to change if it wanted to 
achieve political influence and get into government again. Significantly in this sense is the 
perspective adopted by the Northern League leadership at the federal congress of October 
1998. The speeches by the party leadership indicate that the party was moving towards an-
other phase of political normalization and office seeking politics and considered the Padanian 
nation difficult – if not impossible – to realize. Umberto Bossi said at the congress (Bossi, 
Congresso federale Lega Nord, 25 ottobre1998): 
  
I am sorry that I was not able to realize concretely he Padanian Federal Republic. But nobody 
could do it in such a short time and following democratic methods. We must build with what we 
have, even if the others have much more than us. We are not afraid of them, we can tackle them. 
But we must be more afraid of our mistakes, our crises of trust and our internal divisions. (…) In 
Rome we will do the political opposition being at government, by making laws that can penalize 
the North much less than now. This Congress has not made peace with Rome, on the contrary, it 
declared the total war against it by sending Padanian troops inside the government structure of 
the centralized state. 
 
In an attempt to avoid being politically isolated and marginalized, the League had already in 
1997 started to make careful approaches to the two main political coalitions in Italian politics. 
These attempts were initially contradictory, since it was not clear which of the two coalitions 
the League was getting closer to. The party was still afraid to lose voters to Forza Italia, as it 
happened in the administrative elections of May 1998.  
By 1999 it was also clear that no significant results could be achieved by the party by 
running alone. At the elections for the European Parliament in June, the League lost electoral 
support. The party got 4.5 pct. of the votes and only four MEPs, who joined the Technical 
Group of Independents (until its dissolution in 2001), which included parties like the French 
Front National, the Vlaams Blok and the Italian Radic l Party.65 
In 1999 and 2000 the party focussed less on the Padanian question and increased its po-
litical engagement and activity on other issues. Immigration again became a central issue, and 
the party criticized in particular the new immigration law approved by the centre-left govern-
ment in 1998, best known as the Turco-Napolitano Law and seen as an attempt to transform 
Italy into a multiethnic and multicultural society. The party denounced the rights and guaran-
tees that the law gave the new immigrants in terms of healthcare, welfare benefits, education 
and housing. At the beginning of 1999 the party started to collect signatures demanding a 
                                                
65 Following the 2004 election the Northern League joined the Eurosceptical group Independence and Democ-
racy, from which the party was suspended in 2006, because one of its members wore a t-shirt with one of the 
Danish Mohammed cartoons on. The party joined laterth  Union for Europe of the Nations, of which the Danish 
People’s Party was also a member until 2009. At present both parties have joined the right wing Euroscepti  
group Europe of Freedom and Democracy that was formed after the European election in 2009.  
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popular referendum to repeal the law. Within few months, about 700,000 had already signed, 
but the Constitutional Court decided against a referendum. 
In the same months the party tried to mobilise public opinion by organizing a demon-
stration in Milan against ‘drugs, prostitution and illegal migration’. Speaking to the people at 
the demonstration, Umberto Bossi indicated the immigrat on regime in the country as the re-
sult of an ‘exact political design, that of globaliz tion (…)’ and in which the ‘US would like 
to colonize Europe by creating a multiracial society’. At the time, the Northern League con-
sidered the US as the worse case in relation to culural homogenization and multiethnic/racial 
social experiments (see below). This anti-US positin changed in 2001, largely following the 
events of 9/11 and in relation to foreign policy after 2001 and involving participation by Italy 
in Afghanistan and in Iraq, both approved when the Northern League was in office again.  
Another issue that from 2000 increasingly engaged th  party leadership was the question 
of Islam and the Muslim minority in the Italian society. This issue was not new to the North-
ern League, but in these years the party increasingly adopted identity and anti-Islamic posi-
tions as central themes in the discussion about how to preserve cultural difference and safe-
guard the values and principles embedded in the Western and Christian civilization. As ob-
served by Betz (2009):  
 
Initially founded to bring about the ‘liberation’ of the prosperous northern provinces of Italy 
from the rest of the country – and particularly Rome, the Lega Nord increasingly adopted ques-
tions of identity and immigration as central issues. In this context, the party tried to promote it-
self not only as the defender of western values but also of Christianity, in an effort to appeal to 
practicing catholic voters, particularly in the northeastern part of the country. 
 
The Northern League started to give voice to those who were worried about how the Italian 
society would develop in the future if the number of immigrants with a Muslims background 
continued to increase (see below).  
At the same time the party adjusted its approach on ec omics, maintaining a moderate neo-
liberal position demanding less public intervention. But one of the main questions in the 
party’s economic policy remained the reform of the state. As we will see below, this was no 
longer formulated in terms of secessionist demands, but had been translated into a demand for 
a devolution system, giving the regions more decisional and fiscal autonomy in fields such as 
the school and the healthcare system.  
At the regional elections of April 2000, the Northern League decided to rejoin the cen-
tre-right coalition. Umberto Bossi (2000) explained this decision as follows: 
 
In 1994 the agreement between us [the Northern League] and Berlusconi was improvised and 
there was no precise political programme. Today everything has been planned in detail. There is 
a project in which also the deadlines have been precisely scheduled. The agreement is not based 
on convenience but aims to change the country. 
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At the same time, Bossi criticised the centre-left coalition for its ‘conservatism’ in relation to 
the federalist reform of the state and in particular for the pro-immigrant position which, ac-
cording to Bossi, supported a multiracial and ‘mondialist’ vision of the world, which was in 
direct contrast with the Northern League’s positions.  
At the 2000 regional election, the centre-right coaliti n together with the Northern 
League made a comeback in several northern regional constituencies, implying an electoral 
decline for the centre-left. Following the bad electoral results, Prime Minister Massimo 
D’Alema decided to resign and was followed by Giuliano Amato, who led the country until 
May 2001, when new parliamentary elections were held. In 2001, the Northern League was in 
office for the second time; again as part of the centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi.  
 
6.1.6 The Northern League in government again (2001-2006) 
At the parliamentary election of May 2001 the support t  the Northern League showed a de-
cline also in the party traditional Northern Italian strongholds, where the electoral support 
used to be strongest.66 At the national level the party went from about 10 pct. of the votes to 
only 3.9 pct. (cf. Table 1.4, Chapter 1). Umberto Bssi (quoted in Cronistoria della Lega, 
2001) commented on the result observing that: 
 
Was there perhaps another way? If we run alone we would certainly get more votes, but it was 
like putting them in the refrigerator [li avremmo lasciati in frigorifero]! Either we could get 
more and change nothing or get little and make a difference! (…) We have paid too much, but 
we hope that this sacrifice has not been in vain.   
 
The Northern League came to parliament with a weaker electoral mandate and fewer deputies 
than in 1996. However, the 2001 elections gave the party relevant political influence due to 
the electoral law rewarding the parties in the winning coalition. The Northern League 
achieved three important ministerial posts: the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Social Ser-
vices and the newly established Ministry for the Institutional Reforms and Devolution, which 
had to implement the federalist reform of the state and was assigned to the party leader Um-
berto Bossi. 
The government position again exposed the party to the risks of entering office and 
gaining government responsibility and political influence. As discussed above, this experience 
had failed in 1994. Experience showed that it was easier for the party to emphasize its role of 
political alternative to the establishment while in opposition. This seemed to support the in-
terpretation that the process of normalization coming with government responsibility can turn 
the radical right party’s strength in opposition into disadvantages when the party gets into 
office (see Heinisch 2003). Therefore, the Northern League’s attempt to regain power with the 
                                                
66 In the North-West the Northern League went from 21.8 pct. of the votes in 1996 to 9.5 pct. in 2001. In the 
North-East from 26.2 pct. in 1996 to 9 pct. in 2001.  
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centre right coalition ‘required striking a difficult balance between being a party of govern-
ment and a movement of opposition’ (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2005: 953).  
The Northern League had to retain and strengthen th core support of the Northern pro-
vincial heartland, and at the same time appeal to the voters who had left the party to join 
Forza Italia in the 1990s. The strategy was first of all to consolidate its position by showing 
that the party was a reliable political actor. This was particularly important if it wanted to 
reach the more moderate and pragmatic electorate th s ill remembered its betrayal in 1994. 
To reassure these segments, the Northern League sign d before the elections an official 
agreement with Berlusconi promising a rapid approval f the federalist reform in return for 
enduring and solid support from the party to the coaliti n. 
The second time in government, the Northern League was undoubtedly the most faithful 
partner in the coalition. The party moderated its critique against the other partners in the coali-
tion, in particular Alleanza Nazionale. This moderation became evident also in the way the 
party referred to Silvio Berlusconi; from being portrayed as the bad guy using his position to 
safeguard his economic interests, he turned into the self-made man that could guarantee the 
necessary structural reforms of the state, giving re ions more autonomy from the centre. 
Devolution, rather than fiscal federalism became a frequent buzzword in the Northern League 
leadership to indicate the priority of the party on economic matters.  
While in government, the party participated actively in the decision making process. A 
new immigration law, Law no. 189, was rapidly approved already in July 2002, better known 
as the Bossi and Fini law, which introduced stricte rules on immigration and harsher meas-
ures against irregular and illegal immigration. In the same period, the equation between terror-
ism, Islam and immigration became one of the central themes in the party’s public discourses, 
showing a similarity with the development of the politics in several other radical right parties 
in Western Europe.  
9/11 made the anti-immigration issue even more pertinen  in terms of national security 
and anti-Islamic positions, emphasizing the dangers that immigration, particularly from Mus-
lim countries, represented for the national identity and the survival of the West. Several 
scholars agree that the Northern League was becoming ore radical, appearing even more ‘in 
a league of its own’ (cf. Albertazzi & Mc Donnell 2003). Particularly on cultural and value 
issues the party went through a process of radicalization, becoming increasingly sceptical not 
just of immigration and its cultural and social impact on the Italian society, but also on issues 
such as abortion, homosexuality and religious freedom.  
In this (new) phase of government responsibility, the Northern League definitively 
abandoned the secessionist project, focussing on the reform of the state in the direction of 
more legislative, economic and administrative power to the regions. In 2001, the parliament 
approved a constitutional reform that gave the individual regions more legislative power. In 
2005 the government followed up, presenting to the parliament a bill with a vast plan of re-
form that would ensure the regions full control in the health sector, in education and in mat-
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ters of public order and security. The bill included a reform of the functions and number of 
members in the Deputy Chamber and Senate, the empowerment of the role and position of the 
Prime Minister and a general redefinition of appointment and functions of organs such as the 
Constitutional Court and of the High Court. The bill gave rise to an intense parliamentary and 
public debate. When it was approved in parliament, the opposition together with other actors 
attained the numbers and conditions for a popular referendum, which was held in June 2005. 
About 62 pct. of the voters rejected the reforms. The regions Lombardy and Veneto voted yes, 
showing once more the electoral closeness of these areas to the economic policy promoted by 
the Northern League.  
As we will see, the Northern League has maintained direct continuity with the past con-
cerning the neo-liberal orientation on economic matters. The demands for lower taxes, less 
government involvement in the economy, a more effici nt public administration and better 
conditions for the small and medium entrepreneurs remained on the agenda. In this respect, 
the position of the Northern League on economic issue  matched the support that the party 
continued to get from the self-employed (see Chapter 8 and 9). Unlike the Danish People’s 
Party and the Austrian Freedom Party, the Northern L ague has not (or at least not yet) be-
come a clear cut working class party, although an increasing number of manual workers has 
started to vote for the party. Nonetheless, significant electoral support still comes from the 
medium and small entrepreneurs, clearly influencing the party’s overall position on econom-
ics. An analysis of the position of the Northern League voters on relevant economic issues 
indicates that the voters have a clear neo-liberal o ientation on several economic issues. 
Northern League voters want less government intervention in the economy, privatization of 
the healthcare system and more freedom for firms to hire and fire workers. This positioning is 
very close to and at times even more neo-liberal thn t e declared liberal position of Forza 
Italia. 
In the years in government (2001-2006), the Northern League also distinguished itself 
on its foreign policy and relations to the EU. It radically changed position from a pro-EU ap-
proach, which characterised the party until at least 1997, to EU scepticism distinguishing the 
present approach of the party on the EU integration politics (see below).  
 
6.2 NEO-LIBERALISM AND TAXES 
6.2.1 Neo-liberal politics, federalism and taxes 
During the 1990s, the Northern League developed a federalist project that essentially replaced 
the demands for regional autonomy advanced in the years when the ‘many’ different leagues 
still were mainly a regionalist phenomenon sharing o ly few political and programmatic in-
terests. The decision to launch the Northern League in the early 1990s suggested finding a 
broader frame to the party’s socioeconomic demands.  
In the 1990s, the Northern League proposed a federalist development based on the defi-
nition of three macro-regions (North, Central and South Italy) which would become new 
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powerful and specialized productive centres and agencies for the collection and administration 
of the taxes.67 The party saw fiscal federalism as the only effectiv  solution to the centraliza-
tion of the economic and political power in the hands of a clientelist and corrupt political es-
tablishment. It was also expected to help solve the problem of the unjustifiable costs of the 
public administration and the increasing public deficit that was putting Italy’s entrance in the 
Euro area at risk.  
A macro-regional agency was therefore to be placed t the top of a so-called five-stream 
system, taking care of the economic balance between income and expenditure. This solution 
would allocate a quota to finance spending for the Federal State, the European Union and to 
social and welfare costs such as pensions, contributions to the local municipalities in eco-
nomic need and the payment of the public debt (cf. Lega Nord 1994).  
The fiscal federalism represented the Northern Leagu ’s ‘Trojan horse’ on socioeco-
nomic matters. Opposite pairs such as efficient/ineffici nt, rigid/flexible; complicated/mini-
mal; expensive/cost-effective were often used in the 1994 and 1996 policy agendas, to make 
clear the difference between the bureaucratic and centralized nation state controlled by the 
political establishment versus the well-functioning and productive solution represented by the 
macro-regional federalism proposed by the Northern L ague.  
The federalist solution was a key element in a broader context of socioeconomic politics 
in which a neo-liberal orientation prevailed. The aim of the Northern League was clearly to 
create a lean state characterized by less bureaucracy and more efficiency. The party suggested 
‘more market and less State’, also to solve a number of national economic problems, first of 
all unemployment. Privatization of state owned enterprises and agencies and closure of the 
unproductive ones were to be considered in the same framework. Other measures included a 
general simplification of the legislation and of the bureaucracy, lower income taxes (a ceiling 
of 30 pct. on income taxes and 25 pct. on enterprises), economic and legislative measures 
helping in particular the small and medium-scale enterprises.  
The medium and small scale firms were the backbone of the Italian economic upturn in 
the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in the northwest and north east, which just at the turn of the 
century and until the beginning of the 1970s were hit by economic decline and high rates of 
emigration. It was in the same regions (Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia) that the 
development of small firms responded to the economic crisis of the large scale industries that 
came in the late 1970s and 1980s. The crisis of the industrial sector was largely the result of 
the development of the global market and increasing international competition, which forced 
                                                
67 Gianfranco Miglio became the inspiring scholar and intellectual behind the federalist position of theNorthern 
League. Miglio, who was elected to the Senate as independent in 1990 on the Lombardy League-Northern 
League list, was one of the most important intellectuals in the party promoting the federalist project. According 
to Miglio, also European politics had to change from a Europe of the national states into a Europe of the regions. 
Miglio left the Northern League in 1994, in protest of the leadership’s approach to the federalist cause (cf. Mig-
lio 1994).  
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companies to decentralize their production and rely increasingly on subcontracting and cheap 
labour in the developing economies of Eastern Europe and in South Eastern Asia. 
Medium and small scale firms had emerged and flourished in this rapidly changing so-
cial and economic context, having flexible structures that could be easily adjusted to market 
conditions and changing consumer patterns. Previously unknown geographical areas of the 
North and Central Italy became specialized industrial d stricts producing and exporting na-
tionally and internationally. Often territorially delimited and clustered by sector, these dis-
tricts facilitated the creation of forms of identity and belonging that often had as a common 
denominator involvement in the same local and working community and a Protestant work 
ethic. These communities and in particular their unts, represented by the small and medium – 
particularly family driven – enterprises started to represent in the rhetoric and politics of the 
Northern League the place of the fundamental values characterising the Padanian people: ‘in-
dustriousness, initiative, obstinacy, straightforwardness and the ability to face the challenges 
of globalization without losing touch with the local roots’68 (Biorcio 1997: 176). 
Until the mid 1990s, small entrepreneurs, artisans, self-employed and manual workers 
were overrepresented in the electorate of the Northern League (see Diamanti 1993, see also 
here chapter 8). This partly explains the attention he Northern League programmes of those 
years dedicated to policies aimed at helping the small and medium enterprises in a situation of 
increasing globalization and de-industrialization of the advanced capitalist countries. For the 
Northern League, big business and big capital threaened the interests of the local communi-
ties and their identity, primarily because these forces are considered to promote a multieth-
nic/multiracial society in favour of the private profit and the economic interests of the few. As 
underlined by Bossi (1996: 35): 
 
Compared to the small and medium companies and to the arts and craft which are the only real 
carrying structures of the ‘Made in Italy’ today, we have to recognise that big capital has squan-
dered, through major political compromises, the largest economic resources, keeping the small 
and medium companies on short rations (…) and the small and medium companies are the major 
predestined victims of the unsuccessful financial politics of this political regime. 
   
In the late 1990s, the Northern League saw national economic and financial processes and 
dynamics in the broader framework of globalization/mondialization. For the party these words 
indicated the development of a society, where the rul s of the market forces and the laws of 
profit defeated the interests of the community and the nation. The worst possible example in 
the documents of the Northern League, at least up to 2001, was represented by the United 
States, a model of the conflictualities and differences of a multicultural and multiethnic ex-
periment. This had been then further worsened by the damages produced by what the North-
ern League called the ‘McDonaldization’ of American society.  
                                                
68 It is interesting that some of the same values are today underlined by the Danish People’s Party in relation to 
Danish society (see Chapter 5).  
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Another important issue on the agenda of the Lombard League in the 1980s and 1990s 
was taxes. Because of the higher productivity and affluence of Northern Italy in relation to the 
South, the party claimed that ‘the outcome of the work and taxes of the Lombards should be 
controlled and disposed by the Lombards’ and not used to finance the unproductivity of the 
South and the public deficit created by the political establishment. The status of the Italian 
North as ‘producer’ was put in contrast with the ‘dpendent and unproductive’ South. A party 
manifesto illustrated this by portraying the Lombardy egion as a hen laying golden eggs for a 
fat matron that represented the government in Rome.   
In the past, the Northern League also triggered tax protest actions; the party electorate 
was referred to in the 1990s as the ‘people of the fiscal protest’. However, as Biorcio (1997) 
has observed, the tax protest issue was used by the party more as a vote maximising strategy, 
rather than as an instrument to obtain concrete results. The party has maintained tax protest on 
the agenda because of its continued appeal to some egments of the society, particularly in the 
North and among the medium and small private entrepreneurs and the self-employed. As we 
will see in Chapter 8, it is still among these groups that the Northern League receives its elec-
toral support.    
 
6.3 ANTI-IMMIGRATION 
The emergence of anti-immigration in the League’s ideology can be dated back to the late 
1980s. There is no direct reference to immigration in the early manifestoes of the Lombard 
League. However, in the second half of the 1980s an increasing number of migrants began to 
arrive in the country, particularly from North Africa and Albania. In Lombardy, the number of 
immigrants went from about 50,000 in 1986 to about 160,000 in 1990. Today the region still 
has a high percentage of immigrants. The rapid increase of the immigrant presence in the re-
gion fuelled anti-immigration grievances among the population, which the Lombard League 
was prompt to take up and which the Northern League since developed.  
The discourse about non-EU and non-Western immigrants (immigrati extracomunitari) 
developed around three main themes (cf. also Biorcio 1997: 150): 1) the economic and social 
costs of immigration (housing problems, uncertainties in the labour market, criminality, social 
benefits and so forth); 2) the need to defend the enic and cultural identity against people of 
non-western origins; and 3) the attack against the political, economic and religious establish-
ment via support to the development of a multicultural and multiethnic society.  
Particularly at the beginning, the anti-immigration rhetoric used argumentations similar to 
those employed by the Lombard League to explain whythe party was against the arrival of 
Italians from the South; both were considered to take houses and jobs from the local 
Lombards, to burden the economy and to represent a foreign element to the ethnic and cul-
tural identity of the host community. Therefore, slogans like ‘Lombardy for Lombards!’ were 
in those years addressed both to Southern Italians and to migrants in general.  
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Later in the 1990s, anti- question became one of the Northern League’s central issues, 
whereas its position on internal migration from theSouthern regions gradually lost impor-
tance and remained on the party agenda only in terms of a general critique of public spending 
in the Italian South and against the region’s difficulties starting a process of development and 
productivity, that the party considered favoured by a complacent political establishment.   
Starting with the approval of the so called Martelli Law69 (Law 39/1990) on immigration in 
1990, the Lombard League first and the Northern Leagu  afterwards strongly criticised the 
immigration policy enacted by different Italian governments in those years, accusing them of 
allowing an unrestricted immigration flow and trying to create a multiracial and multicultural 
society. In 1998, a new immigration law, the Turco-Napolitano Law (Law 40/1998), met 
equal opposition from the Northern League. In 2002 the Northern League, in government with 
the centre-right coalition, approved the Bossi-Fini Law (Law 189/2002), which tightened the 
rules and terms of immigration to the country significantly. 
In recent years, the Northern League has increasingly focussed on cultural and value 
questions in relation to immigration. Immigration is not only considered in terms of the eco-
nomic and social costs and problems of increased crime and prostitution, but has also acquired 
a cultural and value perspective, which particularly in relation to Islam underlines the difficul-
ties – if not impossible attempt – to combine its principles and values with those characteris-
ing the Christian and Western societies. The different stages of development of the anti-
immigration question in the politics of the Northern League will be traced below.  
 
6.3.1 From the Southern question to anti-immigration in the politics of the League 
The Lombard League was in the late 1980s very negative towards the government’s immigra-
tion policy, and in particular towards the impact of immigrants of non-Western and non-
European origin on society as a whole, but particularly in Lombardy. This position was often 
expressed by emphasising the massive economic and social costs of immigration on the local 
communities, but also the fact that the newcomers were carriers of a foreign way of life, con-
trasting with what the League considered the honest and civic values characterising the socie-
ties of the North.  
Because of these positions, the League early on had to reply to charges of racism and in-
tolerance from the political establishment and from parts of the public opinion and the mass 
media (cf. Bossi & Vimercati 1992: 141-150; 1998: 11-18). The party has always rejected 
these charges and according to Umberto Bossi, ‘if there is a concept which is radically alien to 
the Padanian people and particularly to the politics of the League, this is racism’ (Bossi & 
Vimercati 1998: 13).  
                                                
69 It is common in Italy to give a law the surname of the Minister or Ministers who contributed to design t and 
make it approved. The member of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) Claudio Martelli was vicepresident i the 
Chamber of Deputies in 1989 and later Minister of Justice.  
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In the League’s official documents there is no space for explanations based on racial or bio-
logical differences. Rather, the Northern League emphasises, besides the concrete economic 
impact and the problems of law and order coming with immigration, aspects of cultural and 
value differences (cf. also Biorcio 1997). These have lso acquired increasing attention in the 
party ideology across the years. Particularly since the late 1990s, the Northern League has 
approached the positions developed and expressed by the Western European radical right. 
As mentioned, the Lombard League was primarily concer ed about the costs of immi-
gration in terms of social benefits, housing and law and order. It was a situation that the mem-
bers of the Lombard League considered damaging in particular for the native Lombards, 
whose needs always ended up at the bottom of the list. The discourse referred to non-
European immigrants as well as Italians from the South who had moved up North already in 
the late 1960s and 1970s, when the rapid industrialization demanded labour.  
Within this perspective, internal migration and immigration from other countries was 
initially mainly considered a socioeconomic problem for the regions of the North. The League 
made little distinction between the Southern Italians nd non-European immigrants. The main 
concern those years was what the party interpreted as unfair bypassing of the local population 
in favour of foreigners that was accomplished by the state, which preferred the latter in the 
allocation of benefits, employment in the public sector and housing. The party paper 
Lombardia Autonomista published articles entitled ‘A homeless is worth less than an immi-
grant’ (Lombardia Autonomista 1982), or ‘Colonial school, enough!’, which attacked what 
the party considered the diffuse practice of employing Southern Italians in the public sector in 
the North, instead of Northern natives (Lombardia Autonomista 1996). 
In the first programme of the Lombard League dated 1983, stronger regional autonomy 
in a federal state form was among the first issues m ntioned, immediately followed by the 
need to strengthen and defend the Lombard ‘culture, history and language’ and the common 
‘social and moral values’ against every threat to the Lombard ‘national identity’ (Lega 
Lombarda, Programma 1983). The party demanded concrete measures, for example that ‘the 
Lombards must be given priority when looking for jobs, housing, care and social benefits’ as 
well as in ‘the public administration and in the schools’. These statements introduced a posi-
tion that would be later fully exploited by the Northern League and which dealt with what the 
party considered the less deserving groups in society. For the Northern League, Southern Ital-
ians as well as immigrants from the developing world were unjustly favoured in the allocation 
of social benefits, houses and public employments. According to the party, ‘Lombardy’ was 
‘no longer for the Lombards’ and ‘la Padania’  70 no longer belonged to the ‘Padanian people’ 
                                                
70 In a geographical sense, Padania refers to the vall y of the Po river in Northern Italy. The term is rarely used, 
as the terms pianura Padana or Val Padana are preferred in geography textbooks and atlases. In politics it was 
introduced by the League.  
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(Lombardia Autonomista, 1982). This should be enough for the people of Lombardy to react 
against the situation independently from any ideological and political belief. As a pamphlet in 
the party paper Lombardia Autonomista (in Lombardia Autonomista 1982) directly encour-
aged: 
 
Lombards! It does not matter how old you are, what kind of job you have and what political ori-
entation: what matters is that you are – we are – all Lombards. This is the most important thing 
and time has come to recall this by giving it a political concreteness.  
 
The only way to safeguard the local and regional interests was to support a political actor with 
deep roots in the territory and in the community. This represented a first attempt to brush 
away differences based on social class and religion and to construct a political belonging 
based primarily on the ethnic community, the place nd the local identity. It was something 
that everybody could relate to, albeit with a different perception of how and to what extent. 
The Lombard League and later the Northern League wer able to put these feelings of belong-
ing into words and to strengthen them by insisting o  regional and local aspects that made 
people who were born and grew up in the same regional reality concretely feel more similar to 
each other and therefore more different from all those coming from outside. 
In this view, cultural difference was accepted as long as the differences were confined within 
their respective spaces and allowed only very limited forms of permanent exchange. As Bossi 
(Bossi & Vimercati 1998: 14-15) clearly put it: 
 
Make a note of this: I– like all the other leaguers [leghisti] who are worthy to be called this – 
am not capable of racial hatred. For me all men are equal, in the sense that they have equal dig-
nity. The blackest of the blacks has the same rights as my neighbour; but where he comes from. 
Among his rights is not to hinder our people to live as such, respecting our rules. It is not only 
an economic problem, here the point is to stop globalization and to avoid that everything be-
comes commodified and reified. Men are reduced to the same thing, homo oeconomicus, without 
soul and identity. With the alibi of racism the most unbearable things are allowed, as the right of 
peoples to defend their identity and the duty of other peoples to (…) be their own masters, but 
elsewhere, in their homes [padroni a casa propria]. 
 
Bossi’s words seem to resume the dual aspect of what at that stage was the party’s anti-
immigration position: from one side legitimated by the right to ‘cultural self-defence’, from 
the other explained by the need to avoid a situation as that of Italians who ‘after a life of 
work’ got ‘from the state an insignificant sum of money, while a Roma receives 1 million lire 
every month, that is double the amount of a minimum pension’ (Bossi 1998: 15).  
In the following years, the League became increasingly critical of the way the political 
establishment handled immigration policy. Particularly during the 1990s, the party – under the 
form of the Northern League – continued to frame th anti-immigration position within the 
context of increasing globalization and internationalization of the world, which produced 
mainly negative effects on the unity and identity of local communities. In the effort to save 
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them, the Northern League was against immigration and against what the party referred to as 
the ‘mondialisation’ of contemporary societies.  
 
6.3.2 The Northern League and anti-immigration in the 1990s 
As in several other Western European countries, immigration flows to Italy increased rapidly 
during the 1990s. In the attempt to deal with immigration and asylum, the parliament passed  
the first comprehensive law on the issue (Law no. 39/1990) with a huge majority in February 
1990. The Communist Party, then the main opposition party, also voted in favour, whereas the 
then Republican Party, AN and the Northern League vot d against. 
The 1990 Law, also called Legge Martelli, after then Vice President of the Council 
of Ministers, provided the first specific set of laws regulating the foreigners’ entry and perma-
nence in the country. The main purpose of the law was to limit the number of immigrants to 
Italy, augmenting the control and measures against tho e entering illegally. The law was also 
an attempt to bring Italy in line with other signatories of the EU Schengen Treaty, by giving 
immigrants who were already on Italian soil, but who had entered illegally, the opportunity to 
regularize their position in the country. The 1990 Law confirmed equal access to social rights, 
but little money was actually allocated to this aim in the national budget (see Zincone 2006: 
21). This was one of the reasons why the League was strongly against it.  
In 1990, Umberto Bossi, elected as only senator for the Lombard League, presented no 
less that 108 amendments to the law in an attempt to revent, or delay, approval of the law 
(cf. Biorcio 1997: 152). The Northern League argued that although the law was restrictive in 
some respects, it was still too soft on immigration, because it allowed undocumented workers 
in the country to be regularised and because it gave immigrants access to some of the same 
social and welfare rights accorded to Italian citizens (e.g. housing, health care and education). 
The party started a campaign against the law in Lombardia Autonomista to collect 50,000 
signatures to repeal the law, but the initiative failed.  
According to the League, it capital rather than the labour force had to move; non-EU 
citizens needed to be helped at home. A slogan of the League said: ‘To take the blacks into 
our country is a form of slavery’. As later explained in the 1994 Northern League programme: 
‘the word solidarity in reality covered a massive introduction of labour quotas on the market 
that applied a form of “inverted colonialism” in favour of a few and with relevant social costs 
to be paid by the society’ (Lega Nord, Lavoro ed immigrazione extracomunitaria, 1994: 14). 
The Northern League suggested stopping the immigration flow and eventually to introduce 
quotas of needed labour to be let into the country (Bossi 1998: 145-146): 
 
Immigration in Italy is today a completely independt variable in relation to the productive sys-
tem. The League’s proposals aim to reconstruct this link. How? It s simple: applying new and 
much stricter rules than those suggested in the Martelli law (…) Those asking to come into the 
country to work will not be let in if they cannot exhibit a signed contract issued by the entrepre-
neur that wants to employ them. 
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The Northern League could in fact not ignore that some industrial sectors in the country and 
particularly in the affluent industrial districts in the North needed labour and that this demand 
could not be satisfied without immigrant labour. This implied that segments of the Northern 
League electoral base, consisting of small and medium private entrepreneurs and self-
employed were becoming more positive on immigration.  
The party found a way to answer these needs by supporting an immigration model that 
opened up to severely controlled quotas of immigrant l bour. An immigrant’s entry into the 
country for working reasons would be regulated by a previous contractual agreement between 
employer and employee (cf. Bossi & Vimercati 1992: 146). Any other form of immigration 
(for instance for tourist reasons or family visits) had to be severely regulated and controlled 
by the Italian authorities.    
By the end of 1995, a new Decree Law (cf. Decreto lgge nr. 489 1995), also known as 
the Dini decree, regulated the legal status of immigrants in Italy. It was approved under the 
transitional and ‘technical’ government created after the fall of the first Berlusconi govern-
ment (1994-1995). The Decree did not repeal, but considerably amended the previous law and 
contributed to further regulation of the immigration flows particularly on matters concerning 
the employment of seasonal workers. But the decree law also extended access to most public 
health services to illegal immigrants and access for their children to the school system.   
This decree law was reiterated several times in 1996 and followed by other temporary 
regulations in immigration (cf. ISMU 2005: 47). This until 1997, when the emergency situa-
tion required turning a decree into law regulating permanence and exclusion. The event was 
the second arrival of Albanians, who landed on the Adriatic coasts of Puglia and caused a 
major political crisis in the country. During the 1997 municipal elections one of the Northern 
League’s mottos was ‘one more vote [for the League], one less Albanian’ (Gold 2003: 126). 
The party also had a flyer reading: ‘No to the horde!’ and under this an image of a boat 
crowded with people.71 The aim was clearly to give the idea of a horde of immigrants coming 
into the country. Particularly in relation to the em rgency created by the Albanians coming to 
the Italian shores at the beginning of the 1990s, the Italian government had acted very ques-
tionably. The images of the immigrants gathered in a sports ground in the hottest summer 
days waiting for repatriation went around the world, and the Northern League took the chance 
to blame the government for the ‘inhuman treatment’ despite the discussions about solidarity 
(cf. Bossi & Vimercati 1992: 150).  
In 1998, a new law regulating immigration and the legal status of foreigners in Italy 
(Law nr 40/1998 also known as Turco-Napolitano Law) presented a unitary normative 
framework on immigration. The law was actually the first that was not directly conceived in a 
situation of internal emergency ‘in that it intended to treat immigration a permanent phe-
                                                
71 See the image at http://www.flickr.com/photos/leganordpadania/2266352019/in/set-72157603924891452 
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nomenon and to regulate the subject with a comprehensiv  act’ (Zincone 2006: 23). The need 
for clear legislation on immigration was felt by almost all actors in parliament, with the ex-
ception of the Northern League.  
The 1998 Law considered the immigrants legally present on Italian soil as potential citi-
zens and provided a number of social and civic rights to the immigrants living permanently in 
Italy. At the same time, the law introduced a number of repressive measures against illegal 
immigration; this also in view of the Italy’s entrance in the Schengen area. One of the most 
significant repressive measures introduced was the so-called ‘temporary detention centres’, 
where illegal immigrants without documents could be held (up to 30 days) for identification 
and possible repatriation.  
The Northern League (and the radical left-wing party Rifondazione and the Greens) was 
strongly against the law, which the party considere left-wing, favouring illegal immigration 
and crime. In particular, the party considered unacceptable that the immigrants gained access 
to some of the same social and civic rights that applied to Italian citizens (cf. Lega Nord, 
1999: 2-3 and Lega Nord Flash, March 1999). As in the past, the Northern League started a 
campaign at the beginning of 1999 to abrogate the text of the law. In May 1999 the party had 
already collected 700,000 signatures against the law, but the demand for a referendum was 
refused by the Constitutional Court.  
The party continued to criticize the government’s immigration regime, asserting that it 
did not reflect people’s demands on the issue. For the League this was the result of the agree-
ment between the political establishment and big capital, which had produced an ‘assembly 
line’ that ‘first attracts and facilitates the entrance of illegal immigrant in the country and 
then, through the amnesties, regularises them’ and this ‘against the will of the people that 
wants to be free and to be its own masters at home [padrone e libero a casa sua]’ (Bossi’s 
speech in Parliament, December 20, 2000).  
Quite significantly, one of the first measures realized by the newly established centre-
right government in 2001 was the formulation of a new law on immigration. The Bossi-Fini 
law (law n.189 2002) was approved already in 2002. In the same years, the Northern League 
started to put increasing emphasis on aspects related to culture, identity and difference when 
dealing with immigration and particularly with the impact of immigrants from Muslim coun-
tries. These aspects are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
6.3.3 The Bossi and Fini immigration law 
As mentioned, one of the first legislative initiatives taken by the centre-right government in 
2001 was the amendment of the Italian immigration law. As for most of the previous legisla-
tions on the matter, the Bossi-Fini Law sought to improve the migration flows and to contrast 
more effectively illegal immigration by means of a more restrictive system particularly in 
relation to the entries. Most of the conditions and rules introduced by the 2002 Law regarded 
the terms of entry of the immigrant labour force in the country, the conditions of permanence 
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and achievement of residence permit, family reunification and social integration. Relevant 
space was also given to control and measures against illegal immigration at the borders and to 
the norms concerning repatriation of illegal immigrants, had committed serious crimes, or lost 
their right to stay in the country.  
The initial purpose of the centre-right government was to tighten the conditions and 
terms of immigration significantly, but the coalition had to find a compromise with the more 
moderate and Catholic component. This meant that some f the most restrictive measures, 
such as the proposal to make illegal immigration a crime, did not pass. Furthermore, the Bossi 
and Fini Law did not encroach on any of the social rights achieved under the previous centre-
left reform not only for the documented, but also for the undocumented immigrants (cf. Zin-
cone 2006: 31).72 
Several of these regulations followed the direction on immigration policy from the 
European Council in Seville in 2003, indicating an intensification of the bilateral co-operation 
between European and African countries to fight illegal immigration (e.g. Libya). The 2002 
Law was criticized by humanitarian organizations because it allowed immediate expulsion of 
immigrants because of illegality or violation of some norms without right to appeal. Another 
aspect was the possibility to keep asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants in the so-
called identification centres, waiting for their identification and eventual expulsion in the so-
called temporary permanence centres, already created under the 1998 Law.  
The Bossi and Fini Law also introduced the contract of residence (contratto di sog-
giorno), according to which immigrants coming to work in the country had to have a previous 
agreement with the Italian employer, who guaranteed th  economic conditions and proper 
housing. Only with these guarantees can the immigrant apply for a permit to stay in the coun-
try for two years. Under legal working conditions the permit could then be renewed twice. 
Stricter measures were applied to family reunions and harsher punishments used against those 
abusing the rules. 
The framework of the 2002 Law was, as in the past, mainly to regulate immigration in 
relation to the labour market and to contain and fight illegal immigration. Contrary to the 
1998 Law, which considered immigrants as a permanent and potential part of the population 
and thus subject to duties and rights, the Bossi and Fi i Law went back to an idea of immigra-
tion as a flexible and temporary factor and to immigrants as guest workers rather than citi-
zens.  
In comparison to the immigration law approved in Denmark with the support of the 
Danish People’s Party the same year, the Italian Law dealt much less with questions of inte-
gration in society and for example with the question of naturalization. The conditions for 
                                                
72More recently, the Northern League has within the tird Berlusconi government (2008- ) introduced sever  
restrictions on some of the basic rights that undocumented immigrants and their children still were granted in 
Italy in spite of their irregular position, such as the right to basic medical assistance and education. These new 
measures were strongly criticised by the opposition, by NGOs and by most of the Catholic organisations in the 
country.  
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gaining Italian citizenship for non-EU members have lways been strict, as it is possible only 
after a minimum of ten years of permanence in the country.  
In 2006 the Northern League presented a bill introducing more rigid criteria of integra-
tion and loyalty to be entitled to Italian citizenship, asserting that ‘achieving Italian citizen-
ship is a bureaucratic procedure’, which ignores important aspects such as ‘linguistic skills, or 
knowledge of our traditions, habits, history and of our institutional system and of the basic 
rules of our society’. In this sense, according to the party: ‘achieving citizenship should be the 
conclusion of a process leading the foreigner to his perfect integration with the territory and 
citizens of the state where he has decided to live’(cf. Proposta di legge n. 1462, 2006). The 
party required tests of both Italian and the local language and of the history, culture and tradi-
tions and institutional system of the Italian Republic. These demands went clearly in the same 
direction as for example in Denmark, where the criteria of naturalization became increasingly 
dependent on the level of assimilation to the Danish society.  
The fact that the Northern League was not able to achieve significant results in this di-
rection was partly due to the disagreements with some f the Catholic components, which 
traditionally have a tolerant approach to immigration. But both centre left-wing and centre 
right-wing governments have until recently neglected these aspects, focussing on entry, per-
manence and work. In fact, the most important reform f the norms and conditions for achiev-
ing Italian citizenship still refer to a law approved in 1992 (cf. Legge n. 91 1992). Only a few 
additions were made over the years. Linguistic and integration tests are however likely to be 
introduced in the near future, particularly because of the increasing concern about integration 
of the Muslim minority in the country.  
 
6.3.4 Recent developments of the Northern League on the anti-immigration question 
As mentioned, for the Northern League immigration was not just a question of ‘costs and 
benefits’. Cultural differences seen in the perspectiv  of integrating and assimilating other 
non-Western/non-Christian cultures, other habits, tradi ions and values without losing the 
original ethnic, cultural and religious identity, were concerns that had entered at a very early 
stage in its ideology and discourse. For the League, the immigration regime supported by the 
governments previous to 2001 represented a way ‘the political establishment (partitocrazia) 
used to introduce’ in the country and ‘against the popular will’ ‘the multiracial society and all 
its contradictions’ (Lega Nord, Programma elettorale 1994). 
From the 1990s, the Northern League began to deal with and speak increasingly against 
multiculturalism and against the development of a multiethnic society. This interpretation was 
fully developed in the late 1990s in relation to harsh critique against the process of globaliza-
tion/mondialization, where the political establishment and big capital were considered the 
main actors behind the project for a multicultural and multiracial society. It was in those years 
that the ideology of the Northern League started to be influenced by the discourses and ideol-
ogy developed by the Nouvelle Droite in France during the 1970s and 1980s (cf. also Scaliati 
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2006: 62). This influence emerges quite clearly in a party pamphlet published in 1998 enti-
tled: ‘Padania, identity and multiracial societies’ (Enti Locali Padani Federali 1998). The 
document makes rather explicit the ‘differentialist view of the world’ of the Northern League 
(Enti Locali Padani Federali 1998: 14). The pamphlet a so presented a rather elaborate formu-
lation of what the party considered the direct consequences of globalization (often referred to 
as ‘mondialization’) on Western contemporary societies and the role played by politics and by 
multinational capital (in the text called the ‘immigrationist lobby’) to construct a multiethnic 
society on the ashes of the different cultural, ethnic and religious identities of the native peo-
ple and communities (Enti Locali Padani Federali 1998: 3): 
 
The so-called multiracial society is supported first of all by the alliance between the world fi-
nance and the left wing. This alliance is based on b th economic and ideological grounds. The 
global economy looks away from the people, the natio s and the state and interprets the world as 
one big market place where men and capital can be moved around following exclusively the 
logic of the profit. To accelerate the mondialization process the aim is the creation of a ‘global 
consumer’ with no relation to his past, origins and traditions, without any identity if not that 
given by the commercials of the moment. This is the figure concretely and ideally realized by 
the multiracial society as it is preached by the various Benettons and McDonalds.     
 
The document also took an explicit anti-American positi n, suggesting the existence of a con-
spiracy by the political establishment, and strong economic powers and the Church to lobby 
against the survival of the local, regional and national identities, traditions and cultures.  
Particularly in relation to the Church and the Catholic world, the position of the Northern 
League was very contradictory. Until the late 1990s, the Northern League had a very negative 
opinion of the Church, in particular the clergy at the Vatican, which was considered to repre-
sent positions that were directly in contrast with the rest of the Catholic word ‘outside’. On 
several occasions, the Northern League directly attacked the Pope and representatives of the 
Church, often on questions related to immigration, on which the party accused the Church of 
having ‘Catholic-Communist’ positions that were close to the left-wing multicultural and mul-
tiethnic ideal. Even so, this did not prevent the League from speaking in favour of the preser-
vation and defence of Christian and Catholic values, principally against the attacks coming 
from Islam.  
 
6.3.5 The Northern League on Islam  
The originally strident anti-clericalism of the League has softened in recent years. Today, the 
party describes Benedict XVI as a ‘strong and resolute Pope’ determined to defend Christian-
ity, ‘its values and millenarian tradition from Islamic fundamentalism’ (cf. Betz & Meret 
2009). This is also in line with the League’s anti-Islam position that developed particularly 
from the start of the 21st century.   
In 2000, the party leaflet Lega Nord Flash was entitled ‘Islam advances’; it was a warn-
ing that used France as an example of a European country under siege by a growing Muslim 
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community, where – according to the party – the process of Islamization of the French society 
was already visible (Lega Nord Flash November 2000: 2-3). In October 2001, the same publi-
cation was entitled ‘The difficult relationship with he Muslims’ and emphasised the lack of 
respect in most of the Muslim world for universal rights and intolerance against non-Muslims.  
In 2006, Northern League MP Federico Bricolo, declared it necessary ‘to close the doors 
to those coming from the Muslim countries’ as ‘with these [people] we must use the iron fist. 
The same that they use with us’ (Bricolo in La Padania 19-09-2006). The same year, in the 
aftermath of the social and political unrest created by the publication of the Mohammed car-
toons in a Danish broadsheet, the Northern League claimed that the party had in fact been the 
first political force to warn against the dangers of Islam for Western societies and that this had 
for a long time been ignored by the rest of the politica  establishment. 
As we have seen in the case of the Danish People’s Party, also the Northern League has 
always strongly opposed construction of new mosques on Italian soil. The party has on more 
than one occasion opposed municipal plans by supporting the local anti-mosque initiatives, or 
by organizing popular protests against it.  
In 2000, the municipal council of Lodi, a town in Lombardy, decided to allow construc-
tion of a mosque, and the reaction of the Northern League was immediate. The party sup-
ported a public demonstration against the project and started to collect signatures among the 
citizens, explaining that the Padanian soil should remain Christian and not become Muslim 
(La Repubblica 15-10-2000). As it will be explained below, the Northern League continued in 
the following years to develop this approach towards identity and value politics. In this sense, 
it is difficult not to see a common pattern with oter radical right parties in the rest of Europe.  
The Northern League organized a popular demonstration against the building of a 
mosque at Lodi, in which it was claimed that ‘the shadow of the minaret will never obscure 
one of our bell towers [campanili], therefore we say no to the mosque on the site fre ly given 
by the municipal administration’ (quoted in Il Corriere della Sera 26-09-2000). In reality, 
there was no plan to build a minaret. On the same occasion the party used ‘out of the ordi-
nary’ initiatives, for example the celebration of a C tholic mass on the site designated for the 
mosque and pouring pig urine to make the place unclea . Since then, the Northern League has 
actively and resolutely opposed any plan to construct a mosque on a public site by mobilizing 
the local community and at times by suggesting use of less ordinary measures and anti-
mosque protests. In Bologna in 2007, Roberto Caldero i, prominent member of the Northern 
League and at that time vice president of the Senate, suggested a ‘Pig-day against Islam’ 
against the construction of the mosque (cf. La Repubblica 13-09-2007). These methods cre-
ated some embarrassment at the top of the party leadership, but in reality these excesses had a 
great media impact and were in line with the populist style of the Northern League.  
Some of the Northern League’s legislative proposals were clearly a form of political 
mobilization against Islam. In 2002, for instance, the League introduced a proposal for man-
datory exhibition of the Christian cross ‘in all public buildings and public administrations of 
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the Italian Republic’ to remind all ‘dangerous and impudent Muslims that they are in a Chris-
tian country’ (La Repubblica 18-09-2002). In the same year, the party proposed introducing 
an explicit reference to the values and principles of Christianity in the European Constitution 
and later also to modify the Italian Constitution by adding a paragraph to the article on reli-
gious freedom asserting that ‘the Republic consider the Christian religious tradition its spiri-
tual foundation’. 
From 2000 and particularly after 2001, reference to the defence of Christian values and 
heritage became a central ideological feature in the value politics of the Northern League. At 
the practical level, the party advanced a number of bills where the importance of Christianity 
was emphasises, in particular in relation to its values and cultural differences from Islam.   
In 2008, the party presented a proposal to regulate the construction of mosques, consid-
ered a necessary step to solve the problem represented by ‘the presence of numerous religious 
communities that require at several levels the preservation of a specific cultural identity in 
contrast with ours’ (Proposta di legge n. 1246/2008). The demands included: 1) a distance of 
minimum 1 km between the new building and edifices b longing to other religious denomina-
tions; 2) a ban on using instruments to spread sound r messages in open public places (e.g. 
minarets); 3) the explicit acceptance of the democratic and secular bases of the Italian state by 
the religious leaders; 4) a clear identification of the parties financing the project. The building 
of a mosque was therefore not categorically denied, but it would be subject to regulation. In 
practice, however, as we have seen above, the partyranks were always opposed to the pro-
jects. 
In several ways, the League’s anti-Islam position fllowed some of the same develop-
ments characterising other radical right parties in Europe, most notably the Danish People’s 
Party. However, some differences can be noticed in the way the two parties have articulated 
this. The Northern League has continued to emphasise aspects of internal and international 
security in relation to immigration in general and more specifically illegal immigration from 
Muslim countries. The value and cultural aspect has also become one of the leading themes 
when the party deals with the question of Islam. Particularly after 2001, this is increasingly 
considered in relation to the Western Christian values, principles and traditions. Within this 
perspective, the emphasis has increasingly fallen on the significance of Christianity as a cul-
tural and value reference.  
The party’s decision to run with the centre-right coalition La Casa delle Libertà (CdL) 
again at the 2006 election and asking to introduce an xplicit political reference to the defence 
of the European Christian roots and the fight against every form of fundamentalism is signifi-
cant in this connection (cf. Lega Nord, Le richieste della lega nord Padania, 2006: 1). This 
was included in the coalition’s 2006 electoral programme, which was entitled ‘Values in pro-
gress’, in which the coalition parties expressed general commitment to the protection and 
preservation of the traditions, identities and liberty (CdL programma elettorale 2006: 8): 
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Only by preserving the values (…) we can safeguard our identity and enjoy our liberty. In this 
strategy, the national and federal state, being the sum of our shared values and site of our com-
mon destiny, exerts a fundamental subsidiary and rebalancing role between the past and the fu-
ture, between the inside and the outside. A role of defence of the Jewish and Christian roots of 
Europe against every form of fundamentalism. 
 
The attention to moral principles and ethical values has developed in the Northern League in 
direct relation to the Western Christian roots, rather than on politics emphasising basic liber-
tarian principles such as democracy, tolerance, gender equality as it is today more the case of 
the Danish People’s Party.  
 
6.4 Foreign policy and EU relations  
6.4.1 From pro-EU to Euroscepticism 
In the 1990s, the Northern League was among the most enthusiastic and pro-EU political par-
ties in Italy. Italians have traditionally been very positive about the process of European inte-
gration and the Northern League followed this enthusiasm for a while.  
The party used the EU as an example of efficiency against what it considered the highly 
centralized, bureaucratic and largely inefficient organization of the Italian public administra-
tion. The slogan ‘far away from Rome, but closer to Europe’ was used by the party to empha-
sise the political and cultural proximity of the Northern Italian regions to Europe and Brus-
sels, highlighting at the same time what the party considered the political, geographic and 
cultural distance from Rome and from the South. 
The interest of the Northern League in relation to European integration and development 
was essentially related to the economic aspects. The EU offered important support to the 
growth and improvement of the small and medium sizeindustries of the North, where a sig-
nificant part of the Northern League electoral support came from. Therefore, when in the mid-
1990s Italy risked to be left out of the European Monetary Union, because the country did not 
comply with the economic parameters decided in the Maastricht Treaty; the Northern League 
insisted it was important for the country to come in the EMU from the start. The 1994 elec-
toral programme underlined the need to implement the necessary reforms of the national 
economy to be able to rebalance the public debt and meet the Maastricht parameters. The pro-
gramme also underlined the importance of being part of a united Europe in an age of global-
ization and general international insecurity (Lega Nord 1994):   
 
[The Northern League says] a clear yes to the European Union, political and economic, as this is 
taking shape according to the Maastricht Treaty, signed by all EEC countries. This choice entails 
for the country a pro-European policy, coherent andcredible, driven by liberalism and federal-
ism and respectful of all the communitarian obligations. 
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According to the party a solution was to let the Northern regions join the EMU first, waiting 
for later admission of the ‘rest’ of Italy. The party expressed this hypothesis in the 1996 elec-
toral programme: 
 
Will Italy get in or stay outside the ‘hard core’ of the countries that will form Europe in the 
years to come? The question is central (...) We have to decide whether we want to tighten our 
belt and be efficient as our Northern neighbours – thus joining the locomotives of the European 
train – or whether we want to postpone the sacrifices to better times, and to future generations, 
going together with the Greeks, the Portuguese and the other wagons at the back. According to 
the League’s evaluations, the regions of the North taken together fulfill or are very close to ful-
filling the famous Maastrichts criteria (...) Nothing against being together with the Greeks and 
the Portuguese. But if we can join those who are considered more efficient, the ‘hard core’, why 
do we have to renounce? Most people in the regions of the North would prefer this (Lega Nord 
1996). 
 
The issue was used by the Northern League to emphasize the failure of the Italian government 
to work efficiently for the country’s interests and in particular for the North. With the promise 
of bringing Padania alone into the new forming Europe, the Northern League sought to 
strengthen popular support for Northern secession. This position became particularly evident 
in 1996, when the League – after a very brief parenthesis in government – was again a radical 
political force at the margins, asserting the need of the Northern regions to emancipate from 
the rest of Italy. In relation to the EU, the party s arted to emphasise the political project of a 
Europe of the peoples, able to contain and preserve the differences and the self-determination 
of the diverse ethnic groups.    
When the centre-left government led by Romano Prodi managed to get Italy into the 
European monetary area, the League started to shift posi ion on the EU. This opened up a 
phase of EU-scepticism that still characterises the Northern League (cf. Tarchi 2007: 191-
192). The party started to criticize the highly bureaucratic and centralized European super-
state.  
Over the years, the League’s position on the EU has become similar to that of the Dan-
ish People’s Party; EU is seen as a supranational org n limiting national freedom and auton-
omy. The difference is that for the Northern League, this is also related to the local and re-
gional realities and not only to the general national context. The Northern League has criti-
cized both the ratification of the Treaty of Nice and the enlargement to the Eastern European 
countries. The party has also attacked the work of the EU convention, considering the EU 
constitution a document that does not represent the values and principles on which European 
history and society is built. Even more interestingly, the party was among the fiercest advo-
cates for the introduction of a clear reference to the Christian roots into the text of the Euro-
pean constitution. This refers to a similar development of the Western European radical right, 
where immigration, particularly from Muslim countries, became one of the most concrete 
dangers to the survival of the Christian West, both in relation to culture and national security. 
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This was also why the Northern League opposed any attempt to ‘open the doors’ of Europe to 
Turkey.  
Being in government with a clear EU-sceptical positi n has not been easy for the party, 
as it has complicated its position on deciding and ratifying EU decisions. In reality, it proved 
much less problematic for the party’s credibility tha  one would expect. The party was able to 
follow a moderate and rather pragmatic position at the institutional level, fuelling the polem-
ics and critiques against EU in the press and through the rhetoric of its leaders (see also Tarchi 
2007: 195).  
In effect, going against the tide by continuing to emphasise an EU-critical position 
within a pro-European government, allowed the Northern League to maintain the necessary 
degree of differentiation from the other parties in the coalition. It was a strategy that helped 
(and still helps) the party maintain the image of a political force in opposition to the estab-
lishment, although it had government responsibilities. 
 
6.4.2 The League’s anti-Americanism of the 1990s and its position on NATO 
In the 1994 Northern League electoral programme, Italian membership of NATO is explained 
in terms of ‘the only military defence system of our continent’, which the European countries 
had to join at least until a new and effective European alternative would be created, as indi-
cated in the Maastricht Treaty (cf. Lega Nord 1994). In those years, the situation in the Bal-
kans had seriously deteriorated and the party asked for complete diplomatic and political iso-
lation of Serbia from the international community, warning against a direct intervention in the 
country.  
Support to the NATO alliance was endorsed also in the Northern League following the 
electoral programme in 1996 (cf. Lega Nord 1996). However, the deepening of the conflicts 
in the Balkans changed this perspective (see also Tarchi 2007: 193). The decision of the 
NATO forces to intervene in the Yugoslavian region of Kosovo was strongly condemned. 
Bossi declared that the struggle in Kosovo was betwe n the Christian Serbs, who tried to de-
fend their culture and values, and the Muslim Albanians, the vast majority of whom had ar-
rived as immigrants and now demanded independence and annexation into the Albanian state. 
In April 1999, Umberto Bossi was in Beograd to visit Slobodan Milosevic and he avowed that 
the Northern League was the only political force in opposition in a NATO country which sup-
ported a political diplomatic solution in response to the intervention of the NATO forces in 
the region (cf. La Repubblica 24-04-1999). This positi n seemed to contradict the position of 
the party, which had previously declared that it supported rights of self-determination and 
freedom of the diverse peoples. At the same time, the Northern League was focussing its poli-
tics of identity on a new target – the growing presence of Islam in Italy (see also Betz 2002). 
Just as other radical right parties in Europe, the logic was that what happened in Kosovo, 
could also happen in Europe (cf. Betz-Meret 2009).  
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The Northern League considered the NATO resolution in Kosovo a clear symptom of 
the political and social weakness of Europe in relation to the US hegemony. In an article to 
the party newspaper La Padania, Bossi declared that ‘we must stop the criminal project of the 
USA to destroy the UN’ adding that Europe had to say ‘no to the world empire’ (La Padania 
29-04-1999). According to Bossi, the reason the US strongly supported the NATO interven-
tion in the Balkans was to ‘show that the country was not against the Muslims after the [first] 
war in Iraq’ and that for this reason they decided to hit the shield of Christianity, Serbia’. 
In the late 1990s, the anti-US statements were in line with the party’s negative view of 
the international role of the US in relation to Europe. But the criticism was also directed at the 
American society at large, which for the party represented the negative result of globalization 
and multiculturalism. In a section of ‘Padania, identity and multiracial society’, entitled ‘Mul-
tiracial society and mondialism: the system to killthe peoples!’, the US is referred to as the 
‘ideal and practical model of reference of that kind of social design [the multiracial society] 
which on a daily basis sets of interracial conflicts, often ending in violent outbreaks, as during 
the riots in L.A.’73 
The League’s anti-American position changed after 9/11 (cf. Tarchi 2007: 194). The 
United States became the victim of Islamic terrorism and the symbol of the Western values of 
freedom, tolerance and liberty under the threat of Islamic terrorism. As for the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party, the equation between terrorism, Islamism and immigration became one of the 
central themes in the Northern League’s ideology and discourses.  
 
6.5 On traditional values: family, abortion and homsexuality 
In the politics of the Northern League the family has always played an important role. The 
family is referred to as the fundamental element in the Italian society, providing the society 
with the necessary cohesion and contributing both wi economic and social resources where 
the welfare system is lacking. 
Until the beginning of the 1990s, the Christian Democracy had ownership of the family 
‘issue’. The party safeguarded in particular the traditional and Catholic family. When the DC 
split up in 1994, family politics became a field where also other parties and in particular new 
formations like the Northern League and Forza Italia, could develop politics that appealed to 
this issue. It was also what the Northern League did in the 1990s, by promoting ‘politics in 
support of the family and the woman and referred also to the problems emerging from the 
dualism labour and family’ (Lega Nord 1994). Already in 1994, the party mentioned the fam-
ily not only for its important social function, but also as an antidote to the commodification 
and depersonalization of contemporary societies.  
However an interesting change took place in 2000-01, when the Northern League started 
to put increasing emphasis on Christian and Western values and traditions. Also in ‘family 
                                                
73 Padania, identity and multiracial societies, p. 13. 
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terms’, the target of the party’s family politics became almost synonymous with the ‘family 
unit’ consisting of a married couple and their children. The party started to consider alterna-
tive forms of relationships as detrimental, if not directly damaging to the efficiency and inter-
nal organization of a society. This position is clear y expressed in a party document for the 
2001 election, in which the League criticised the lack of social awareness and responsibility 
produced by the increasing focus in contemporary society on individual rights and needs 
rather than on social and collective forms of relationships and structures (Lega Nord, Elezioni 
2001. Ragionamenti per la campagna elettorale 2001): 
 
From the victory of the individualist positivist philosophy derives the present reality, consisting 
of new forms of co-existence that are different from the civic or religious traditional family: 
some say that these [new forms] are also expressions of love and reciprocal support and thus 
there is someone who thinks that they have the same ocial function as the traditional family; but 
if they want to be officially recognized and authorized they have to be judged on the basis of 
their social and civic value in relation to the common good and thus on: their social function; 
project; stability pact; fertility. 
 
Evidently the definition above excluded recognition of homosexual couples, because they are 
infertile. But also unmarried couples entailed greater social uncertainty and instability com-
pared to the conventional family (Lega Nord, Elezioni 2001: 7). In the politics of the League 
the traditional family has started to represents the ‘very heart of a civilization’ and ‘where the 
deepest core of our culture and traditions that make one with our collective identity, is pre-
served’ (Lega Nord 2001: 9). Thus the marriage and the family are considered institutions that 
have to be safeguarded as this is where the values nd traditions are produced and transmitted 
from one generation to another.  
Significantly in this sense, in the 2001 electoral agreement between the Northern League 
and the other parties of the centre-right coalition, among the family figures as the first of the 
four main pillars indicated by the parties; the others are economic development, devolution 
and reform of the state and immigration (CdL Patto Lega-Polo 2001). The family policies 
approved by the centre-right coalition in the period 2001-2006 were much more limited than 
the goals formulated by the Northern League during the electoral campaign. The finance acts 
approved by the centre-right government included funding to finance children’s day nurseries, 
introduction of tax reductions for families with children, establishment of a baby cheque of 
about 1,000 euro for every child born after 2005 in families with lower incomes (cf. Legge 
Finanziaria no 448/2002; Legge Finanziaria 266/2005). However, the achievements of most 
of the measures were limited and no real and long-term initiative was taken to promote and 
facilitate higher participation by mothers on the labour market and to improve maternity 
leave. 
In the second Berlusconi government (2001-2006) nothi g was done to give to unmar-
ried heterosexual couples the same rights as married couples. Particular opposition was then 
shown against rights for homosexual couples. When t centre-left government proposed in 
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2007 a law giving unmarried and homosexual couples some of the same rights recognized to 
married couples, the Northern League argued that the aim of the centre-left was in reality to 
‘destroy the family and destroy the glue of the local ommunities and our identity, also in 
relation to our Catholic roots and to destroy the heritage of values of our young generations’ 
(Lega Nord 2007). 
Also in recent years has the Northern League adopte a much more conformist position 
the family, homosexuality and abortion. The party has developed a very traditionalist profile 
that at times seems to be in conflict with some of the positions expressed in the past. In this 
respect, the Northern League has moved closer to the authoritarianism and conformism that 
some scholars consider characteristic of the radical right on value politics. There is also a dif-
ference between the politics recently developed by the Danish People’s Party and the North-
ern League. While the former party has tried to open its politics in the direction of more toler-
ant positions, for example towards gender equality, freedom of speech and homosexuality, the 
Northern League has chosen a more traditional pattern of political and ideological develop-
ment. In this sense, the emphasis is more on the Christian values, identity and traditions rather 
than on more secular and libertarian principles as in the case of the Danish People’s Party. 
This difference of emphasis can partly be explained by the higher level of secularization of 
the Danish society. The Danish People’s Party’s voters are very secularised (see here chapter 
8). In the Italian society, the process of secularization has not been as strong as in the Scandi-
navian countries, which means that segments of the Italian electorate still respond to positions 
that defend the Christian world against the dangers r presented by a growing Muslim com-
munity in their midst.  
   
Conclusions 
Until very recently the Northern League was only after careful explanations considered a 
party belonging to the radical right. The party was r ther considered more closely related to 
the European ethno-regionalist and independentist move ents, with whom the Northern 
League had several aspects in common, e.g. being politically and electorally anchored in the 
Italian North and its demands for greater fiscal and legislative autonomy to the regions in the 
North of the country. Furthermore, during the second half of the 1990s, the declarations and 
demands of self-government and independence of the ‘Padanian’ state from the rest of the 
country created more than a concern within the institutional Italy.  
These positions were thus considered very much at odds with the rhetoric and agenda of 
the radical right, which referred to national belonging, communal identity and culture as uni-
fying elements against the growing risks and insecurities provoked by immigration and by the 
rapid processes of transformation taking place in the contemporary societies.  
Even so, the Northern League shared also a number of ide logical similarities with the 
positions that in those years were already strongly emphasised by the radical right; one was 
anti-immigration and the other was the party’s contempt for the political establishment.   
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As shown in this chapter, the party has ideologically come closer to the positions of the other 
Western European radical right parties from the end of the 1990s. The Northern League is still 
a party whose electoral support comes largely (but now not any more exclusively) from the 
Northern Italian constituencies, particularly Lombardy and Veneto, but the party has in recent 
years strongly contained and de-radicalised its ethno-regionalist commitment and standpoints. 
This process went together with the decision taken at the end of the 1990s to opt for office 
seeking strategies. At that point the Northern Leagu  had reached a dead end, where the 
times’ conditions and political opportunities clearly showed that there were no concrete prem-
ises and no future in its radical plans to create a new state in the state by means of a ‘soft’ 
separation of the North. The party leadership therefore decided to make use of the votes by 
running for office again in the centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi despite its very 
limited success at government in 1994. Compared to the first time, the LN worked to build a 
profile of a trustworthy coalition partner, with clear political goals and a stable organisation.  
The responsibilities that came with being in office nfluenced the politics supported by 
the party. In the years that followed the 2001 election, the Northern League developed a much 
more domesticated form of fiscal and structural reform called devolution. At the same time 
the position of the party against both legal and illegal immigration became more explicit. In 
relation to this issue the Northern League emphasised aspects of security and law and order, 
criticising at the same time the immigration regimes of the previous governments, responsible 
for having opened the doors to the country. In 2002 the Northern League was one of the main 
architects behind the new Bossi-Fini immigration law (Law 189/2002), which significantly 
tightened the rules and terms of immigration and stay in the country.  
Through the years, the party also became increasingly e aged in identitary and cultural 
aspects in relation to immigration. Already in 2000, the Northern League had started to mobi-
lize against what the party considered the dangerous advance of Islam in the West. Every new 
project for the construction of a mosque was strongly and almost systematically opposed by 
the party. Similarly to other radical right parties n Europe, such as the Freedom Party in Aus-
tria, the Northern League explains Islam in a framework of an ‘antithetic other’, in which the 
self is defined as the Western European civilization, whose spiritual and value heritage is in 
Christianity. The reference to Christianity was one of the significant ideological turns of the 
party, which in the past had a clear anti-clerical and a secularized approach to religion. It was 
not the only ideological transformation of the party to indicate the adaptability and dynamic 
development of the ideology of this party.  
The Northern League was a party with a clear positive v ew about the European Union 
until the end of the 1990s when it changed position. Today the party is member of the Euro-
sceptical group, Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN), in the European Parliament.  
Less relevant changes have taken place in relation to the economic dimension. The 
Northern League has maintained a neo-liberal approach with populist and protectionist fea-
tures. A better and more efficient public administration reducing the costs of the public 
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budget, general cutbacks in public spending helped by the introduction of fiscal federalism 
and more space to the private initiative characterise the position of the Northern League on 
economics. It is in particular the interests of the small and medium enterprises that the North-
ern League has most at heart, which the present situation of economic crisis and increasing 
international competition has laid on the line. The party is much more critical when it comes 
to big business and big capital, considered the dominating economic monopolies that drain 
public money and threaten the interests of the local communities.  
Until recently the Northern League has thus mainly worked for and safeguarded the 
economic interests of those social groups that are most likely support the party. However, the 
recent developments indicate that the Northern Leagu  is now doing well also among other 
social groups, for example manual workers and quite remarkably in electoral constituencies 
that in the past traditionally voted for left-wing parties. It is therefore interesting to see how 
the party will in the near future appease the different and at times opposite interests of the 
electoral basis. This may have an impact on the party rofile in relation to economics, coming 
closer to more pro-welfare positions.  
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7. THE AUSTRIAN FREEDOM PARTY  
Introduction 
The electoral comeback of the FPÖ in the late 1980s and 1990s has always been closely re-
lated to its political and ideological course started in the mid-1980s under the leadership of 
Jörg Haider. This explains why most of the studies published on the party have focussed more 
on the political views and charisma of Jörg Haider than on the party’s ideology and electoral 
profile. It is not an exaggeration to say that until Haider’s exit from the party in 2005, the FPÖ 
was basically synonymous with him. This can also help to explain why, despite the plentiful 
studies that have been published on the FPÖ particul rly in the recent decade, there are so few 
scholarly works which engage in the analysis of the party ideological development, especially 
when looking at the literature in English. 
The aim of this chapter is to look at the way FPÖ’s ideology has developed over time 
and to consider similarities and differences in relation to the Danish People’s Party and the 
Northern League. The analysis of the party ideology is be based on some of the party’s offi-
cial programmes released from about the mid 1980s until about 2007.74 If the party pro-
grammes of the 1980s represent the transformation and new breakthrough of the Austrian 
Freedom Party, the 1990s correspond to the phase of consolidation and vote maximization 
under the leadership of Jörg Haider (cf. Luther 2001). In this phase the party prepared the 
ideological groundwork for the electoral success achieved at the parliamentary elections of 
October 1999, which paved the way into office in 2000 in a coalition with the ÖVP.  
In the years that followed the entrance in office, the FPÖ experienced an electoral de-
cline that was also the result of the party’s failure to manage effectively the achievement of 
government responsibility (cf. Luther 2007). In November 2002, at the new anticipated elec-
tions that were called after the crisis created by the resignation of a number of FPÖ ministers 
from their post, the electorate penalized the party, whose votes dropped to only 10 pct. Al-
though the party managed again to get into government with the ÖVP in 2003, internal dis-
agreements continued to characterise and divide the party from within and in 2005 Jörg 
Haider, together with the government team and the Kärnten provincial party organization, left 
the party and launched the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria, 
BZÖ).   
Released from government responsibility, the FPÖ sans Haider and under the new lead-
ership of Heinz-Christian Strache was able to recovr part of its electoral strength. In 2006 the 
party achieved 11 pct. of the votes (cf. Table 1.1 chap. 1), which was regarded as an overall 
positive result, considering the troubled years the party had gone through before the election. 
In this period, the ideology and position of the FPÖ went towards a phase of renewed radicali-
sation, particularly in relation to immigration and EU integration policy. Welfare, security and 
opposition to immigrants ranked high on the party’s agenda. At the election of 2008, the party 
                                                
74 However, the text also indicates that the aim in the 2008 election was to follow up, where possible, with up-
dates that refer to the most recent developments of the party.  
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achieved over 17 pct. of the votes, showing greater electoral appeal in opposition than in of-
fice (cf. Luther 2007).   
 
7.1 Historical overview and electoral development  
7.1.1 The FPÖ from the origins to 1999 
The origins of the FPÖ date back to the 1950s. In 1949 the League of Independents (Verband 
der Unabhängigen, VdU) was founded with the aim of building a national-liberal political 
alternative to the duopoly represented by the other two camps (or Lager) represented by the 
ÖVP or the SPÖ.  
The politics of cooperation and consensus between th  two parties and among the labour 
market parties (employers and trade unions) became a characteristic of the Austrian model, 
providing the country with economic stability, labour market flexibility and social partner-
ship.  
At the 1949 elections the VdU got 12 pct. of the votes, which peaked at 20 pct. in some 
of the Western zones of occupation (cf. Hubert 2000: 46). Between one-third and one-half of 
the VdU members had a Nazi past and one of the party demands at that time was the lifting of 
wartime restrictions and the end to the penal laws gainst former Nazis. In the following years 
the party electoral support fell consistently and striving for survival it was transformed into 
the FPÖ (Höbelt 2003: 10; see also Sully 1997). For decades the newly formed FPÖ did not 
manage to get more than 8 pct. of the votes at the national level, with strongholds in the 
Western and Southern parts of the country. In the same period, the leader of the FPÖ, Frie-
drich Peter, tried to anchor the party to the democratic party system, preparing it for participa-
tion in a coalition government in 1983.  
Under the leadership of Norbert Steiger (1980-1986), the FPÖ launched an office seek-
ing course. The party thus adopted a more moderate and less confrontational approach and 
emphasised anti-establishment politics and liberal and free market positions. From 1983 to 
1986 the FPÖ was in government in a small coalition with the SPÖ. In the same years, two 
new small environmental parties ran for parliament a d in 1986 they got in, reaching just 
above the Austrian electoral threshold of 3 pct.   
Steiger’s liberal political course gave the FPÖ a position in government, but this did not 
save the party from electoral decline. For about two decades, the FPÖ had in fact never man-
aged to get over 5-6 pct. of the votes at the natiol level. The electoral crisis was therefore 
from many sides considered a consequence of the govrnment seeking and liberalist political 
reposition attempted by Steiger, which had diluted the party identity as a political alternative 
to the establishment. In 1986, Jörg Haider became party leader, helped by the faction within 
the party that had become increasingly critical on Steger and had laid the groundwork for his 
defeat at the FPÖ congress that same year (see Höbelt 2003 42-47). For some Austrian schol-
ars (cf. Bailer-Galanda & Neugebauer 1996: 6), this represented a significant milestone in the 
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further development of the so-called Pan-Germanic political position, the idea of a German 
reunited community of one people and one culture.  
At the anticipated elections of November 1986, the FPÖ under the new party leadership 
doubled its electoral result, gaining 9.7 pct. of the votes (see Table 1.1, chapter 1). At the fol-
lowing election the FPÖ moved definitely away from the liberal and office seeking position 
and started to run on immigration grievances, becoming also increasingly critical against the 
political establishment and against the EU. The newpolitical course was not appreciated by 
the political establishment, which used politics of c ntainment to keep the FPÖ at the margins 
of Austrian politics and without relevant political influence.  
 
7.1.2 FPÖ’s years in government (2000-2005)  
The 1999 election changed dramatically the configuration of Austrian politics. For the first 
time, the ÖVP agreed to form a government coalition with the FPÖ. Due to the internal and 
international critique of FPÖ’s participation in government, Wolfang Schüssel (ÖVP) became 
federal chancellor, while Jörg Haider declined any position within the newly formed govern-
ment. However, the FPÖ achieved two important ministerial positions, finance and social af-
fairs. But the challenges of being in office soon undermined the party’s internal stability and 
electoral support. As well described by Luther (Luther 2007: 8) 
 
The party’s strategy in the governmental arena was undermined by weaknesses in its ministerial 
team, programmatic contradictions, the need to support some neo-liberal ÖVP reforms unpopu-
lar with blue collar voters (…) persuading the voters that a party that had since 1986 pursued 
aggressive structural oppositions was now a reliable steward of the nation’s affairs was always 
going to be a struggle. Moreover, the party had difficulty affecting the transition from a well-
oiled electoral machine to a communicator of the government’s policy and alleged achieve-
ments. 
 
The peak of unpopularity was reached when the ÖVP-FPÖ government decided to postpone 
the tax reforms in the summer 2002, while the parties were working on an agreement for pur-
chasing new interceptor jets. Furthermore, internal conflicts in the FPÖ about its strategy in 
office had seriously divided the party leadership, particularly between the members of the 
party in government and Jörg Haider with the party g assroots. The situation became critical 
and finally some of the FPÖ’s prominent ministers re igned,75 which led to new parliamentary 
elections in November 2002.  
During the electoral campaign the Freedom Party remained deeply split and was unable 
to organize an effective political strategy. Within less than two months, the party changed five 
party leaders five times. In the 2002 election, FPÖ’s support dropped to only 10 pct. Most of 
                                                
75 Especially the resignation of the party leader, Susanne Riess-Passer, appointed in 2000 by Jörg Haider, nd 
Finance Minister Karl-Heinz Grasser provoked turmoil in the parliamentary group.  
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its voters went over to the ÖVP (see SORA 2002),76 which was the party that most strongly 
benefitted from the FPÖ internal crisis. The ÖVP became the largest party in Austria with 42 
pct. of the votes and 79 parliamentary seats, a total gain of 15.4 pct. points and 27 seats – the 
largest gain for an Austrian party in the post-war pe iod. The SPÖ made only moderate gains 
and achieved 36 pct. of the votes, losing its statu of largest parliamentary force in the coun-
try.  
Despite the poor electoral result, the FPÖ decided to enter coalition negotiations with 
the ÖVP. This decision meant giving away most of the demands advanced by the party ‘re-
bels’ under the previous government and it was criticised by several party members who did 
not agree with what they considered the party’s line of pursuing office at any cost.  
In April 2005, leading members and among them Jörg Haider, decided to leave and founded 
the new party BZÖ. The decision created some turmoil, since it was taken while the FPÖ was 
still in office. But since most of the party’s government members joined the BZÖ, the FPÖ 
was suddenly free from responsibility. This new phase resulted in a radicalization of its 
politics and ideology and under the new leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache the FPÖ went 
back to the primary goal of vote maximization (cf. Luther 2007: 11).  
 
7.1.3 The FPÖ outside government and the new phase of radicalization  
In 2006 the party started to mobilise the electorate by going back to issues like anti-
immigration, anti-Islam and EU skeptical positions. Few months before the election that was 
held on October 2006, the FPÖ launched a campaign clled ‘Österreich bleibt frei!’ (Austria 
must remain free), whose aim was to collect signatures against admitting Turkey into EU. The 
campaign was not very successful (cf. Liste der Volksbegehren in Österreich), but this 
initiative pointed to a position that in recent years has become central on FPÖ’s agenda, 
namely anti-Islam.  
At the 2006 election, the FPÖ got 11 pct. of the votes and 21 parliamentary seats. In 
comparison to 2002, the party had gained from an electoral campaign with a more compact 
party organization and with a clearer political agenda based on anti-immigration politics and 
EU skepticism. This result was further improved at the 2008 election with more than 17 pct. 
of the votes, showing that the party was electorally more successful in opposition than in 
government (cf. Heinisch 2003).   
The following pages will look at how the FPÖ’s ideological position has changed and 
developed over time and in relation to the Austrian political landscape. With regard to the 
comparative analysis, particular attention will be paid to the similarities and differences that 
the FPÖ has developed in relation to the Danish People’s Party and the Northern League re-
ferring to the same (main) ideological dimensions discussed in the chapters about the two 
parties.  
                                                
76 SORA (Institute for Social Research and Analysis), Wahlanalyse zur Nationalratswahl 2002 
(http://www.sora.at/de; last accessed 28-10-2008).  
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7.2 NEO-LIBERALISM AND TAXES 
7.2.1 Individual freedom and neo-liberal politics  
One of the central values formulated in all FPÖ programmes already in the 1950s is the prin-
ciple of individual freedom in society. The emphasis on individual freedom clearly and di-
rectly originated from the liberal standpoint that the FPÖ sought to promote and which, as we 
will see, the party leadership did not find in contras  with its pan-German nationalist position. 
Thus, already in 1954 the first paragraph of the Bad Ausser Programm of the VdU stated that 
the party supported the ‘freedom for the improvement (E tfaltung) of the individual within 
society’ and that one of the party’s main concerns wa to support individual well being, free-
dom and opportunities to improve (cf. VdU 1954). 
At the beginning, the principle of individual freedom and free initiative went hand in 
hand with a strong pan-German nationalism and with an anti-Semitic and anti-Slav position 
that in reality had little in common with traditional liberalist views. This, as Höbel has ob-
served (2003: 9), was specific of Austrian liberals, who had always been strong German na-
tionalists, without feeling that this contradicted their liberal commitment. 
The importance of individual freedom as a basic principle in society was deliberately empha-
sised in the name of the party and in the programme of the newly formed Austrian Freedom 
Party, which in 1955 took over what remained of the VdU. The first paragraph of the political 
agenda underlined that the members of the FPÖ had to ‘devote themselves to the fundamental 
principle of freedom and thus to the basic right of he individual and the people’ (FPÖ, Das 
Kurzprogramm 1955).   
Significantly, all FPÖ programmes start with a paragraph dedicated to the principle and 
right to individual freedom. In the policy agenda approved under the leadership of the liberal 
Norbert Steger in 1985, freedom is described as the most precious value, based on ‘self-
determination, independence and personal responsibility’. The goal of the party was thus to 
put people’s freedom at the top of the world order and to protect this from ‘physical, intellec-
tual and economic oppression’. We find this concept expressed in the same terms also in the 
1997 Programme of the FPÖ, where Chapter 1 defines re dom as a ‘supreme possession for 
all people’ that must be granted to everybody (FPÖ 1997: 3).  
The FPÖ’s position on individual freedom was strongly related to the right of private 
property, which for the party represented the very r alization of freedom, ensuring the indi-
viduals the products of their work and of their creative and productive efforts (FPÖ 1997: 4). 
Considering these premises it is not surprising that t e party supported policies developing a 
‘fair market economy’, where the rules of the free market can enhance the competitive 
strength of the Austrian economy, but where individuals feel a degree of social responsibility 
towards others, particularly the less privileged anthe environment (cf. FPÖ 1997: 20-21).  
The neo-liberal interpretation fits rather well in the case of the Freedom Party and par-
ticularly in relation to the party’s development during the 1990s. As mentioned, the political 
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beginnings of the Freedom Party took place under the banner of the liberal camp and this was 
clearly emphasised by indicating individual freedom as one of the cardinal points of the 
party’s ideology and view of the world. Particularly under the leadership of Jörg Haider, the 
FPÖ was clearly in favour of implementation of what the party considered a fair market econ-
omy. The FPÖ supported tax reduction policies and the demand for less state intervention and 
more privatization and liberalization of the national economy. In several respects, the neo-
liberal profile developed by the FPÖ between the mid-1980s and 1990s was much more simi-
lar to that of the Northern League than to the pro-welfare image promoted by the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party.  
In 1997 the FPÖ supported the complete deregulation of the economic life. According to 
the party, this would bring economic prosperity and a higher degree of stability to the Aus-
trian economy and labour market. The programme included a plan for a ‘genuine privatiza-
tion’ of the Austrian economy. In particular, the party demanded the withdrawal of the politi-
cal parties from their dominant involvement in the national economy and reduced influence of 
the interest groups on public life. This position was in line with the anti-establishment politics 
developed by the party, which attacked the diffusion of the so-called Propoz system in Aus-
tria. This system had become widespread under the Great Coalition governments and implied 
an even distribution of the most politically influential posts among the members of the two 
major parties, the SPÖ and the ÖVP.77  
The FPÖ also wanted a structural reform of the public sector and a lean and more 
effective organization of the state. In 1997, the party described the public administration as 
‘the most expensive’ and ‘protected sector, for which the state spends a continually growing 
part of its budget (FPÖ 1997: 22). To regulate the situation it was suggested that: 
 
The savings in the public sector must be realized by a substantial reduction in the number of 
rules, by deregulation, by the introduction of cost accounting, by a better and more objective 
selection of executive personnel, by a concentration and simplification of procedures, by the 
delegation of decision making and by incentives for reducing costs in administration’. 
 
On the tax issue, the FPÖ has always favoured lowering of taxes and creation of tax incen-
tives, considering these measures the best way to fuel Austrian private entrepreneurship. 
However, the party did not protest against taxes as such and did not instigate anti-tax rallies as 
for instance the Northern League in Italy when the party was at the opposition. The FPÖ fa-
voured lower tax pressure and in particular lower taxes to small and medium enterprises. For 
this reason, the FPÖ’s profile on the economic dimension fits well into the neo-liberal inter-
pretation, but less to that of an anti-tax party.  
                                                
77This went together with a strengthening of a number of interest groups with mandatory membership (e.g. for 
workers, employers, farmers) in the legislative process, which meant that hardly any legislation was psed 
without widespread consensus. The FPÖ was against th s practice, against which the party supported a process of 
widespread privatization in the Austrian economy.  
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In recent years the FPÖ has partly changed this profile. Economic liberalism today goes 
along with the emphasis that the FPÖ has started to give to social issues (cf. FPÖ 2008). The 
FPÖ today describes itself as a Heimat and social party. This recent development has created 
an ideological combination in which a regulated liberalism that includes privatisation and low 
taxes is combined with support for the Austrian welfar  state. In one of the recent documents, 
the FPÖ asserts to ‘profess itself to the liberal and human society and to the Austrian welfare 
state’ (FPÖ 2008). The Austrian welfare state is described as a ‘joint and agreeing community 
that has its duties’, consisting primarily in preserving the individual from the risks that emerge 
or can emerge in the course of life ‘with age, handicap, sickness, misfortune of some kind, 
unemployment and ill-fated events to the Austrian citizens’ (FPÖ 2008: 50). The same docu-
ment emphasises that social rights are to be considered conditional on effective control 
against social abuse and against privileges. The unemployment among immigrants is seen as 
one of the most onerous costs for the Austrian welfar  state, making its existence in the future 
very precarious, unless more rigorous restrictions are approved by the government (FPÖ 
2008: 52). According to the FPÖ, if something is not d ne today, the ‘welfare state cannot be 
financed and the bills of hundred and thousand seniors’ pensions in Austria cannot be safe 
anymore’, because ‘the doors to the Austrian welfar state are wide open to looting’. Immi-
grants are in these paragraphs on welfare and in several other places in the document regarded 
as welfare state abusers, taking advantage of a relaxed legislation that gives them access to 
social benefits. According to the party, this makes them subjects living at the expenses of the 
Austrian state and citizens. 
The measures suggested by the FPÖ to limit immigration include rigid quotas of immi-
grant labour based on the effective need of the labour market and harsher rules in the assign-
ment of working and residence permits in general (cf. FPÖ 2008: 53). The entrance of foreign 
labour, Gastarbeiters as the FPÖ prefers to call the immigrants coming to Austria to work, is 
then always conditional on the internal demand and exclusively when it is otherwise impossi-
ble to employ Austrian citizens. Also in this respect the Austrian party has come closer to the 
position of the Danish People’s Party and to the Northern League.  
The FPÖ’s position on welfare is therefore characterised by the same welfare chauvinism that 
we have seen developed by the Danish People’s Party. Particularly in the most recent phase, 
the party has given more emphasis to pro-welfare issue  than to neo-liberal and welfare re-
trenchment issues. This strategy has watered down the FPÖ’s earlier neo-liberal character. As 
mentioned, the party prefers today to define itself as a patriotic, liberal and social party (cf. 
FPÖ 2008: 97). The social standpoint is exclusively addressed to safeguard the interests of the 
‘own people and own state’, which unquestionably come first. The liberal position has thus 
been adjusted in relation to the Austrian welfare state, but the party continues to support 
forms of privatisation, considering public interventio  limited and necessary only where indi-
vidual activity cannot effectively and efficiently intervene. In relation to taxes, the FPÖ de-
 192 
clares that the party ‘basic principle on economics is to relieve the tax pressure on the citi-
zens’ considering lower taxes the precondition for a blooming economy’ (FPÖ 2008: 103). 
 
7.3 ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT POLITICS 
During the late 1980s and 1990s the Austrian voters started to show increasing disaffection 
with the way the two major parties ruled and particularly with consociational and corporatist 
practices that had allowed the parties to dispose of the proportional allocation of civil service 
jobs (Propoz). 
Under the leadership of Jörg Haider, the FPÖ promoted itself as the only parliamentary 
force that could seriously challenge the domination by ÖVP and SPÖ. The party demanded 
and supported a project of radical transformation in Austrian politics. The critique against the 
power concentrated in the hands of the political elite became one of the central issues debated 
by the FPÖ during the late 1980s and until the party’s entry in government in 2000. The FPÖ 
described Austria as a country ruled by an undemocratic system, in which corporate elements, 
privileges and corruption dominated unhindered among the political elite (cf. FPÖ 1986).  
In the 1990s, the FPÖ developed a more concrete plan based on the concept of creating a 
Third Republic to replace the Second Republic that was founded in the post-war years. Only a 
radical transformation of the status quo would in fact grant the change the FPÖ wanted and 
described as the passage from ‘a party state to a citizens’ democracy’. Among the proposals 
of political and social renewal, the FPÖ urged the introduction of more popular referenda, for 
the direct election of the federal president, for a significant reduction of the number of minis-
tries and for more power to the provinces and local councils. In line with several other radical 
and populist parties, the FPÖ launched itself as a popular movement engaged in ‘a battle 
against a system of oppression’ (FPÖ 1993).  
The protest and anti-establishment politics gained momentum in the course of the 1990s, 
in particular among FPÖ voters. When asked about the most important reasons for voting for 
the FPÖ, the voters first mentioned clear anti-establishment themes such as the disclosure of 
irregularities and scandals, the wish for a breath of fresh air in Austrian politics and the rejec-
tion of the Great Coalition (cf. Plasser & Ulram 2000: 37; Luther 2007: 19). 
However, as in the other cases of radical right paries with government responsibility, 
the FPÖ’s advantages in opposition proved less effective while the party was in office. In par-
ticular, the party had difficulties sustaining the image of an anti-establishment political force 
working against the status quo. The tension arising from being in government and at the same 
time maintaining the critical line against the establishment created serious problems within 
the party’s own ranks and more specifically between the FPÖ cabinet members and the grass-
roots. Disagreement with the reforms decided by the government and endorsed by the FPÖ 
grew among the rank and file. The ‘hard-liners’ accused the party members in government of 
sacrificing FPÖ principles and positions to remain in office. This showed that the political 
pragmatism and the politics of compromise resulting from the FPÖ’s direct engagement in 
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government activity and decision making processes destabilised the internal balances. The 
exit of some of the most prominent FPÖ government members indicated the difficulties tack-
ling government responsibility and the inevitable pragmatic decisions. The events triggered 
parliamentary elections already in November 2002, less than two years after the formation of 
the first black and blue government. 
The FPÖ entered the 2002 electoral campaign divided and without any clear party strat-
egy. Significantly, the 2002 electoral programme put emphasis on the results achieved in the 
few years in government and in particular on fields like employment, immigration, asylum 
policy and law and order (cf. FPÖ 2002). The programme, entitled ‘Social and worth living in 
and possible’ (Sozial und Lebenswert und Leistbar), attempted to dissociate the party from 
some of the unpopular reforms implemented by the government.  
The second ÖVP-FPÖ government showed strong continuity with the reform policies 
that had characterised the period 2000-2002 (cf. Fraser 2007: 15-16). The FPÖ tried to exert a 
stronger pressure on the ÖVP to influence more directly the decisions of the government on a 
series of relevant policy reforms such as pensions and privatisation of public enterprises. The 
efforts were more or less in vain, also because the FPÖ had a much weaker electoral backup 
than in 2000. Moreover, the SPÖ showed to be more open to cooperate with the government, 
and voted for resolutions on education policy issue and even more controversially, for the 
enactment of a highly restrictive asylum policy in 2004 (see below).  
When in 2005 all FPÖ cabinet members and most of the parliamentary group left the 
party to launch the BZÖ, the rest of the FPÖ was suddenly again in opposition. Under the new 
leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache, the FPÖ resolutely returned to vote maximising strate-
gies that again emphasised its anti-establishment posi ions. This, together with the renewed 
radicalisation on other issues, seemed to pay back in electoral terms, as the party most recent 
results at the polls quite clearly indicate. 
 
7.4 THE ANTI-IMMIGRATION ISSUE 
7.4.1 The FPÖ and the anti-immigration issue 
Before the 1980s, immigration was not an issue of str ng relevance in Austrian politics (see 
Gärtner 2002), even though migration of foreign workers to Austria dated back to the 1960s. 
But neither the grand coalitions at government, nor the individual ÖVP and SPÖ governments 
had made serious attempts to discuss the issue.  
As in Western countries that had experienced the phenomenon (e.g. Denmark), the guest 
workers that came to Austria in the 1960s and 1970s were expected to leave as soon as the 
country did not need them anymore. In order to ensure this, immigration of guest workers was 
based on a rotation system; immigrants were supposed to stay for a short period of time in 
order to cover the specific demand for labour and to leave again. But for several reasons, 
thing did not go this way. Migrants wanted to stay longer because their income had not met 
their expectations and employers often refused to recruit new inexperienced workers, prefer-
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ring to keep those who were already trained. As mostly male immigrants decided to stay 
longer in the country, family unification raises the number of immigrants in the country. This 
phase of immigration profoundly changed the structure of the foreign population. Austria be-
came an immigration country with a high percentage of immigrants relative to the size of its 
population. However, this status has rather surprisingly never become part of Austria’s offi-
cial self-understanding (Fassmann & Münz 1995). Even in periods of significant immigration, 
the political discourse held on to notions of Zuwanderung, thus emphasising the transitory 
state of immigration, rather than on the concept of Einwanderung, which also implies perma-
nent settlement of immigrants. Integration was considered as the unifying policy objective in 
relation to immigrants, which served to distract from the fact that Austria was already a coun-
try of immigration. Moreover, the opening of the borders to Eastern Europe had a clearly 
augmented the number of immigrants.  
The attitudes towards immigration and immigrants changed during the late 1980s and in 
the 1990s. Immigration became an increasingly relevant issue on the voters’ political agenda. 
Before 1989, immigration was not even on the list of he most important problems, but in 
1990 it was number 10 on the list of the most important things the government had to take 
care of. In 1992, the issue was number 2 on the political agenda of the Austrian electorate (cf. 
Gärtner 2002). 
When Jörg Haider became leader of the FPÖ, anti-immigration position became increas-
ingly important on the party agenda. In a document presented in 1990 entitled ‘Resolution on 
the immigration question’ (cf. FPÖ, Resolution zur Ausländerfrage 1990), the party listed 
some measures that were considered necessary to regulate immigration and asylum in the 
country. The document was published in the controversial right-wing paper Aula, whose pro-
moters in those years had close relations with members of the FPÖ (cf. Gärtner 1995: 308). 
In 1993, the FPÖ launched a popular initiative on the topic of immigration called ‘Aus-
tria First!’ (cf. FPÖ Österreich Zuerst! 1993). The aim was to collect signatures in favour of a 
popular referendum on the subject based on twelve demands of restrictions and control in 
relation to immigration. The initiative was considered very controversial and provoked the 
exit of five party MPs, among them Heide Schmidt, who later launched the new party Liberal 
Forum (LiF). In the same year, relations between FPÖ and the Liberal International group – of 
which the party was a member since 1979 – became mor difficult. In 1993, the Liberal Inter-
national executive recommended the expulsion of the FPÖ from its ranks, but the measure 
was preceded by the decision of the FPÖ to withdraw its membership.  
Asserting that ‘Austria is not a country of immigration’ (cf. Österreich Zuerst! 1993), 
the party asked to introduce this concept as a constitutional provision. The FPÖ was very 
straightforward on this and thought that Austria had to stop immigration, explaining that ‘on 
account of its size and density of population’ the country ‘was not a country of immigration’.  
The FPÖ suggested a number of clear and concrete demands: introduction of more rigorous 
measures against immigration, including more efficient border controls and expansion of the 
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police force in order to prevent illegal immigration and control crime. The demands also in-
cluded a restriction of the rules for achieving Austrian citizenship, tougher measures against 
immigrants abusing social benefits and a limitation of the percentage (max 30 pct.) of students 
with another mother tongue in Austrian school classes.  
The immigration petition fell far behind the party’s expectations, reaching less than 10 
pct. of the electorate (about 400,000 signatures) and it was considered a failure. But even so, 
the initiative put immigration on the political agenda of the mainstream parties. In the same 
years, the SPÖ-ÖVP government coalition decided to pass a number of restrictive measures 
for the immigrants already living in Austria. Immigrants were required to send to the authori-
ties documented information about their working permit, health insurance certificate and a 
detailed account of their housing conditions (cf. Sully 1997: 79). The enactment of these 
measures showed that the government parties were concerned about FPÖ’s attempt to mobi-
lise the electorate on the immigration question andfeared that the FPÖ could take a leading 
role on the issue if the government did not tighten the rules.  
At the anticipated elections of 1995, less than a ye r after, the FPÖ continued to cam-
paign on the topics that now characterised the party main political issues. One was anti-
establishment politics, the other was anti-immigration. In the programmatic platform entitled 
‘Contract with Austria’, the FPÖ presented a list of 20 pledges that the party – when it took 
office – would realize within the first 100 days. As for immigration the party made some con-
crete promises:  
 
The existing immigration laws should not be softened. Each potential immigrant must prove to 
have a job and an accommodation. To enable the return of numerous illegal immigrants we pro-
pose ID requirements such as exist in most industrial countries today. The current practice of 
granting citizenship well before the legally required ten years should also be stopped. 
 
As the Danish People’s Party and the Northern Leagu, the Freedom Party reacted rapidly to a 
situation in which the electorate showed increasing concern about the impact and conse-
quences of the immigration flows on the Austrian society at large. At the same time, the po-
litical establishment seemed unable to work out a plan that could act in response to the new 
developments in the field of immigration and integration.  
 
7.4.2 Immigration policies under the FPÖ and ÖVP governments (2000-2006) 
Significantly and quite similarly to the Italian and Danish cases, FPÖ’s influence on migration 
and asylum policies became evident with the achievem nt of political influence. Under both 
the ÖVP and FPÖ coalition governments (2000-2006) led by chancellor Schüssel, several 
restrictive amendments were made in relation to the country’s migration regime and integra-
tion policies. In July 2002 the parliament approved the so-called Integration Agreement (Inte-
grationsvereinbarung), introducing the obligation for non-EU migrants applying for a resi-
dence permit in Austria to acquire a basic knowledge of the German language and enough 
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abilities to participate in the social, economic and cultural life in Austria. In practice, this im-
plied following a compulsory course that had to start within the first 2 years of arrival in the 
country and completing it successfully within the first 4 years of permanence. Non-
completion of the course would then give rise to a number of sanctions, such as a fine for re-
fusing integration, or refusal of residence permit (cf. Kamali 2008: 80 also for the critique that 
followed the implementation of the agreement).  
By 2005, the Austrian National Council approved theintroduction of new significant 
changes to the Asylum Act, for instance the controve sial measure of force-feeding asylum 
seekers during hunger strikes and the wide range of authorizations given to the police force, 
such as the right to expel asylum seekers despite a pending trial. This lowered the number of 
new asylum applications from 32,000 in 2003 to the 13,300 in 2006. 
The most comprehensive ‘package’ on immigration issue  (Fremdenrechtspaket) was 
approved by the government in 2005. This regarded different fields of migration and included 
significant reforms contained in four new acts: thesettlement and residence act, the alien’s 
police act and foreign labour act. The government explained the enactment of the package as 
a necessary piece of legislation to implement the EU directives in the field, but it was also a 
way to strengthen the measures against immigration in light of the EU enlargement to the 
Eastern countries (cf. Krzyzanowsky & Wodak 2008: 47).  
The restrictions introduced under the ÖVP-FPÖ governm nt regarded different aspects 
related to the conditions of entry, rules of settlement and residence and requirements for ob-
taining Austrian citizenship. As in the Danish and Italian cases, the legitimization of the radi-
cal right and the achievement of political influenc had concrete effects, particularly on the 
immigration regimes of these countries.  
 
7.4.3 The politics of exclusion: From the right to a cultural identity (Heimat) to the FPÖ as 
Heimatpartei  
To understand the position of the FPÖ in relation to immigration it is important to explain the 
meaning that the party has given to the concept of Heimat through the years. This notion is 
present in most of the party programmes and in several official documents released between 
1985 and 2008. Heimat is a German word which is difficult to translate and which in English 
can indicate both the homeland and a more general notion of cultural identity. It is not the 
place here to dig theoretically deep into this concept. It can be helpful to remark that in dis-
course analysis this can be referred to as a ‘nodal point’, whose function is to create and sus-
tain the identity of a certain discourse by constructing a knot of definite meaning (Torfing 
1999: 98). In this sense, the nodal point, here represented by the Heimat, has been loaded with 
contents and meanings that have been used to develop politics of belonging and exclusion.   
Together with the idea of individual freedom the con ept of Heimat therefore plays a 
central role in defining FPÖ’s ideology. Its full commitment to the Austrian nation, its culture, 
values, principles and tradition is formulated very arly in the policy agendas. The concept of 
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Heimat has developed and changed over time and in relation to the different phases of the 
party’s life-cycle. At the beginning, Heimat indicated mainly patriotic feelings of national 
belonging and identity that were influenced by a pan-German vision of the national question, 
whose main goal was considered the reunification of all German-speaking and ethnic-German 
(Volksdeutsche) people.  
For example, the 1985 programme stated that the FPÖ ‘regard[s] the democratic repub-
lic of Austria as (our) mother country in which the values of national tradition and love of 
one’s country are to be highly valued’. This had to take place in respect of the basic rights, 
identities and co-existence of the different ethnic (autochthonous) groups living in the country 
(cf. FPÖ 1985 in Sully 1997:45). But only a few pass ges further, it was specified that ‘the 
overwhelming majority of Austrians belong to the German ethnic and cultural community’ 
and therefore the party wanted ‘(…) an Austria embedded within the German ethnic and cul-
tural region, to autonomously shape its future’ (cf. FPÖ 1985 in Sully 1997: 46).    
Yet in the following years the FPÖ downplayed the pan-German nationalist claims, in 
particular in its official documents. In ‘Theses for the political renewal of Austria’ from 1993, 
the framing of Heimat was more blurred. The purpose of the party is ‘(…) to preserve and 
maintain the natural environment and cultural heritage inherited from our forefathers in order 
to hand them on to our descendants’. The party defined this approach as a ‘positive form of 
patriotism’, which ‘thoroughly promotes the idea of being European’ (cf. in Sully 1997: 50). 
However, the document was also rather explicit that ‘Austria is for Austrians’ and ‘the protec-
tion of cultural identity and social peace in Austria equires a stop to immigration’ (Sully 
1997: 51) – hence the need to apply more rigorous brder controls and to fight illegal immi-
gration more effectively.   
From the 1990s the concept of Heimat evolved into an exclusionary right to the home-
land (see e.g. Gärtner 2000). This approach allowed th  party to argue that the main question 
was not about being against foreigners, but rather about safeguarding the interests and cultural 
identity of the historical indigenous groups. This was for example clearly underlined in the 
1997 FPÖ programme, where the party strived to defen  a specific version of Austrian 
patriotism and idea of homeland (FPÖ 1997: 7): 
 
Our country [Heimat] is the democratic Republic of Austria and its federal states, including the 
historically settled indigenous groups (Germans, Croats, Roma, Slovaks, Slovenians, Czechs 
and Hungarians) and the culture moulded by them. The legal system in Austria presupposes that 
the overwhelming majority of Austrians is of German origin. 
 
The definition of ‘Austrian’ referred to the country’s different historical ethnic groups 
(ethnische Volksgruppen), even if the reference to the German-speaking majority was not 
forgotten in the text. 
The characteristic Austrian cultural identity that originated in the different historical 
autochthonous groups was thus something that needed to (FPÖ 1997: ): 
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be preserved, protected and developed in these spatial, historical groupings and cultural as-
pects.(…) The coexistence and collaboration of the diff rent cultural groups have formed Aus-
tria’s characteristic identity, which can only be preserved through a guaranteed continuing exis-
tence of the historical settled cultural groups. 
 
The paragraph above was followed by the explanation that due to its small size, population 
density and limited resources ‘Austria is not a country of immigration’ and therefore the right 
to a homeland or Heimat is reserved only to the country’s historical ethnic groups. The FPÖ 
was thus against ‘unlimited immigration’, as this would ‘endanger the right to preservation 
and protection of the Heimat’ and therefore rejected any form of ‘multicultural experiments’ 
for the social conflicts that these involve.  
The Heimat in the reading of the FPÖ was also intrinsically related to Western and 
Christian values, principles and culture. Already the 1997 policy agenda underlined that ‘the 
intellectual foundations of the West included the id al of human dignity and basic liberties as 
well as ideas deriving from this, such as democracy, codetermination, rule of law, solidarity 
and respect for life and creation’ (FPÖ 1997: 9). 
It was also emphasized that these foundations had to be defended against the dangers 
from ‘different streams of thought’; here the party quoted for example the fundamentalism of 
radical Islam, but also the culture of hedonistic consumption, aggressive capitalism, growing 
occultism, pseudo-religious sects and omnipresent nihilism. In the 1997 programme the party 
expressed a careful formulation of what concretely hreatened and endangered the nation. In 
particular, the reference to Islam was limited to its radical and fundamentalist expressions. 
This is not the case in the party’s recent official publications. Today the FPÖ clearly de-
fines itself as a social and Heimat party78 (Die Soziale Heimatpartei), which emphasises the 
role of the party as guarantor of the Austrian identity and social welfare. In the Manual of the 
Freedomites’ Politics an entire chapter is dedicated to ‘Heimat and Identity’ (FPÖ 2008: 21-
43). Already from the introduction, the approach to the concept of Heimat is given a new and 
thicker meaning in relation to the past. As explained above, in 1997 the Heimat was still a 
rather blurred concept defined in spatial-geographical, ethno-historical and cultural ways, 
whose foundations and existence had to be protected. In the more recent party literature, the 
cultural and value approach has gained ground in relation to this debate. The geographical and 
territorial space is today increasingly associated to a leading monocultural vision of the Aus-
trian society, connected to ideas of western cultural superiority. An introductory passage to 
the chapter asserts that the FPÖ’s main goal is ‘to protect the Austrian leading culture (Leit-
kultur), the homeland (Heimat) and the autochthonous population’ against the main threat 
represented by immigration, because ‘Austria is not a country of immigration’ (FPÖ 2008a: 
                                                
78 The definition was first introduced by FPÖ politician Hans Tschürtz in 2005 when he defined the party as a 
‘social Heimat and control party’ (see http://oesterreich.orf.at/burgenland/stories/176457/ last accessed: 29-03-
2009) 
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21). A little later it is explained that ‘Austria needs neither Americanisation nor Islamisation. 
The western culture is rich and varied. It connects the European cultural nations. It is then 
necessary to support and to further develop our own culture’ (FPÖ 2008: 21).  
In the passage above it is worth noticing that the FPÖ mentions both Americanization 
and Islamization as leading to the demise of the Austrian culture and more generally of the 
Western civilization.79 But even if the Americanization of the Austrian society is here men-
tioned among the concerns for the country’s present ocial and political development, the 
greatest threat remains Islam and immigration.  
The party considers the future of the H imat seriously threatened in particular by the in-
creasing number of Muslims in the country. In several passages, the document explicitly re-
fers to reliable sources (academic, scientific, statistical) to support its statements and theses. 
For example, to support the thesis of a developing Islamization of the Austrian society the 
FPÖ document quotes the conclusions of a report by the Austrian Akademie der Wissen-
schaften on the ‘New projections for the Austrian population after religious denomination’:  
 
The structure of the denominational milieu in Austria has changed in recent years (…) the two 
groups of the Muslims and of the non religious have increased. (…) In all the calculations it is 
possible to observe a further decline of members of the Roman-Catholic church. (…) Likely the 
group of the Muslims will grow stronger. 
 
The numerical increase is thus automatically related to the identity, cultural and value chal-
lenge. The clash between the Islamic and Christian Western cultures is then described by the 
party as embedded in the very view of the world andin social behaviour. Islam is considered 
to hinder individual freedom, human rights and equality, in particular for Muslim women. 
There is no opening to an understanding of culture in a relational and dynamic framework. 
Moreover, like the Danish People’s Party (see Chapter 5), the Freedom Party tries today to 
champion liberal values (solidarity, minority women rights, freedom of speech, animal wel-
fare and so forth) by creating several ‘contrast pictures’ in which the intolerant, anti-
libertarian and chauvinist approach of Islam is compared to the tolerant, secularised and mod-
ern Western and Christian society.  
This is not necessarily done in a stereotyped way. In the document ‘We and Islam’, for 
instance, the two sections entitled ‘Islam is a monotheist world religion that deserves our re-
spect’ and ‘The geopolitical importance of Islam must be accepted’ (FPÖ 2008b), present 
Islam and the Islamic culture as realities that have significantly contributed to the world’s 
cultural and scientific progress. However, a more careful reading of the rest of the document 
shows that the thesis remains that the conflicts emerge when the two cultures meet as a result 
of what the party considers the massive immigration fr m Muslim countries. In reality, and 
                                                
79 Something more about the anti-American position of the FPÖ will be said in relation to the party positi ning 
on foreign policy. For a recent analysis of how anti-Americanism and American-criticism have developed in 
Austria since the XIX century (see Bischof 2007).  
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indeed quite in conflict with what was just said, in the following reflections about ‘Us and 
Islam’ it is avowed that ‘it must be explained to what extent the Muslim tradition and the 
European democracy and constitutional understanding ca  be combined’ (FPÖ 2008b).  
Muslims are considered difficult to integrate because they refer to a backward society. 
The party suggests different practical political measures to promote integration of Muslim 
immigrants and to prevent radicalization of some of its components, among these: the educa-
tion and formation of the imams in the country and the obligation to preach only in German in 
the mosques; surveillance of educational material and teaching in Islamic schools; a ban on 
building minarets to be introduced in the Austrian federal constitution; stronger control of 
activities in the mosques, considered recruiting places of radical elements; ban on wearing the 
Muslim veil in the public space; a declaration of cmpliance with the laws and with democ-
racy when obtaining Austrian citizenship; harder sentences for honour killings, forced mar-
riages and genital mutilations. As seen in the previous chapters, these are issues that have 
been intensively discussed by the Danish People’s Party. Furthermore and in this way more 
similarly to the Northern League, the FPÖ refers to the need to defend the Christian roots and 
heritage of the West against Islam’s attempt to take the control of the Christian world. 
 
7.5 AUTHORITARIANISM AND CONFORMIST VIEWS OF THE WORLD 
7.5.1 Authoritarian attitudes, law and order and security issues 
The Austrian Freedom Party has historical roots that date back to the 1950s. As we have seen 
above, the party went through significant ideological transformation, renewal and restructur-
ings during the 1980s and 1990s. Even so, much of te scholarly research the FPÖ describes 
the party as an extreme right wing party with authori arian and anti-libertarian features. Con-
cepts of Volksgemeinschaft, criticism of democracy, the relativisation of the National Socialist 
past, the belief in an autocratic leadership and authoritarian state are often mentioned when 
referring to FPÖ’s ideology. These explanations are partly based on the party’s historical 
background and ideological roots, partly on the biographical records of some of the party’s 
leadership members and on discourses, statements and comments made by Jörg Haider when 
he was leading the party and by other prominent FPÖmembers. However, looking at the way 
the party ideology has developed in the past two deca s and specifically at how authoritarian 
attitudes and law and order issues are dealt with, the FPÖ’s positions are in many ways not so 
different from those of the Danish People’s Party and the Northern League. And in their case, 
there are no direct historical roots or heritage in post-war fascism. 
As observed in relation to the Danish People’s Party nd the Northern League, the Free-
dom Party supports a hard line on law and order and national security. In the 1993 popular 
petition Austria First!, the FPÖ asked for the expansion of the police force and permanent 
border controls. The 1997 policy agenda included a chapter entitled ‘Law and order. There is 
no freedom without law and there can be no law withou  justice’ (FPÖ 1997: ). The party 
urged the state to adopt a more decisive interventionist line against crime, terrorism, smug-
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gling and worldwide drug trafficking. According to he party, life imprisonment must imply 
what it says. At the same time the party is against the dead penalty, because the risk of execut-
ing innocent persons is too high (cf. FPÖ 1997: 20 and FPÖ 2008: 142).  
Immigrant and refugees are often mentioned in relation to crime, illegal conduct and 
abuse. Therefore one demand is an efficient border police force that is able to counter and 
control ‘the flood of illegal immigrants and those engaged in smuggling refugees’ (FPÖ 1997: 
19).  
The demand for more law and order, for example by expanding the police force and its inter-
vention on the local scale to prevent crime is thus a common issue championed by the radical 
right regardless of historical legacies. Particularly fter 9/11, the demands for more police and 
control were intensified by these parties also in relation to the threat represented by the radi-
calisation of Islamic elements within society and by international terrorism. 
It is difficult to find direct references in the recent FPÖ ideology to antidemocratic and auto-
cratic views of the state. The party has supported pl biscitary forms of democracy and the use 
of more direct instruments of popular democracy. In the mid 1990s the FPÖ asked explicitly 
to concentrate greater decisional power in the hands of the Austrian federal president, whose 
election had to be directly decided by people, together with that of the provincial governors 
and mayors. The concentration of power in the hands of the federal president would have 
made redundant the post of government chancellor and according to this plan the government 
should then be reduced to only seven ministers elected by the parliament after hearings. The 
principle of direct election of the highest organs of the state also appears in later party docu-
ments (cf. FPÖ 1997: 16-17). However, the same demands for forms of more direct democ-
racy in the country, concretely translated into instruments of popular initiatives, such as refer-
enda and direct ballots, are common to several other radical right parties (for example the 
Northern League). These demands have to be read in the perspective of these parties’ populist 
and anti-establishment positions, which are generally stronger when the party is in opposition. 
Their position is generally less confrontational as soon as they reach government responsibili-
ties and political influence. 
 
7.5.2 Family, children and sexuality 
The Austrian Freedom Party considers the traditional family the social core of Austrian soci-
ety. This position has emerged together with the party’s in support of the Christian founda-
tions of Europe and the church and which changed th FPÖ’s more liberal and open approach 
to the composition and social function of the family. This clearly emerges from the definitions 
that we find in the party documents before and after th  late 1990s. The FPÖ 1985 policy plat-
form regards the family ‘as the most important element in the community’ adding that ‘all 
families deserve the protection of society’ and that ‘the demands of the family and its auton-
omy’ must be respected. The approach in the 1997 policy agenda is different, the family is 
defined as ‘the common life between a man and a woman, which finds a special expression in 
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society through the institution of marriage’ and if an addition concedes that also ‘sole parents 
with children are to be regarded as families’ the party rejects any ‘effort that equates homo-
sexual partnerships with families’80 (FPÖ 1997: 25; see also FPÖ 2005: 23).   
The party’s approach to the role of women in society emphasises gender equality. The 
equal role, equal opportunities and equal standing of men and women in society and their 
‘equality in their degree of responsibility’ (cf. FPÖ 1985) were aspects that the party empha-
sised in the documents of the 1980s. By the end of the 1990s, the FPÖ started to take a more 
traditional line, for example by appealing to more ‘family-friendly’ social policies that could 
help in particular ‘women who spend their time bringing up children or caring for family 
members’ (FPÖ 1997: 26; FPÖ 2005: 23). The greater at ntion in the 1990s to the role of 
Christianity and to the relationship with the church challenged to some extent the early posi-
tion on gender equality. On the one side the approach continued favour increasing gender 
equality, and on the other side the more traditional role and responsibilities of the woman as 
mother and wife gained some place in the way the party discussed family and social policies. 
It is a ‘tension’ that can be noted also in relation t  moral issues, such as abortion, euthanasia, 
genetic technology and the like, on which the party has adopted a more conformist position. 
In recent years the party has amplified and extended th  gender equality issue by relat-
ing it to Muslim women’s rights. Quite similarly tohe Danish People’s Party, the FPÖ men-
tions forced marriages, genital mutilations and the wearing of the Muslim veil as fundamental 
barriers to equal rights to all women in society. At the same time, the party underlines the 
problem of the decreasing birth rate in the country, u ging Austrian women to give birth to 
more children (at least two) to prevent the Austrian population from ‘becoming a minority in 
(their) own Heimat’ (cf. FPÖ 2008: 82).   
 
7.6 EU AND FOREIGN POLICY 
7.6.1 The FPÖ on EU: from support to scepticism 
Austria is a late joiner in the EU. Despite the country’s economic and ideological western 
orientation if did not apply for the EU membership until 1989 and it became an official mem-
ber as late as 1994. The country’s history and geopolitical situation helps to explain this deci-
sion (cf. Pelinka 2004). Like Germany, the Austrian territory was after 1945 divided into four 
occupational zones, of which one-third was militarily controlled by the Soviet troops and the 
remaining two-thirds by the Allied forces. However and in this differently from Germany, 
Austria had only a single national government, which was based on a western style liberal 
democracy (see Pelinka 2004: 210). In 1955 the country signed the State Treaty, which pro-
vided for the withdrawal of the four allied powers on the condition that the state became a 
permanently neutral country in accordance to the Swiss model. This decision was taken in 
                                                
80 However, the declarations on the issue are limited to enying homosexuals the same family rights as hetero-
sexual couples, but the party has never expressed positions that could indicate discriminating attitudes against 
homosexuals. 
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consideration of Austria’s geopolitical position. The country occupied a strategic ‘front-line’ 
between the European East and the West, whose borders during the Cold War were even more 
markedly defined by the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO).  
The perception that, due to its neutrality, the country had to refrain from getting involved in 
the sphere of Western European military cooperation, was felt also in relation to the Western 
European economic integration. During the Cold War, Austria continued to be economically 
and ideologically oriented towards Western Europe. At the end of the Cold War, most of the 
reservations related to the country’s strategic geopolitical position lost significance and in 
1989 the country applied for EU membership. 
As underlined by Pelinka (2004: 214), the vote in the Austrian EU referendum showed 
sensible socioeconomic differences. Lower levels of upport to the EU were found amongst 
the younger generations, women and voters with lower education. This reflected the differ-
ences among the Austrian parties between the EU positive and EU sceptical parties (see also 
Chapter 8). The FPÖ and the Greens were the two parties that opposed Austrian EU member-
ship; at the time both parties had a strong appeal among the younger cohorts and the FPÖ par-
ticularly among voters with lower educational levels. In the following years the Greens 
(Grüne) adopted a more positive attitude towards EU, whereas the FPÖ’s position on EU has 
grown more sceptical during the last decade.  
In reality, the Austrian Freedom Party was in favour f Austria’s EU membership until 
the beginning of the 1990s. The 1985 policy agenda affirmed that ‘the future of Europe lies in 
a close community of all its countries and peoples. In pite of all the difficulties of unification 
the goal remains a unified and strong Europe to which there is no reasonable alternative’ 
(FPÖ 1985 in Sully 1997: 46) 
For the party, the unification of Europe was a way to safeguard and guarantee the politi-
cal and economic survival and to ensure peace in the world. However, last step to unification 
was the creation of a ‘European confederation’ in which people had to preserve their identity 
and their right to self-determination. In 1994, theFPÖ officially asked its MPs to vote against 
the ratification of the Treaty that the Austrian government had signed with the EU. 
In the ‘Theses for the political renewal of Austria’, the position towards Europe started 
to be strongly conditioned by the demand for a sovereign Austria in a pan-European confed-
eration of states. This introduced the preference for a confederalist model in relation to the 
form and functioning of European cooperation that at the same time warned against the crea-
tion of a European super-state implying the loss of independence and national sovereignty. 
Today this interpretation characterises the approach to EU of most of the radical right (cf. 
Mudde 2007: 165-169).  
In the1997 policy agenda, in Chapter VI on ‘Europe –a common destiny’ (FPÖ 1997: 9-11) 
the ‘limits’ to European integration are more directly defined:  
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The future destiny of Europe has to be shaped throug  close cooperation of its peoples. Politi-
cally Europe is represented only partly by the European Union. Europe’s diversity calls for 
forms of political cooperation which envisage different confederations on different levels. The 
independence of states should be restricted only by what is absolutely necessary to reach spe-
cific goals (…) The European Union is just a part of he European reality. The European Union 
shall not become a European federal state but a confederation.  
 
It was not clearly specified what form of European confederation the party more concretely 
wanted. Often the alternative is based exclusively on what Europe should not do and on few 
indications about the policy areas where European cooperation is accepted, for example on 
security and control in relation to international crime and illegal immigration. In 1998, the 
FPÖ was against Austria’s participation in the European Monetary Union and organized a 
popular initiative against replacing the Austrian shilling with the euro.81 
The EU sceptical position developed by the FPÖ in the 1990s created some difficulties 
in 2000, when the party entered government with the EU positive ÖVP. In this respect, it was 
easier for the party to be critical of EU when it was in opposition, whereas it became difficult 
to see what kind of implications this could have for the country and the country’s politics 
when the FPÖ got into office in 2000. This implied taking concrete decisions and standpoints 
in relation to EU policy that could strongly affect the position of the country in the EU. There-
fore, one of the pragmatic initiatives of the new government, also to respond to the diplomatic 
sanctions imposed by the other EU countries on Austria, was to make an official declaration 
of the government’s commitment to Europe. In the ‘Government declaration’ by Austrian 
chancellor Wolfang Schüssel of February 2000, the new government clearly wants to reassure 
the other EU members of Austria’ and particularly the FPÖ’s position: 
 
Our government programme identifies itself resolutely with Europe and with the fundamental 
values which characterise the new Europe. We are Austrians and we are European and proud of 
it. The Austrian population has expressed this in the last five years and in the high electoral vote 
for the membership (….) There is no alternative to the participation in the EU. Participation in 
the monetary union was the last important progress. (…) And Austria has another unique his-
torical opportunity with the enlargement of the European Union. (…) The federal government 
strongly commits to a common security and defence policy and to peace in Europe’ (ÖVP-FPÖ 
Regierungserklärung 2000). 
 
That the newly formed government listened to Europe was also seen in Haider’s decision to 
resign – at least formally – as FPÖ party leader and to elect in his place the less controversial 
Susanne Riess-Passer. Haider declined any cabinet post, declaring that he would concentrate 
on his position as governor in the Kärnten region. However, even if Haider continued to main-
tain strong control on the party, the effects of government responsibility started to be felt at 
different levels of the FPÖ’s politics. In particular, the leadership in government started to 
                                                
81 The referendum campaign for the Austrian shilling (Schilling-Volksabstimmung) was held from November 24 
to December 1. The FPÖ managed to collect ‘only’ 253,949 signatures. This was just one of several referendum 
campaigns organized by the party over the years.  
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carry out politics that were not in accordance with the ideological positions held by the party 
before coming into office and thus conflicted with Haider and the party rank and file. They 
still considered it possible to combine participation in government with anti-establishment 
politics. But by getting into government, the party had lost appeal among the protest voters. 
The party members in government believed that the concrete records achieved would have 
helped the party consolidate support from the electorate, for example in relation to EU policy. 
In 2002, Susanne Riess-Passer asked for the party’s commitment to the EU enlargement. This 
was not appreciated by Haider and the rank and file, which continued to show reservations in 
relation to the EU integration process, particularly the effects of the enlargement on the Aus-
trian labour market. The FPÖ was clearly suffering the strains of the conflict between the fun-
damental party ideology and the short-term, pragmatic and inevitably concretely targeted po-
litical goals (cf. Chapter 3). It is the same constraints that we have seen in the case of the 
northern League and which the Danish People’s Party was to some extent able to contain in 
its position as support to the government coalition rather than a direct member.    
The intra-party conflict ended with the resignation of some of the party most prominent 
government members and ministers at the Knittelfeld meeting. As a consequence new early 
elections were called by chancellor Schüssel in November 2002. In the 2002 election cam-
paign the FPÖ adopted again a critical position towards the European Union and the enlarge-
ment in particular. The slogan during the campaign was: ‘EU critics vote blue. The FPÖ 
stands for an Austria without ifs and buts’ (FPÖ 200 ). The party declared to be against the 
enlargement claiming that it was necessary to wait for the new countries to reach the same 
levels of social welfare and environmental standards before joining the EU. The Temelin nu-
clear power plant located in the Czech Republic and close to the Austria border became one 
of the main issues explaining an Austrian veto against the enlargement.  
At the 2002 election the FPÖ lost about two-thirds of its electoral support. In 2005, 
Haider and other ex-FPÖ members formed the BZÖ. In the following years, FPÖ’s position 
on EU became more openly critical. This was facilitated by the fact that the FPÖ was no 
longer in government, since all members of the party who had been in government had shifted 
to the BZÖ.  
At the 2006 parliamentary election, the FPÖ, now under the new leadership of Heinz-
Christian Strache, emphasised the importance of preserving Austrian sovereignty and its neu-
trality in a Europe of fatherlands (Europa der Vaterländer) (cf. FPÖ 2006:10). Just like the 
Danish People’s Party, the FPÖ did not reject Europe t ut court, but pointed to the threats to 
national independence and problems of democratic def it that are embedded in the European 
process. However, in recent documents the party describ  the Austria’s possible exit from the 
EU as ‘not a taboo, but ultima ratio’ (FPÖ 2008: 172) against the development of the Euro-
pean Union into a central state. The party also observe  that an exit from the European Union 
does not mean an exit from Europe and that the European countries which at present do not 
belong to the EU ‘are on average – measured in GDP per capita – considerably richer than 
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those which are part of the Union’ (FPÖ 2008: 172) and here the party mentions Luxemburg, 
Switzerland, Norway and Iceland (before its financil and economic collapse).  
As the Danish People’s Party and the Northern Leagu, the FPÖ has strongly and cate-
gorically opposed Turkish EU membership (cf. FPÖ 2006: 10 and FPÖ 2008: 173). Turkey is 
considered culturally far too different from Europe and therefore not an eligible member. For 
this reason the party argues that ‘the accession negotiations with Turkey must stop and must 
be followed by the determination of the EU external borders’ and in the end ‘Turkey’s access 
in the EU has to be followed by the immediate exit of Austria from EU’ (FPÖ 2008: 173).  
 
7.6.2 On Austrian neutrality, NATO and on the FPÖ anti-American position  
FPÖ has also changed its position on NATO over the years. As mentioned, Austria’s histori-
cal and geopolitical situation immediately following WWII did not allow the country to join 
NATO when it was established in 1949. At that time, one-third of the country’s territory was 
still under the military control of Soviet troops, while the remaining two-thirds were con-
trolled by the other Allied forces. Moreover, the alpine land did not have armed forces of its 
own and it occupied a strategic position between the East and the West. Under these condi-
tions, NATO did not and could not ask Austria to join in. The possibility of Austrian NATO 
membership became even more remote in 1955, when the country signed the State Treaty, 
which provided for the withdrawal of the Allied troops from Austrian territory on the condi-
tion that the country became a permanently neutral s ate. In the following years and particu-
larly during the Cold War, Austria maintained this specific position of ‘non-engagement’; the 
country never joined NATO and – as described above – it became a member of the EEC/EU 
only after the end of the Cold War in 1995.  
The Austrian EU membership changed also the perspective on NATO. In the late 1990s, 
joining the NATO became a concrete perspective for the neutral country. In those years, the 
FPÖ had a rather positive standpoint, which was quite clearly formulated by in the 1997 pro-
gramme:  
 
Neutrality as the dominant maxim of action in Austria’s foreign policy has lost its function with 
the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the end of the Cold War. After entry into the UN in 1955 
neutrality was given up step by step and became obsolete with EU accession in 1995. In addi-
tion, the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 has become irrelevant’ (FPÖ 1997: 12). 
 
According to the FPÖ, this called for a different approach to the country’s security policy: 
 
It is in the interest of Austria’s security to have the protection of a functioning comprehensive 
defence system. That is why Austria should be a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) and should actively participate in 
building up the European Security and Defence system (FPÖ 1997: 12). 
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The FPÖ’s position expressed above was perhaps also a sign of the normalization and gov-
ernment seeking process that the party was evidently going through in the late 1990s. The 
opening towards NATO was also endorsed by the declaration of intents by the new ÖVP-FPÖ 
government in February 2000, in which chancellor Schüssel affirmed that the cooperation on 
security and defence policy at the European level in order to maintain peace was one of Aus-
tria’s highest priorities and that this involved ‘deepening the relations with NATO in order to 
open the possibility of a membership at a later point in time’ (in ÖVP and FPÖ 2000). 
The Freedom Party also seemed to have abandoned the anti-American sentiments and 
positions that had characterised some right wing enviro ments in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
which had much earlier historical roots (cf. Bischof 2007). Similarly to the anti-American 
position and feelings in some left-wing milieus, the right wing’s critique developed into two 
main directions: the hegemonic role of America in international politics against which Europe 
was considered to play almost the role of a colony a d the American cultural assault on the 
European civilization, considered to corrupt the value and cultural system of Europe with its 
exploitative and consumerist capitalism and values.   
However, at least in terms of FPÖ’s official position, the party seemed to have devel-
oped a more positive attitude towards the US in the late 1980s and 1990s. This was partly also 
transmitted by Jörg Haider, who showed particular interest in the American electoral cam-
paigning strategies.82 Things changed in 2003, when Haider visited Saddam Hussein in Iraq 
on the eve of the US attack on Iraq. Haider condemned US foreign policy and asserted that 
there was little difference between President George W. Bush and the Iraqi dictator (cf. 
Bischof 2007: 169). Haider’s initiative was strongly criticised in particular by FPÖ’s govern-
ment members, but also indicated another readjustment of the party’s politics.  
The most recent FPÖ official documents show that the party has actually stepped back 
on most of the positions on foreign policy described above. Today the party not only rejects 
the prospect of Austria as a member of NATO, but has developed a very negative critique of 
USA’s role in foreign policy and its (lack of) values and principle. These positions emerge 
clearly in the ‘Manual of the freedomite politics’ and ‘We and Islam’. In the latter, the FPÖ 
attacks what the party considers the belligerent US foreign policy promoted by George Bush 
‘the warmonger’ (Kriegshetzer), that particularly in the Middle East increased the level of 
violence. The FPÖ condemns ‘the aggressive repressive politics of Israel against the Pales-
tinians’ asserting that the methods are ‘inhuman and to be denounced’, adding that the FPÖ 
‘supports the efforts of the Palestinians who want to live in their own state’ (FPÖ 2008). This 
is a very different position on the Israeli-Palestinian question than the one developed by the 
other two parties, in particular by the Danish Peopl ’s Party (see here chapter 5). The latter 
two parties consider Israel one of the last bastion of ‘western civilization’ resisting the Mus-
lim threat (cf. also Betz and Meret 2009). The FPÖ seems to prefer the principle often as-
                                                
82 The FPÖ leadership was clearly inspired by Newt Gingrich in the party document ‘20 pledges for the contract 
with Austria’ mentioned above (cf. also Bischof 2007: 169)  
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serted in its policy agendas claiming the basic right to their Heimat of the ‘historically settled 
cultural groups’, which is repeated when the party speaks about a Europe of fatherlands. 
 
On the whole, the critique of the US role and the appeal to Europe to free itself from its 
subordinate position are specific positions developd by the FPÖ and which certainly distin-
guish the Austrian party today from the Danish Peopl ’s Party and the Northern League. In 
this respect, the FPÖ’s quest for a European identity and self-consciousness that has to re-
spond to the cultural assaults against the European value system is somehow better fastened. 
Islam continues to represent the principal and most imminent threat to Western culture and 
values, but also other exogenous principles and values can, in the view of the party, corrupt 
and ruin the Christian European civilization. Undoubtedly the recent radicalization of the 
FPÖ’s positions must be considered in relation to the party’s return to opposition in Austrian 
politics, which has allowed it to recuperate and re-launch the image of an anti-establishment 
party defending the identity, values and principles of a Christian Europe.  
 
Conclusions 
Of the three parties considered in this study, the Freedom Party has gained the least from be-
ing in office from 2000 to 2005. The Austrian party was not able to take advantage of the cir-
cumstances once it became politically influential. Part of the explanation is to be found in the 
specific conditions that followed the FPÖ’s entry into government and in the party’s internal 
organisation. However, also in ideological terms, it  participation in government implied po-
litical negotiations and concessions that directly affected the position of this party in Austrian 
politics and damaged its image among the party supporters. 
Compared to the other two radical right parties, the FPÖ started its government experi-
ence under strong national and international pressu. From start, its politics seemed domesti-
cated by the responsibilities of being in government and by the necessity of proving itself a 
reliable political partner. The first disappointment was of course that Jörg Haider did not 
manage to get into government. But also that in the 2000 declaration of intents, the newly 
formed ÖVP-FPÖ government had to take almost an oath f compliance to the European in-
tegration project. It was a bad start for the FPÖ, which impinged on the profile of an anti-
establishment party working to change the status quo. Things did not get better with time. The 
tension between being a party with government respon ibility and the attempt to keep a criti-
cal line against the politics of the establishment created serious problems also within the 
party’s own ranks. The FPÖ cabinet members were directly accused of sacrificing the party’s 
ideology and politics for real politics. The policies approved by the government did not meet 
the voters’ expectations. An example is immigration where only limited results were obtained 
in the first year the FPÖ was in office.  
The party’s internal crisis took a sharp turn in 200 , when some of the FPÖ’s most 
prominent members in government resigned. This confirmed the party’s difficulties coping 
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with government responsibility and the additional three years that the FPÖ spent in office 
with the ÖVP did not bring the internal factions together. When in 2005 most of the FPÖ 
government team left the party to launch the BZÖ, the opportunity for a new start was created 
for the FPÖ. Back in opposition, the party returned to a vote maximizing strategy (cf. Luther 
2007), which started a new phase of radicalization, whose impact can be traced on the party’s 
ideology.  
The chapter has described the FPÖ’s ideological development during the different 
phases of its lifecycle. As in the chapters on the Danish People’s Party and the Northern 
League, this has been done by considering how the Fre dom Party has placed itself in relation 
to main ideological issues referring respectively to the economic and value dimensions of 
politics. More concretely the aspects considered have dealt with the party’s position on neo-
liberal and tax issues, anti-establishment politics, anti-immigration, EU and foreign policy and 
with positions that refer to the tensions between authoritarian and libertarian values, conform-
ist and anti-conformist views. As mentioned, the att mpt was to track some of the main trans-
formations in relation to the party’s ideological development and political achievements, pay-
ing attention to the way the political opportunity structure has influenced the decisions and 
characteristics of the party.  
Like the other two parties, the FPÖ is a highly dynamic party, also in ideological terms. 
Today, its profile as social and Heimat party is highly emphasised. This is one of the most 
interesting and recent developments of this party, in roducing the two most important corner-
stones of the FPÖ’s ideology: its commitment to the nation/homeland and to cultural and 
identity questions as well as its focus on social and welfare issues. In this respect, it is difficult 
not to see a higher degree of similarity with the pro-welfare direction already consolidated 
and championed by the Danish People’s Party. Considering the predominantly neo-liberal 
vocation that characterised the FPÖ in the 1990s, thi  new formulation represents a notewor-
thy adjustment in the party’s positioning on economic atters, in which a welfare chauvinist 
approach is no longer considered to interfere with demands for a more efficient public ad-
ministration, less public spending and more space to the private initiative. The party therefore 
underlines the importance of a welfare state limited to those in society who deserve help, ask-
ing at the same time for stricter rules against welfar  abuse, particularly among immigrants, 
who are framed as undeserving recipients of welfare programmes and benefits.  
However, the stronger ideological convergence betwen the FPÖ and the other two par-
ties observed in this study regards the developments o  the value and cultural dimension. Im-
migration, but increasingly Islam, is to be considere  the greatest problem for the future sta-
bility and security in the Western and Christian part of the world. The reference to Europe’s 
Christian heritage is also for the FPÖ (as we saw for the Northern League) relatively new. 
Actually it only became part of the party’s official discourse at the end of the 1990s, thus 
changing the FPÖ’s traditional anti-clerical profile. Significantly, Christianity has become one 
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of the cardinal references in the discussion about the (spiritual) values and foundations of the 
West threatened by the advance of Islam.83 
Much less aligned is the position of the Austrian Freedom Party on foreign policy is-
sues. On the process of European integration the party h s developed a more radical line, 
maintaining for example that if Turkey enters in the EU, Austria should react by withdrawing 
its membership. Furthermore and quite in contrast with the position of the Northern League, 
but particularly with the Danish People’s Party, the FPÖ continues to encourage an anti-
American position and also in relation to the Israeli nd Palestinian conflict, the FPÖ stands 
out for its attacks to Israel, diverging in this from the pro-Israel position that at present charac-
terises most of the radical right in Western Europe.  
The analysis of the development of the FPÖ ideology over time shows therefore that the 
Austrian party has several common ideological positions with the Danish People’s Party and 
the Northern League, but that substantial differences between the parties continue to be such. 
The FPÖ’s negative experience in government has driven the party back to a more radical line 
and vote maximising profile. The question is whether t  party in the future will look at the 
experience of the mainstream radical right, or if it will prefer to remain in opposition to exert 
its political influence.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
83 At the European Paliament election of June 2009 one of FPÖ’s slogans was: ‘The West in Christian hands’ 
(Abendland in Christenhand; cf. also Betz and Meret 2009).  
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PART III  
THE VOTERS’ PROFILE AND ATTITUDES 
 
8. THE VOTERS’ PROFILE: SOCIAL CLEAVAGES  
Introduction 
This and the following chapter will look respectively at the profile and issue positioning of the 
Danish People’s Party, the Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party voters. The pre-
vious chapters, mapping the ideological development of the three parties (see here Chapters 5, 
6 and 7), have suggested an ideological convergence taking place on the cultural and value 
dimension of politics and in particular on the immigration question, but also on a number of 
other value-related issues. The task of this chapter is to see whether there is convergence be-
tween the profiles of radical right electorates in the three countries as regards voters’ social 
profile and issue positions. Have the radical right parties become loudspeakers of the needs 
and demands of particular segments of the electorate? Here, the messages and the policies of 
the radical right parties need to be considered and understood in relation to the characteristics 
and demands of the electoral support base. Differenc s may remain, for example the three 
party agendas still seem to diverge on the economic dimension. The Danish People’s Party 
dropped tax protest and public retrenchment in favour of a pro-welfare positioning. The Free-
dom Party in Austria has until recently maintained a strong neoliberal profile, defending pri-
vate initiative and market freedom and asking for less interference from the state. However, 
this position would seem at odds with the party’s support among manual workers, and this 
may explain why in more recent years the Freedom Party h s adopted a social and more pro-
welfare profile (see Chapter 7). Compared to the other wo parties, the Northern League has 
maintained a neoliberal and tax protest profile, thus changing little of its economic agenda 
over the years (cf. Chapter 6). It is interesting to examine whether this corresponds with a 
different social composition of the party’s electorate, with a recruitment more biased towards 
self-employed and people working in the private sector.  
To a considerable extent, the ideological development of a party must be assumed to de-
pend also on the political and institutional environment within which the party operates (e.g. 
Carter 2005; Kriesi et al. 2008; Arzheimer 2009). This means that competition with other par-
ties, feedback from the electorate and the different positions occupied by the party in the na-
tional political space can stimulate a re-orientation of political strategies and politics. In this 
sense, party politics can both influence and be influe ced by the demands and opportunities 
coming from the national electoral market. In this and the following chapter, the effects of the 
interaction between the parties and the electorate will thus be addressed and elaborated in a 
comparative approach that will hopefully produce more knowledge about the radical right 
vote in relation to the political context and its development.    
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The radical right electoral profile will be analysed in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. The present 
chapter introduces a comparative overview and discussion of the parties’ social profile regard-
ing gender, generational composition, occupation and educational levels. Several studies un-
derline the increasing similarities of the radical right social profile, focussing in particular on 
working class support and on the low educational att inments among supporters of the radical 
right (cf. Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Arzheimer and Carter 2003; Goul Andersen & Bjørk-
lund 2002). Roughly formulated, male manual workers and voters with lower education seem 
to have become the electoral backbone of several radical right parties in Western Europe 
(Swyngedouw 1998; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2002; Plasser and Ulram 2000; Hains-
worth 2000).  
These characteristics have been differently interpreted, often with reference to the pro-
found socioeconomic and cultural transformations that have changed working and living con-
ditions in the last couple of decades. Risk has becom  a main component, it is argued, of the 
way individuals experience their present role and future prospects in the different contexts of 
their everyday life (cf. Bauman 1998; Beck 2009; Kriesi et al. 2008). As described in previous 
chapters, the marginalisation hypotheses tends to acribe the voting patterns of the working 
class to the impact of globalisation on advanced capitalist societies. In particular, globalisa-
tion is considered to limit the employment opportunities of the less qualified and low edu-
cated social groups, which could arguably make them more worried about the effects of in-
creasing immigration on the labour market and on the welfare state.  
We will not discuss the premises of the social impact of globalization, which seem ques-
tionable at least in the Scandinavian countries (e.g. Goul Andersen 2007c). Even if the social 
impact is minor, “objectively” speaking, there may still be a psychological effect. In our em-
pirical analysis we will concentrate on the association between the individual’s socio-
economic background and vote for the radical right. 
Referring to an even deeper layer of social, cultura  and political change, the new politi-
cal cleavages approach claims that support to the radical right parties should be understood 
first of all in terms of a shift in traditional class voting and consequent realignment following 
different and new patterns of political support. Within this framework the radical right is 
largely explained in terms of authoritarian and materi list attitudes and viewpoints clashing 
with the libertarian and postmaterialist concerns of the new left. Social class and economic 
interests gradually became less important elements to explain how people vote, whereas a 
new dimension gained ground in politics. This was increasingly engaged with values, princi-
ples and beliefs which increasingly came to be at odds with each other and which projected a 
whole new set of politics and cultural issues on which the parties had find a position (cf. 
Flanagan & Lee 2003). Hence, the attitudes of the electorate of the Danish People’s Party, the 
Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party will be examined in relation to some of 
these issues, to see in what respect and eventually how the positions of these voters differ 
 213 
from the rest of the electorate. This will allow us to track down some of the most relevant 
similarities and differences among them.   
Apart from providing a comprehensive and as reliable as possible data foundation to de-
scribe the voters’ social profile, the approach is to move away from the interpretation of the 
radical right as a fleeting phenomenon. If this reading was understandable at a time when 
these parties were still considered “flash” parties, today several of them are no longer excep-
tional or marginal actors, but have become mainstream and active participants in the political 
landscape.  
This also means that the political position and the political messages of these parties may 
change over time; a development that, in turn, could also impact on the parties’ electoral 
composition. As observed in the previous chapters on party ideology (see Chapter 5, 6, and 7), 
parties may enter a phase of ‘normalisation’ where ideology tends to de-radicalise, in because 
the party works to gain broader support among the electorate and therefore pays more atten-
tion to the nature and substance of the message that is sent out to the electorate. This ap-
proach, which until very recently has been largely neglected by the scholarly literature, en-
courages more explicit analyses of the mutual relationship between the radical right ideologi-
cal and institutional development and the electoral support. 
 
8.1 The survey data  
The comparative analysis of the electorate is based on quantitative data from national elec-
toral surveys and other international surveys (cf. Chapter 2). The analysis of the DPP voters is 
based on the Danish Election Surveys (1994-2007), which represent the most detailed and 
comprehensive material to study the electoral profile of the Danish People’s Party in relation 
to the other parties in Denmark. The Italian National Election Studies (ITANES) covering 
1994-2008 are the basis of most analyses of the profile of the Northern League supporters. 
Radical right supporters are often better representd in national election surveys than in inter-
national surveys; for this reason these data were preferred over cross-country surveys. How-
ever, since the Austrian national election surveys are unfortunately not available to the inter-
national scientific community, the analysis of FPÖ voters is based on a number of recent in-
ternational surveys (ISSP, EVS and ESS), referring approximately to 1995 to 2002-03.  
 Exploiting different national and international data sources was therefore one of the 
most challenging tasks of this comparative analysis, particularly in relation to the need of 
finding equivalent and comparable variables. The variables selected are therefore those con-
sidered most reliable and similar in relation to the scopes and goals of the present analysis. 
This has also allowed an extension of the time span considered, which is here long enough to 
observe how the voters’ social profile and position on a number of issues have developed and 
changed over time.  
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8.2 Male dominated parties 
Voting patterns have shown that the electorate of radical right parties, in the broadest sense, is 
skewed towards men (cf. Givens 2004; 2005; Mayer 1998; Kitschelt 1995; Plasser, Ulram and 
Sommer 2000). Radical right parties are also held to be swayed by the appeal of charismatic 
male leaders (cf. Pedahzur and Brichta 2002; Eatwell 2002). Recent studies have actually 
shown that strong leadership does not have a significa t effect on the electoral support and 
outcomes of the radical right (cf. van der Brug and Mughan 2007), but both the Northern 
League and the Austrian Freedom Party have since the la e 1980s been led by charismatic 
male leaders. In contrast, the Danish People’s Party h s since the start been led by a woman, 
Pia Kjærsgaard.84 Together with the male overrepresentation in the party electoral composi-
tion, the charismatic leadership has for long been considered a common feature with the fas-
cist parties of the past (cf. Durham 1998) also characterising the poujadiste and later the tax 
protest movements of the 1970s.    
The high proportion of male voters has followed theel ctoral development of most of 
the recent radical right parties over time, cutting across the different national contexts and 
thus also different social and cultural traditions i  relation to gender role and gender equal-
ity.85 Interpretations of the difference between men’s and women’s votes for radical right par-
ties vary (cf. Givens 2004; Simmons 2001) and it isuseful to sum up some of the main hy-
potheses that have been used to explain this trend. However, the analysis of gender difference 
in this section will focus on gender composition to see whether the electorate of the three 
cases here considered is heavily skewed toward men.If so, it will be interesting to observe if 
the support from women has changed over time, suggestin  a relationship with the different 
phases of the radical right party life course. Finally, s gender can only indirectly explain the 
difference between male and female voters (cf. Norris 1996), we will briefly consider what 
are the intervening variables. Specific gender attitudes have for instance been associated to 
different conditions that pertain to different aspects and conditions of women’s life style, so-
cial and political values and working experiences.  
A classical interpretation considers gender difference in voting behaviour closely re-
lated to women’s preference for parties that promote moderate politics and views of the world 
(cf. Norris 1996). This makes female voters less keen to vote for parties that are considered to 
have radical positions. In this case, the radical right’s low electoral appeal among female vot-
ers should be seen in relation to the party’s position n the party system; the more extreme, the 
lower its appeal to women. The scholarly research that suggests that it is because of the par-
                                                
84 The Scandinavian radical right represents an interes ing exception to charismatic male leadership. Pia Kjærs-
gaard was leader of the Progress Party in the years 1985 and until her leaver in 1995. More recently in Norway, a 
woman, Siv Jensen, took over the leadership of the Norwegian Progress Party, replacing Carl I. Hagen. Under 
her leadership, the Norwegian Progress Party gained about 23 pct. of the votes at the parliamentary election in 
September 2009. The Norwegian Progress Party is the econd largest in the country after the social democratic 
Arbejderparti (Labour Party).     
85 The lack of thorough analyses of the radical right ender difference has recently been observed also by Cas 
Mudde (see Mudde 2007: 90).  
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ties’ authoritarian positions, anti-immigration politics and ultratraditionalist views (for in-
stance on abortion, homosexuality and children upbringing) that women do not vote for the 
radical right as much as men, refers to the same notion (e.g. Kitschelt 1995; Mayer 1998). In 
this case, the authoritarian positions expressed by the radical right are believed to find limited 
support among female voters, as women have less authoritarian values and a more moderate 
view of the world.  
With the increasing participation of women in the labour market, other approaches 
gained weight, emphasising for example the fact that women can be strongly influenced by 
working in specific sectors of the labour market. The low appeal that radical right parties have 
among female voters is in this case ascribed to the fact that women, more often than men, are 
employed in environments with high levels of social interactions, e.g. the nursing and social 
care sectors, and more generally as public salariats. Working in these sectors may affect 
women’s empathy, making them more inclined than men to develop tolerant attitudes and 
liberatian values (Kitschelt 1995).  
The explanations above start out by considering howvalue preferences influence party 
choice among female and male voters, implicitly maintaining that the position of a party re-
mains constant over time. However, as pointed out in the introduction, the position and the 
political messages of these parties may change over tim . Government seeking policies and 
positions could for example contribute to a less radic l image of a party, increasing its elec-
toral appeal among female voters. In this case, the effects of the party strategy and life-cycle 
should be empirically observed in a reduction of the gender gap, when a radical right party 
approaches or achieves political influence. 
 Some of the implications of the hypotheses will be discussed in relation to the three 
radical right parties considered, to the extent allowed by the data and by the limits established 
by this section.  
 First we examine to what extent the image of ‘male-dominated’ parties applies to the 
Danish People’s Party, the Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party. Table 8.1 shows 
that men are more inclined than women to vote for the Danish People’s Party, the Northern 
League and the Austrian Freedom Party. The gender gap is significant for the whole period 
(1998-2005) in the case of the Danish People’s Party, but changes in the two other cases.86 
 
                                                
86 However this is also a result of the varying and often small number of cases registered for the Northern 
League in the 2001 and 2005 survey and for the Freedom Party in the 2002 survey.  
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Table 8.1 Support for Frp/DF, LN and FPÖ among men and women, 1994-2006. Percentages. 
Sources and notes to survey data used:  
Denmark: Danish Election Studies, 1994-2007. Political weight (based on official election result). For the 
2007 Danish election survey only the main survey is included and not the web panel.  
Italy: Italian National Electoral Studies (ITANES), 1994-2006. Demographic weight only for 2001 (peso-
dem) as suggested in the ITANES survey guidelines. Population and political weight (ACweight) for sur-
vey 2006. 
Austria: International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1995; European Value Survey (EVS) 1999; Euro-
pean Social Survey (ESS) 2002-03. Population weight (design weight); ISSP 2004. 
N refers to the elections in Denmark (DF), Italy (LN) and Austria (FPÖ).  
 
* Gender difference significant at 0.05 level.  
¹ Danish Progress Party (FrP) in 1994. In 1998 the FrP managed to get just above the electoral threshold. 
The party’s strong (female!) candidate in Northern Jutland, Kirsten Jakobsen, ensured the FrP two of the 
four parliamentary mandates. 
² The question for party choice in the 1994 post electoral study was open-ended (see ITANES 1994). The 
vote for 1994 is therefore calculated as the sum of votes coded for the Lombard League, for the Venetia  
League and for Umberto Bossi, respectively. 
 
Considering the gender composition of the parties, he proportion of men was already at the 
time of the Danish Progress Party voters (1973-1990) between 55 and 67 pct. (Goul Andersen 
& Bjørklund 2000). This was at the time when tax protest, anti-establishment politics and 
ultraliberal positions were (still) central issues on the party’s political agenda. This at least 
suggests that the biased gender composition is not primarily related to the emergence of the 
party’s anti-immigration position. Other studies confirm that gender is not so central to ex-
plaining different attitudes towards immigration in Danish politics (cf. Stubager 2004). There 
is also little evidence for the interpretation indicat ng employment in the public sector and 
particularly in occupations with a high degree of scial interactions as a reason that women 
are less likely than men to vote for a radical right party. The Danish People’s Party is in fact 
poorly represented among the public salariats, bothw men and men. 
 When the Danish People’s Party was launched in 1995, men continued to be overrepre-
sented in comparison with other mainstream parties. Even though the issue of immigration 
was now elevated to the core issue, there was no change in gender composition. Nor dit it 
DF 1994¹ 1998 2001 2005 2007 
14 Male 
Female 
  8* 
5 
  9* 
6 
  15* 
9 
  15* 
11 13 
LN 1994² 1996 2001 2006 2008 
Male  6   10* 3 3 8 
Female 5 7 2 3 9 
FPÖ 1995 1999 2002 2004  
Male   21* 23   7* 11  
Female 12 18 4 10  
N      
Denmark 906 1002 983 1138 627 
 862 832 894 921 694 
Italy 808 1101 1191 1314 899 
 749 905 1056 1207 828 
Austria 333 490 651 285  
 377 550 732 311  
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improve the party’s appeal among Danish female voters that the party leader was a woman 
(Pia Kjærsgaard) with an employment record in the (public) elder care sector. As observed in 
Table 8.2, showing the percentage difference from the average proportion of female voters in 
the election surveys in the main Danish parties, the proportion of women in the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party electorate remained below average from 1998 to 2007.  
 
Table 8.2 Proportion of women among voters of main Danish political parties. Percentage differences 
from proportion of female among all voters with party choice (1994-2005). 
Source: Danish Election Studies, 1994-2007. Politica  weight (see note under Table 8.1). 
Abbr.: Socialist People’s Parti (SF); Social Democrats (S); Social Liberals (RV); Liberal Party (V); 
Conservative Party (K); Danish People’s Party (DF).  
¹ The figure for 1994 refers to the Danish Progress Party (FrP). 
² Figures are in brackets if N is lower than 100. 
 
The male ‘dominated’ electoral profile of the Danish People’s Party seems to support the hy-
pothesis that women are more reluctant to vote for political parties that are considered ex-
treme (as they have always been, cf. Goul Andersen 1984). On the other hand, Table 8.2 dis-
confirms the classical assumption about a conservative orientation among the female elector-
ate (cf. Duverger 1955; see also Norris 1996: 335). Currently, women show rather to prefer 
left-wing parties, and at least since the late 1960s, there has been no conservative inclinations 
among women (cf. Goul Andersen 1984) as it still did in other European countries. Since the 
mid-1970s, the vote for the left has been stronger among public employees; this explains 
much of the gender difference in voting patterns, but the Danish People’s Party is poorly rep-
resented among public employees, both for men and women.  
The observations thus confirm the stronger popularity of the Danish People’s Party 
among the male electorate. However, this gender bias seems to have become less pronounced 
since 2001 and had almost evaporated in 2007, according to the Danish election survey. Table 
8.2 actually suggests that the Liberals and the Conservatives had a more biased gender com-
position than the Danish People’s Party in the 2007 election. However, it is very difficult to 
conclude with certainty whether the political responsibility wielded by the Danish People’s 
Party from 2001 to 2007 has helped to ‘normalise’ th  party’s image and to increase its appeal 
 1994 1998 2001 2005 2007 
SF +12 +11 +17 +9 +13 
S +1 +1 +3 +5 0 
RV (+7)² (-1) +9 -3 (+8) 
V -3 -6 -2 -3 -6 
K -7 -1 -5 -3 -5 
DF¹ (-11) -8 -13 -7 -1 
All 49 45 48 45 52 
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among women87. In any case, the figures at least seem here to indicate that women do not 
longer consider the party so much at odds with the rest of the mainstream right wing.  
 In the case of the Northern League, there is reason to believe that during phases of 
‘normalisation’ the party achieves better results among the female electorate, whereas in peri-
ods of political radicalisation outside government, for example in 1996, Italian men remain 
the core supporters, while women prefer to vote elswhere. This reading seems to be sup-
ported by early analyses of the gender gap in the Northern League’s electoral composition. 
Already in the 1980s, when the different ethnoregionalist leagues had not yet merged under 
the Lombard League to form today’s Northern League, th  support from the male voters was 
dominant (see Mannheimer 1991). In the following years, also women started to show in-
creasing interest for the party (see Diamanti 1993), perhaps as an effect of its political nor-
malization as it became more engaged in government seeking politics. The party succeeded in 
1994, when the centre-right wing coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi took office. But the pro-
found changes of the Italian political system that d helped the party away from the margins 
brought on the scene a new and strong electoral competitor to the Northern League: Forza 
Italia, the party founded by Silvio Berlusconi. FI appealed to some of the same electoral seg-
ments in the North and became particularly popular among Italian housewives (cf. ITANES 
2001: 47-58; cf. also Meret 2007).   
 The Northern League’s withdrawal from the first Berlusconi coalition provoked a gov-
ernment crisis and disappointed part of the electorate. At the following election in 1996, the 
centre-left coalition won. It is likely that the period of radicalization and peripheralization that 
followed the Northern League’s short government experience in the 1990s contributed to 
alienate female voters from the party. This decision was followed by a radicalisation of the 
party politics, particularly in relation to the North and South question and the proposed seces-
sion of the Padanian ‘nation’ from the rest of the country (see Chapter 6).  
 In 1996 the League got large electoral support from men (cf. Table 8.1 above). The 
Northern League radicalized its politics as well as its language and rhetoric. It was in the 
same years that Bossi provocatively stated that “the League has a hard-on”.88 He obviously 
did not take into account the negative impact that is kind of ‘macho’ slogan could have had 
on the female voters.  
 In 2001 the Northern League was again on its way to government, this time with much 
narrower electoral support. Table 8.3 shows that in the years 2001 and 2008 the percentage 
differences from the proportion of female voters is le s pronounced in the electoral composi-
tion of the Northern League, suggesting that governm nt responsibility helped the party to 
attract more female voters than for example the right wing party Alleanza Nazionale. 
                                                
87 A larger Gallup omnibus survey (N=61,000) carried out in November 14, 2007- October 1, 2008 shows how-
ever that the Danish People’s Party continues to be more strongly represented among men (57%) than women 
(48%).  
88 ‘La Lega Nord ce l’ha duro’; these words were shouted loud by the LN leader Umberto Bossi at the party 
congress in 1997. See at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uV6U0p0ie8s.    
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Table 8.3 Proportion of women among voters of main Italian political parties. Percentage differences 
from proportion of female among all voters with party choice (1996-2008). 
Source: ITANES 1996-2006. Only votes to Chamber of Deputies (proportional vote). 
Weight as indicated under Table 8.1. Data unweighted for ITANES 2008. 
 
Abbr.: Communist Refundation Party (Prc); Ulivo (OliveTre Coalition: Leftwing Democrats (DS), Mar-
gherita, Italian Communists (CI) and Greens (Verdi)); Forza Italia (FI); National Alliance (AN); Northern 
League (LN).  
¹ N lower than 100 are indicated in parentheses. For the LN the number of survey respondents was: 158 
(1996); 55 (2001); 86 (2006); 152 (2008). 
² The percentages for 2008 answer to the new scenario of political coalitions: Prc is therefore replaced by the 
Leftwing Rainbow (Sinistra Arcobaleno) including Prc, CI and Verdi; the Ulivo coalition by the Democratic 
Party (PD) and AN is considered with FI under the People’s Freedom Party (Popolo della Libertà, PdL). The
LN runs the elections ‘alone’, making a separate agr ement with the PdL. Same party coding for 2008 in all 
the following tables with main Italian parties. 
 
At the election in 2008, the Northern League seemed to regain some support from Italian 
women, whereas the support to Forza Italia was negativ ly affected by its merger with Al-
leanza Nazionale to form the new right-wing The Peopl ’s Freedom Party (Il Popolo della 
Libertà, PdL) (cf. Table 8.3).  
 By 2006, the Northern League had been in government for about five years, showing to 
be a loyal and reliable political coalition partner. In the brief period when the centre left was 
in government (2006-2008), the Northern League consolidated its profile as a government 
oriented party that could ‘make a difference’. The party continued to support the coalition led 
by Berlusconi, but refused to join the formation of the PdL, the right-wing answer to the crea-
tion of the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD) on the left wing of Italian politics.  
 At the elections held in April 2008, the party achieved more than 8 pct. of the votes at 
the national level, doubling the electoral result and the number of parliamentary mandates 
(from 26 to 60) in the Deputy Chamber (cf. Table 1.3 Chapter 1). Also in terms of gender 
composition, there was little difference between the male and the female vote for the party 
(see Table 8.1; cf. also ITANES 2008: 84). These reults again seem to support the thesis that 
in phases of normalization and government seeking responsibility the radical right has a better 
appeal among female voters than in periods of margin lization and radicalization.  
 Another aspect of the party ideology also deserves to be mentioned in relation to the 
vote; the Northern League has in recent years emphasised ‘modern traditionalist’ positions on 
family politics and on questions involving the role of women in society. Against the 
“mondialist” and homogenizing view of the world (see Chapter 6), promoting what the party 
considered a dominant individualism and the fragmentation of the social, the Northern League 
 1996 2001 2006 2008² 
Prc +2 -7 -5 (-14) 
Ulivo +2 +2 +1 +2 
FI +12 +10 +6 +5 
AN 0 -10 -9 . 
LN -5 (-3)¹ (+1) +1 
All 45 47 48 48 
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invokes the ‘integral’ and integrated unit represented by the family (husband, wife, father, 
mother and children) and its social and civic function in terms of stability, fertility and posi-
tive social unit of reference. In practical terms, the party has translated this position into de-
mands for an improved social welfare for families with children, including for example child 
benefits, tax reductions to families with many children, housing facilities and discounts to 
basic child products.  
 The Northern League promotes a profile of protector of the traditional family, a role that 
in the past was almost the exclusive domain of the C ristian Democrats. The party has also 
taken a more inward position on matters such as abortion, homosexuality and rights to unmar-
ried couples (see here Chapter 6). It is important to point out that the increasing interest and 
emphasis on family politics and rights matured togeher with amplified attention towards the 
Christian values and principles and the need to defend these values against the dangers from 
Islam and from the generalized deterioration of contemporary Western societies due to indi-
vidualist lifestyles and multicultural utopias. The significance that Christianity is given today 
in the Northern League’s political agenda and rhetoric has driven the party toward more in-
transigent positions, for example in relation to abrtion, artificial insemination and scientific 
use of embryonic stem cells. It is plausible that tis change in political profile would enhance 
the appeal of the Northern League among the most religious female voters with lower levels 
of education and perhaps also with a conventional view of the world. This might also suggest 
that the party will continue to be rather poorly represented among the younger generations of 
female voters with higher levels of education.   
 Gender-specific voting behaviour has characterised Austrian politics since the 1980s. 
Austrian electoral studies have demonstrated that the gender gap widened in the course of the 
1980s, and in the late 1990s it was possible to speak about a gender-specific party system in 
Austria (Plasser Ulram 2000: 27). In the 1970s, women began to move away from a tradition-
ally anchored voting behaviour, influenced by churc affiliation and denominational milieus, 
and also as a consequence of increased labour market p rticipation and higher levels of educa-
tion. In the following decades women’s votes became more and more influenced by libertar-
ian and egalitarian values and principles. This adjustment went through a phase of gender 
voting alignment, during which the difference between men’s and women’s voting behaviour 
diminished significantly. The result was an increased electoral appeal of left-wing parties 
among female voters, in particular among the higher educated. Later the female electorate 
showed a preference for new political parties supporting environmental issues and libertarian 
politics, e.g. the Greens (see Plasser and Ulram 2000: 29). 
 While the left-wing parties appealed successfully to the female electorate, the Austrian 
Freedom Party became popular particularly among men. As Austrian electoral studies high-
light, the FPÖ was already in 1994 and until 1999 the second largest party among the male 
electorate (Plasser and Ulram 2000). Table 8.4 show a clear underrepresentation of women 
in the party’s electoral composition for the period 1995-2003. 
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Table 8.4 Proportion of women among FPÖ voters and main Austrian political parties. Percentage 
differences from the average proportion of female party voters in survey (1994-2006). 
 1995 1999 2003 2004 
Grüne -6 +8 +7 +7 
SPÖ 0 +1 -3 -3 
ÖVP +10 +1 +1 +2 
LiF (+2) (-2) . . 
FPÖ -14 -6 -15 -4 
All 53 53 53 52 
Sources: ISSP 1995; EVS 1999; ESS 2002-03; ISSP 2004. Weight (see note to Table 8.1). 
 
In 2002 electoral support to the Freedom Party dropped to only 10 pct. of the votes. The sud-
den decline of electoral support again widened the gender gap. According to the ISSP data, in 
2004 the difference between men and women seems to have weighted less than in the past. 
However, at the recent Austrian elections, the votef r the FPÖ was again higher among male 
voters than among women (see Plasser and Ulram 2008).  
 Predictably, the analysis of the gender composition above confirms that men have been 
overrepresented among the voters for all three parties in the period considered. As regards the 
explanations that have been put forward for this generalised gender difference in the radical 
right it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. However, the observations do suggest that – 
partly in line with the classic thesis about women’s reluctance to support “extremist” parties – 
the gender bias may decline over the party’s life course and in particular when the radical 
right party ‘becomes mainstream’.  
 
8.3 Generations, age and vote for the Danish People’s Party, the Northern League and the 
Austrian Freedom Party 
Several classical studies dealing with political behaviour and party choice have underlined the 
different political attitudes, preferences and priorities that characterise different generations 
and their vote across time. However, in relation to the radical right, there are contradictory 
interpretations of the effect of age and the generation l profile that characterises these parties.  
According to Ronald Inglehart (cf. Inglehart 1971; 1977), postmaterialist issues and new 
values have replaced the importance that materialist ssues and priorities had played for the 
generation born before the WWII. Consequently, postwar generations have developed more 
libertarian and anti-authoritarian attitudes in comparison to older cohorts. The unfolding of 
these changes implied that traditional, authoritarian and nationalistic positions mainly appeal 
to the older electoral cohorts, rather than to the new and increasingly postmaterialist genera-
tions. In this case, as Norris (2005) almost provocatively suggests, the radical right parties 
would be deemed to fade in popularity, due to the process of population replacement and the 
consequent shrinkage of the radical right electoral base.   
Quite in contrast with the above mentioned view, another scholarly reading suggests that 
it is often among the youngest generations of voters that the radical right finds the strongest 
support, as these voters are more likely to be unemployed and do not have the same partisan 
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connections as their parents (cf. Givens 2005: 60). If this is the case, education may play a 
role by influencing the position of the younger voters and their views of the world (cf. Westin 
2003: 119). 
If we look at the generational profile of the three parties, we observe a slightly skewed 
distribution towards the older cohorts that characterizes in particular some stages of the party 
development. However, when considered in a comparative perspective and at different peri-
ods, the generational composition of the radical right actually shows more varying patterns. 
This is shown in Table 8.5 below.  
 
Table 8.5 Support for Frp/DF, LN and FPÖ among main cohorts. Percentages. 
DF 1994¹ 1998 2001 2005 2007 
Born before 1930 
1930-44 
1945-59 
1960-74 
1975 and after 
11 
8 
5 
4 
0 
7 
9 
7 
7 
5 
11 
13 
10 
13 
12 
10 
18 
12 
12 
13 
19 
21 
14 
9 
11 
LN 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 
Born before 1930 5 12 2 2 4 
1930-44 5 7 2 2 7 
1945-59 6 8 3 5 9 
1960-74 6 11 2 4 12 
1975 and after 12 9 3 3 8 
FPÖ 1995 1999 2002   
Born before 1930 15 17 5   
1930-44 14 22 8   
1945-59 14 17 4   
1960-74 20 21 4   
1975 and after  18 24 6   
N      
Denmark      
 363 213 185 180 61 
 363 469 403 473 275 
 514 526 548 597 406 
 492 491 535 555 377 
 35 133 206 253 232 
Italy      
 255 99 170 62 68 
 300 266 509 462 369 
 456 673 608 688 474 
 483 732 694 785 406 
 63 236 276 563 408 
Austria      
 117 93 108   
 181 274 276   
 199 291 390   
 175 276 419   
 38 106 178   
Sources: Danish Election Studies 1994-2005; ITANES 1994-2006; ISSP 1995; EVS 1999; ESS 2002-03. 
Weight as indicated in Table 8.1. Note that the N can vary and are often small. The N indicated are referr d 
to the unweighted data.   
¹ Progress Party for 1994.  
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In the 1990s, the Danish Progress Party gained significa t support from older voters, but this 
was also a result of the party electoral decline, which came along with the younger voters’ 
exit from the party (cf. Table 8.2 above for 1994). At the 2001, 2005 and 2007 elections the 
Danish People’s Party continued to be overrepresentd among the older generations. This 
generation includes the ‘over 60s’, that is people who at the time of the survey interviews 
were already pensioners, or very close to retiring from the labour market. Considered over a 
longer time-span, the generational composition of the Danish People’s Party therefore looks 
rather polarized (cf. also Andersen 2000: 8-9). With the achievement of political influence in 
2001, support for the party had increased among the o r generational groups (see Table 
8.5), but the party remained underrepresented among the so-called 1968 or welfare generation 
(born 1945-59) and to some extent also among the children of that generation. However, the 
Danish Party undoubtedly has some positive appeal to the older generations of voters.  
 At the 2008 election, the Northern League confirmed its profile as a party with a broader 
‘generational’ appeal. In any case, and contrary to those who would expect the party to be 
more popular among the older voters, the Northern League is actually receiving more support 
from the younger cohorts than from the old. This was similar to the Freedom Party, which in 
the 1990s was significantly supported by the younger generations of Austrian voters (see Ta-
ble 8.5 above). This support followed the steady declin  of the electoral appeal of the tradi-
tional parties among voters of the younger generation hat was registered in those years 
(Plasser & Ulram 2000: 32). While the SPÖ and ÖVP had managed to attract 97 pct. of first-
time voters in 1979, this figure dropped to only 42 pct. in 1999 (cf. Plasser and Ulram 2000). 
By contrast, the FPÖ had in the same period increased it  share among first-time voters from 
3 to 38 percent. The younger generations did not ident fy with a political party in the same 
way as the older generations of voters did, which perhaps made it easier for them to vote for 
the FPÖ. However, already in the first period in office in 2000, the FPÖ lost much of the sup-
port from those who had voted for the party to protest against the status quo (see Müller 2004) 
and also from the younger cohorts. At the 2002 election, the FPÖ was overrepresented among 
the generation of the ‘over 60’; about 17 pct. of these voters gave their support to the FPÖ (cf. 
SORA 2002) at the elections that downsized the party from 27 to only 10 pct. of the votes.  
 In brief, the electoral composition of the Danish People’s Party, the Northern League 
and the Austrian Freedom Party did not reveal a particularly high and significant overrepre-
sentation among the older generations of voters. It would therefore be inexact to consider 
these parties voted only by the old people. This said, it is unquestionable that the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party has consolidated the support from older voters. The support seemed first encour-
aged by the Danish People’s Party positions on the value dimension and less directly by the 
pro-welfare politics favouring improved conditions and services for older people in the Dan-
ish society.  
 The generational profile characterising the Northern League and the Austrian Freedom 
Party is more scattered. The electoral support came from different cohorts and has varied over 
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time, most likely in close relation to the different phases of development of these parties. Both 
parties have in the past been overrepresented among voters of the younger cohorts, who sup-
ported the two parties when they were still at the opposition.  
 To conclude, the specific age profile of the parties varies from country to country (see 
also Norris 2005: 144-148) and in relation to the sp cific historical, social and ideological 
development of the parties, which therefore appeal to different groups of voters.  
 
8.4 Are radical right parties today’s working class parties?  
Traditionally the radical right parties’ electoral breakthrough and success was considered a 
middle-class reaction rather than a working class phenomenon (e.g. Fryklund and Peterson 
1981). Particularly in relation to the radical and populist right-wing wave of the 1970s and 
1980s the hypothesis of a middle-class reaction was widely referred in the political literature 
dealing with the issue (Lipset 1960). The so called p tite bourgeoisie, consisting of small en-
trepreneurs, shopkeepers, self-employed craftsmen and artisans, was afraid of the social and 
economic deprivation following the rapid social and economic transformations that were felt 
as particularly threatening in periods of economic recession. Early seminal accounts (e.g. Lip-
set 1960) had already anticipated the tension created by the impact of the economic and social 
transformations on the middle class giving rise to social and political reactions that in the 
interwar period caused support to fascism.   
The middle-class reaction applied also to the electoral breakthrough and success of the 
Scandinavian protest parties in the 1970s and determining the initial fortunes of the Progress 
Parties in Denmark and –to some extent– in Norway (e.g. Fryklund and Peterson 1981). In the 
1980s, studies of the Northern League’s breakthrough in Italy emphasised the overrepresenta-
tion of small entrepreneurs and self-employed in the electoral composition of the party. Inter-
estingly, it was in the affluent regions of the North and among these segments of the elector-
ate that the League found its electoral bedrock (Mannheimer 1991; Diamanti 1996). 
If there was an historical continuity with the past lso in the social basis of contempo-
rary politics, it would thus still be possible to observe an overrepresentation of the so called 
petite bourgeoisie among contemporary radical right voters. In this case, following the theory 
of social deprivation, the vote would emerge out of the fear of having something to lose in the 
present situation, for example in relation to the personal economy, or social status89.  
However, recent studies on the radical right have instead underlined the wider class ap-
peal of these parties today, considering the phenomn in terms of a more diffuse manifesta-
tion of protest, discontent and desire to put an end to the political ‘status-quo’ (cf. Mayer and 
Perrineau 1992, Ivaldi 1999). Kitschelt (1995) considered the message of the radical right 
deliberately targeted to different segments of the electorate (see also Betz 1994:174). In this 
perspective, while populist anti-statist politics can appeal to low-skilled white-collar workers 
                                                
89 This argument is similar to the readings put forward to explain the electoral support to the French poujadist 
movement of the late 1950s (see Hoffmann 1957).   
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in the private sector, the working class is more lik ly to respond to the authoritarian positions 
expressed by the radical right parties in particular on questions such as immigration and law 
and order (Kitschelt 1995: 9-14).  
Other authors (cf. Givens 2005: 60; Bjørklund and Goul Andersen 2002: 119; Norris 
2005: 139; Mayer 2005:5) point to the fact that theW stern European radical right parties 
have – particularly in some countries – become new clear-cut working class parties, in the 
sense that the most relevant support to these parties nowadays comes from unskilled and 
skilled manual workers who in the past voted for a left-wing party. These patterns of political 
dealignment and following realignment of the working class then have to be seen in relation 
to the rapid processes of socioeconomic and political changes that have affected the way and 
rhythms of work and life in most of the advanced capitalist societies, influencing traditional 
class-voting behaviour.  
More narrowly, the transformation from an industrial to a postindustrial economy are 
believed to have had a different impact on the individuals, depending on their position within 
the social space. In this respect, the globalization and marginalization hypothesis (see here 
Chapter 2) underlines in particular the conflict emerging between those who mostly benefitted 
from modernization and globalization (the modernisation winners) and those who lost out in 
terms of status (economic and social) and who live in the uncertainty of what the near future 
will bring (the modernisation losers) (cf. Kriesi 2008). This would make people blame immi-
grants for economic problems and unemployment in the country. Anti-immigration grievances 
would then mainly respond to feelings of economic and social uncertainty that the radical 
right has been able to translate into politics supporting restrictions against immigration and 
increased regulation of the distribution of the benefits in the country. The support to the radi-
cal right is thus considered a way to reward policies that help shelter the country against the 
negative consequences of globalization and post-industrialization, for example by regulating 
labour market competition and promoting politics supporting general restrictions of welfare 
rights and attacking welfare abuses.  
Another reading brought up in the existing literatue on the radical right explains the 
support from the working class by putting emphasis on aspects of cultural adversion rather 
than on the direct economic costs of immigration and o  competition for welfare (cf. Rydgren 
2003). The social and economic uncertainties associated with the transformations into global 
markets and postindustrial societies spread a generaliz d fear of what is perceived as different 
and difficult to integrate in society. The increasing social and cultural heterogeneity under-
mined the basis of social solidarity and welfare that was established on shared national iden-
tity, common cultural values and ethnic homogeneity (cf. Alesina and Glaeser 2004: 180-81). 
Other researchers challenge the assumption that growing ethnic diversity in Western Europe 
contributes to widespread negative feelings towards interethnic redistribution and social 
spending (e.g. Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Goul Andersen 2006).  
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The erosion of class voting behaviour and the emergence and mobilization of new po-
litical cleavages present another perspective to explain the radical right vote. Until about the 
1970s, social and occupational conditions were good pre ictors of the voting behaviour in 
most of the Western industrialized democracies; the occupational status and in particular the 
division between manual and non-manual working activities had an effect on voting behav-
iour and led to comparably stable patterns of party voting (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This 
started to change from the 1970s and in the 1980s (e.g. Inglehart and Rabier 1986; Inglehart 
and Flanagan 1987) in line with the rapid socioeconomic and generational transformations at 
the social and individual level, which contributed to the weakening of traditional class voting. 
Immigration grievances seem in this situation to have led to widespread mobilisation of new 
anti-immigration right-wing movements with particular appeal among the manual workers. 
The fact that anti-immigration policies have stronger appeal among manual workers finds 
slightly different explanations; for instance the classical theory based on working class au-
thoritarianism (Lipset 1960). These issues gained increasing relevance in the decision of 
which party to vote for. However, this behaviour started to be considered a consequence of 
lower educational standards, predisposing people to view things in “black and white, good 
and evil” (Lipset 1960) rather than in terms of child rearing and patterns of family life, as ear-
lier suggested by part of the scholarly research (cf. Adorno et al. 1950). In more recent stud-
ies, this reading has been taken a step forward, making the role of education more explicit and 
asserting that it is not class as such, but the cognitive and socialising effects acquired through 
education that influence and shapes the individual’s positions and attitudes. The effects of 
education on party voting will be more closely considered below.  
In the following, part of the interpretations mentio ed above will be taken into account. 
To start with, Table 8.6 shows the support to the thr e parties based on the main occupational 
sectors, which allows us to look at changes over time. 
Already in the late 1970s the Danish Progress Party started to get increasing support 
among manual workers, which accellereted during the 1980s (not shown in Table 8.6; e.g. 
Goul Andersen 2006). From the beginning, the party received a level of working class support 
and a social compositon that was highly unusual for non-socialist parties in Denmark. As Ta-
ble 8.8 reveals, from 1998 the support from manual workers was taken over by the Danish 
People’s Party, which reached 9 pct. of the support among manual workers already in 1998. 
The party support among manual workers has increased with time and in 2007 was about 19 
pct. More than 20 pct. of the younger generation of manual workers voted for the DF in 2007, 
but the party enjoyed a high level of support among all enerations of manual workers (table 
not shown). 
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Table 8.6 Support for FrP/DF, LN and FPÖ among the different occupational sectors. Percentages. 
Sources: Danish Election Studies 1994-2005; ITANES 1994-2006; ISSP 1995; EVS 1999; ESS 2002-03. 
Weight as indicated in note under Table 8.1. 
¹ Progress Party for 1994. 
² ITANES 2008 did not include the variable distinguishing between public and private sectors. The other 
sectors considered were therefore: white collars with lower (14 pct.) and higher functions (7 pct.), directors 
(15 pct.) and teachers (2 pct.).   
³ In the EVS of 1999 and ESS 2002 there was no variable that allowed to distinguish between occupation in 
the public and in the private sector. The other occupational categories considered were in this case: white 
collars with higher functions and with lower functions, whose percentages were respectively 13 pct. and 18 
pct. in 1999 and 1 pct. and 8 pct. in 2002. See also footnote 96. 
 
Among the other occupational groups (see Table 8.6 above), the Danish People’s Party does 
not have the same level of support, but the party has consolidated its position among voters 
employed in the private sector and self-employed, whereas the party achieves low support 
from the public salariats. Among those outside the labour market, the percentage of support is 
DF 1994¹ 1998 2001 2005 2007 
Manual workers 
Private salariat 
Public salariat 
Self-employed 
Outside labour market 
8 
4 
1 
10 
8 
9 
5 
5 
13 
7 
18 
9 
6 
10 
13 
20 
9 
6 
7 
16 
19 
9 
4 
9 
18 
LN 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 
Manual workers 6 11 4 4 11 
Private salariat 9 12 4 3 (²) 
Public salariat 3 7 2 3 (²) 
Self-employed 8 8 3 5 12 
Outside labour market 6 8 2 3 7 
FPÖ 1995 1999 2002   
Manual workers  24 28 12   
Private salariat 13 (³) (³)   
Public salariat 11 (³) (³)   
Self-employed 22 14 7   
Outside labour market 15 21 5   
N      
Denmark      
 373 411 393 445 277 
 294 319 354 398 285 
 327 318 356 334 224 
 128 115 124 145 84 
 648 645 652 736 431 
Italy      
 156 491 310 350 186 
 204 48 210 257 . 
 210 64 241 315 . 
 167 503 314 351 175 
 814 268 1127 1227 933 
Austria      
 85 169 125   
 133 . .   
 72 . .   
 62 66 66   
 350 487 563   
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increased by the inclusion of the pensioners. This matches also what we have seen in previous 
paragraphs in relation to support from the older cohorts.   
 At present, the Danish People’s Party is undoubtedly the most clear-cut working class 
party in Danish politics. This position was achieved at the expense of the traditional working 
class party, the Social Democrats, which through the years have lost considerable support 
among manual workers. This is better shown in Table 8.7, which displays more clearly how 
the share of manual workers has continued to move away from S and the socialist parties to-
wards first Progress Party first and after the mid-1990s the Danish People’s Party.  
 
Table 8.7 Share of manual workers within main Danish parties/ party groups (1994-2007). Difference 
from the average/all in percentage points. 
Source: Danish election surveys (1994-2007). Politica  weight (see note under Table 8.1). 
¹ Progress Party in 1994. 
Legend: DF= Danish People’s Party; Non-socialist par ies= Liberals (V), Conservatives (K), Social Liber-
als (RV), Centrum Democrats (CD), Christian Democrats (KrD); S= Social democrats; Other left-wing= 
Socialist People’s Party (SF); Unity List (Enh.). 
 
In other words, Table 8.7 highlights how the Danish People’s Party has actually benefitted 
from the working class political dealignment. At the party’s first parliamentary election, the 
share of manual workers voting for the Danish Peopl’s Party was 9 percentage points above 
the average and in 2007 it had expanded to +24 percentage points. In the same period, the 
share of manual workers voting for the Social Democrats remained about 10 percentage 
points above population average (see Table 8.7), but far from the high percetages registered 
by the Danish People’s Party. 
 The class voting de-alignment among manual workers started already with the Progress 
Party in the 1980s (see Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2000: 216-217). The proportion of 
workers among the Progress Party supporters increased in nearly every election starting from 
the late 1970s and representing in this sense an origi al development in relation to the ‘tradi-
tional’ support from the middle class expected from a tax protest party. During the 1980s, 
working class support to the Progress Party became incr asingly significant.  
 As explained in Chapter 5, the increased support fr m the working class went together 
with some relevant changes in the Progress Party’s political agenda. In those years the party 
dampened on the tax protest issue and on ultraliber positions and started to emphasise other 
 1994¹ 1998 2001 2005 2007  
DF  +18 +9 +20 +25 +24  
Non-socialist parties -10 -10 -7 -10 -7  
S +13 +11 +9 +12 +7  
Other left-wing parties -3 -2 -11 -2 -10  
All 33 36 32 33 33  
 
N 
     
 
DF 112 136 225 273 188  
Non-socialist parties 842 802 898 1055 586  
S 612 658 547 532 350  
Other left-wing parties 185 187 165 193 208  
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types of issues, such as the anti-immigration question. Until the electoral decline in the 1990s, 
the support from manual workers indicated also thate Progress Party was entering a new 
phase, which put an end to the tax protest years. The working class profile was overtaken by 
the Danish People’s Party in the late 1990s. At present the DF is the most clear-cut working 
class party in Danish politics and thus an electoral competitor of the Social Democrats for the 
vote of the manual workers.  
 The pro-welfare position implemented by the Danish People’s Party across the years has 
probably helped the party to maintain and enhance the support among the manual workers. As 
seen in Chapter 5, the DF has also clearly and often spoken about the party as the heir and 
protector of the ‘real’ social democratic values. The party’s restrictive and critical approach to 
immigration has certainly played an important role in this, creating the right combination that 
has been able to consolidate support from the working class. It could therefore be argued that 
while the DF’s anti-immigration policy attracts the votes of the immigration sceptics, the 
party’s social policy helps keep them.  
 Particularly manual workers and pensioners perceive immigration as a threat. In 2007, 
more than 51 pct. of the manual workers agreed withthe statement that immigration consti-
tutes a threat against the national culture and identity; a position similar to the pensioners 
(here disability pensioners and old age pensioners), whereas only 18 pct. of the public salari-
ats and students expressed agreement. Things look a little different on the subject of private 
economy where pensioners and self-employed fear most for their economy in the future.90 
This would suggest that manual workers do not feel th  pressure of economic marginalisation 
in the near future so much and this does not seem to be the main explaination for the strong 
support that the Danish People’s Party gets from this group.  
 The Danish People’s Party appeals to pro-welfare positions on the traditional economic 
dimension and to the anti-immigration attitudes in relation to the so called value dimension of 
politics. The relevance that value and cultural issue  have achieved in politics makes us ques-
tion question if social class only indirectly explain the vote for the radical right, whose main 
effects should be searched in the different levels of education and in the implications this has 
on how people vote. It is something that is going to be discussed in the following paragraph. 
 Compared to the Danish People’s Party, the Northern L ague still has a rather strong 
appeal among the self-employed (cf. Table 8.6). It is difficult to draw a clear picture of the 
party composition for the period 2001-2006, due to the small results achieved by the Northern 
League in those elections; however, it can be observed that through the years the party has 
maintained its support among the self-employed and at the parliamentary elections in 2008, 
the Northern League obtained 12 pct. of the votes from this occupational group A similar 
trend can be observed among the private salariats th  particularly in the 1990s supported the 
                                                
90 Asked: “If we look 3-5 years ahead would you say that you feel very/quite sure about your economic situation 
or very/quite unsure?” 33 pct. of the pensioners declar d they feel unsure, followed by self-employed (29 pct.) 
and by students (27 pct.).    
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party, so that 9 pct. voted for the League in 1994 and 12 pct. in 1996. The opposite seems to 
apply for the public salariat where support has remained low through the years. The Northern 
League’s popularity among the self-employed and the private salariats in general suggests an 
electorate that matches the tax protest profile and with several similarities to the Danish Pro-
gress Party of the 1970s. The party is considered a guarantor of the private sector in general, 
since it has supported protectionist measures that helped safeguard the activity of the small 
entrepreneurs and the self-employed from what the party considered the burden of the tax 
system in the North and from the consequences of globalization. 
 But over the years the Northern League has also gained increasing popularity among the 
manual workers. Already in 1996 the LN was rather strongly represented among the working 
class (see Table 8.6; cf. also Beirich and Woods 2000) and about one third of the manual 
workers in the North of the country voted for the party (cf. Biorcio 1997: 254). Recently, at 
the last parliamentary election in 2008, 11 pct. of the manual workers voted for the League 
(11 pct. among all population) with much higher percentages in the Northern constituencies 
(15 pct. in the North West and 33 pct. in the North East of the country). Some scholars have 
interpreted this as a reaction to the labour market competition following the increasing global-
ization and internationalization processes and recently fuelled by the international economic 
crisis (cf. Biorcio 2008). 
 Compared to the Danish People’s Party, the Northern L ague does not have the same 
clear-cut working class profile. Undoubtedly, the party has tried to appeal to different elec-
toral groups by adressing different questions over th  years, starting with the geographi-
cal/territorial cleavage, i.e. the North and South divide. The Northern League has also pro-
moted an anticentralist and anti-elitarist position, supporting forms of decentralisation of the 
economic and political power, tax relief and a lean public administration that could appeal to 
the private salariats and the self-employed. From the late 1990s these issues have also been 
used in relation to the European Union. Furthermore, th  Northern League appeals to the im-
migration sceptics and in recent years the party has strongly fueled anti-immigration issues, 
particularly in relation to problems of law and orde , but also and increasingly the social and 
cultural difficulties that the party sees as emerging from the encounter with Islam.   
 The support for the Austrian Freedom Party seemed instead to follow the same devel-
opment observed in the case of the Danish People’s Party. As in Denmark, Austrian politics 
experienced already in the late 1970s the dealignment of the working class from traditional 
class voting. Until then, about 65 pct. of the Austrian blue-collar workers were voting for the 
SPÖ. In 1999, the support for the SPÖ among manual workers had slimmed down to only 35 
pct., with the FPÖ as the party that mostly gained from this loss (cf. Plasser and Ulram 2000). 
But already in 1995, about 24 pct. of the manual workers had cast their vote for the FPÖ. It 
was in particular among young workers that the FPÖ received the strongest support: 57 pct. of 
male working class voters below the age of 30 voted for the FPÖ in 1999 and 46 pct. of the 
younger female workers (Plasser and Ulram 2000). With reference to these groups, 24 pct. of 
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the young male workers ‘under 30’ voted for the Danish People’s Party in 2001, but the party 
received stronger support among the 30-44 age group (48 ct of the DF working class votes 
came from this age group), while the party is better represented among the female workers 
aged 45-59 that the DF (44 pct).  
 The role as a working class party changed for the FPÖ in 2002 also as a result of the 
dramatic drop in electoral support. In 2002 the FPÖ achieved ‘only’ 16 pct. of the votes 
among the workers (Plasser and Ulram 2002) and the SPÖ was able to recapture some of 
these votes (Plasser and Ulram 2002). But the decline in the working class electoral support 
was mainly ascribed to the party’s internal conflicts and to the leadership struggle that charac-
terised the years 2002-2006. At the 2008 parliamentary election the FPÖ took back its work-
ing class profile. The Freedom Party received 34 pct. of the skilled and unskilled manual 
workers’ votes (un- und angelernt Arbeiter), whereas only 21 pct. voted for the SPÖ91 and 16 
pct. for the ÖVP.    
 From the observations about the relationship betwen party vote and occupational sector 
it emerged that among the three parties analysed here t  Danish People’s Party is the only 
clear-cut working class party. Until the late 1990s al o the FPÖ followed this pattern, being 
well represented in particular among the younger manual workers. However, the data do not 
say whether the FPÖ has managed to regain the same upport from the manual workers in 
recent years. With the electoral decline experienced by the Austrian party in the years 2002-
2006, the FPÖ lost an important share of support frm this occupational group. Recent litera-
ture suggests however that at the 2008 elections the FPÖ has gained back votes from this oc-
cupational group. Compared to the other two parties, he class profile of the Northern League 
voters is more heterogeneous. The party has remained strong among the self-employed and 
private sector employees. At the April 2008 election, the Northern League witnessed an in-
crease of support among the manual workers, showing that the party is today well established 
and represented among all the occupational sectors, when we look at the electoral constituen-
cies in the North. 
 In relation to the hypotheses introduced at the beginning, we can here observe that while 
the Danish People’s Party and eventually the Austrian Freedom Party could provide some 
evidence for the marginalisation theory, given in terms of support from the manual workers, it 
is more difficult to explain the vote to the Northern League as mainly a working class reaction 
to the consequences of globalisation. However, we still need to consider the impact on the 
vote to the three radical right parties of other aspects, e.g. education, and the voters’ attitudes 
towards major issues like welfare spending and immigration.  
 
                                                
91 Among the specialized workers (Facharbeiter und Vorarbeiter) the share of votes was 32 pct. for the SPÖ and 
34 pct. for the FPÖ. 
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8.5 Education and vote for the radical right  
As mentioned, social class can be an indirect explanation for the vote for the radical right. 
What makes the difference is education, which provides different explanations in terms of 
cognitive capacities (cf. Nunn et. al. 1978; Lipset 1960; Knutsen 2004) or alternatively social-
ising/relational experiences (cf. Todal Jenssen 1993) that can react with other aspects of the 
individual’s socioeconomic background and affect voting behaviour.  
Different theories take into account the impact of education on values, attitudes and on 
political behaviour in general. However, there is st ll cholarly disagreement about what char-
acteristics, aspects and contents of education havean influence (most and more directly) on 
the creation and transmission of specific values (cf. Stubager 2006). At least three different 
approaches can be distinguished when considering the effects of education on party choice 
and value positions.  
Some studies emphasise the relationship between education and employment (cf. 
Kitschelt 1995). This approach is close to the margin lization hypothesis and draws attention 
on the reaction from the social groups that are most exposed to the transformations taking 
place in contemporary societies. Higher educated have less reasons to fear the social and eco-
nomic transformations, because they are usually employed in non-manual and conceptual 
professions, largely in the public sector. Consequently, those with lower levels of education 
(at least in the first stages of the globalisation process) experience more directly and nega-
tively the challenges posed by the postindustrial and information society, for example in rela-
tion to the increasing immigration flows. 
Another approach puts more weight on the direct effects of education. More specifically, 
education is considered to convey a specific knowledge and a cognitive sophistication, mak-
ing it easier to process and frame complex situations (cf. Lipset 1960). In accordance with this 
interpretation, people with low educational attainments should then be more likely to under-
stand and therefore support with their vote parties with ‘black and white’ readings of the 
world and simple solutions to problems. However, this is somehow a rather hasty and partly 
reductive explanation of the radical right parties’ ideology, which, as we have seen in previ-
ous chapters on ideology, is in reality more complex than often described by some scholarly 
literature. Furthermore, to understand the value differences in terms of more/less complex, 
more/less primitive, good/bad political behaviour – as done by the cognitive approach to the 
effects of education on voting – seems to give an oversimplified picture of how individuals 
develop their attitudes and positions.  
According to a third perspective, level of educational attainment an important variable 
to understand party vote, but first and foremost as a variable explaining different value posi-
tions. Together with the rising educational levels in the advanced capitalist societies, the ef-
fects of education on the formation of values and political attitudes have become more and 
more evident. In this case, the socialising effect of education is considered an important fac-
tor. The years spent in school have a strong influece not just in terms of qualifications, but 
 233 
also on the political formation and behaviour of young men and women. Type, length of edu-
cation and in particular socialising conditions areth refore likely to encourage more tolerant 
views towards diversity and otherness and promote higher levels of social and political trust; 
particularly in countries where the transmission of such values has become an integrated part 
of the educational system.92  
The overrepresentation of voters with lower levels of education can thus be considered 
in relation to the approaches above. For reasons of brevity, however, the present analysis will 
only get through a few aspects in relation to education and radical right vote and mainly look 
at how educational attainment is related to party vote.  
One of the first problems of the cross-national comparative approach is that the educa-
tional systems still differ significantly in the different European countries. This is partly in 
relation to length (for example mandatory years in chool), but also in terms of qualifications 
and skills achieved within the different educational fields.  
For this reason, the comparison of the educational system can be done only with some 
approximation. However, a general orientation is posible, as particularly for the higher edu-
cational attainments the levels in Europe are slowly becoming more similar and because the 
attainment of an upper secondary school degree can represent a good indication of the differ-
ence beween the lower and higher educated. Three main levels were distinguished in order to 
establish equivalents for the education system in the three countries. Low education refers to 
the years of mandatory school in Denmark and Austria (9 years). In the case of Italy, the 
mandatory school consists of 5 years in primary school and three at the lower secondary level 
(scuola media inferiore). The second and middle levels include the years necessary to attain a 
professional/vocational education. Those with a high education, a high school degree or a 
university degree (upper-secondary and tertiary level), are here considered as the third and 
higher level. It is among the voters of this group that we expect to find lower support for the 
radical right parties. Table 8.8 shows how the support to the Danish People’s Party, the 
Northern League and the Freedom Party is distributed on the three different levels of educa-
tional attainment.  
 
 
 
                                                
92 The philosophy and work of N.F.S. Grundtvig was particularly significant for the development of the Danish 
basic educational system as we know it today.   
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Table 8.8 Support for FrP/DF, LN and FPÖ among main educationl groups. Percentages.  
DF 1994¹ 1998 2001 2005 2007 
Low (up to 9yrs) 
Middle (10-11yrs) 
High (12+ yrs) 
10 
4 
2 
9 
9 
2 
17 
11 
6 
19 
15 
5 
26 
14 
5 
LN 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 
Low (up to 8 yrs.) 6 11 2 4 10 
Middle (11yrs) 10 15 3 5 8 
High (13+ yrs) 5 5 2 3 8 
FPÖ 1995 1999 2002   
Low (9yrs) 19 24 6   
Middle (up to 13yrs) 13 21 6   
High (14+ yrs) 12 12 4   
N      
Denmark      
 785 683 681 732 367 
 600 611 620 632 409 
 383 531 576 690 494 
Italy      
 983 1240 1150 1124 892 
 88 86 162 182 114 
 442 614 939 1216 721 
Austria      
 73 112 416   
 26 74 1217   
 14 25 624   
      
Sources: DF: Danish Election Studies 1994-2005. LN: ITANES 1994-2006. FPÖ: ISSP 1995, European 
Value Survey 1999, European Social Survey 2002-2003, ISSP 2003. Weighted data as already indicated 
under Table 8.1. 
¹ Progress Party in 1994. 
 
The support to the Danish People’s Party among voters with low levels of educational attain-
ment (9 years of compulsory school or less)93 has significantly increased from 17 pct. in 2001 
to 26 pct. in 2007, showing the party’s strong appel in this group of people. This could also 
suggest that the way the Danish People’s Party has de lt with the influential position of sup-
port to the government first achieved in 2001 has convinced this group of people. At the same 
time, only about 5 pct. of the higher educated supported the party and this percentage has re-
mained stable through the years.  
 In Denmark, the educational cleavage has become incr asingly important for the under-
standing of electoral behaviour and party competition. The strong support to the left-wing 
parties among the higher educated started already in the late 1960s and was later followed by 
a similar repositioning among voters with lower educational levels to parties like the Progress 
Party (e.g. Goul Andersen 1979; 1981). Meanwhile, several studies have clearly documented 
that the different educational levels are related to ifferent positions on authoritarian and lib-
ertarian values, identity formation and consciousnes , which explains why individuals tend to 
                                                
93 Until the mid-1960s, 50 pct. of the population left school after seven years of compulsory school. The school 
reform of 1972 increased the number of mandatory years to the actual nine.    
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vote for parties that best reflect and articulate their positions (see Borre 2001; Stubager 2004; 
Stubager 2007).  
 The Danish People’s Party has also accentuated its profile as an anti-elitist and anti-
intellectualist political force. As the Progress Party before it, the Danish People’s Party has on 
more than an occasion and particularly while in opposition criticised intellectuals, academics 
and artists for their lack of common sense, left-wing attitudes and prejudicial position against 
the party. But at the same time, the mainstream parties particularly on the left used isolationist 
strategies and labelled the Danish People’s Party as politically unfit to the parliamentary de-
mocracy, thus augmenting the divide (see Meret 2009). 
 Also the FPÖ achieved increasing support from the vot rs with lower levels of educa-
tion in the 1990s. The party was thus in competition with the SPÖ, which traditionally en-
joyed strong support among voters with a compulsory chool education, or with a professional 
educational degree (Berufschule/Fachschulbildung). The Green party was instead increas-
ingly supported by voters with a higher secondary or university degree. As we will see below, 
it is between the Greens and the Freedom Party that we find the greatest difference in terms of 
voters’ profile and attitudes. 
 The party’s educational composition became less skewed in 2002, due to the sudden 
electoral decline of the FPÖ. However, the FPÖ continued to be less represented among the 
voters with higher levels of education (cf. SORA 200 ). This was again clear at the 2006 elec-
tions, where only 7 pct. of the voters with a high sc ool degree voted for the party, while 21 
pct. voted for the Greens, 37 pct. for the ÖVP and 26 pct. for the SPÖ (cf. Plasser-Ulram 
2006).  
 The voters’ educational profile in the case of the Northern League seems less polarised 
(see Table 8.8 above). The educational level of the Northern League electorate reflects the 
party’s occupational composition, where small entrepreneurs, self-employed and lower level 
administration are represented. Yet the Northern Leagu  has low levels of support among 
voters with higher school degrees and in particular among those with an academic degree (cf. 
also ITANES 2008). 
 
8.6 The combined effect of socioeconomic variables on party vote  
Education seems to have an important effect on the decision of which party to vote for. It re-
mains to be established how important this variable is compared to the other main socioeco-
nomic indicators: gender, cohort and social class. The logistic regression models shown in 
Tables 8.9, 8.10 and 8.11 attempt to give a more in-depth analysis of the effects of the differ-
ent socioeconomic background variables on the vote for ach of the three parties. In the case 
of the radical right parties, where the vote percentages are in general rather low, the effects of 
the different independent variables on the dependent variable can best be investigated by 
means of a logistic regression. In our case, all logistic regression models are tested against the 
dependent and dummy variable ‘vote or no vote for the radical right party’ (DF, FPÖ and LN 
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respectively). The socioeconomic variables included in the model are standard: gender, co-
hort, social class (manual workers, self-employed, public and private salariats) and formal 
educational attainment (high school and university education); all variables were coded as 
dummy variables. The results are based on the 2005 election survey for the Danish People’s 
Party,94 the ESS 2002-03 for the FPÖ and the 2008 Italian Election Survey for the Northern 
League. The first model (Model I) of the logistic reg ession starts to estimate the probabilities 
of the vote for the three radical right parties in relation to gender, cohort and social class, 
while the second model (Model II) looks at the effect on vote when controlling for the educa-
tional variable.   
 
Table 8.9 Effect of different main socioeconomic background variables on the vote for the Danish 
People’s Party (2005). Logistic regression analyses (b ta coefficients). 
Source: Danish Election Survey 2005. 
* Significant at the 0.05 level.  
 
The first model in Table 8.9 shows that social class has an important effect on the vote for the 
Danish People’s Party before controlling for level of education. It implies that being male, 
elderly and manual worker is positively related to voting for the Danish People’s Party. At the 
same time, the strongly significant negative coefficients that are related to the category of 
self-employed, the public salariats and the private salariats, tell us that the Danish People’s 
Party is poorly represented among these occupational groups in relation to (our reference 
category) the voters outside the labour market. The positive and not statistically significant 
coefficient95 associated with the category of manual worker confirms that it is to a higher de-
gree manual workers and people outside the labour market that vote for the Danish People’s 
Party and not the small entrepreneurs and the self-employed, as it happened in the tax protest 
phase that characterised the Progress Party in the 1970s.  
 The second model of the logistic regression shows that higher education is clearly and 
strongly negatively related with the vote for the Danish People’s Party, meaning that people 
with higher levels of education exhibit a significantly lower propensity to vote for the party 
than people with lower educational attainment. The educational variable also strengthens the 
degree of correlaton between our dependent and the independent variables (from 0,05 to 0,08 
                                                
94 The 2005 Danish election survey is considered more reliable than the 2007 survey. 
95 This is due to our reference category, represented by the people outside the labour market.     
Independent variables Model I Model II 
   
Male 0.25   0.24 
Cohort (before 1945) 0.11  -0.20 
Manual worker 0.31   0.05 
Self-employed -0.97*    -1.08* 
Public salariat -1.04*    -0.91* 
Private salariat -0.63*    -0.60* 
Higher education      -1.08* 
Constant -1.86  -1.44 
R² (Nagelkerke)   0.05   0.08 
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R²), even if it is not so much. However, there is st ll an effect of social class, since the catego-
ries of the public and private salariats and of the self-employed remain significantly below the 
other groups in relation to the Danish People’s Party vote. This allows us to reject the hy-
pothesis that explains the vote for the Danish People’s Party in terms of a reaction from the 
petite bourgeoisie consisting of small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, self-employed, but more 
generally from the middle class.   
 Besides, the logistic regression models of Table 8.9 show that neither gender nor the 
variable controlling for the effect of the older cohorts have statistically significant effects on 
the vote for the Danish People’s Party.  
 To sum up, the findings above suggest that it is mainly among the male manual workers 
and people outside the labour market with lower levels of educational attainment that the 
Danish People’s Party is more likely to find electoral support. This would indicate that the 
marginalisation hypothesis touches on some aspects in relation to the radical right vote that 
need to be investigated more in-depth by looking at the voters’ attitudes towards a number of 
relevant issues.     
 Similarly, the Austrian Freedom Party attracts manual workers and to some extent low 
skilled white collars,96 while the party is poorly supported among the highly skilled white 
collars (cf. Table 8.10). 
 
Table 8.10 Effect of different main socioeconomic background variables on the vote for the Austrian 
Freedom Party (2002-03). Logistic regression analyses (beta coefficients). 
Source: ESS 2002-03. 
* Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Also after controlling for education, being a manual worker continues to have a very strong 
and significantly positive effect on the Freedom Party vote. Interestinlgy, there is also a 
higher propensity to vote for the party among white collars with lower functions. Rather in-
terestingly, the variable on education has a little but positive coefficient, here indicating that 
                                                
96 In the ESS 2002-03, occupation is coded according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO). In this case, the low skilled white collars consist of the group classified as clerks by the ISCO. The 
group of high skilled white collars includes: managers, directors, professionals, technicians (cf. ISCO at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/d cs/resol08.pdf; last viewed 01-10-2009).     
Independent variables Model I Model II 
   
Male  0.52 0.51 
Cohort (before 1945)  0.69 0.71 
Manual worker   1.13*   1.18* 
Self-employed  0.54 0.56 
Low skilled white collars   0.94*  0.95* 
High skilled white collars -1.03 -1.08 
Service sector workers  0.49 0.50 
Higher education   0.18 
Constant -3.56 -3.61 
R² (Nagelkerke)  0.08 0.08 
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there is no substantial difference of effect on the vote for the FPÖ between people with a 
higher educational attainment and those with a medium/lower education.   
 Compared to the other two parties, the Northern Leagu  in 2008 turns out to have a 
rather heterogeneous electoral support (see Table 8.11).  
 
Table 8.11 Effect of different main socioeconomic background variables on the vote for the Northern 
League (2008). Logistic regression analyses (beta coeffi ients). 
Source: ITANES 2008. 
* Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Regarding the effect of gender, the negative coeffici nts (although small) tell us that gender 
does not play an important role for the Northern League, and in generational terms the party is 
not primarily voted for by the older cohorts. As regards social class, the findings shown in 
Model I reveal that among white collars with lower skills, the self-employed and to some ex-
tent also the manual workers, there is a higher propensity to vote for the party. On the other 
hand, the negative coefficient associated with the high skilled white collars suggests that the 
Northern League has lower support from this group compared to the reference group consist-
ing of people outside the labour market. Besides, the logistic regression models of Table 8.11 
show statistically not significant and negative coefficients in relation to the variables of gen-
der and cohort, also when controlling for education. This basically means that it is not particu-
larly men and voters born before 1945 that vote for the Northern League.    
 As regards education, the effect is actually lower than expected and even if the negative 
coefficient indicates that the voters with higher lvels of education are less likely to support 
the Northern League than people with a primary and middle school education, the variable is 
not statistically significant. These results suggest al o that other variables than those consid-
ered, might have a stronger effect on party vote.   
 To conclude, the Danish People’s Party vote is influenced by education as well as by 
social class. More precisely, in the case of the Danish Party there is a clear and positive effect 
on vote that comes from the manual workers and from v ters that have medium/lower educa-
tional attainments. The vote for the Austrian Freedom Party is influenced by social class, but 
not by education. In the data for 2002-03, manual occupation represents the decisive factor for 
the vote for the FPÖ. 
Independent variables Model I Model II 
   
Male -0.15 -0.11 
Cohort (before 1945) -0.14 -0.21 
Manual worker  0.38  0.32 
Self-employed  0.52    0.58* 
High skilled white collars -0.05  0.10 
Low skilled white collars    0.69*    0.75* 
Higher education   -0.38 
Constant -2.40 -2.30 
R² (Nagelkerke)  0.01  0.02 
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The vote for the Northern League party is more influenced by social class than by education. 
Of the remaining variables discussed, neither cohort differences nor gender differences stand 
out as statistically significant variables after contr lling for education and social class. 
 However, these results also need to be considered in light of the impact of issue voting 
on the support for the radical right. This allows us to observe if and what specific attitudes are 
eventually triggered by the socioeconomic variables and whether these derive from the party 
specific socioeconomic composition. The relationship between political attitudes and vote for 
the radical right is the subject of the following chapter. 
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9. THE VOTERS’ PROFILE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND RAD ICAL RIGHT 
VOTE  
Introduction 
Most of the literature dealing with the radical right has for a long time mainly focused on spe-
cific attitudes and reactions which alone are considered to explain the electoral support to 
these parties, such as anti-immigration, protest, political distrust and marginalisation (e.g. 
Betz 1994; Hainsworth 2000; Schain et al. 2002). More recently, however, the scholarly con-
tributions to the radical right studies have started to deal with the position characterising the 
radical right voters in relation to the voters of the other mainstream parties (cf. Givens 2005; 
Carter 2005, but also Kriesi et. al. 2008) though often still in terms of political and institu-
tional structural opportunities for the emergence of these parties. As already underlined else-
where in this study, the approach that until recently has captured these in the frame of an ‘out 
of the ordinary’ political phenomenon, triggered by the reaction of segments of the electorate 
to present or imminent social, economic or political conditions, has contributed to reproduce 
this reading of radical right ‘exceptionalism’ also in those cases where the radical right has by 
now become a well established political actor.   
The approach suggested here aims at challenging this reading. In this sense, radical right 
issue voting is not necessarily determined by the immediate response or reaction (of a more or 
less irrational character) to a specific situation or social condition, but is rather the result of an 
issue positioning that makes the vote for these parties something more solidly founded, some-
thing that, as it is the case for the voters supporting other parties, results from the ideas, atti-
tudes and positions developed by the individuals and which reflect their meanings and view of 
the world. Thus, just as much as for the mainstream p rties and their electorate, the vote for 
the radical right results from the fact that the voter considers the party to be the best represen-
tant of his/her positions, goals and interests. As explained by Downs’ (1957) geographical 
model, voters will vote for the “nearest party”. In brief, the voter’s issue(s) positioning results 
in a preferred policy orientation that gives support f  the party that has the same, or at least 
very similar, goals and policy solutions on the agenda. Moreover, in relation to what we have 
defined the radical right parties’ lifespan development, it is interesting to observe if for the 
period considered, there have been changes in the attitudes and positions of the radical right 
supporters toward relevant issues and how these can be i terpreted, when considered in rela-
tion to the other mainstream parties.   
While Chapter 8 has focussed on the importance and effect of the socioeconomic back-
ground variables on party vote, this chapter attemps to get a step further in the analysis, con-
sidering the influence and effect of the socioeconomic variables when we take issue voting 
into the picture.  
Two main ideological dimensions are considered important in relation to the ideology 
and electoral appeal of the radical right (cf. here Chapter 3): the economic and the cul-
tural/value dimension (see also Kriesi et al. 2008). As we have already seen, the marginalisa-
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tion hypothesis tends for example to hightlight theway globalisation spills over on the posi-
tion of the voters towards income distribution, wefar  services’ access and government inter-
vention on the economy, whereas the new cleavage appro ch puts more weight on the role 
that new issues such as immigration, environment and European politics play nowadays on 
the voter’s decision of what party to choose. The relationship between the voters and the po-
litical system and the levels of trust in politics and more generally in the others are also con-
sidered important factors that influence the attitudes of the voter and his or her decision of 
which party to vote for. The different hypotheses daling with the radical right vote will thus 
be kept in mind, while observing the attitudes of the radical right electorate in the following 
pages.  
 
9.1 On welfare issues and neoliberal positions  
As we have seen in the three chapters on party ideology (see here Chapters 5, 6, 7), several 
radical right parties have today unambiguously oriented their politics towards more pro-
welfare positions. This gives another perspective on h w to place the radical right, when it 
comes to economic issues. Until recently, radical right parties were considered more likely to 
support neoliberal views asking for less government intervention in the national economy, 
cutbacks in public spending and lower taxes to stimulate the private entrepreneurship. In his 
analysis, Kitschelt (1995) maintained that these positions were actually part of the radical 
right’s ‘winning formula’, which allowed the radical right parties to broaden the electoral 
support appealing to different social groups, including for example small entrepreneurs in the 
private sector and self-employed. This combination of authoritarian politics and liberal eco-
nomics has later been questioned by other scholars (e.g. Ivarsflaten 2008; Mudde 2007: 119-
137; Norris 2005: 182) and in part reassessed by Kitschelt (2007), who however reaffirmes 
the significance of the economic dimension in relation o the radical right electoral support.   
In the last decade another development seems to have pre ailed, however, particularly in 
cases where the radical right parties have gained strong electoral support among manual 
workers. The decision to promote a pro-welfare profile could therefore be an answer to the 
demands from the working class, which traditionally supports social security regulations and 
politics promoting a levelling of income differences. It remains to be seen if this is true and if 
this regards primarily parties that are overrepresented among manual workers, as is the case of 
the Danish People’s Party and the Austrian Freedom Party. Furthermore, considering that the 
three parties have either been in government or supported (centre-)right-wing coalitions, it is 
important to find out to what extent the positions of the radical right electorate and the right 
wing electorate differ.  
By making explicit the support for more pro-welfare politics, the Danish People’s Party 
in 1995 formally broke with the neoliberal and tax protest stances that had characterised the 
Progress Party. Perhaps this also enhanced the electoral success of the Danish People’s Party, 
especially among specific social groups. As a matter of fact, already the Progress Party had 
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started to advance claims for more public investmens in the Danish welfare state (cf. Bjørk-
lund and Goul Andersen 2000: 211). 
DF’s voters’ position on these issues is indicated by four survey questions asking 
whether the government spends ‘too much’, ‘a suitable mount’ or ‘too little’ in traditional 
welfare sectors (health care, elder care, pensions and unemployment benefits). A factor analy-
sis of the variables about budget spending revealed that all four load on a single principal 
‘welfare factor’ component.97 Table 9.1 shows the average values scores to the four questions 
for the Danish People’s Party’s and the other main p rty voters for 1994-2007.  
 
Table 9.1 Attitudes towards public spending for welfare among Danish People’s Party and other main 
party voters. Mean values for four indexed areas of wel are spending. 
 SF S RV V K DF¹ All  
1994 10.5 10.4 9.9 9.6 9.5 10.1 10.0  
1998 10.5 10.2 9.3 9.4 9.3 9.9 9.8  
2001² 10.1 10.1 9.4 9.7 9.4 10.2 9.9  
2005³  10.1 10.4 9.4 9.4 9.3 10.0 9.8  
2007 10.5 10.6 9.6 9.5 9.2 10.3 10.0  
 
N        
 
1994 112 540 61 356 238 99 1540  
1998 122 588 64 142 383 119 1617  
2001 106 476 76 509 140 197 1608  
2005 107 472 149 527 192 242 1793  
2007 152 311 56 281 129 168 1166  
Source: Danish Election Survey 1994-2007. 
Legend: SF= Socialist People’s Party; S= Social Democrats; RV= Social Liberals; V= Liberals; K= Con-
servatives; DF= Danish People’s Party.  
¹ Progress Party in 1994. 
² Standard deviations: SF= 1.23; S= 1.16: RV= 1.20; V= 1.31; K=1.34; DF= 1.21. 
³ Standard deviations: SF= 1.11; S= 1.14; RV= 1.16; V= 1.32; K= 1.26; DF= 1.26. 
Wordings:  
- I will now ask about your views on public expenditures for different purposes. I read some public tasks to 
you, and I ask you for each of these tasks (health c re; pensions; unemployment benefits; elder care sector) 
to say whether you think the public spends too much money, a suitable amount, or too little money on these 
tasks. 
 
Table 9.1 shows that already in 1994 the Progress Party’s electorate was very positive to-
wards welfare spending, particularly compared to the Liberal and Conservative voters. With 
the Danish People’s Party this position became more obvious with the years. The mean values 
based on the four questions of welfare spending show t at particularly in recent years, basi-
cally nobody voting for the Danish People’s Party wants to cut down on the traditional wel-
fare areas. The similarity between the position on welfare spending of the DPP voters and that 
of the Social Democrats is also interesting. It would thus be difficult to find evidence for the 
market-liberal position of the Danish People’s Party on the distributive politics dimension. 
                                                
97 In relation to different areas of public spending, the variables tend to group into three main factors: a welfare 
factor (health, retirement, unemployment benefits), an authoritarian/ public order factor (law enforcement, de-
fence) and a new politics/humanitarian factor (culture and arts, education, environment) (see Borre 2003b).   
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 Particularly in comparison to the two government parties, the Liberals and the Conser-
vatives, which the Danish People’s Party has supported since 2001, the differences in relation 
to how much money should be spent for welfare has increased. While the Liberal and Conser-
vative voters have maintained a stable position on welfare spending, the DPP voters have 
moved towards more pro-welfare spending positions, at least in traditional welfare areas such 
as healthcare, elder care, pensions and unemployment benefits. Needless to say, these voter 
favour reduced public spending for refugees and immigrants (or for aid to developing coun-
tries) – and much more than the Liberal and Conservative voters (data not shown).    
 The Danish People’s Party also differs with the government parties on other more gen-
eral economic issues. It is positioned further to the left on levelling of income differences, 
government intervention in the economy and the conditi  of social reforms (see Table 9.2). 
 
Table 9.2 Attitudes among the Danish People’s Party and other main party voters’towards relevant 
economic issues. Percentages of voters that agree with the statements. 
 SF S RV V K DF All  
Keep social reforms as now         
1998 91 83 68 43 41 47 65  
2001 87 76 63 44 38 54 59  
2005 88 83 77 56 54 65 69  
2007 89 90 86 70 71 81 81  
Income differences still too high         
1998 78 65 46 29 17 40 49  
2001 79 66 50 35 29 47 49  
2005 85 76 59 38 28 53 56  
2007 82 74 40 33 24 51 53  
State control over private firms         
1998 68 52 43 12 17 20 35  
2001 64 52 46 20 16 27 36  
2005 65 61 56 31 25 36 45  
2007 66 60 42 32 18 40 45  
Source: Danish Election Survey 1998-2007. (N(s) as in Table 9.1 above). 
Wordings: 
- I will now read some political judgements, which represent a discussion between two persons, A and B. 
We would like to ask you whether you agree more with A or with B. Even if you do not agree completely 
with either, please indicate which of the two positi ns is closer to your own: 
- First we have a question on social expenses: 
A: We have gone too far with social reforms in this country. People should more than now be able to man-
age alone without social assistance and benefits from society. 
B: The social reforms realised in our country must be kept at least as they are now. (Agree) 
 
- The next question is on state control over private entrepreneurship: 
A: Businessmen and industrial managers should have mor freedom to decide over their own business. 
B: The state should control and direct private entrepreneurship. The state control should not be lower than 
it is nowadays in Denmark. (Agree)   
 
- Then we have a question on living standard and income: 
A: Differences in income and living standards are still too high in our country. Therefore people with lower 
incomes should be able to improve their living standards faster than those with higher incomes.  
B: Income levelling has gone far enough. The income diff rences that still exist should be kept as they are.  
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As shown in Table 9.2, 81 pct. of the DPP voters agreed in 2007 that social reforms must be 
kept at least as they are, compared to only 70 pct. of the Liberal and Conservative voters. As 
regards income differences, the majority of the Danish People’s Party supporters believe that 
there are still strong inequalities and that the living standard of those with lower incomes 
should be improved more rapidly than that of people with the higher incomes. However, the 
standpoint towards more government control with the private economy found much less ap-
proval among the DPP voters, even if an increase over time can be observed in Table 9.2.   
 In brief, in relation to traditional welfare spendi g, social reforms and income differ-
ences, the DPP voters place themselves at the centre-l ft of the economic-distributive dimen-
sion, showing small variations of positions within the party electorate towards these issues.   
 In comparison, the Northern League’s electorate has a more liberal approach to econ-
omy, government intervention and public spending (see Table 9.3). It is interesting to observe 
that the Northern League voters have a more liberal orientation than the supporters of Forza 
Italia and Alleanza Nazionale. In 2006, 53 pct. of the NL voters agreed that the government 
should intervene less in regulating the national economy. The percentage fell to about 38 pct. 
at the 2008 election, but the party’s voters were still among the most positive on the issue. In 
2006, the Northern League voters did not agree that there are still relevant income differences 
in the Italian society and that something should be done to level them out. The Italian Na-
tional Election Studies (ITANES) include only very few variables directly addressing welfare 
spending. It was also difficult to use other sources, since the Northern League is often poorly 
represented in international social surveys. 
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Table 9.3 Attitudes among the Northern League and other main p rty voters’ towards relevant eco-
nomic issues. Percentage agreeing with the statemens. 
Source: ITANES 2001-2008. Weight as indicated under Table 8.1. 
Legend: 
Prc: Communist Refundation Party; Ulivo (OliveTree Coalition): Leftwing Democrats (DS) + Margherita+ 
Italian Communists (CI) and Greens (Verdi); FI: Forza Italia; AN: National Alliance; LN: Northern 
League. 
* The results for the 2008 election are referred to the new Italian political scenario of party formations. 
Thus, Prc= the Leftwing Rainbow (Sinistra Arcobaleno) including the Italian Communists (CI) and the 
Greens (Verdi); Ulivo= Democratic Party (PD); AN joined with FI and formed the People’s Freedom Party 
(Popolo della Libertà, PdL). The LN ran the 2008 election ‘alone’, making a separate agreement with the 
PdL. The same party constellation applies to all the following tables reporting results from the 2008 elec-
tions. 
 
Table 9.3 contains two relevant questions on welfar: whether the government should lower 
taxes even if this means a lower quality of public service and whether the healthcare system 
should be privatised. Both variables confirm the liberal orientation of the Northern League 
voters on the economic-distributive dimension, suggesting that in this respect the Italian party 
matches the neoliberal orientation suggested by Kitschelt better as a component of the radical 
right winning formula.   
 The data available for the Austrian Freedom Party e somehow scattered and this 
makes it difficult to observe how the voters’ position on economic issues has developed over 
time and particularly in recent years.98 However, Table 9.4 shows that the FPÖ voters hold a 
neoliberal position on most of the issues taken into account. This is also shared by the ÖVP 
                                                
98 Austria did not join the ISSP on the role of government in 1996 and 2006 where a battery on welfare spending 
was included, and the 2008 EVS, which could have been interesting to compare to 1999, has not yet been r -
leased.  
 RC Ulivo FI AN LN All 
       
Less government intervention in 
economy 
      
2006 26 27 42 44 53 34 
*2008 25 30 36 . 38 32 
Income difference still high       
2006 85 84 71 80 59 79 
Private firms more freedom to 
hire and fire 
      
2001 20 24 55 61 53 42 
2006 17 21 58 65 67 38 
2008 18 30 55 . 61 42 
Less taxes even if lower public 
services 
      
2001 34 31 57 54 46 45 
 2006 30 23 44 39 45 32 
Privatisation of healthcare system        
2001 15 16 40 39 45 29 
2006 4 6 34 39 41 19 
N       
2001 140 767 802 316 55 2267 
2006 213 955 551 308 86 2525 
2008 94 680 602 . 152 1727 
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and the Liberal Forum, which sometimes are placed furthest into the liberal field of the eco-
nomic dimension. 
 
Table 9.4 The position of the Austrian Freedom Party voters’ on public spending and economics. Per-
centages that agree with the statements 
Source: EVS 1999; ESS 2002-03. 
Statements: 
-(EVS 1999) On a scale from 1 to 10 where would youplace yourself if 1 menas that the state should give
firms more freedom and 10 the state should control firms more effectively. 
-On a scale from 1-5 where 1 means very important and 5 not important at all, how important is to you that 
society deals with levelling big income differences. 
-Responsibility for pension with the individual (no answer/dk; with the state). 
  
About 47 pct. of the FPÖ voters answered in 2002-03 that the government should intervene 
less in economy and 62 pct. agreed that the state should give more freedom to private firms. 
FPÖ voters are less concerned about levelling out income differences.  
 In the 1999 EVS data, respondents were asked how concerned they were with welfare 
service areas dealing with the elderly, the unemployment and the sick and disabled. The mean 
value scores for all three questions,99 referring to a scale from 3 to 9, where 3 means very lit-
tle concern and 9 very great concern, reveal that te FPÖ voters were not among the most 
concerned (6.7) when it came to these groups, just like he supporters of the ÖVP (6.9). The 
Greens’ (7.0) and the SPÖ’s voters (7.1) are most wrried about the situation.100  
 To sum up, a larger share of working class support and a well established welfare state 
seem to be factors that encourage the development of pro-welfare politics also among the 
radical right parties. Looking at the Danish case, for example, up to 81 pct. of all the manual 
workers agree that more money should be used to support the Danish welfare state. The per-
centage falls to 60 pct. when considering the private s lariats and the self-employed. To some 
                                                
99 A factor analysis shows that the three variables have high loadings on the same dimension. The reliability test 
gives a Cronbach’s alpha value of about 0,8. Unfortuna ely, the very low number of respondents in the survey 
for the Danish People’s Party and the Northern Leagu  made too uncertain the results for the Danish and It lian 
cases. The answers were recoded: 1 Very much/much concerned; 2 concerned only to a certain extent; 3 Not so 
much/not at all concerned.      
100 There are though some relevant differences within t e parties, as shown by the values of the standard evia-
tions: SPÖ: 1.72, ÖVP: 1.78; Grüne: 1.67 and FPÖ: 1.79.    
 Grüne SPÖ LiF ÖVP FPÖ All 
More freedom to private firms       
1999 67 59 82 73 72 68 
Pensions an individual responsibility       
1999 28 26 34 32 33 30 
Levelling income inequalities        
1999 51 54 42 49 52 51 
2002 74 74  61 56 65 
Less government intervention in economy       
2002 26 35 40 56 47 43 
N       
1999 101 344 45 326 211 1522 
2002 234 470 17 570 73 1384 
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degree, this should help to understand the relationship between the stronger support that the 
Danish People’s Party has achieved over the years among the manual workers and the devel-
opment of the party politics in a pro-welfare direction. The Danish People’s Party leadership 
has on more than one occasion said that the party is today the only real carrier of the genuine 
and traditional social democratic values and principles.   
 The transformation of the radical right party agenda towards pro-welfare politics seems 
also to entail an explicit rupture with the liberal or neoliberal legacies. In this sense, the 
launching of the Danish People’s Party allowed it to make the pro-welfare profile a formal 
and explicit ‘ingredient’ of the party ideology. This is also what allegedly happened to the 
Austrian Freedom Party in 2005, when the exit of Jörg Haider and other party members al-
lowed the FPÖ and the new leadership to develop a welfare oriented profile. In this respect, it 
is also quite significant that the party today prefe s to define itself a Heimat and social party 
(see Chapter 7).  
 In those cases where the self-employed and the small entrepreneurs still constitute a 
significant component of the radical right electorae, the agenda continues to promote liberal 
policy solutions on the economic dimension. The party electoral composition and the particu-
lar political and geographical conditions behind its rise and development suggest that the 
steps in the direction of pro-welfare politics are possible in the case of the Northern League, 
but they will very likely be limited. The support that the party has recently achieved among 
manual workers might therefore also trigger some tensions in the future on economic matters.  
 The findings above suggest, however, that there are still relevant differences between 
the radical right parties in terms of their position n the economic-distributive dimension, 
responding to the interests and demands of the parties’ electorates. These empirical results 
thus show that the radical right parties do not necessarily embrace market liberal positions on 
economic distributive issues as an essential element of their ‘winning formula’. The positions 
on this dimension can be different, mixed in terms of liberal and redistributive preferences 
and can change over time (cf. also Kitschelt 2007), as it happened in the Danish case and 
seems to be happening in the Austrian Freedom Party. However, this does not mean that the 
economic dimension has become irrelevant or inconsequential for the radical right.  
 
9.2 Anti-immigration, Islam and the vote for the radical right  
Since about the mid-1980s, immigration has become a strong mobilization issue in several 
Western European countries, and studies of voter atitudes and reactions have proliferated 
(e.g. Gaasholth and Togeby 1995; Fetzer 2000; Sniederman, Peri et al. 2000; Nielsen 2004; 
Frølund Thomsen 2006).   
As regards the radical right, several studies (e.g. Gibson 2002; Ivarsflaten 2007; van der 
Brug and Fennema 2005; Rydgren 2005; Mudde 2007) support the hypothesis that anti-
immigration grievances are the main reason for support to the radical right parties. Some 
scholars (cf. van der Brug, Fennema, Tillie 2000) saw this as evidence that these parties are to 
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be considered predominantly as single-issue parties, that is anti-immigration parties. In this 
case, other issues are considered of minor importance when explaining the electoral support to 
the radical right. The risk of this approach is to oversimplify the more comprehensive ideol-
ogy developed by these parties over time and to fail to take notice of other attitudes expressed 
by radical right supporters, which are also important to comprehend the reasons behind their 
vote. Other scholars have tacitly or more explicitly distinguished between economic and cul-
tural aspects and implications in their analyses of the radical right electorate and ideology 
(e.g. Kitschelt 1995; Givens 2002; but indirectly aso Kriesi et al. 2008). Both approaches 
emphasise the role played by the cultural and value dimension in relation to the vote for the 
radical right and in particular by the anti-immigration issue. But being against immigration 
does not itself explain why. The present section will first of all look at what concerns the vot-
ers supporting the radical right when it comes to imm gration. Do they worry about the eco-
nomic consequences for the labour market (unemployment, lower wages) and for society as a 
whole (welfare state decline)? Or does the cultural impact of what they consider the different 
set of values and principles that immigrants bring with them feed the negative attitudes to-
wards immigration and integration? Moreover, it is relevant to observe if the different phases 
of the radical right life cycle have influenced the attitudes towards immigration and immi-
grants.101  
The character of the anti-immigration attitudes among radical right voters and in com-
parison to other main party voters will be addressed in the first part of this sub-section. The 
remaining part will look more closely at the effects of immigration attitudes on party choice. 
Briefly, we will include attitudinal variables in the logistic regression analyses that in Chapter 
8 dealt only with the effects of the main socioeconomic background variables on the vote for 
the radical right. This should help us understand whether the effect of social class and educa-
tion works through the anti-immigration attitudes. 
Several early studies have underlined the close relationship between the position on eth-
nic and racial interaction and the individual’s socioe onomic background and uprising. Lipset 
(1960) spoke for example of ‘working class authoritarian’ attitudes among manual workers, 
resulting from strictly disciplined family upbringing and basic education and partly explaining 
the low tolerance in this group toward ethnic and cultural difference and unconformist behav-
iour. 
Other scholarly contributions have emphasised the diff rent socialisation experiences re-
lated to education as well as to the individual occupational experiences. In this case, it is not 
so much the cognitive skills achieved via education hat make the difference, but rather the 
socialising experiences encountered and accumulated in the formative years at school and 
later at work that are considered to have an impact on the way the individuals understand and 
relate to the rest of the world (Kitschelt 1995). 
                                                
101 In relation to the three parties considered here it is particularly with reference to the political influence and 
government responsibility they have achieved after 2000-2001.  
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The studies which make reference to the marginalisation hypothesis (e.g. Givens 2002 
and 2005: 68-86; Kriesi et al. 2008) also relate the attitudes against immigration to the fear of 
wage dumping and marginalisation on the labour market that some social groups (in particular 
unemployed and manual workers) feel in connection with the entry of cheap immigrant la-
bour. An overrepresentation of unemployed and manual workers among the supporters of the 
radical right could be explained through attitudes indicating an increasing and generalised 
concern about the consequences of globalisation on the personal economic situation in the 
present and for the future. Considered in this perspective, immigration would thus become a 
factor of labour market competition.  
Table 9.5 addresses the marginalisation hypothesis and looks at how the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party positions itself on explicit questions of whether respondents consider their private 
economic situation improved or worsened in relation  the near past and what their expecta-
tions for the future.  
 
Table 9.5 Experienced improvement or deterioration of own economic situation in last 3 years and 
expectations 3-5 years into the future. Pct. and PDI (percentage difference index: much/some better – 
some/much worse). Percentage points 
Source: Danish Election Survey 2005-2007. 
Questions: 
- How is your own economic situation compared to three years ago? (much better; somewhat better; the 
same; somewhat worse; much worse) 
-  If we look 3-5 years ahead, do you feel optimistic about your economic situation, somewhat optimistic, a 
little worried or very worried about your economic s tuation? 
¹ The question in 2001 was slightly different: 
- All in all I am rather optimistic about how Denmark and the Danes will do in the future (agree; disagree) 
 
In comparison to the other voters, the supporters of the Danish People’s Party experienced in 
the period 2001-2007 less improvement of their personal economic situation and they are 
2007 Private economy 
improved or wors-
ened Improved Unchanged Worsened 
PDI 
2007 
PDI 
2005 
PDI 
2001 
SF 37 46 17 20 28 28 
S 40 43 17 23 26 22 
RV 47 43 10 37 33 24 
V 52 38 10 42 47 24 
K 52 45 3 49 48 21 
DF 39 42 19 20 35 9 
All 44 43 13 31 37 22 
 
Optimism about the 
future 
Optimist Neutral  Pessimist 
PDI 
2007 
PDI 
2005 
PDI 
2001¹ 
SF 72 1 28 43 43 72 
S 68 0 32 36 34 69 
RV 70 1 29 41 45 76 
V 80 0 20 60 66 73 
K 86 1 13 73 70 77 
DF 66 2 32 34 30 41 
All 73 1 26 47 48 68 
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comparatively less optimistic when they think about the development 3-5 years into the fu-
ture. If their position is much more negative than the Conservatives’ and the Liberals’ (more 
than 40 pct. of their voters answered positively to both questions in 2005 and 2007) it is not 
so different from the balance percentages points between optimists and pessimists registered 
among the left wing parties (S and SF), with the exception of 2001, when very few Danish 
People’s Party supporters had experienced an improvement of their economy. However, based 
on these results it would be difficult to maintain that the DPP voters are more marginalised 
than others, also in respect to their socioeconomic profile. 
The same, although in a very different social and political context, can be argued in rela-
tion to the Northern League. Table 9.6 reports variables which are similar to the Danish case, 
seen within the Italian electoral framework.      
 
Table 9.6 Experienced improvement or deterioration of own economic situation in recent years and 
expectations 3-5 years into the future. Pct. and PDI (percentage difference index: much/some better – 
some/much worse). Percentage points. 
Source: ITANES 2001-2008. 
For 2008 the parties are as indicated under Table 9.3. 
Questions: 
- In your opinion, has your family’s economic situation in the last year become: much/somewhat worse; the 
same; much/somewhat better. 
- If you look at the future, how will your family’s economic situation be 3-5 years from now? 
Much/somewhat worse; the same; much/somewhat better. 
¹ In 2008 respondents were only asked about the Italian economy in 3-5 years and not about the family’s 
economic situation. 
 
In terms of general pessimism and experienced deterioration of the family economy, the posi-
tion of the Northern League voters does not differ so much from that of the liberal party Forza 
Italia. The supporters of the Northern League do not express particular concern for the future, 
2006 Private economy 
improved or wors-
ened Improved Unchanged Worsened 
PDI 
2008 
PDI 
2006 
PDI 
2001 
Prc 5 38 56 -49 -51 4 
Ulivo 3 47 50 -37 -47 7 
UDC 6 61 32 -47 -26 3 
FI 10 57 33 -58 -23 -15 
AN 5 63 32 . -27 -4 
LN 3 71 26 -56 -23 -5 
All 5 52 43 -47 -38 -3 
       
2006  
Optimism about the 
future 
Optimist Neutral  Pessimist 
PDI 
2008¹ 
PDI 
2006 
PDI 
2001 
Prc 11 42 47 -69 -36 16 
Ulivo 12 49 39 -29 -27 21 
UDC 21 60 19 -12 2 47 
FI 28 55 17 37 11 50 
AN 27 53 20 . 7 55 
LN 24 57 19 26 5 42 
All 18 51 31 -4 -13 38 
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either; on the contrary, it seems that their optimis  increases when the party is in office (cf. 
results in Table 9.6 for 2001 and 2008). Unfortunately, no equivalent data were found for the 
Austrian Freedom Party. 
Negative feelings towards immigrants could also be activated by the idea that they are 
undeserving recipients of welfare services and benefits, who undermine the bases of the wel-
fare state for those who have ‘paid for it’.     
In short, there are both socioeconomic and cultural/value aspects that need to be ad-
dressed when considering the anti-immigration attitudes in relation to the radical right vote. 
Going to the empirical analysis, a preliminary observation made on the basis of four 
questions (Table 9.7) and dealing primarily with socioeconomic implications of immigration 
shows that in 2002-03, the Danes seemed less worried than Italians and Austrians about the 
possibility that immigrants can bring down the averge wages on the labour market. At the 
same time, people in Denmark express a rather negativ  opinion about the impact of immigra-
tion on the Danish economy. In Denmark immigrants are seen as passive recipients of welfare 
benefits and social services, rather than active contributors. Immigration is therefore consid-
ered a cost rather an economic gain for the Danish society.   
 
Table 9.7 Immigrants, job competition and marginalization fear. Mean values. Higher values corre-
spond to less concern for immigrants as competitors on the labour market. 
 Immigration brings 
down average 
wages 
Immigrants harm 
economic prospects 
of poor 
Immigrants unem-
ployed should be 
sent home 
Immigrants take 
jobs away 
 DK IT AT DK IT AT DK  IT AT DK IT AT 
All 62 56 51 54 51 44 61 42 50 56 46 47 
Radical right party* 52 43 36 42 42 26 43 28 29 47 41 39 
Liberal/Cons. party¹ 62 56 51 54 50 43 58 39 48 56 44 47 
Social Democratic party² 63 56 48 53 51 40 61 46 49 57 50 45 
Libertarian left-wing party³ 67 62 59 64 57 58 73 46 69 63 46 55 
Source: ESS 2002-2003. *Only 9 Northern League respondents, 76 FPÖ and 94 DF.  
¹ Respectively: Venstre (V); Forza Italia (FI); ÖVP. 
² Socialdemokrater (S); Partito Democratico della Sinistra (DS) and SPÖ.  
³ Radikale Venstre (RV); Rifondazione Comunista (RC); Grüne. 
 
The immigration question started to gain relevance i  Denmark during the late 1980s, but 
‘matured’ during the 1990s. The percentage of Danish voters mentioning immigration among 
the most important problems politicians should deal with went from 7 pct. in 1990 to 22 pct. 
in 2001 and 17 pct. in 2005 (cf. Van der Brugge andVoss 2007). Particularly in 2001, the 
electoral campaign was strongly influenced by the imm gration question and the surveys of 
that year clearly indicate that immigration was among the most important issues on the politi-
cal agenda of many Danish voters (cf. Goul Andersen, 2003) regardless of their political posi-
tion and attitudes.  
 However, the perception that immigrants represented a threat to the survival of the Dan-
ish nation, culture and identity became more and more relevant with the years. Table 9.8 
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shows the position of the DPP voters in relation to tw  questions dealing with immigration as 
a threat to the Danish national culture and security.  
 
Table 9.8 Attitudes towards immigration among the DF and other Danish party voters. PDI (percent-
age difference index: strongly agree/agree – strongly disagree/disagree). Percentage points. 
 SF S RV V K DF¹ All 
Immigration a threat against national 
culture 
     
 
 
1994 -56 -1 -49 8  8 74 -2 
1998 -62 -9 -70 15 -1 73 -5 
2001 -66 -15 -81 9 -6 73 -5 
2005 -60 -17 -66 16 -6 76 -3 
2007 -55 -24 -81 20 -15 69 -9 
Muslim countries a security threat        
1994 -40 -12 -9 -2 -21 35 -11 
1998 -42    2 -57 18 10 65 3 
2001 -64  -7 -62 17   3 64 0 
2005 -48  -1 -54 32 -3 74 8 
2007 -28   4 -36 53 34 81 21 
Source: Danish Election Survey 1994-2007. (N(s) as indicated under Table 9.1). 
¹ Progress Party in 1994.   
Wordings:  
- Immigration constitutes a threat to our national culture (strongly agree/agree – strongly disagree/ dis-
agree). 
- In the long run the Muslim (‘Arab’ in electoral survey 1994) countries constitute a serious threat to Den-
mark’s security (strongly agree/agree – strongly disagree/disagree). 
 
As shown in Table 9.8, the DPP voters are undoubtedly he most concerned about the impact 
of immigration on the Danish culture and identity. Since the 1990s, more than 70 pct. of the 
supporters of the Danish People’s Party have agreed with the statement that immigration 
represents a threat to Danish culture. Compared to the Danish People’s Party, the Social Lib-
erals (RV) and the Socialist People’s Party voters (SF) have the opposite attitude. The Social 
Liberals in particular have become the Danish People’s Party counter-pole on attitudes to-
wards immigrants and refugees. This has had important consequences for the party political 
competition and strategies, since the Social Liberals h s historically (since at least the 1930s) 
acted as a potential coalition party ‘in the middle’ for government formation both for the left 
wing and for the non-socialist parties (on this cf. Green Pedersen 2008). The position among 
the Liberal (V) voters on this issue is also interesting; in 2001 the percentage difference be-
tween those who saw immigration as a threat to the national culture and those who did not, 
was about 9 pct. in favour of the former; six years l ter this had increased to about 20 pct. (see 
Table 9.8 above). A different development can be observed among the Conservatives (K), 
whose position has gone in the opposite direction (from -6 pct. in 2001 to -15 pct. in 2007; cf. 
Table 9.8 above).  
Over the past decade another issue has met increasing consensus among the Danish 
People’s Party’s and other voters: that Muslim countries represent a security threat. Particu-
larly DPP voters, but also the electorate supporting he two government parties (V+K) ex-
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pressed high concern for the threat from Muslim countries to national security. In a short term 
perspective, this position has likely been fuelled by events such as 9/11 and its aftermath and 
more recently by what today is known as the Mohammed cartoons controversy, which started 
with twelve cartoons, most of them depicting the Islamic prophet Mohammed, published by 
the Danish broadsheet Jyllands Posten in September 2005. However, concerns about Islam 
have been on the agenda of certain segments of the electorate since at least the 1990s, and 
they have been especially pronounced among the DPP voters102 (cf. Table 9.8).  
In direct contrast to the positions of the Danish People’s Party electorate we find the So-
cial Liberals (RV) and the Social People’s Party voters. Across the years the supporters of 
these two parties have been much less worried about Islam and the Muslim threat compared to 
the rest of the Danish electorate and particularly to the DPP voters. In this case, the different 
socioeconomic backgrounds and levels of education chara terising the electoral composition 
of these parties might help explain the different atti udes on immigration. This question will 
be addressed later in this section. 
Another dimension related to attitudes towards immigrat on deals with its economic and 
social costs and with the problems that Western societies have counting immigrants as part of 
the same community with common rights and responsibilities (cf. Alesina and Glaeser 2004). 
In terms of competition theory (cf. Olzak 1992), the attitudes towards immigrants and refu-
gees could therefore be read as a reaction from those v ters who believe that immigrants can 
negatively affect the labour market conditions and the level of the welfare state. In this case, 
the positive attitudes towards more public spending in traditional welfare areas that character-
ise the Danish People’s Party supporters turn negative when it comes to spending more on 
immigrants and refugees (see Table 9.9).  
 
 
 
                                                
102 However, this does not automatically make the DPP voters xenophobic, Islamophobic or even racists. About 
this cf. Rydgren 2008.   
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Table 9.9 Attitudes towards public spending for immigration and refugees and immigrant rights to 
welfare state among the DF and other Danish party voters. PDI (percentage difference index: too little 
money – too much money; strongly agree/agree – strongly disagree/disagree). Percentage points. 
More money to refugees and immigrants SF S RV V K DF All 
1994 4 -36 -19 -48 -44 -81 -38 
1998 1 -37 2 -59 -52 -86 -42 
2001 25 -18 21 -52 -54 -83 -34 
2005 39 4 41 -31 -31 -69 -13 
2007 51 19 58 -19 -9 -53 5 
Refugees and immigrants same welfare 
rights 
      
 
1994 12 -46 -6 -51 -49 -92 -42 
1998 25 -27 21 -51 -46 -76 -31 
2001 28 -12 27 -51 -43 -77 -28 
2005 22 -2 22 -38 -37 -68 -20 
2007 29  4 46 -33 -29 -58 -10 
Source: Danish Election Survey 1994-2007. . (N(s) as indicated under Table 9.1). 
¹ Progress Party in 1994.   
Wordings:  
- Do you think the public spends too much money, a suitable amount or too little money on refugees and 
immigrants? 
- Should refugees and immigrants have the same rights as Danes to social security, even though they are 
not Danish citizens? (strongly agree/agree; strongly disagree/disagree). 
 
Particularly among the DPP voters there is a widespread opinion that too much public money 
was spent on refugees and immigrants. However, it is worth noticing that between 2001 and 
2007 the difference between those who think that ‘too much’ public money is spent on immi-
grants and refugees and those who think that ‘too li tle’ goes to this purpose, went from 83 
pct. to 53 pct. A similar trend toward a less negative position can be observed in relation to 
the question whether immigrants and refugees should have the same welfare rights as Danish 
citizens (see Table 9.9). Also among the Liberals and the Conservatives, the attitudes towards 
these issues of economic character in relation to immigration have in recent years met less 
restrictive positions. This trend might be partly interpreted as the effect of the restrictive poli-
cies that have been approved within this field since 2001 and perhaps partly influenced by the 
debate that animated the 2007 electoral campaign about the poor economic and living condi-
tions of asylum seekers in Denmark, particularly children. Interestingly, the development to-
ward less negative attitudes involved in particular the economic implications of immigration, 
whereas the same cannot be said for immigration grievances related to the cultural and value 
dimension (cf. Table 9.8).   
The Italian voters are also rather polarized when it comes to attitudes towards immigra-
tion, although to a lesser extent than in Denmark.103 Table 9.10 includes four questions about 
immigration; the first two questions are mainly relat d to cultural and identity implications in 
relation to immigration, the last two deal respectively with civic rights (the right to vote at 
administrative elections) and labour market consequences (immigration as a threat to em-
                                                
103 The eta value estimated for the Italian parties in relation to immigration perceived as a cultural threat is 0.35 
for 2008, which is a little lower than the eta 0.45 for Denmark in 2005. 
 255 
ployment). Overall, the voters of the centre-left-wing parties are more positive towards immi-
gration than the major parties of the right wing (FI, LN and AN). In this context, the Northern 
Legue voters are the most concerned about the impact of immigration on different social and 
economic aspects of the Italian society, also compared to Alleanza Nazionale. 
 
Table 9.10 Attitudes towards different aspects of immigration among Northern League and other main 
Italian party voters. PDI (percentage difference index: strongly agree/agree – strongly dis-
agree/disagree). Percentage points. 
Immigrants a threat to identity and culture RC Ulivo UDC FI AN LN All 
2001 -46 -41 -21 -6 -5 18 -21 
2006 -41 -21  12 32 37 62 1 
2008 -70 -55 -14 11 . 18 -24 
Immigrants should be allowed to build 
mosques 
  
 
    
2006 13 -13 -36 -49 -40 -60 -24 
2008 35 11 11 -49 . -71 -16 
Immigrants with regular permit should 
vote at municipal elections 
  
 
    
2001 32 36 15 14 8 5 22 
2006 59 52 28 17 14 -28 36 
Immigration a threat to employment        
2001 -26 -36 -42 4 -2 13 -15 
2006 -32 -22 -3 25 23 42 -4 
2008 -62 -51 -30 15 . 6 -22 
Source: ITANES 2001-2008. 
Wordings: 
- Immigrants constitute a threat to our national culture and our identity: (strongly agree/agree – strongly 
disagree/disagree). 
- It is right to allow Muslims to build mosques on Italian soil: (strongly agree/agree – strongly dis-
agree/disagree). 
- Immigrants represent a threat to employment (of Italian workers): (strongly agree/agree – strongly dis-
agree/disagree).  
- Some people say that immigrants, if they are legal and pay taxes, should vote in administrative elections 
in the municipality where they live. What do you think about it? (strongly agree/agree – strongly dis-
agree/disagree). 
 
Similarly to the Danish People’s Party, also the Northern League voters agreed with the 
statement that immigrants constitute a threat to natio l culture and identity. Taken as a 
whole, the attitudes toward this issue have become more positive in 2008 (see Table 9.10). 
Among the Northern League supporters, the difference between those who considered immi-
gration a threat to the national culture and those who did not, changed from 62 pct. in 2006 to 
18 pct. in 2008, but remained highest when compared to the other voters. The supporters of 
the two other major right-wing parties, FI and AN,104 follow closely: respectively 32 pct. and 
37 pct. in 2006 and 11 pct. in 2008 of the voters of these two parties considered immigrants as 
a cultural threat. 
                                                
104 At the 2008 election FI and AN ran together in the People of Freedom (Popolo della Libertà, PdL) party. The 
new party was first launched by Berlusconi in Novemb r 2007 and was officially founded at the first party con-
gress in March 2009.    
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 The Northern League’s position on construction of m sques on Italian soil is very nega-
tive: in 2008 about 71 pct. of the party supporters continued to oppose. This attitude is for the 
most part shared by the voters of Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale (PDI -49 pct. in 2008; 
see Table 9.10) and also the average percentage difference among Italians indicates that there 
is still general opposition. The supporters of the Northern League are the only ones who are 
against giving immigrants with a regular residence permit the right to vote at the administra-
tive. This measure, which was approved in several other Western European countries already 
in the 1980s, is strongly supported among the electorate of the left-wing parties and to some 
extent also by centre-right-wing voters.  
 Compared to the other immigration issues, the Northern League voters seem to be a lit-
tle less concerned about the consequences of immigration for the labour market. Between 
2006 and 2008, the opinion balance between the supporters of the Northern League who saw 
immigration as a threat to employment and those whodisagreed went from 42 pct. to 6 pct. 
This might be explained by the fact that the Northern League gets the strongest electoral sup-
port in the North of the country, where the immigrant labour force is a vital factor in some 
industrial sectors. This would also suggest that in relation to immigration, the voters of the 
Northern League are much more worried about the impact on culture, identity and on law and 
order rather than on the labour market.  
 Similar concerns about the consequences of immigration on society can be observed 
among the supporters of the Austrian Freedom Party. Table 9.10 presents similar, though not 
completely equivalent, questions from ESS 2002-03 which can be compared to those already 
introduced for the other two parties in relation to attitudes towards immigration and immi-
grants. The first two questions of Table 9.10 deal with immigration mainly perceived as a 
cultural threat and as a disaggregating element for he survival of the traditions and cultural 
habits of the Austrian community. The third question brings in the view of immigrants as 
competitors on the labour market and relates to the implications advanced by the marginalisa-
tion hypothesis. Whether immigrants should be entitl d o enjoy the same political and civic 
rights as national citizens is the issue brought up by the fourth question. 
 In 2002, 51 pct. of the Austrian Freedom Party electorate declared that the cultural life 
of the country is generally undermined by immigrants (see Table 9.11). By contrast, among 
the ÖVP voters, the party that from 2000 until 2005 was in government with the FPÖ, only 26 
pct. agreed with these statements. On the political left wing, 21 pct. of the SPÖ voters and 7 
pct. of the Greens considered the Austrian culture undermined by immigration.  
 In line with this position, cultural diversity was perceived as a threat to the Austrian cul-
ture and national awareness; 63 pct. of the Austrian Freedom Party supporters agreed that it is 
best for the country if people share the same customs and traditions, in comparison to 49 pct. 
among ÖVP voters and respectively 34 pct. and 14 pct. among the SPÖ and the Greens.  
 However, also to the question whether average wages nd salaries are generally brought 
down by people coming from outside, 64 pct. of the FPÖ supporters expressed agreement. 
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This position was followed by 41 pct. of the SPÖ voters, who expressed more concern on this 
particular issue than the ÖVP (see Table 9.11). The FPÖ seemed to have a less negative 
postion on the more general question of whether people who come to live in Austria should be 
given the same rights as everyone; 42 pct. of the FPÖ voters are in favour of extending the 
rights to all and 42 pct. are against. This issue finds a general positive attitude among the sup-
porters of the other parties and in particular among the Greens (cf. Table 9.11). 
 
Table 9.11 Attitudes towards immigration among the Austrian Freedom Party and other main Austrian 
party voters. PDI (percentage difference index: strongly agree/agree – strongly disagree/disagree). 
Percentage points. 
Source: ESS 2002-2003. 
Wordings: 
- Would you say that Austria is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other 
countries? (0 thru 4= Austria’s cultural life undermined; 5= Neutral; 6 thru 10= cultural life enriched)   
- Is it better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions? (strongly agree/agree; 
neither/nor; strongly disagree/disagree).  
- Average wages and salaries are generally brought down by people coming to live and work here (strongly 
agree/agree – strongly disagree/disagree). 
 
Similarly to the Danish People’s Party and to the Northern League, the supporters of the Aus-
trian Freedom Party stand out in comparison to the ot r voters as being the most sceptical 
2002 Cultural life enriched or 
undermined by immigrants Cultural life 
undermined 
Neutral 
Cultural life 
enriched 
PDI 
2002 
N  
Grüne 7 10 83 -76 233  
SPÖ  21 27 52 -31 461  
ÖVP 26  28 46 -20 563  
FPÖ 51 29 20  31 70  
All  22 24 49 -27   
Better for Austria if most 
share same customs/  
traditions 
Agree Neutral Disagree     
Grüne 14 24 62 -48 233  
SPÖ 34 30 36  -2 461  
ÖVP 49 27 25  24 563  
FPÖ 63 24 13  50 70  
All  39 26 33   6   
Average wages and salaries 
brought down by people 
coming to Austria 
Agree Neutral Disagree    
Grüne 24 29 47 -23 220  
SPÖ 41 23 36    5 431  
ÖVP 31 35 34 -31 530  
FPÖ 64 19 16  48 67  
All  33 25 32    1   
Immigrants same rights as 
nationals 
Agree Neutral Disagree    
Grüne 80 10 10 70 228  
SPÖ 54 18 28 26 449  
ÖVP 48 24 28 20 552  
FPÖ 42 16 42 0 69  
All  56 19 25 31   
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about immigration. Comparatively, the supporters of the three parties have over the years de-
veloped similar positions on the immigration issue. In particular, the perception of immigrants 
as a threat to national identity and culture seems to have become one of the main concerns 
and to have a strong effect on the support for the adical right. The following section conducts 
a closer analysis of the effect of different attitud nal issues on the radical right vote. 
 
9.3 Considering the effects of the voters’ socioeconomic background and political attitudes on 
party vote   
At the end of Chapter 8 we looked at the effects that e main socioeconomic variables have 
on the radical right vote. Here, we look at how the socioeconomic variables ‘react’ to the in-
troduction of the attitudinal variables that have to do with the issues so far discussed in this 
chapter, namely welfare and immigration. This will al ow to control for spurious correlations 
between variables and to look whether there are intervining variables that can help explaining 
the socioeconomic variations characterising the vott  the three parties.  
To evaluate the effect of these issues on the radical right vote, the independent variables 
considered refer to the general attitude towards immigration as a threat to culture and identity 
and the variable indicating different positions towards welfare spending. The attitudinal vari-
ables have been recoded and given values from -1 to + (with 0 as neutral position); positive 
values reflect the positions generally ascribed to the radical right on the economic and cul-
tural/value dimensions of politics (neoliberal and anti-immigration) and thus indicate a left-
leaning bias in the case of negative figures and a right-leaning bias with positive numbers. 
Table 9.12, in which Model II is carried over from Chapter 8, shows that introducing the 
variable on welfare spending contradicts the interpretation that being a voter with neoliberal 
standpoints increases the probability of voting for the Danish People’s Party. Instead we find 
that it is to some extent people who favour spending more money to improve the welfare who 
show a higher propensity to vote for the Danish People’s Party. The other issues related to the 
economic dimension are of a more general character nd they deal with the voters’ position on 
the issues considered in Table 9.2 about government control with private firms, about income 
differences and the level of social reforms. Interestingly, the coefficients for the variables 
dealing with government control over private busines and about income differences in the 
country are positive and statistically significant (see Table 9.12). This might suggest that vot-
ers supporting the Danish People’s Party are welfare oriented when it comes to concrete is-
sues (more money to hospitals, pensioners and unemployed), but at the same time they prefer 
to have a degree of freedom from government intervention and control over the private intia-
tive and do not believe that the state has to increase taxes to level income differences. These 
attitudes also allowed the Danish People’s Party to work together with the Liberals and Con-
servatives on economic matters.   
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Table 9.12 Effect of different main socioeconomic background a issue variables on the vote for the 
Danish People’s Party (2005). Logistic regression analyses (beta coefficients). 
Source: Danish Election Survey 2005. 
* Significant at at the 0.05 level. 
 
As concerns the effects of the attitudes towards immigration, the findings confirm what has 
already been said in previous studies about the strong impact that immigration related issues 
have on the vote for the radical right (e.g. Ivarsfl ten 2008(b)). In the case of the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party it clearly emerges that the variables that control for attitudes towards immigration 
strengthen the degree of correlation (here 0.27 R² Nagelkerke) between the dependent vari-
able and the independent variables. At the same tim, some of the socioeconomic background 
variables become weaker predictors of the vote, once these issues are included in the model. 
Most noteworthy, higher education loses most of its (negative) effect on the support for the 
party. The coefficients in Model IV of Table 9.12 suggest that among voters who perceive 
immigration as a threat to national culture and identity, Muslim countries as a threat to na-
tional security and think that Danish workers have to be employed first, there is a higher 
probability for a vote for the Danish People’s Party. In this sense, these attitudes toward im-
migration have to be seen in close relationship to the socioeconomic profile of the Danish 
People’s Party.    
 Finally, Model V of Table 9.12 shows that the introduction of the independent variables 
dealing with immigration weakens the effect of the attitudes towards economic issues and to 
some extent also of welfare spending. As concerns the immigration attitudes, the coefficients 
are positive and all of them significant, which is in line with our expectations about the role of 
these issues as interventing variables on the vote for the Danish People’s Party. 
 Looking at Table 9.13 about the Austrian Freedom Party and as already observed in 
Chapter 8, we find that social class has a strong and significant effect on party vote also after 
controlling for education. The coefficients in the table show that being a manual worker 
strongly increases the probability of voting for the FPÖ (in relation to the reference category 
Independent variables Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
     
Male 0.24  0.28   0.24  0.29 
Cohort (before 1945)      -0.20 -0.08   -0.59* -0.43 
Manual worker       0.05  0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Self-employed -1.08*  -1.00*   -1.15*   -0.96* 
Public salariat -0.91*  -0.86*   -0.75*   -0.70* 
Private salariat -0.60*  -0.71*   -0.63*   -0.65* 
Higher education  -1.08*  -1.01* -0.25 -0.31 
Less welfare spending   -0.59*    -0.38* 
Less government control over privates    0.20*    0.16 
Income differences     0.17*    0.10 
Less social reforms   0.14    0.01 
Immigration a cultural threat      0.97*     0.97* 
Muslim countries a threat     0.48*     0.39* 
Danish workers first     0.30*     0.27* 
Constant -1.44 -1.84 -1.97  -2.28 
R² (Nagelkerke)   0.08   0.11  0.27   0.27 
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represented by people outside the labour market). In terms of class composition, this makes 
the FPÖ similar to the Danish People’s Party. However, it is also among lower skilled white 
collars that the Austrian party gets some electoral support (cf. Table 9.13).   
 
Table 9.13 Effect of different main socioeconomic background a issue variables on the vote for the 
Austrian Freedom Party (2002-03). Logistic regression analyses (beta coefficients). 
Source: ESS 2002-03. 
* Significant at at the 0.05 level. 
 
Examining the other models, it emerges that the effct of issue voting weakens the importance 
of social class. Introducing the two independent variables on attitudes towards the economy 
does not strengthen the effect on party vote. The coeffi ients are small, but significant in rela-
tion to the question about income difference, on which the supporters of the party hold a neo-
liberal position, asserting that the government should not intervene to reduce differences of 
income. 
 In line with the expectations, the results of model IV in Table 9.13 show that anti-
immigration attitudes have a strong effect on the FPÖ vote which is markedly positive, par-
ticularly when dealing with the consequences of immgration on the country’s culture and 
identity. However, also the variable holding immigrants to lower average wages on the labour 
market and to harm the economic prospects for the poor has statistically significant effects on 
the vote for the FPÖ.     
 As observed at the end of Chapter 8, the socioeconomic background variables highlight 
a more varied electoral composition of the vote for the Northern League compared to the Dan-
ish People’s Party and quite interestingly a strong propensity for support among low skilled 
white collars in relation to the reference category here represented by people outside the la-
bour market. In Table 9.14 we can see how introducing the attitudinal variables affects the 
vote for the Italian party. 
 
Independent variables Model II Model III  Model IV Model V 
     
Male  0.51  0.46 0.36  0.41 
Cohort (before 1945)  0.71  0.69 0.27  0.27 
Manual worker   1.17*    1.06* 0.85  0.85 
Self-employed 0.56  0.59 0.23  0.32 
Low skilled white collar   0.95*    0.87* 0.82    0.96* 
High skilled white collar -1.08 -1.12 -1.25* -1.19 
Service worker  0.51  0.58 0.40  0.25 
Higher education   0.18  0.15 0.39  0.41 
Less government intervention in economy  -0.07 -0.03  
Income differences     0.30*   0.37*  
Immigration a cultural threat     0.63*   0.61* 
Immigrants lower wages      0.45*   0.39* 
Immigrants harm economic prospects for poor     0.45*   0.47* 
Constant -3.61 -3.37 -3.42 -3.65 
R² (Nagelkerke)   0.08  0.08   0.19   0.17 
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Table 9.14 Effect of different main socioeconomic background a issue variables on the vote for the 
Northern League (2008). Logistic regression analyses (b ta coefficients). 
Source: ITANES 2008. 
* Significant at at the 0.05 level. 
 
As far as the economic dimension is concerned, the prediction is also for the Northern League 
to find an effect from attitudes that tend to support a neoliberal orientation. For this purpose, 
the two variables included in the regression model ar  about more freedom for private firms 
to hire and fire and less government intervention in the economy. Interestingly, only the for-
mer has a positive coefficient, which is significantly different from zero, indicating that the 
Northern League voters have a liberal attitude on freedom for private entrepreneurs in matters 
such as hiring and firing workers. 
 Also in the case of the Northern League, the attitudes towards immigration have a 
stronger effect on vote. In particular the position that immigration is a threat to culture and 
identity and the opposition against building mosques on Italian soil have the most significant 
effect. For immigration as a threat to employment conditions, the coefficient is very small and 
not statistically significant. This suggests that the main concern about immigration among the 
supporters of the Northern League is not so much margin lisation on the labour market, but 
rather the effects on culture, identity and law andorder.  
 
9.4 Protest and distrust fuelling the radical right support? 
Until at least the end of the 1990s one of the main explanations of electoral support for and 
the subsequent breakthrough of the radical right was th t this vote was a populist reaction 
especially from those segments of the population that felt politically marginalised (e.g. Betz 
1994; Taggart 2000). As discussed in earlier chapters (see e.g. Chapter 2), the nature and 
character of the populist protest have been differently explained and seldom with the neces-
sary precision that allows a clear empirical operationalisation of this reaction. Recent studies 
(cf. Taguieff 2002; Albertazzi and McDonnel 2008: 1-1 ) have tried to update the concept of 
populism and to relate it to the new times, looking more specifically at the social, political and 
Independent variables Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
     
Male -0.11 -0.12   0.14  0.11 
Cohort (before 1945) -0.21 -0.24 -0.35 -0.38 
Manual worker  0.32  0.34  0.14  0.14 
Self-employed    0.58*  0.44  0.42  0.30 
High skilled white collar  0.10  0.13  0.06  0.08 
Low skilled white collars    0.75*    0.74*  0.77*    0.77* 
Higher education  -0.34 -0.33 -0.07 -0.10 
Private firms more freedom     0.42*      0.34* 
Less government intervention in economy    0.11    0.08 
Immigration a cultural threat      0.28*     0.26* 
No allowance to build mosques      0.73*     0.70* 
Immigration a threat to employment    0.01  -0.01 
Constant   -2.30 -2.28 -2.78  -2.72 
R² (Nagelkerke)    0.02   0.05   0.11   0.12 
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ideological conditions that in some countries have contributed to encourage and support popu-
list reactions. 
The fact that populism is neither historically nor s ciologically exclusively a right-wing 
political phenomenon (see Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Canovan 1981; Laclau 2005) has not 
prevented that – at least in the Western European context – the dominant tendency until re-
cently was to ascribe the ideological and social fetures of populism mainly to the parties of 
the right and particularly to the radical right-wing parties (cf. Betz 1994; Taggart 1996 and 
2000). The populist protest hypothesis (see Chapter 2) has been employed in particular when 
the radical right parties were still at the periphery of the political system (see e.g. Bergh 
2004), a position that allowed these parties to abound with anti-establishment politics, without 
having direct responsibility for concrete, realized politics. This allowed the radical right par-
ties to amplify the rhetoric about the sovereignty of people over the political elites, to blame 
the government for its policies and to emphasise the role of the party/movement (and particu-
larly of its leader) as the ultimate guardian of the rights and interests of the people. Consider-
ing that today, many radical right parties are or have been involved in the decision making 
processes and in government activity, there is reason to believe that this process encouraged a 
process of ‘normalisation’ both in terms of party ideology and of the levels of trust in politics 
and politicians among radical right supporters.105 In any case, in the present context it is diffi-
cult to speak about generalised protest in relation to the radical right, at least for the three 
cases here considered. 
However, all three parties have in different phases of their life cycle and with different 
degrees and rhetoric attacked the political establishment and supported politics that asked for 
a more direct relationship between the needs and demands of the people and the politics ap-
proved by the government. This does not necessarily make them protest parties (cf. Van der 
Brug, Fennema, Tillie 2000), but it has enabled them to appeal to voters who are disenchanted 
with the political institutions, have lower levels of trust in politics and find it difficult to un-
derstand the political decisions and initiatives taken by the government. Pasquino (2008: 15-
29) has observed that the populist reaction implies th  intervention of different political, so-
cial and ideological conditions that facilitate the rise and resistance of populism and its differ-
ent forms. This means that the opportunities for a populist reaction can be different from 
country to country and they can change over time. Similarly, also the social and psychological 
conditions that at the individual level are considere  to favour the support of parties with a 
populist appeal (such as social and political isolati n, political distrust, low political efficacy, 
and lack of civic engagement) can be subject to change. 
The following paragraphs looks at the levels of political trust and political efficacy 
among the supporters of the three radical right paries and at the way they have developed 
                                                
105 This approach has been partly tested by Sönderlund and Kestilä (2007) on the ESS 2002-03, who concluded 
that party identification of radical right-wing voters does not seem to increase their trust in parliament and politi-
cians. 
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over time, and examines to what extent these issues have actually influenced the vote for the 
three radical right parties.  
Starting with the Danish case, the different levels of political trust in the Danish elector-
ate are based on the question whether political leaders can generally be trusted to make the 
right decisions for the country. Table 9.15 shows the Danish percentage differences between 
pragmatic trust and political distrust. 
 
Table 9.15 Political trust among Danish People’s Party and other main parties. PDI (strongly 
agree/agree – strongly disagree/disagree). 
Political trust SF S RV V K DF¹ All 
1994 -1 19 12 12 9 -41 7 
1998 11 28 46 16 21 -30 16 
2001 8 39 35 50 47 13 36 
2005 4 20 18 63 58 26 34 
2007 -16 12 4 71 61 37 30 
Source: Danish Election Survey 1994-2007. 
¹ Progress Party in 1994. 
Wordings:  
- In general we can trust our political leaders to make the right decisions for the country (strongly 
agree/agree – strongly disagree/disagree). 
 
The level of trust among the party’s voters in what t e political leaders do for the country has 
changed from deep distrust to moderate, but positive trust. In 1998, the difference between 
those who said that they trusted and those who declared they did not trust what politicians 
decided for the country was -30 pct. among the supporters of the Danish People’s Party (see 
Table 9.15); in 2001, the year the Danish People’s Party became an important supporting 
partner to the V and K government, it changed from negative to positive (+13 pct.) and about 
six years later, at the 2007 election it reached +37 pct. The level of political trust is still low 
among the supporters of the Danish People’s Party when compared to the Liberal and Con-
servative voters; however, there is a clear trend in the positive direction that can be ascribed to 
the effect of the political influence and responsibilit es achieved by the party since 2001. The 
opposite development can be observed among the voters f the parties that from 2001 have 
been in opposition (S, SF and RV), whose levels of trust have decreased since 2001 (see Ta-
ble 9.15). The shift of government in 2001, or the ‘system change’ as it is sometimes referred 
to now, influenced trust towards more positive leves among the Liberal and the Conservative 
voters and towards less positive levels among the supporters of the parties at the opposition.  
 If a high degree of political distrust and disillusionment in politics characterised the DPP 
voters in the late 1990s, these feelings have given place to much more positive attitudes in 
recent years. This makes it even more difficult to find evidence of a generalised protest atti-
tude among the DPP voters, if it has ever existed.  
 External political efficacy is another concept used to explain the voter’s belief that he or 
she understands national and international politics and therefore has influence on the political 
process (see Lane 1959; Campbell et al. 1960). Low political trust, together with low levels of 
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political efficacy have also been mentioned in relation to the Danish Progress Party first (cf. 
Jørgen Nielsen 1976) and later to the Danish People’s Party electorate (eg. Andersen 2000). 
The position of the DPP voters on (internal) political efficacy was explored by means of an 
index that was constructed on the basis of four classic l questions in the Danish Election Sur-
vey (see Goul Andersen 2000):  
- Sometimes politics is so complicated that people lik  me cannot really understand what 
is going on. 
- I do not really think it is so difficult to decide in political matters. 
- I know so little about the EU that I have almost given up following what happens. 
- When economists discuss the economic policy I only u derstand little of what they are 
talking about. 
A factor analysis on these variables on the 2005 Danish election survey shows that the four 
variables have quite high loadings on the same factor and the reliability test gives an alpha 
value of about 0,7, which is about the same as in previous surveys (cf. Goul Andersen 2000: 
137). The political efficacy index obtained from the above mentioned items and going from 
the minimum value of +4 to the maximum of +20 was then recoded into three different posi-
tions indicating low, medium and high levels of political efficacy. This implies that lower 
scores respond to low internal political efficacy, whereas higher scores indicate higher levels 
of political efficacy. The results are shown in Table 9.16. 
 
Table 9.16 Political efficacy among Danish People’s Party voters and other main party voters. Per-
centages based on index of political efficacy. 
 1994 1998 2001 2005 2007 
 Low 34 19 18 20 29 
SF Medium 37 43 45 49 46 
 High 29 38 37 31 26 
 Low 49 35 33 32 37 
S Medium  35 40 45 46 44 
 High 16 25 22 21 20 
 Low  40 20 13 18 24 
RV Medium 34 29 46 43 45 
 High 26 51 41 39 31 
 Low  38 24 29 21 25 
V Medium 36 42 43 49 47 
 High 26 34 28 30 28 
 Low  24 18 25 18 14 
K Medium 39 34 40 47 44 
 High 37 48 35 35 42 
 Low 59 46 36 36 37 
DF Medium 29 29 44 49 48 
 High 12 25 20 15 15 
 Low 41 29 29 26 29 
All Medium 34 39 43 47 45 
 High 25 32 28 27 26 
Source: Danish Election Survey 1994-2007. 
 
At the 2007 election, the DPP voters were still characterised by very low levels of (internal) 
political efficacy. However, the picture does not seem so different from the voters of the So-
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cial Democrats, whereas we find the higher scores on this index among the voters of the So-
cial Liberals and the Conservatives. Despite the political influence achieved by the Danish 
People’s Party after 2001, little improvement can be registered in the levels of internal effi-
cacy among the Danish People’s Party supporters, sugge ting that this is an effect of the vot-
ers’ educational level.   
 The comparison with the Northern League in Italy is complicated by the lack of equiva-
lent variables in the Italian data. However, it is important to mention the specific political 
conditions, opportunities and the political culture characterising the Italian case, which, ac-
cording to some scholars, has made Italy a country where many forms of populisms and pro-
test can co-exist and thrive (see e.g. Tarchi 2008: 84-99). 
 Protest, political trust and political efficacy must therefore be considered in relation to 
the specific Italian social and political context, where feelings of disbelief and political dis-
trust are widespread among the whole population and are not exclusive to the supporters of a 
specific party. At least three questions relate to political trust and efficacy in the data:  
- Sometimes politics is so complicated that one can not understand what is really happening. 
- People like me have no influence on what the governm nt does. 
- People we elect to parliament soon lose contact with their voters. 
 
The first two questions have to do with political efficacy, whereas the third can shed light on 
the levels of trust in how much they feel represented by the political leaders elected to parlia-
ment. Table 9.17 shows that the supporters of the Northern League feel high political distrust 
and low political efficacy.  
 
Table 9.17 Political efficacy and political trust among LN voters and other main Italian parties. Per-
centage of voters agreeing with the statements. 
 RC Ulivo UDC FI  AN  LN All 
Politics is too complicated        
2001 84 82 85 90 83 94 86 
2006 73 78 81 82 80 79 79 
2008 67 72 83 80 - 84 75 
People like me have no influence on 
what the government decides 
       
2001 75 78 78 86 80 87 81 
2006 55 68 62 74 71 73 68 
2008 59 67 65 64 - 65 65 
Elected politicians loose soon contact 
with voters  
      
1996 79 79 (91) 83 88 92 83 
2001 96 92 (92) 94 93 93 93 
2006 81 87 91 89 90 85 88 
Source: ITANES 1996-2008. 
 
However, Table 9.17 shows that also voters of other parties, e.g. Forza Italia and Alleanza 
Nazionale, are characterised by low political efficacy and low trust. This does not come as a 
surprise; Italians are known to be among the populations in Western Europe with the lowest 
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levels of trust in politicians. These feelings are extended to the main political and legislative 
organs and institutions, such as the Italian parliament, and even to the Court of Justice (see 
Table 9.18). Interesting is also the position on EU, towards which the Northern League voters 
have shown alternate feelings in the course of the years. This is in line with the EU politics 
developed by the party, which in the 1990s changed from overall pro-EU to a sceptical 
evaluation of Europe’s role in relation to national sovereignty and national politics (see Chap-
ter 6). The attitudes of the LN voters towards some of the most important institutions have 
remained negative across the years, suggesting that it c n still be important for the Northern 
League to emphasise the differences with the other mainstream parties even if in government. 
This may also explain why the Northern League has not joined the new centre right party the 
People of Freedom, launched by Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale.    
 
Table 9.18 Trust in main representative institutions among LN and other main Italian party voters. 
Percentages for 2006 and PDI (trust very much/some – trust little/very little). 
Source: ITANES 2001-2008. 
 
2006 
Trust in the parliament 
Trust very 
much/some 
Do not 
know 
Trust little/ 
very little 
PDI 
2001 
PDI 
2006 
PDI 
2008 
RC 53 0 47 -4 6 -50 
Ulivo 59 3 38 18 21 -12 
UDC 52 3 45 22 7 -26 
FI 44 2 54 -9 -10 -2 
AN 49 1 50 7 1 . 
LN 36 1 63 -9 -27 -30 
All 53 2 45 4 8 -15 
Trust in the Court of Justice       
RC 67 0 33 11 34 42 
Ulivo 69 2 29 25 40 33 
UDC 58 3 39 3 19 23 
FI 46 2 52 -11 -6 -26 
AN 48 0 52 -18 -4 . 
LN 34 0 66 -42 -32 -40 
All 59 2 39 3 20 3 
Trust in parties       
RC 33 1 66 -43 -33 -61 
Ulivo 32 1 67 -40 -35 -49 
UDC 24 2 74 -45 -50 -47 
FI 20 1 79 -59 -59 -45 
AN 27 0 73 -49 -46 . 
LN 19 0 81 -45 -62 -55 
All 28 1 74 -50 -46 -51 
Trust in the EU       
RC 65 2 33 29 32 . 
Ulivo 71 3 26 49 45 . 
UDC 63 5 32 63 31 . 
FI 54 4 42 23 12 . 
AN 62 3 35 23 27 . 
LN 55 1 44 -13 11 . 
All 65 3 32 33 33 . 
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Like the Italian voters, the Austrians have low levels of trust in politicians and in institutions 
like the parliament and the European Union. FPÖ voters had the lowest levels of trust among 
the Austrian parties (cf. Table 9.19 below).  
 The electoral success of the Austrian Freedom Party in the 1990s was interpreted as a 
voter reaction to mainstream politics. Protest and ti-establishment feelings were seen as 
strong motivations for the vote for the FPÖ (e.g. Plasser and Ulram 2000). The lack of politi-
cal trust in Austria at that time is interpreted as an effect of the long period with SPÖ and 
ÖVP, the so-called Great Coalition, in government. They had governed the country from 
1987, fuelling the general opinion that the two parties had centralised the political power and 
supported patronage and clientelist practices for the division of the country most influential 
posts. Thus, one of the main reasons that the FPÖ supporters gave for their vote in 1999 was 
the demand for political change and a rejection of the Grand Coalition (27 pct.) (Plasser and 
Ulram 2000: 228-230). 
 
Table 9.19 Trust in main representative institutions among FPÖ and other main Austrian party voters. 
Percentages and PDI (trust very much/some – trust little/very little). 
Source: EVS 1999; ESS 2002-03. 
 
2002 
Trust in parliament Trust very much/ 
some Neutral Trust little/none 
PDI 
1999 
PDI 
2002 
SPÖ 38 25 37  2     1 
ÖVP 46 28 26 -2  20 
FPÖ 38 25 37  -47     1 
Grüne 45 24 31  -29  14 
LiF 41 12 47 -2 -6 
All 40 24 36   -19 4 
Trust in the legal system      
SPÖ 61 15 24  43 37 
ÖVP 63 19 18  55 45 
FPÖ 54 22 24  5 30 
Grüne 57 19 24  33 33 
LiF 35 24 41  68 -6 
All 60 18 22  34 38 
Trust in politicians      
SPÖ 16 18 66 . -50 
ÖVP 24 20 56 . -32 
FPÖ 14 11 75 . -61 
Grüne 15 16 69 . -54 
LiF 0 13 87 . -87 
All 19 18 63 . -44 
Trust in the EU      
SPÖ 24 23 53 -9 -29 
ÖVP 27 22 51 -12 -24 
FPÖ 13 24 63 -51 -50 
Grüne 34 25 41 3       -7 
LiF 25 31 44   23 -19 
All 26 20 47 -25 -21 
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As shown in Table 9.19 above, the supporters of the FPÖ had, particularly in the late 1990s, 
very low levels of trust in basically all the main political insitutions. The positions seem a 
little more positive a few years later in 2002. At that time, the FPÖ had been in government 
with the ÖVP for a couple of years, which might help to explain the improvement. However, 
the levels of trust in politicians in general and i the European Parliament are low also among 
the supporters of the other parties, although the FPÖ voters remain among the most distrust-
ful.  
 To get the complete comparative perspective over this issue, Table 9.20 shows how the 
DPP voters position themselves in relation to institutional trust.  
 
Table 9.20 Trust in main representative institutions among DF and other main Danish party voters. 
Percentages and PDI (trust very much/some – trust little/very little). 
Source: ESS 2002-03. 
 
It can be immediately noticed that the Danish voters have comparatively higher levels of trust 
in the most important political institutions. However, the electorate of the Danish People’s 
Party clearly has least trust in the parliament and in politicians and in particular in the Euro-
2002 
Trust in parliament Trust very much/ 
some Neutral Trust little/none 
PDI 
2002 
SF 64 21 15 49 
S 64 22 14 50 
RV 77 15 8 69 
V 68 18 14 54 
K 75 14 11 64 
DF 44 22 35 9 
All 65 19 16 49 
Trust in the legal system     
SF 82 13 5 77 
S 78 12 10 68 
RV 90 8 2 88 
V 78 9 12 66 
K 89 4 7 82 
DF 59 18 23 36 
All 78 11 11 67 
Trust in politicians     
SF 55 31 14 41 
S 49 30 21 28 
RV 68 18 15 53 
V 56 22 22 34 
K 60 27 13 47 
DF 42 18 40 2 
All 53 25 22 31 
Trust in the EU     
SF 37 24 39 2 
S 38 25 37 1 
RV 49 23 28 21 
V 43 22 35 8 
K 47 20 33 14 
DF 21 20 59 -38 
All 39 23 38 1 
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pean Parliament (59 pct. of the DPP voters have non or very little trust in the EP). Table 9.20 
does not show if the levels of trust among DF supporters have changed in more recent years; 
however, in relation to political trust and efficacy, it is likely that the positions have remained 
on the lower side, compared to the other Danish voters.    
 To conclude, the levels of political efficacy and of the levels of trust in politics and insti-
tutions among the supporters of the three radical rght parties remain among the lowest within 
the respective poltical environments; this despite the political influence and responsibilities 
achieved by the parties in the last decade or so. Seen in a cross-country perspective, the Dan-
ish People’s Party shows higher levels of trust in comparison to the Austrian Freedom Party 
and the Northern League, but this has to be considered in relation to the generally high levels 
of trust that characterise the Danish society as a whole and which are sharply contrasting with 
the widespread scepticism and disbelief towards politics and politicians be observed among 
Italians and partly also among Austrians. However, given the degree of influence and respon-
sibility achieved by several radical right parties n Western Europe, it is difficult, especially 
today, still to refer to the radical right in terms of a pure reaction against mainstream politics 
and against the status quo. However, it is still relevant to reflect about the reasons these voters 
trust politics and institutions much less than most other voters, also when their politics man-
age to get out from the margins. The next section adds another perspective by looking at a 
question that the scholarly literature on the radicl right has perhaps often underestimated in 
relation to trust: trust in others.     
 
9.5 About trusting others: interpersonal trust and the radical right vote   
Modern democratic societies today depend very much on t e well functioning of interpersonal 
social relations, which affect different levels of the private and public life and engagement of 
individuals. Social trust has thus become an essential i gredient that helps explain when well-
founded modern democracies work best. Contemporary societies rely heavily on the fact that 
when individuals meet each other, the feelings of mutual trust and the wish to work together 
prevail. This has opened up the concept of social trust to different interpretations and ap-
proaches.  
 In the social capital literature, social trust plays a crucial role and is considered the glue 
of a more cooperative and more engaged community life (e.g. Putnam 2000). At the individ-
ual level, social trust is considered an important resource influencing the individual’s social 
and political tolerance and more generally the trust in politicians and institutions. Early social-
psychological works (e.g. Allport 1961) considered social trust to tap into aspects of the core 
personality of the individuals and thus starting alre dy with the individual’s experiences in the 
formative years of early childhood. More recent approaches maintain that social trust can be 
influenced in different ways and by different circumstances of the individual’s social and po-
litical life.    
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 The importance of having an indicator measuring the level of generalized social trust 
was emphasized as early as the late 1950s and early 1960s. The classical work ‘The Civic 
Culture’ by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba (Almond and Verba 1965) introduced a ques-
tion, whose aim was to evaluate the level of social trust in five different societies: “Generally 
speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t bee too careful 
(careful enough) in dealing with other people?” This rather simple question was then later 
adopted in most international and national social surveys, allowing a comparison of the levels 
of social trust within and among different countries and across the years. 
 The purpose is here to look at the relationship betwe n social trust and radical right 
vote. It is interesting is first of all to see how much the supporters of the radical right parties 
trust others and whether the levels of social trust have changed in relation to the three parties’ 
life course and development. Furthermore, the purpose is also to look at the role played by 
social trust in relation to the radical right vote when taking into account the voters’ attitudes 
towards immigration. Even if it will be difficult to come across all the interesting implicatons 
that emerge from considering social trust in the analysis of the radical right vote, mainly due 
to space limitations, this section will hopefully shed light on some aspects of the individuals’ 
attitudes and behaviour that until recently have received very little attention in radical right 
studies (for exceptions, see e.g. Rydgren 2009). 
 The differences in social trust in the whole population in the three countries are shown 
in Table 9.21.  
 
Table 9.21 Social (interpersonal) trust. Percentages. 
Country 1981 1990 1999 N  
Austria . 32 33 2257  
Denmark 53 58 67 1506  
Italy 27 35 33 1207  
Sources: European Value Survey 1981; 1990; 1999. 
Wordings: 
“Generally would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can not be careful enough in dealing 
with people?”. Entries are percentages saying: “Most people can be trusted”. “Don’t know” answers are 
here excluded. 
 
In the late 1980s and 1990s the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland) 
had the highest percentages of social trust in Western Europe (see also Borre 2005: 135), 
whereas in Italy, people’s trust in others has always been low. Predictably, several seminal 
studies have pinpointed the specificity of the Italian civic culture, suggesting different inter-
pretations of the Italians’ wariness when it comes to interpersonal trust (see e.g. Banfield 
1958; Putnam 1993; Pasquino 2002).  
 The Austrian voters are also rather careful when they relate to other people. The 1999 
European Value Survey (EVS) shows that only about 33 pct. of the Austrian voters answered 
that most people can be trusted, whereas 67 pct. found that one can never be careful enough. 
Similar figures emerge from the 1999 EVS for Italian voters, while Denmark is again the 
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most trustful of the three, when it comes to interpr stonal trust (67 pct. of the voters say that 
most people can be trusted). 
 In Denmark social trust has since the 1980s followed an ever-increasing trend (e.g. Goul 
Andersen 2004; Borre 2005; Torpe and Lolle 2009). The percentage of respondents who an-
swered that most people can be trusted was 15 pct. in 1990, 33 pct. in 1999, 45 pct. in 2001 
and 52 pct. in 2001 and 2008. However, the level of trust in others has varied from party to 
party and across time, as shown in Table 9.22.  
 
Table 9.22 DF and other main party voters by levels of social trust. PDI (trust in most – do not 
trust).Percentages. 
Trust in people SF S RV V K DF¹ All 
1981 27 -10 19 6 3 -38 2 
1990 42 7 33 33 14 -32 15 
1999 48 31 71 33 34 -9 33 
2001 73 42 91 44 50 11 45 
2005 74 46 76 59 59 11 52 
2007² 78 72 89 64 77 21 63 
2008 68 44 79 57 67 18 52 
Sources: European Value Survey 1981; 1990; 1999; 2008. Danish Election Surveys 2001; 2005; 2007. 
Note: The question posed was the same in all surveys (see note table 9.21). There are though differencs in 
sampling and weighting procedures among the surveys that it would be too long to describe here. However, 
the main goal was here the comparison between the FrP and the DF voters and between these and the other 
party voters.  
¹ In 1981 and 1990 the figures are referred to the Progress Party. 
² For 2007 only the election main survey was included and not the web panel. 
 
The DPP voters clearly have the lowest levels of social trust among all main Danish party 
voters. It was the same case for the Progress Partyin the 1980s and 1990s (cf. Table 9.22 for 
1981 and 1990). This changed in 2001, when the party registered for the first time a positive 
balance (+11 pct.) between those who answered that mos people can be trusted and those 
avowing that one can never be careful enough. However, the level of trust remained the low-
est among the Danish People’s Party voters. This suggests that the party life course has in this 
case not affected in any significant way the carefuln ss with which the Danish People’s Party 
voters’ meet other people. 
 While feelings of reciprocal trust clearly prevail over distrust when people meet each 
other in Denmark, widespread distrust and caution affects the relationships between people in 
Italy and this has increased over the years (see Table 9.23).   
 
Table 9.23 LN and other main party voters’ by levels of social trust. PDI (trust in most – do not 
trust).Percentages. 
Trust in people RC Ulivo UDC FI AN LN All 
2001 -30 -39 -35 -52 -63 -46 -45 
2006 -35 -41 -50 -62 -53 -46 -47 
2008 -34 -43 -55 -70 . -70 -55 
Source: ITANES 2001-2008.  
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Whether left, centre or right wing, all voters in general have very little trust in other people. 
The Northern League voters are among those who are most careful when it comes to trusting 
others, but it was among the supporters of the two parties Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and Forza 
Italia (PdL in 2008) that we find the lowest levels of interpersonal trust in 2001 and 2006.   
 When we look at social interpersonal trust in relation to the different Austrian parties, 
the Austrian Freedom Party voters have lowest trust in other people (see Table 9.24). At the 
opposite side we find the Greens, whose high levels of trust in the other people contrast not 
only with the Austrian Freedom Party, but also with all other voters. This position emphasises 
once again the role of the Green party voters at the political counterpole to the FPÖ. It is in-
creasingly these two parties that are placed at the two extreme poles as regards value politics, 
in the same way as in Denmark the Social Liberals (RV) are often found at the opposite side 
of the Danish People’s Party.   
 
Table 9.24 FPÖ and other main party voters’ by levels of social trust. PDI (trust in most – do not 
trust).Percentages. 
Trust in people SPÖ ÖVP FPÖ Grüne LiF All 
1999 -38 -32 -55 +30 -12 -31 
2002 +2 +14 -10 +34 +12 +8 
Source: EVS 1999 and ESS 2002-03. 
 
Both the Danish People’s Party and the Austrian Freedom Party voters have low levels of 
social trust in comparison to other parties. However, in the case of the Danish People’s Party 
we have observed an increase in the levels of interpersonal trust from 2001 and until the elec-
tion in 2008. This suggests that the political influence and the responsibility achieved by this 
party since 2001 may indirectly have affected also the levels of political and social trust 
among its supporters. However, no clear evidence of this was found in the data. 
 In the Italian context, the Northern League is, compared to the other case studies, a less 
outstanding case on lack of social trust since low interpersonal trust is common to a major 
part of the Italian electorate.  
 From what observed above, the supporters of the three radical right parties can be de-
scribed as rather bad social trusters. It would be interesting to examine what implications and 
effects this has on other aspects of radical right electoral behaviour, for example on attitudes 
towards immigration. There is still little knowledge about how low interpersonal trust can 
affect anti-immigration attitudes (see though Herreros and Criado 2009) and to what extent 
low trust is the result of specific individual socieconomic characteristics, for example a spu-
rious effect of low educational attainment.106  
                                                
106 In a recent article, Rydgren (2009) finds that social isolation and civic engagement are of marginal value for 
explaining the vote for the radical right. However, the paper emphasises the role of social trust, suggesting that 
“trust should be conceived more broadly and that trust in fellow citizens also plays a potentially important role 
for people’s voting behaviour” (Rydgren 2009: 141).  
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 The multivariate logistic regression of Table 9.25 attempts takes a closer look at the role 
played by social trust in relation to the radical right support. The analysis starts with a previ-
ously introduced model (cf. Model II Chapter 8 Table 8.9), showing the effect of some main 
socioeconomic background variables on the vote for the Danish Peoples Party. 
 
Table 9.25 Effect of different main socioeconomic background a  issue variables on the vote for the 
DF (2005). Logistic regression analyses (beta coeffici nts). 
Source: Danish Election Survey 2005. 
* Significant at at the 0.05 level. 
 
Social trust is here included in Model III as a new independent variable. The indicator of in-
terpersonal trust is the standard survey question: “Generally speaking would you say most 
people can be trusted, or do you think that one cannot be too careful in dealing with other 
people?”, which was given the values -1 (“one can not be careful enough”) and +1 (“most 
people can be trusted”) (with “don’t know” as neutral position). The coefficient related to 
social trust is significant and in the expected direction; this means that voters with low levels 
of social trust show a higher propensity to vote for the Danish People’s Party. It is also inter-
esting that the effect of social trust does not disappear with high education; both variables 
have a highly significant negative effect on the Danish People’s Party vote. This would sug-
gest that social trust, or in this case the lack of it, is not just a spurious effect of educational 
attainment, even if the explained variance is not so much higher.  
Controlling for the effect of political trust, the r sult shows a negative coefficient in re-
lation to the reference variable indicating that in general political leaders make the right deci-
sions for the country; however this is rather small and not statistically significant, contrary to 
social trust and education. Most noticeably, the eff ct of social trust on the vote for the Danish 
People’s Party remains significant when the two variables related to immigration are included 
in the model (Model V), whereas the educational variable is no longer significant. This sug-
gests that social trust has a direct intervening effect between party vote and anti-immigration 
issues that could be very interesting to further investigate.   
Independent variables Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
     
Male   0.24     0.28*    0.32* 0.27 
Cohort (before 1945)  -0.20  -0.15 -0.19  -0.51* 
Manual worker   0.05   0.12   0.10 0.01 
Self-employed   -1.08*   -0.94*   -0.93*  -1.03* 
Public salariat   -0.91*   -0.75*   -0.74*  -0.73* 
Private salariat   -0.60* -0.47 -0.45  -0.60* 
Higher education    -1.08*   -0.93*   -0.94*     -0.25 
Social trust    -0.43*   -0.42*   -0.20* 
Political trust     -0.11  
Immigration a cultural threat       1.01* 
Muslim countries a threat      0.50* 
Constant -1.44 -1.43  -1.42 -2.06 
R² (Nagelkerke)   0.08   0.11    0.11  0.26 
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The effect of social trust on the vote for the Northe n League is also interesting (Table 
9.26). In Model III, the coefficient of interpersonal trust is negative and statistically signifi-
cant, contrary to education. However, the effect of this variable is reduced and no longer sig-
nificant as soon as we introduce the independent variables dealing with attitudes towards im-
migration.  
The variable of political trust is here constructed on the basis of the two questions ask-
ing about trust in parliament and in political parties because the survey lacked more suitable 
questions. As expected, the coefficient of political trust is negative, but contrary to social trust 
it is not statistically significant.  
 
Table 9.26 Effect of different main socioeconomic background a  issue variables on the vote for the 
LN (2008). Logistic regression analyses (beta coeffici nts). 
Source: ITANES 2008. 
* Significant at at the 0.05 level. 
 
Unlike the other two, social trust does not have a significant effect on vote in the case of the 
Austrian Freedom Party (see Table 9.27). Instead social class still has the strongest effect on 
party vote. The results show that manual workers and clerks exhibit a high propensity to sup-
port the FPÖ, while highly skilled white collars (managers, directors, professionists) have the 
lowest propensity to vote for the party in relation t  the reference group here represented by 
people outside the labour market.  
As regards political trust, the variable (cf. Model IV Table 9.27), asking if voters’ think 
politicians in general care about what people think, has a negative, but very little and statisti-
cally not significant coefficient. When all variables are included, the attitude towards immi-
gration seen as a cultural threat has the strongest eff ct on the FPÖ vote.  
Independent variables Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
     
Male  -0.11 -0.06 -0.06  0.17 
Cohort (before 1945)  -0.21 -0.19 -0.15 -0.34 
Manual worker   0.32  0.32  0.33  0.13 
Self-employed     0.58*    0.58*    0.59*  0.41 
High skilled white collar   0.10  0.11  0.13  0.05 
Low skilled white collar    0.75*    0.77*     0.79*    0.79* 
Higher education  -0.34 -0.30 -0.27 -0.05 
Social trust    -0.29*   -0.27* -0.16 
Political trust   -0.17  
Immigration a cultural threat       0.27* 
No allowance to build mosques       0.72* 
Constant  -2.30 -2.52 -2.61 -2.89 
R² (Nagelkerke)    0.02   0.03   0.03   0.11 
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Table 9.27 Effect of different main socioeconomic background a  issue variables on the vote for the 
FPÖ (2002-03). Logistic regression analyses (beta coeffi ients).   
Source: ESS 2002-03. 
* Significant at at the 0.05 level. 
 
The findings of this paragraph support the hypothesis that low levels of interpersonal trust can 
have an effect on the vote to the radical right paries, but also that there can be cross-national 
variations in significant this variable is when contr lling for socioeconomic background vari-
ables and anti-immigration attitudes. Low interpersonal trust has a significant effect on the 
vote for the Danish People’s Party and for the Northern League also after controlling for edu-
cational attainment, whereas it does not have a significant effect on the vote for the Austrian 
Freedom Party, for which the socioeconomic variables (occupation) continue to have a 
stronger effect on the vote. However, the present analysis suggests and encourages further 
research in relation to the effect of social trust in general on the vote for the radical right, per-
haps by trying alternative patterns in the way thisvariable is operationalised and understood. 
 
9.6 A note on euroscepticism and foreign policy issue  
Questions of foreign politics and international affairs were initially not considered as a main 
political concern on the agenda of the radical right parties (cf. Schori Liang 2007), in particu-
lar when these were parties were still marginal actors in the respective national party systems.  
 The political efforts of the radical right were considered to focus primarily on national 
politics and national interests and therefore much less interested and engaged in aspects of 
foreign policy, such as international alliances, security issues and border controversies in 
other parts of the world. Moreover, the electorate of the radical right has perhaps also been 
considered more inclined to look within the national border and not to be especially interested 
in what is going on outside. In short, voters of radic l right parties are considered to be more 
indward-looking and isolationist compared to other pa ty voters, perhaps because of the em-
phasis on the commitment to the nation and national interests. Without exaggerating this read-
ing, it can in fact be observed that the supporters of the radical right are less in favour than 
Independent variables Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
     
Male  0.51 0.50  0.51  0.39 
Cohort (before 1945)  0.71 0.72  0.72  0.55 
Manual worker    1.18*   1.20*   1.18*    0.99* 
Self-employed  0.56 0.59  0.58  0.55 
Low skilled white collar    0.95*   0.98*    0.97*   1.01* 
High skilled white collar -1.08 -1.02 -1.01 -0.93 
Service worker  0.18  0.56  0.56  0.43 
Higher education   0.18  0.23  0.23  0.34 
Social trust  -0.27 -0.27 -0.18 
Political trust   -0.04     
Immigration a cultural threat       0.80* 
     
Constant  -3.61 -3.65 -3.36 -3.50 
R² (Nagelkerke)   0.08  0.08   0.08   0.14 
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other voters of an increasingly international society that wants to put less weight on national 
borders and peoples. It is for example what Table 9.28 suggests in relation to the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party.  
 
Table 9.28 Attitudes towards the internationalisation of society among DF and other main party vot-
ers. PDI (% strongly agree/agree – % strongly disagree/disagree). 
Source: Danish Election Survey 2005-2007. 
Wordings: 
- We have to aim for a society which is more internationally oriented and puts less emphasis on the borders 
between countries and between people (strongly agree/agree; strongly disagree/disagree). 
 
The DPP voters tend to prefer a society in which natio l borders and nationalities maintain 
their relevant function, although 32 pct. in 2007 favoured a more internationally oriented so-
ciety (29 pct. in 2005). However, the percentage of Social Democratic voters who are interna-
tionally oriented is also lower than voters for other parties, and the most openminded are the 
supporters of the centre parties and in particular of the Social Liberals (RV). This distribution 
suggests an effect of the educational composition of the parties’ electorate, which is likely to 
affect how voters look at this issue.   
 The position of these parties and of their voters on European integration and politics 
might – among other things – have also to do with the way voters relate to a political and eco-
nomic institution that is considered to challenge th importance of national borders and to 
water out the differences between countries and between people. 
 Euroscepticism is today considered one of the relevant issues characterising the atti-
tiudes of the radical right supporters in relation t  European integration and political role. 
Most of the radical right parties have through the years developed negative views about Euro-
pean integration, although showing different degrees of scepticism (cf. Szczerbiak and 
Taggart 2004; Mudde 2007; see also Chapters 5, 6, 7). Some of the central issues discussed 
by the radical right include: the EU considered a threat to national sovereignty and national 
identity, the centralisation and bureaucratization of the EU, the immigration regime supported 
by the EU, the problems related to the EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, and lately also the 
plan to include Turkey as a member country.  
 The parties’ discontent with EU and EU politics thus involves different levels, which are 
often difficult to pinpoint by means of the variables about EU available in most national and 
international surveys. Previous studies have shown that the position on European politics has 
very little effect on the support to radical right parties. (cf. van der Brug, Fennema 2003; 
2007 
 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
PDI 
2007 
PDI 
2005 
Leftwing 58 24 18  40  41 
S 44 29 27  17  39 
Centre parties 62 24 14  48  62 
V+K 53 27 20  33  46 
DF 32 20 48 -16 -18 
All 49 26 25  24  37 
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2008). However, even if this issue does not – or perhaps not yet – exert the strongest appeal 
on the radical right electorate, there are signs that in some countries where EU attitudes have 
been more strongly politicised over the years, for example in Denmark, Euroscepticism has 
become a better predictor of support (in this case) to the Danish People’s Party (see van der 
Brug, Fennema 2008). It is therefore interesting how the attitudes of DF supporters towards 
EU have developed over time and in relation to the other main Danish parties. In the follow-
ing, some of the attitudes towards EU will be taken up in relation to the Danish case.   
 Until the 1980s and early 1990s, most radical right parties were actually almost enthusi-
astic supporters of the process of European integration, as we saw with the Northern League 
and the Austrian Freedom Party (cf. Chapters 6 and 7). The Danish People’s Party was al-
ready from beginning in 1995 against further EU integration. Also after the influence 
achieved in 2001, the party has maintained this standpoint (cf. Chapter 5). In a government in 
which the Liberals are clearly in the lead in their support for EU, followed closely by the 
Conservatives, the Danish People’s Party’s position against more EU has thus been directly in 
contrast with the pro-European line followed by thegovernment parties and in general by the 
Danish population.107 This has at times created some conflicts in relation o EU politics be-
tween the government parties and their influential supporting partner.108 One could argue that 
since the Danish People’s Party is not directly involved in government, the party has had 
more political freedom on this issue.  
 Table 9.29 shows the main attitude towards EU among the different Danish party voters.  
 
Table 9.29 General opinion about the role of EU among DF and other main Danish party voters. 
Percentages and PDI (very/quite positive – very/quite negative). 
Source: Danish Electoral Survey (1998-2007). 
¹ Leftwing: SF (Socialist People’s Party) + Enh (Unity List). 
² Centre parties, for 2007: RV (Social Left) + KD (Christian Democrats, former Christian People’s Party; 
KrF) + NA (New Alliance; formed in 2007, now Liberal Alliance). Other elections: RV+KD+CD (Centrum 
Democrats). 
                                                
107 The Eurobarometer standard survey of spring 2009 showed that up to 65 pct. of the Danes consider the EU 
membership as a “good thing”, compared to 53 pct. in he EU27. The percentage of people considering EU a 
“good thing” was in Austria and in Italy only 48 pct. (see Eurobarometer analysis Spring 2009).  
108One of the most discussed issues in summer 2008 was the EU sentence declaring illegal the Danish rules on 
family reunion related to the Danish immigration law pproved by the government together with the DPP in 
2002. The European Court asserted that a European citizens living in one of the member countries is allowed to 
take his/her spouse to Denmark, even if this would not be possible according to the Danish law. The verdict was 
strongly criticized by the Danish People’s Party, which considered this a clear indication of European interfer-
ence in national politics. See Dansk Folkeblad, September 2008, (12)4. 
2007 
General opinion 
about EU  
Very/quite 
positive Neutral 
Very/quite 
negative 
PDI 
2007 
PDI 
2005 
PDI 
2001 
PDI 
1998 
Leftwing ¹ 35 34 31 4 -7 -26 -48 
S 51 30 19 32 21 19 18 
Centre parties² 60 22 18 42 49 42 39 
V+K 71 20 9 62 58 55 65 
DF 26 38 36 -10 -26 -13 -36 
All 53 27 20 33 30 26 24 
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As shown in the table, the DPP voters have maintained a negative opinion about EU, showing 
a pattern with no clear indications of less negative positions. But the Danish People’s Party 
was not always the only eurosceptical political party in Danish politics. Particularly in the 
past, Euroscepticism characterised the supporters of the left-wing parties and especially the 
two parties Unity List (Enh) and the Socialist Peopl ’s Party (SF), but to some extent also 
some Social Democratic voters. Denmark was also the country that until the 2009 European 
elections counted two Eurosceptical poltical movements only represented in the European 
Parliament. The situation has partly changed in recent years, in line with the more pro-
European direction that characterises the politics of SF towards Europe and with the electoral 
decline experienced by the Unity List at the Danish parliamentary election of 2007. This im-
plies that the Danish People’s Party is at present the most clearly Eurosceptical party in Dan-
ish politics, which can contribute to positively differentiate the party among voters who for 
different reasons have negative or sceptical attitudes towards the EU.  
 In the perspective above, Taggart’s thesis (cf. Taggart 1998)that Euroscepticism helps 
parties to differentiate themselves when they are at the periphery of the party system, could 
actually be effective in this sense also when the radical right has become mainstream. The 
example of the other two parties, the Northern Leagu  and the Austrian Freedom Party sug-
gests a similar pattern. 
 Austria joined the EU in 1994, together with Sweden and Finland. Joining to the other 
EU countries was the consequence of important transformations that at the end of the 1980s 
and beginning of the 1990s had radically changed th geopolitical position of Austria (cf. Pe-
linka 2004). Until then, the country had played almost the role of barrier in the East-West 
conflict that already emerged during the postwar period. With the approval of the State Treaty 
in 1955, the Austrian state had become neutral. This gave rise to Eurosceptical positions from 
those who considered EU membership incompatible with the country’s principles of neutral-
ity. Becoming a full member of the EU was considere to imply a militarization of the coun-
try, for example by also accepting NATO membership. This position explains why the EU 
scepticism initially came from parties such as the SPÖ and from the Greens. In the 1990s, 
both governing parties, the SPÖ and ÖVP, became incr asingly positive towards an applica-
tion for EU membership, whereas the sceptics were found at the ends of the political spec-
trum. Rather than a left-right divide it was then more correct to speak about a centre-periphery 
divide on EU, with the Greens and the FPÖ leading the Eurosceptics. Both parties were 
against Austrian membership, but for opposite reasons. The Greens were mainly worried 
about Austria’s neutrality and about EU’s role in the globalisation process. The FPÖ was 
against EU for questions related to the country’s sovereignty and to the mass-elite relationship 
(see Pelinka 2004).  
 The Greens have since shifted to a positive attitude towards EU, reflecting the more 
positive attitudes towards EU among the Austrian population as a whole. Therefore, the FPÖ 
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has remained the most outspoken critical opponent of EU integration and of the consequences 
of the European enlargement.  
 Also the Northern League was until the mid-1990s one f the most enthusiastic support-
ers of the European integration process. This does n t urprise, considering that Italy has al-
ways had high support for EU. Particularly in the yars when the Northern League cam-
paigned for the separation of Northern Italy from the South, Europe was considered an eco-
nomic opportunity for the North over the centralized state in Rome, or as the party put it in 
those years: ‘closer to Brussels and further from Rome’. In the late 1990s the party changed 
its position radically and began to express considerabl  scepticism about EU integration poli-
tics. After its entrance in office in 2001 the party has toned down, trying to find a balance 
between the party’s Euroscepticism and the political responsibilities of a party in office to-
gether with a pro-EU government coalition. To the pr sent European integration the Northern 
League suggests a Europe of the peoples, where the different national states and identities are 
respected, protected and valued. 
 
Conclusions  
The analysis of the electoral profile and attitudes of the Danish People’s Party, the Northern 
League and the Austria Freedom Party helped to highlight some characteristics of their devel-
opment over time and some of the similarities and differences that distinguish them.  
 One of the important aspects emerged is that the thre  parties are quite different in terms 
of the voters’ positioning on the economic dimensio. In this respect, the Danish People’s 
Party electorate has shown to be much more welfare oriented, for example pro public spend-
ing, when money is spent in the health care sector and in general to improve the economic and 
living conditions of the elderly and the sick. In li e with the ideological development of the 
Danish People’s Party on the economic dimension (see here Chapter 5), the Danish People’s 
Party electorate has become more and more pro welfare st te, but the welfare solidarity drops 
markedly when the economic and social support goes t  help immigrants and refugees in the 
country. However, the political placement of the DPP voters in relation to welfare issues, but 
also in relation to the levelling of income differences and government intervention in econ-
omy, is at the centre-left of party politics rather than right-wing liberal positions. This 
matches the socioeconomic profile of the party supporters; the Danish People’s Party has 
from its early years gained increasing support among manual workers. This happened at the 
same time as the left-wing parties and particularly the Social Democrats were losing support 
from the working class. The working class political dealignment started already in the late 
1970s and the Danish Progress Party was among the first beneficiaries, but the party seemed 
unable to fully exploit this situation. The task was successful for the Danish People’s Party, 
which is today the most clear-cut working class party in Danish politics. 
 The pro-welfare pattern developed by the Danish People’s Party suggests also that this 
kind of politics has a better return when the manual workers are overrepresented in the radical 
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right electoral composition. We have found a similar electoral composition characterising the 
Austrian Freedom Party in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Being a manual worker has a sig-
nificant effect on support for the FPÖ. However, based on the analysis of the data and the 
period considered, the voters of the Austrian Freedom Party have a more neoliberal approach 
to economic issues. The FPÖ voters favour privatization and liberalization of the market, be-
lieving that the government must not get too much control over private firms and private ini-
tiative. Compared to the Danish People’s Party, the FPÖ seemed, at least until the beginning 
of 2000, still anchored to the neoliberal and anti-es ablishment tradition that had characterised 
the party in the 1990s. The FPÖ’s recent ideological development indicates a shift towards a 
social and pro-welfare profile (cf. here Chapter 7), however. Today, the FPÖ supports the 
‘welfare state Austria’ as an important foundation f r the country’s economic and social sta-
bility, particularly in periods of crisis. Also in this case, the pro-welfare politics are framed 
into a selective notion of welfare state, strictly limited to Austrian citizens and with very few 
rights for immigrants and refugees.     
 The electorate of the Northern League is still neolib ral and against taxes. In this respect 
the party has not changed so much from the position developed in the 1990s, when anti-
establishment and anti-tax politics were at the core of the economic agenda of the LN. The 
party is in general against an increase in public spending and taxes, which according to the 
party discourage the private initiative. We have sen that the position of the Northern League 
on economics represents the party profile. Compared to the other two parties, the Northern 
League has a more varied electoral composition. As observed above, the party is still well 
represented among the self-employed and among the private salariats in general. In this re-
spect, the Northern League cannot be called a clear- ut working class party, unlike the Danish 
People’s Party. This can be read together with the fact that the effect of education is particu-
larly significant in the Danish case, but it seems to be less important in relation to the vote for 
the other two radical right parties 
 Among the other variables tested, interpersonal trust has also shown to have an interest-
ing effect on the vote for the radical right parties. It emerged that people with low levels of 
social trust have a higher propensity (than people with high social trust) to vote for the Danish 
People’s Party and for the Northern League in particular, while the effect of this variable in 
the case of the Austrian Freedom Party was much less evident. Actually, social trust has 
proven to be a variable with a more significant effect on the radical right vote than political 
trust. This encourages further investigations about the character and implications of general 
trust in others in relation to the radical right voe.  
 To sum up, the three parties still differ on the (old) economic dimension, whereas a high 
degree of similarity has been achieved on the (new) value dimension and particularly the vot-
ers’ attitudes on immigration and related issues. The analysis has also confirmed the finding 
in previous studies that anti-immigration attitudes have the strongest effect on the radical right 
vote. More explicitly, anti-immigration attitudes have in recent years become increasingly 
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synonymous with a perceived threat against national identity and culture. Thus, it is not so 
much the presence of immigrants on the labour market that is considered threatening, but 
rather the presence of immigrants in society with dfferent principles, values, religious beliefs 
and cultural norms. These attitudes have certainly made the western European radical right 
parties more similar in the course of the past decas  
 Things are different on the economic dimension, which still depends on country specific 
opportunities, structural conditions and on the party electoral composition. However, this does 
not mean that this dimension has become irrelevant in relation to the support and development 
of the radical right parties. As observed in this chapter, it is in particular with the achievement 
of government responsibility that it becomes important for a party to show clear lines on na-
tional wealth, taxes, welfare and economic redistribu ion. It is in the later stages of party de-
velopment that the radical right has to prove to be a complete and wide ranging political or-
ganization and not a single issue party.     
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10. CONCLUSIONS  
Over the past decades, the consequences and impact of the crisis of modernisation and follow-
ing globalisation have been among the most studied and discussed topics in social and politi-
cal research. The scholarly interest has mainly focused on the macrostructural plan, consider-
ing the effects on global economy, on the nation state and on the effects in terms of cultural 
and value change and new configurations of the political system (e.g. Bell 1973; Giddens 
1990; Bauman 1998; Held et al. 1999; Kriesi et al. 2008). Much less attention has been given 
to the analysis of the direct and lasting effects on p litics, party ideology and on the electoral 
behaviour. The radical right is an example of this. The rise and further development of the 
radical right parties continue in much of the existing literature to be framed in an understand-
ing of ‘extremeness’ and ‘exceptionalism’ (e.g. Hainsworth 2000; Merkl and Weinberg 1997; 
Eatwell and Mudde 2004; Carter 2005; Mayer 2005). This, despite the fact that several radical 
right parties in Western Europe in the last decade have achieved political influence and in 
more than one case also government responsibility. Even so, the ‘most natural’ place of the 
radical right continues to be considered at the margins of the political system. Different ap-
proaches have contributed to this understanding, for example by drawing attention primarily 
to the importance of specific domestic factors and political opportunities. Rising levels of 
political distrust, anti-establishment feelings and voter populist protest have also been men-
tioned as main reasons behind the rise and the support for the radical right (cf. Mény and 
Surel 2000; Taggart 2000; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008).  
Other approaches have explained the support for the radical right parties as a major reac-
tion to the structural changes introduced by the globalisation process (cf. Betz 1994). The 
effects on society and politics are still a point of c ntroversy and debate in political science 
and sociology, but the rapid and far-reaching transformations of contemporary societies are 
considered to have created different types of winners and losers (cf. Kriesi et al. 2008), whose 
‘gains and losses’ can be evaluated in economic and social terms. In this perspective, support 
to the radical right is understood as the reaction of the so called ‘modernisation losers’, the 
most directly exposed to the risks of marginalisation on the labour market and in society. But 
even more generally, post-industrialisation processes and the increasing mobility of both capi-
tal and labour spread growing concerns among those segments of society which had previ-
ously enjoyed more sheltered conditions. Uncertainty about the economic situation and the 
future prompted what some studies have interpreted as irrational reactions to the situation, 
that found a political answer in the way the radical right parties deal with immigration, global 
economy, national interests and European integration.  
What the marginalisation and the protest hypotheses have in common is therefore to un-
derstand the radical right largely in terms of a rection against what the future might bring or 
against a condition of existing marginalisation (e.g. unemployment). As a consequence, the 
support and success of the radical right is considered in electoral terms highly dependent on 
the socioeconomic background of the voters (cf. Lubbers and Scheepers 2002) and in ideo-
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logical terms strongly influenced by a limited number of issues and the way these are ad-
dressed by the political parties. This hypothesis ha  never really found strong evidence in the 
empirical research (cf. Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2002; Goul Andersen 2004; Ivarsflaten 
2005; Flecker 2007; Ivarsflaten 2008(b)). Even so it was important to include it, as it ad-
dresses specific socioeconomic aspects of the radical right electorate and ideology and refers 
to dynamics that may surface, for instance in periods f economic crisis.   
Another hypothesis in this study refers to the emergence and consolidation of new po-
litical cleavages. This approach focuses on conflicting attitudes and value positions, consider-
ing the radical right as the result of the now deeply rooted oppositions between authoritarian 
versus libertarian values and materialist versus post-materialist positions (cf. Kitschelt 1995; 
Goul Andersen 2004). Briefly, this kind of approach emphasises the relationship/contrast be-
tween authoritarian and libertarian attitudes, values and interests and their impact on vote, 
rather than the direct effects of social class as such. Working class support for the radical right 
is in this sense interpreted within the framework of change and declining class consciousness, 
followed by a political realignment answering to other logics than those strictly related to 
economic (class) interests. Also in this case the radical right is presented as the political prod-
uct of a reaction, although this time having deeper value and cultural implications.  
 The present comparative analysis of the ideology and electorate of the Danish People’s 
Party, the Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party referred at the start to the above 
mentioned explanations of the radical right support and to the implications that these hypothe-
ses have on the ideological and electoral development of the three parties. However, it soon 
became clear that these hypotheses had a major limit. Referring to the radical right mainly as 
a reaction against specific conditions has in fact pinned this political and electoral phenome-
non into narrow interpretations of causal effects that work best to account for the phase of the 
radical right breakthrough and success, rather than to later or intermediate phases of their evo-
lution and development (see Chapter 1). Indeed, to understand the development of the radical 
right today and the reasons behind the voters’ support in a national, but particularly cross-
national context it is necessary to start updating he approach to these parties by using the 
same tools that are applied for the analysis of all the other ‘normal’ political parties. In the 
course of the years, but particularly in the last decade, several radical right parties have 
proved able to survive, consolidate, adapt to new situations and tackle political influence and 
government responsibility (cf. Williams 2006). Several of them, among others the three case 
studies here considered, have shown that they repres nt a part of the electorate, whose politi-
cal positions and attitudes are more solidly rooted to be ‘exclusively’ the result of protest or 
the mounting reaction against marginalisation. As a result of these observations, part of the 
effort of the present study was to look at the ideological and electoral development of the 
Danish People’s Party, the Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party over a life-span 
perspective (see Chapter 4). It has emerged that the ideology of these parties and the profile 
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and attitudes of their supproters have changed, transformed and adjusted across the years and 
in relation to what has been identified as the main phases of a party life course.  
 
Phases of political development and patterns of ideological change  
An approach to tracking down the ideological and electoral development of the three case 
studies was to consider their historical, ideological and electoral development by referring to a 
lifespan approach. The three case studies fit this approach well, since they have all gone 
through some of the main phases of party development indicated as: 1) a breakthrough and 
formative phase; 2) a consolidation and maturity phase; and 3) a phase of government respon-
sibility and political influence (cf. Pedersen 1988).  
 The empirical analysis of party ideology (Chapters 5, 6, 7) therefore highlighted how the 
different phases of development have influenced the ideological and electoral development of 
the three parties, also in relation to the different opportunity structures and the national politi-
cal history. The analysis of party ideology thus spanned three chapters, each dealing with a 
single party, since it would have been too complex to bring the three cases together without 
having to omit important observations on the national conditions, opportunities and contexts 
that saw the emergence and development of the three parti s. 
 In general terms, the analysis of party ideology has shown that during phases when the 
radical right party is still at the margins, the idology of the party tends to radicalise. The fact 
that from this position the party does not have to tackle the responsibilities and duties that 
come with the achievement of political influence and government incumbency, gives a higher 
degree of freedom in terms of what a party can say and promise to the electorate. It is in these 
phases that the radical right parties adopt more radical positions for example on immigration, 
European integration and other issues. From this position, it is also easier for a radical right 
party to promote a profile of alternative to the political establishment. At the same time, it is 
at this stage that the radical right parties are more subject to the politics of containment trig-
gered by the political establishment and to forms of policy co-optation intended to keep these 
parties away from political influence.  
 To avoid electoral volatility and marginalisation, the next phase of the radical right party 
development is to consolidate the electoral support. F r radical right parties this requires, as a 
minimum, an internal reorganisation based on a strong centralisation of the party leadership, 
followed by the dismissal of the most extreme and non-aligned members. A more solid ideo-
logical, programmatic and also organisational reliability are also important requisites for a 
radical right party entering the phase of party consolidation (cf. Seliger 1970).  
Achievement of political influence and in some cases of government responsibility can 
thus have a different impact on the radical right parties. In the cases observed here, things 
seem to become more difficult when a party achieves direct government responsibility. The 
FPÖ paid a high price of ‘respectability’ when it was in government from 2000 to 2005 (cf. 
also Heinisch 2003). From the start, the party was tied up to the declarations of intents made 
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by the government in front of Europe and constrained by the strong political role played by 
the ÖVP. When it returned to opposition and the margins of Austrian politics, the FPÖ radi-
calised its positions, recovering part of the electoral support that it had lost in 2002. In the 
case of the Austrian Freedom Party and for the Italian Northern League it has been observed 
that at different periods in time, the achievement of government responsibility was followed 
by a new radical phase of the party politics and ideology and by vote-seeking strategies, rather 
than office-seeking strategies.  
In respect to the lifespan history of the three parties, the present analysis has also under-
lined the comparatively more advantageous position that the Danish People’s Party obtained 
at the 2001 election. The party has not joined the governing coalition, but works as a support-
ing partner to the Liberal and Conservative parties at government. This has given the Danish 
People’s Party a higher degree of political and decisional autonomy in relation to the politics 
of the government. At the same time the party has used its position to obtain concrete political 
results, well aware of the power of its votes and importance of its support for the present gov-
ernment. This has on more than one occasion given better pay-offs than being in office.  
 For the radical right, getting too close to power also implies the risk that it can become 
difficult to see the difference between their own and the other parties’ ideas and programmes. 
This was for example the problem of the Northern League at government at the beginning, but 
the party has struggled and to some extent managed to distinguish itself from the other parties 
of the right-wing coalition (cf. Albertazzi & McDonnell 2005). In different ways, both the 
Italian and the Danish party have advanced demands o  the economic dimension that helped 
them to distinguish themselves from the main political course followed by the government. 
For the Danish People’s Party it was pro-welfare issue  and for the Northern League the fiscal 
federalist reform of the state. This introduces another position underlined in this study, that to 
explain the radical right it is necessary to consider both the value and cultural dimension and 
the economic dimension. The position on economics mu t not be underestimated when con-
sidering the outcomes of the radical right. 
 
The radical right ideology: anti-immigration an important issues, but not the only one.      
Anti-immigration is considered the main and often the only ideological issue of relevance of 
the radical right (van der Brug and Fennema 2005; Mudde 2007; Ivarsflaten 2008(b); 
2008(c);). This study endorses that anti-immigration s an important ideological issue and 
ensures the radical right parties the support of a part of the electorate. In relation to this issue, 
an increasing ideological convergence has been observed between the parties; immigration is 
increasingly considered in terms of a cultural threat and a threat against national security.  
It was also observed that anti-immigration is a question that the radical right has contin-
ued to develop and elaborate , recently also by including perspectives and readings that gener-
ally are not considered to belong to the ‘world’ of right-wing radicalism; positions such as 
freedom of speech, gender equality among ethnic minorities, social solidarity and tolerance 
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have been taken up in particular by the Danish People’s Party in the discussions about the 
problems of integration and the impact of immigration on the Western society. Making use of 
libertarian positions that are turned inwards and often appeal to feelings of risk and unsecurity 
has been interpreted in this study as a new stage of radical right ideological development, at-
tempting to create an approach to this issue that is more appropriate to the influential position 
achieved by these parties and which looked for broad espectability both nationally and inter-
nationally. 
On other dimensions than immigration, the position of the radical right parties has often 
been explained as the programmatic result of opportunistic and instrumental choices (cf. 
Mudde 2007: 119-135), or strategically formulated to appeal to broader segments of the elec-
torate (cf. Kitschelt 1995). This study has advanced a different position, maintaining that an 
important step in the ideological development of the radical right has taken place when these 
parties have been able to formulate concrete and covincing economic programmes that ap-
pealed and convinced a part of the potential electorate. The survival of the fittest is not re-
stricted to a single issue, but requires a more solid political platform. A case in point is the 
Danish People’s Party’s pro-welfare orientation that was adopted when the party was 
launched in 1995 and which has become an important fe ture for its political identity. It is a 
pro-welfare position characterised by chauvinism that privileges traditional areas of welfare 
spending and considers immigrants mainly as undeserving and often exploiting recipients of 
social benefits and services. The declared and sometimes declaimed pro-welfare position of 
the Danish People’s Party has helped to ensure the support of a large segment of the working 
class. Quite significantly, the Danish People’s Party is today the most clear-cut working class 
political formation in Danish politics which, it could be argued, gives this party a basis to 
claim that it is the real heir of the traditional social democratic values.    
In Italy, the federalist vocation of the Northern League responded to the neoliberal de-
mands from the electoral strongholds in the North of the country. The party has not followed 
the same line as the Danish People’s Party in relation to the economic positions, but continues 
to be a party with a liberal agenda when it comes to public intervention and welfare. 
Not so for the Austrian Freedom Party, whose neolibral position was already in the late 
1990s in contrast with the party’s strong support in he Austrian working class. In this per-
spective, the recent developments of the FPÖ seem to go in the same direction of a social and 
more pro-welfare profile that bears more than a similarity with what happened to the Danish 
People’s Party in the 1990s.  
Similar positions between the parties have emerged in relation to foreign policy issues. 
Predictably, it is particularly on European politics and integration that the parties have devel-
oped similar agendas. The Euroscepticism of the radical right has then in recent years been 
additionally fuelled by the proposal to include Turkey in the European Union.  
What the analysis of party ideology here suggests is herefore that even if differences in 
the ideological positions of the three parties still exist, we have witnessed a development over 
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the past decade that has brought them closer, particul rly on the value and cultural dimension 
of politics.   
 
The electorate of the radical right: profile and attitudes. 
The analysis of the radical right ‘demand side’ is carried out in Chapter 8 and 9. Looking at 
the voters’ socioeconomic profile and attitudes in relation to the radical right (Chapter 8) has 
contributed to highlight some of the main similarities and differences in relation to gender, 
cohort, educational levels and social class of the electorate supporting these parties and the 
effects that the socioeconomic variables have on the vote for the three parties.  
 We have for example seen that the Danish People’s Party has large support among the 
manual workers and among voters with medium/lower education. There is very little support 
from public salariats, but comparatively also from self-employed and private salariats, indi-
cating that this party can hardly fit into explanations of populist protest from the middle class. 
We find a similar social profile for the Austrian Freedom Party, though not yet as clearly de-
fined as for the Danish People’s Party. No wonder th n, if explanations with weight on the 
consequences of globalisation and on marginalisation pr cesses have been suggested in rela-
tion to the radical right. However, the political attitudes and issue positioning of the radical 
right electorate do not provide strong empirical evid nce that the supporters of these parties 
feel particularly marginalised and concerned about their present and future economic situa-
tion. 
 The case of the Northern League is a little different. Its electorate reveals the transversal 
and to some extent particular position of the Northern League in the Italian political system; 
electorally and politically entrenched geographically nd still well represented among the self-
employed and among the private salariats in general, but at present getting increasing support 
also among the working class, the Northern League tries o mediate and to talk to all its dif-
ferent ‘souls’.  
However, we have to look within the field of issue voting to find more comprehensive 
explanations for the radical right vote and about the transformations that might have charac-
terised the issue positioning of the radical right electorate across the years. The attitudes of the 
voters supporting the three radical right parties are dealt with in Chapter 9. The empirical 
analysis has shown that the importance of the voters’ socioeconomic background diminished 
as soon as attitudinal variables were taken into acc unt. Individual attitudes are therefore of-
ten strong factors to explain the support for the radical right that lay in-between the socioeco-
nomic background variables and the choice of what party to vote for. The strongest effect on 
the radical right vote is undoubtedly represented by anti immigration. For all three cases the 
strongest effect on the radical right vote comes from those voters who perceive immigration 
as a threat against culture and identity, whereas little evidence was found in support of inter-
pretations indicating the radical right as primarily housing voters who are economically mar-
ginalised in society. If there is some concern about the fact that immigrants come and take 
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‘our’ jobs, or contribute to lower average wages, it is limited, compared to the opinion that 
immigration constitutes a cultural and identitary threat to the Western contemporary societies. 
Radical right voters may be worried about their present and future economic situation, com-
paratively also more than other voters, but actually not enough to say that their concerns are 
exaggerated.   
In Chapter 9 we have also seen that compared to other voters, the radical right support-
ers are in general characterised by lower levels of trust. Particularly interpersonal trust rather 
than political trust played a role in relation to the radical right vote; especially in Denmark 
and Italy. Recently, other studies have underlined the need to take social trust more ‘seri-
oulsy’ in studies of the radical right vote (e.g. van der Brug and Fennema 2007 and more re-
cently Rydgren 2009). The implications of social trus  can be differently interpreted, but it is 
clear that integration in society can only be more difficult if it starts from individuals that 
meet each other with feelings of distrust.  
 
Finally, the life-cycle approach has drawn more attntion to the influence that different phases 
of the party development might have had on support for the radical right parties and on their 
political behaviour, hopefully contributing to look at the radical right electorate from another 
angle than that influenced by the radical right parties’ emergence and reasons of success. This 
perspective has also allowed us to consider the reciprocal influence exerted by the supply side 
on the demand side and viceversa.  
 At the electoral level, some improvement and a degree of policy dependent effect has 
been observed in relation to for example gender, suggesting that female voters are more likely 
to vote for the radical right parties when they become ‘normalised’, rather than in phases of 
radicalisation. Limited, but anyway a little less negative positions have also been registered in 
the latest developments of the Danish People’s Party, for instance in relation to public spend-
ing and welfare rights to immigrants and refugees, v ry likely following the restrictive politics 
enacted since 2001. DPP voters seem to have a little more trust in decisions made by politi-
cians and this could perhaps be interpreted as a reult of the politics implemented under the 
Liberal and Conservative governments with the support of the Danish People’s Party.   
 In the case of the Northern League, the years in government seem to have had an effect 
on the positions held by the supporters of the party. On many of the issues considered, the 
positions of the Northern League supporters were vey close to Forza Italia and today to the 
recently founded People’s Freedom Party (in which Alleanza Nazionale has joined Forza 
Italia). Besides the Northern League’s secure electoral and political anchoring in the Italian 
North and the consequences in terms of electoral composition and behaviour, the most obvi-
ous difference between these parties remains in the approach to immigration. Not surpris-
ingly, the two parties in government often disagree on this issue at present.  
 It was more difficult to see the recent developments i  the composition and attitudes of 
the FPÖ supporters, as the data stopped chronologica ly when the party was in a phase of 
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electoral decline, on its way back to opposition and u dergoing profound internal organisa-
tional changes. However, the empirical analysis of the ideology and electorate of the FPÖ 
suggests that the Austrian party shares more than a similarity with the Danish People’s Party, 
starting with the strong appeal among the working class and with the emphasis also today on 
pro-welfare issues and policies. 
At any rate, the life-cycle approach was also an attept to introduce a perspective that 
needs to be followed up by radical right studies in the future, when the impact of the different 
life phases of the radical right party on the political behaviour and attitudes of its supporters 
will become even more obvious, particularly in a comparative perspective.  
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ENGLISH ABSTRACT  
 
The present study looks at the ideology and electorate of the Danish People’s Party, the 
Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a comparative perspective and at their 
breakthrough, consolidation and achievement of politica  influence and government responsi-
bility. 
Despite the ample literature published on radical right-wing parties through the years, 
this field of research is still short of comparative analyses that can help explain how the radi-
cal right has become mainstream in some Western European countries and what similarities 
and differences characterise these parties in terms of ideology, electoral support and voters’ 
attitudes.  
The attention of this study has therefore turned away from the many assumptions and 
discussions about conceptual definitions that so often have characterised this field of research 
and which in more than one case have forgotten the real object of investigation: the radical 
right parties, their development over time and the similarities and differences characterising 
their ideology and electorate.   
The present study therefore strives to combine the analysis of the ‘supply-side’ with that 
of the ‘demand-side’ and to frame these into a comparative approach. In short, this implies 
examining the role of the parties (the supply-side) via a careful analysis of first-hand sources 
like party programmes and party literature, whereas the demand-side, represented by the vot-
ers and their attitudes, has been dealt with by means of a rather comprehensive analysis of 
national and international survey data.  
The period covered by the study refers primarily to the years from their breakthrough 
until their recent developments (2007-08), at least in the analysis of the party ideological de-
velopment. The ambition was to broaden the time span to include all the phases of these par-
ties’ development, indicatively distinguished into heir breakthrough, consolidation and 
achievement of political influence and eventually also government responsibilities. For the 
quantitative data, the research on the parties’ electoral composition and behaviour starts from 
about the mid-1990s until the most recent parliamentary elections, respectively 2007 and 
2008 in the case of the Danish People’s Party and the Northern League and until 2002-03 for 
the Austrian Freedom Party.  
Besides the effort of this study to address the analysis of the radical right by considering 
the interplay between ideology and electoral support and attitudes, the approach was also to 
understand the impact from the different phases of the parties’ life cycle.  
The dissertation consists of three parts: the firstpar  (Chapter 1 to 4) deals with theory 
and method and with the operationalisation of the main dimensions that more concretely 
structure the analysis of the party ideology and electorate. More specifically, Chapter 1 intro-
duces the three cases studies, their electoral results over time and the reasons for selecting 
these cases and ends with a critical assessment of the existing research and literature on the 
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radical right. Chapter 2 turns the attention to the exploration of three main theories or hy-
potheses explaining the rise and development of the radical right, respectively indicated as: 
the new cleavages thesis; the marginalisation and the protest thesis. This allows a preliminary 
mapping of some of the main dimensions that are considered to characterise the radical right 
ideology and electorate and to use this as a referenc  for the comparative empirical analysis in 
the later chapters. Chapter 3 goes deeper into this discussion, considering more concretely 
what issues are useful to examine in relation to the radical right ideology. This results in a list 
of main issues that creates a guideline to the following empirical analysis. Chapter 4, which 
concludes the theoretical and methodological part of the dissertation, finally considers the 
importance of the different phases of a party lifecycle on the development of ideology in par-
ticular. This is still a rather unexplored approach to the radical right party ideological devel-
opment, as most of the efforts have concentrated on contextual factors such as opportunity 
structures at the national level, electoral systems and the like. Chapter 4 introduces also a 
comprehensive description of the sources used for the analysis of ideology for each case 
study. This was done for reasons of precision, but also to encourage and inform other analyses 
of radical right party ideology. 
In the second part of the study (Chapters 5 to 7), the analysis turns to the empirical 
analysis of party ideology; a chapter for each of the three parties. The chapters start with a 
section on the parties’ history, context setting and opportunities, whose scope is to pin down 
the different phases of political development. The c apters get then down to the analysis of 
party ideology, considering how a number of relevant issues have developed and transformed 
over time. The ideological elements analysed include welfare and neoliberal issues; anti-
establishment politics; anti-immigration; foreign politics and EU relations; authoritarian and 
conformist views. The issues refer to the so called ‘ol ’ economic dimension of politics, as 
well as to the ‘new’ cultural and value dimension.  
The findings of these chapters suggest a highly dynamic ideological development that 
on several occasions has taken advantage of the opportunities created by the specific political 
context and which was highly reactive to demands from the electorate. The different phases of 
the party lifetime clearly influenced the parties’ ideological positions; for example, when a 
radical right party is at the margins, its ideology tends to radicalise. From this position the 
radical right party is free from the responsibilities and inter-party negotiations that come with 
achievement of political influence and government incumbency. From the margins it is also 
easier to emphasize and gain on anti-establishment positions, since there is no direct involve-
ment with the political establishment and in the decision making process.  
A higher degree of ideological, programmatic and also organisational reliability is re-
quired from the radical right party when entering the phase here defined as party consolida-
tion. 
Finally, achievement of political influence and in some cases also of government re-
sponsibility can have different impacts on the radic l right parties. For example, the present 
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analysis underlines the more favourable position occupied by the Danish People’s Party since 
2001. Acting as a supporting partner to the Liberals and Conservatives in government allowed 
the Danish People’s Party to continue distinguishing itself from the rest of the establishment 
and consequently keep a little more decisional autonomy than if the party were in office.  
However, the radical right parties seem to have more difficulties when it comes to direct 
government responsibility. This indicates that bringing a radical right party in from the cold 
may display its ideological, programmatic and someti s organisational weaknesses. In some 
cases, e.g. the Austrian Freedom Party and the Italian Northern League in different periods, 
this is followed by a new radicalisation of the party ideology and by a return to vote-seeking, 
rather than office-seeking strategies.  
The parties’ positions on economic matters also play a central role when the radical 
right becomes mainstream. Both the Danish People’s Party and the Northern League have an 
economic programme that better matches the profile f their respective electorates and which 
partly distinguishes itself from the positions of the right wing governments in office. In this 
sense, the moderate but clearly pro-welfare position of the Danish People’s Party and the (fis-
cal) federalist orientation of the Northern League, have affected the position of these parties 
and their participation in government decision making and activity.    
A relevant observation from the chapters on party ideology is the increasing similarity 
characterising these parties in relation to anti-imm gration. They have developed similar 
agendas particularly and most clearly on Islam and on the cultural and value impact on West-
ern democracies. But the analysis of party ideology also reveals that anti-immigration has 
been an issue under constant development. Today the radical right anti-immigration politics 
refer increasingly to culture and values and not exclusively to welfare costs, national and in-
ternational security matters and crime rates. The radical right can therefore also be heard 
championing questions that in the past were almost the ‘domain’ of left-wing parties. It is not 
at all uncommon today to hear leading profiles of these parties championing freedom of 
speech, women’s rights issues, gender equality and social solidarity.  
Other similarities have also emerged for example on EU and on foreign policy issues. 
Even so, it is still difficult to provide clear evidence for the existence of a process of cross-
national learning that should have created the basis for an ideological ‘master frame’. The 
patterns of this reciprocal influence are difficult if not impossible to map and it is more likely 
that the radical right parties have ‘learned by doing’ and by observing each other in more in-
formal ways. Major differences among the parties still exist, for instance in relation to eco-
nomic matters, although there are signs of rising similarities, indicating a development to-
wards more social and pro-welfare positions, particularly for radical right parties with high 
electoral support from the working class. Some of the ideological differences can also be con-
ditioned by the position occupied in the party system, or by specific conditions at the national 
level.  
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The third part of the dissertation (Chapters 8 and 9) examines the development of the 
socio-economic profile and attitudes of the three radical right parties’ voters. The aim is to 
take a closer look at the similarities and differenc s that distinguish the parties and to deter-
mine whether they are indications of an increasing convergence between the parties’ respec-
tive electorates. The findings suggest that parties that have developed an ideology that best 
reflects the profile of their electorate have a greater chance of maintaining or increasing the 
levels of electoral support. The Danish People’s Party is a case in point. Being the most clear-
cut working class party in Danish politics, opting for pro-welfare has strengthened the party’s 
support and position. However, for the period here considered, there is still a clear difference 
between the more pro-welfare orientation of the Danish People’s Party voters and the neolib-
eral positions supported by the electorate of the or two parties.   
Anti-immigration attitudes and in particular the perception of immigration as a threat 
against the country’s culture and identity clearly explain the vote for the radical right. How-
ever, these attitudes towards immigration and immigrants have to be read in connection with 
other important features, such as the generally low levels of educational achievement, low 
trust in the others and in the institutions, and the conformist and authoritarian dispositions that 
characterise the radical right electorate. In general, it is registered that political and policy 
influence and responsibilities have had an effect on he voters’ trust in politics and in other 
people in general and to some extent also in relation to positions on, for example, public 
spending and immigration. 
The purpose of this study is to look at the radical right parties from another angle, ap-
praising their ideological and electoral development over time, in their respective contexts 
and in relation to each other, by taking into account main ideological dimensions and major 
issues. This perspective disclosed patterns of ideological convergence and differences on the 
value and cultural dimension and on the economic dimension of politics. Most significantly, it 
has clearly emerged from this study that interpretations referring exclusively to bottom-up and 
macrostructural explanations are not enough to fully disclose the radical right development 
and transformations. Indeed, to understand what confli ts are about and the way different po-
litical actors deal with them requires going ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’, linking the macro 
with the meso and the microlevel. This study is an attempt to go in this direction.   
 
 
 
 319 
DANSK RESUMÉ 
 
Denne afhandling undersøger Dansk Folkepartis, italienske Lega Nords og Det Østrigske Fri-
hedspartis ideologier og vælgere i et komparativt pers ektiv samt partiernes gennembrud, 
konsolidering og opnåelse af politisk indflydelse og regeringsansvar. 
På trods af en omfangsrig litteratur om højreradikale partier, mangler der stadig kompa-
rative analyser, der kan bidrage til at forklare, hvordan det radikale højre er blevet mainstream 
i nogle vesteuropæiske lande, samt hvilke ligheder og forskelle der karakteriserer disse partier 
i forhold til ideologi og vælgeropbakning og -holdninger. 
Jeg ser derfor bort fra de mange antagelser og diskussioner om begrebsmæssige defini-
tioner, der så ofte har kendetegnet dette forskningsområde, og som i mere end ét tilfælde har 
overset det egentlige mål for undersøgelsen: de højr radikale partier, deres udvikling over tid 
samt ligheder og forskelle i ideologi og vælgerskare. 
Denne afhandling forsøger derfor at kombinere en analyse af ’udbudssiden’ med en 
analyse af ’efterspørgselssiden’ og at frame disse i en komparativ tilgang. Partiernes rolle 
(udbudssiden) undersøges i en detaljeret analyse af førstehåndskilder såsom partiprogrammer 
og partilitteratur, mens repræsenteret af vælgerne og deres holdninger (efterspørgselssiden) 
undersøges i en omfattende analyse af nationale og internationale surveydata. 
Tidsmæssigt koncentrerer undersøgelsen sig hovedsagligt om årene fra partiernes gen-
nembrud op til 2007-08, i hvert fald analysen af partiernes ideologiske udvikling. Ambitionen 
var at udvide perioden til alle faser af de tre partiers udvikling, delt op i gennembrud, konsoli-
dering og opnåelse af politisk indflydelse, og endda regeringsansvar. De kvantitative data, 
dvs. partiernes vælgersammensætning og adfærd, går fra midten af 1990’erne indtil de seneste 
valgresultater, nemlig 2007 og 2008 for Dansk Folkeparti og Lega Nord, og 2002-03 for Det 
Østrigske Frihedsparti. 
Ud over at analysere det radikale højre ved at se på samspillet mellem ideologi og væl-
gerstøtte og –holdninger, har jeg også forsøgt at fors å effekten af de forskellige faser i parti-
ernes livscyklus. 
Afhandlingen består af tre dele. Del 1 (kapitel 1 til 4) omhandler teori og metode samt 
operationalisering af de hoveddimensioner, der mere konkret strukturerer analysen af partier-
nes ideologi og vælgere. Kapitel 1 introducerer de tre casestudier, deres valgresultater over 
tid, begrunder valget af de tre cases og slutter med en kritisk evaluering af eksisterende forsk-
ning og litteratur om det radikale højre. Kapitel 2 undersøger tre hovedteorier eller –
hypoteser, der forklarer det radikale højres fremgang og udvikling og er baseret på hhv. skille-
linjer, marginalisering og protest. Dette muliggør en foreløbig kortlægning af nogle af de ho-
veddimensioner, der ses som kendetegnende for det ra ikale højres ideologi og vælgere, som 
kan bruges som reference for den komparative analyse i senere kapitler. Kapitel 3 går dybere 
ind i diskussionen og ser mere konkret på, hvilke emn r der er nyttige at undersøge i forhold 
til ideologien hos det radikale højre. Dette resulterer i en liste af hovedemner, der danner en 
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guideline for den empiriske analyse. Kapitel 4, som afslutter den teoretiske og metodologiske 
del af afhandlingen, undersøger, hvordan de forskellige faser af partiernes livscyklus påvirker 
især den ideologiske udvikling. Dette er stadig en rimelig uprøvet tilgang til udviklingen af en 
højreradikal ideologi, da man mest har koncentreret sig om kontekstuelle faktorer såsom mu-
lighedsstrukturer på det nationale niveau, valgsystemer og lignende. Kapitel 4 giver en omfat-
tende beskrivelse af de kilder, der er anvendt i analysen af ideologi for hvert casestudie, dels 
af hensyn til nøjagtighed, men også for at opfordre til og informere andre analyser af højrera-
dikale ideologier. 
Del 2 (kapitel 5 til 7) indeholder den empiriske analyse af partiideologi, og der er et ka-
pitel for hvert parti. Kapitlerne indledes med et afsnit om partiernes historie, kontekst og mu-
ligheder, og det er hensigten at afgrænse de forskellige faser i den politiske udvikling. Kapit-
lerne fortsætter med en analyse af partiideologi og ser på, hvordan forskellige relevante emner 
har udviklet og forandret sig med tiden. De ideologiske elementer, der bliver analyseret, om-
handler velfærd og neoliberalisme, anti-establishment politik, modstand mod indvandring, 
udenrigspolitik og EU-forhold, autoritære og konformistiske synspunkter. Emnerne refererer 
til den såkaldte ’gamle’ økonomiske dimension af politik såvel som til den ’nye’ kultur- og 
værdidimension. 
Resultaterne i disse kapitler antyder en meget dynamisk ideologisk udvikling, som ved 
adskillige lejligheder har udnyttet de muligheder, der er opstået i en specifik politisk kontekst, 
og som var meget lydhør over for vælgernes krav. De forskellige faser i partiernes livscyklus-
ser påvirker helt klart partiernes ideologiske positi ner. Således har ideologien en tendens til 
at blive radikaliseret, når et parti befinder sig i periferien. Fra denne position er det højreradi-
kale parti fri for det ansvar og forhandlinger med andre partier, der følger med politisk indfly-
delse og regeringsansvar. Fra periferien er det også nemmere at fremhæve og drage fordel af 
anti-establishment-synspunkter, da man er uden for det etablerede politiske system og beslut-
ningsprocessen. Det kræver en helt anden grad af ideologisk, programmæssig og organisato-
risk pålidelighed fra et højreradikalt parti, når det træder ind i den fase, der her er defineret 
som konsolidering. 
Endelig kan politisk indflydelse og i nogle tilfælde også regeringsansvar påvirke højre-
radikale partier på forskellige måder. Denne analyse understreger for eksempel den meget 
gunstige position, som Dansk Folkeparti har indtaget siden 2001. Som støtteparti for VK-
regeringen har partiet til stadighed skilt sig ud fra resten af det politiske system og derfor be-
varet lidt mere selvbestemmelse, end hvis det havde vær t i regering. 
Højreradikale partier ser dog ud til at have flere vanskeligheder, når det handler om di-
rekte regeringsansvar. Dette tyder på, at når man bringer et højreradikalt parti ind fra kulden, 
så kan det udstille dets svagheder i forhold til ideologi, program og nogle gange organisation. 
I nogle tilfælde, fx Det Østrigske Frihedsparti og italienske Lega Nord i visse perioder, bliver 
dette fulgt op af en ny radikalisering af partiets ideologi og en tilbagevenden til strategier, der 
skal skaffe stemmer i stedet for indflydelse.  
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Partiernes standpunkter i økonomiske spørgsmål spiller også en central rolle, når det ra-
dikale højre bliver mainstream. Både Dansk Folkeparti og Lega Nord har et økonomisk pro-
gram, der passer bedre til deres respektive vælgerprofiler, og som delvis skiller sig ud fra de 
borgerlige regeringspartier. På den måde har Dansk Fol epartis moderate, men klare pro-
velfærdsholdning og Lega Nords (finansmæssigt) føderale orientering haft indflydelse på par-
tiernes position og deres deltagelse i regeringsbeslutninger og –aktiviteter. 
En relevant observation fra kapitlerne om partiideologi er den stigende lighed mellem 
partierne, hvad angår deres modstand mod indvandring. Deres dagsordner ligner hinanden 
især og mest udtalt i forhold til islam og den kulturelle og værdimæssige indflydelse på vest-
lige demokratier. Men analysen af partiernes ideologi afslører også, at modstand mod indvan-
dring er et emne, der har været under konstant udvikling. I dag refererer højreradikal anti-
indvandringspolitik i stigende grad til kultur og værdier, og ikke udelukkende til velfærdsom-
kostninger, national og international sikkerhed og kriminalitet. Man kan derfor også se det 
radikale højre forfægte spørgsmål, som førhen næsten var venstrefløjens ’ejendom’. Det er 
ikke usædvanligt nu om dage at høre ledende profiler fra disse partier som fortalere for yt-
ringsfrihed, kvinders rettigheder, ligestilling mellem kønnene og social solidaritet. 
Der er også ligheder på andre områder, for eksempel EU og udenrigspolitik. Det er dog 
stadig svært at finde klare beviser for en tværnatio l læringsproces, der skulle have dannet 
basis for en ideologisk ’master frame’. Det er svært, for ikke at sige umuligt at kortlægge 
mønstre for gensidig indflydelse, og det er mere sand ynligt, at de højreradikale partier har 
lært gennem praksis og ved at iagttage hinanden på mere uformelle måder. Der er også større 
forskelle mellem partier, fx på økonomiske spørgsmål, selvom der er tegn på voksende lighe-
der, hvilket tyder på en udvikling mod mere sociale og pro-velfærdsholdninger, især for høj-
reradikale partier med stor vælgeropbakning fra arbejderklassen. Nogle af de ideologiske for-
skelle kan også være betinget af den position, partier indtager i partisystemet, eller af specielle 
forhold på det nationale niveau. 
Del 3 af afhandlingen (kapitel 8 og 9) undersøger udviklingen af socioøkonomiske pro-
filer og holdninger blandt de tre partiers vælgere. Formålet er at se nærmere på de ligheder og 
forskelle, der adskiller partierne og finde ud af, om de er tegn på voksende konvergens blandt 
partiernes respektive vælgerskarer. Resultaterne tyder på, at partier, der har udviklet en ideo-
logi, der bedst afspejler deres vælgeres profil, har større chance for at fastholde eller øge væl-
gertilslutningen. Dansk Folkeparti er et godt eksemp l. Det er det mest utvetydige arbejder-
parti i dansk politik, og dets opbakning til velfærdsstaten har forstærket partiets støtte og posi-
tion. I perioden, der undersøges her, er der dog stadig en tydelig forskel mellem de mere vel-
færdsorienterede DF-vælgere og den neoliberale position, der støttes af regeringspartiernes 
vælgere. 
Modstand mod indvandring og især opfattelsen af indva ring som en trussel mod den 
nationale kultur og identitet forklarer støtten til det radikale højre. Disse holdninger til ind-
vandring og indvandrere skal dog ses i forbindelse med andre vigtige elementer, såsom det 
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generelt lave uddannelsesniveau, lav social og institutionel tillid og de konformistiske og au-
toritære tendenser, der kendetegner højreradikale væ gere. Generelt har indflydelse på politisk 
og policy og det medfølgende ansvar påvirket vælgernes tillid til politik og til andre menne-
sker generelt og til en vis grad også i forhold til ho dninger til, fx, offentligt forbrug og ind-
vandring. 
Formålet med dette studie er at se på det radikale højr  fra en anden vinkel, bedømme 
deres ideologiske og vælgermæssige udvikling over tid i deres respektive kontekster og i for-
hold til hinanden ved at inddrage de større ideologiske dimensioner og emner. Dette perspek-
tiv har afsløret mønstre af ideologisk konvergens og forskelle på kultur- og værdidimensionen 
og på den økonomiske dimension i politik. Væsentligst har undersøgelsen vist, at bottom-up 
og makrostrukturelle fortolkninger ikke til fulde kan afdække det radikale højres udvikling og 
forandring. For at forstå hvad konflikter handler om, og hvordan forskellige politiske aktører 
takler dem, er man nødt til at tænke ’top-down’ og ’bottom-up’, at linke makroniveauet med 
meso- og mikroniveauet. Denne afhandling er et forsøg på at gå i denne retning. 
 
